




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P R I N C E T O N
R E V I E W .

By ~~Whom~~, all things; for ~~Whom~~, all things.

FIFTY-FOURTH YEAR.

JANUARY—JUNE.

NEW YORK
1878.

JANUARY.

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RELIGIOUS CONDITION OF THE FRANCE OF TO-DAY.

FOR the honor of humanity, or rather for the honor of God who has formed in it his image, the real foundation of history is religious. No influence is comparable to the action exerted on a people by their beliefs. Such as is their God will be their inmost character; and this so truly, that they have only to alter their ideas of God in order that their destinies may be entirely transformed. In vain does Positivism reiterate that the age of theology is past, that modern humanity sits now intrenched within the circle of things visible; and though, as a spirited writer has declared, it should henceforward confine itself to making the tour of the planet, this prevents not religion from still being to-day the very soul of contemporary history; the most formidable struggles of our time are kindled by it. Within a year have we not seen burst forth in Oriental Europe a war which is in reality a religious war? If this view be true, there is a serious interest in knowing, upon this capital point, what is the real state of the various peoples which are, as it were, the great actors of history, and in particular of this French nation, which, after having submitted to the most terrible lessons of a misfortune almost unexampled in our epoch, is passing through a crisis so worthy of interest, and, as we trust, so fruitful of grand results. It will be easy to show from facts that the very node of her destinies lies in her religious history. Of the latter we shall make a rapid sketch, in order to fully understand what is her real condition in this regard, at the present moment.

I.

For nations, as for individuals, there come decisive hours, wherein they are called upon to make a resolution upon which their future shall depend.

The eighteenth century was one of those epochs for France. It is certain that she was at that time undecided between the Reformation and Catholicism. We know no more peremptory refutation of the famous theory of the predominant influence of race and environment than the rapid development of the Reformation upon this land of France, where it has been maintained that the Roman religion alone could be developed, as if it were a fatality for the Latin races. Here new beliefs were not like an exotic plant that can subsist only by artificial culture; on the contrary, they had a character altogether national. The Reformation in France was completely French, unfolding and at the same time purifying the inherent qualities of the nation: clearness of idea, precision of language, impetuous courage, and at times that chivalrous character of which it is possessed on great occasions. It spread with unheard-of rapidity, thereby showing that it answered to a general need. Its conquests were multiplied amongst all classes, from the peasantry and the artisans to the ranks of the highest aristocracy. The bourgeoisie, above all, the universities, upon which had been poured the breath of renascence, gave to it its most eminent representatives. In the court and on the famous promenade of the *Pré aux Clercs*, where the young nobles of the time were wont to throng, were heard hummed those psalms and versions by Marot that were sung in the conventicles in which the adherents of the new beliefs had vainly evaded persecution, though ever ready to face and to endure it. We are not to review that grand history of the French Reformation, which gave to Protestantism some of its most heroic types, such as Coligny and D'Aubigné, and also the very masters of its doctrine, in the immortal Calvin and Theodore Beza. Unfortunately, an ambitious aristocracy, who, if they had faith, were too often forgetful of works, being more desirous of acquiring appanages for themselves than of setting the example of the Christian virtues, threw Protestantism into the hazards of civil war, and by put-

ting in its hand the sword, caused it to descend from the sphere of the simple truth which is immortal, into that of the games of force, in which whoever takes the sword shall perish by the sword, unless he be the stronger. In spite of the recantation of Henry IV., the defeat of Protestantism was not yet complete, until after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes under Louis XIV.—a most odious breach of faith with regard to the great treaty concluded between the two religions under the auspices of the first of the Bourbon kings. Although reduced definitively to the condition of a minority since the end of the sixteenth century, and constantly battered in breaches before being proscribed in the course of the seventeenth, it formed still an imposing corporation in the kingdom at the eve of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. It counted in all parts of the country numerous churches, animated by a sincere and enlightened piety, and bound together by that admirable synodical system which was to become the model of representative governments. The universities of Montauban, of Sémur, of Sédan, were centres of Christian science; its clergy were learned, pious, eloquent; and it had formed a laborious bourgeoisie, by which flourishing industries had been everywhere created. It is certain from the admission of impartial historians, even Catholic by birth, such as Edgar Quinet and Michelet, that even after its defeat in the sixteenth century, Protestantism, by preserving, conformably to the edict of Henry IV., the simple right of existence, would have exerted the happiest influence on the destinies of France; it would have stemmed for her the terrible reactions of the eighteenth century against a despotic religion, and would have given her against the day of instituting the parliamentary régime a third estate, sober, enlightened, prepared for civil by religious liberty, which would have spared her many shocks and tempests. Exposed to the most frightful persecution, the French Protestants quitted in great numbers their native soil; those who remained bathed it with their blood, or were consigned to the galleys of the *grand roi*. The feeble residue that escaped the sabre of the dragoons found no spot of sunlight in a fatherland; theirs to live proscribed and to celebrate their worship in those famous assemblies in the wilderness which shall be the everlasting honor of

their courageous faith. Persecution succeeded, none the less, to the most serious detriment of France, in cruelly weakening Protestantism in numbers and importance.

Another event of the same order was no less fatal to it in the religious point of view: the condemnation by the throne and Papal See combined of Jansenism, which had founded at Port Royal a school of lofty piety, whose influence became widely spread. Jansenism was not, undoubtedly, so complete a return as the Reformation to the Evangelical faith. It opposed, nevertheless, to the semi-Pelagianism of the Jesuits the doctrine of grace, drawn by it rather from St. Augustine than from St. Paul, but having none the less that strange yet fundamentally logical consequence of setting up the independence of the religious conscience as opposed to human authorities, while at times entirely disregarding liberty of judgment. It is thus that whensoever man is thrown at the feet of the Divine Sovereignty, even to the extent of entire abnegation, he is relieved from all other sovereignties; and the lower he prostrates himself before the Almighty, the more is he exalted before his fellow-men, formed alike of the same clay. The Augustinianism of the Jansenists gave them a certain independence of the Papacy, whose authority they limited to questions of doctrine, refusing to it the decision of those of fact. They were the born adversaries of the Ultramontane tendency which began to strengthen at this time under the auspices of the Society of Jesus. It is known what a war they waged upon it, not only in the doctrinal and ecclesiastical point of view, but even in the moral, denouncing and combating its loose maxims, which are summarized in the verse of the greatest comic poet of France:

"Il est avec le ciel des accommodements."

Pascal, one of the masters of Christian apologetics, and one of the finest geniuses of our literature, whose achievement it was to fashion French prose, that marvellous instrument of the French mind, riddled Jesuitism in his "*Provinciales*" with brilliant and piercing shafts, that recall those divine darts sped from the quiver of Apollo, in the Homeric combats. Port Royal with St. Cyran, Arnaud, Silvestre de Sacy, and the saintly religionaries at whose head were Mère Angélique and Mère Agnes, was

a centre of light and of sanctity. At this austere and fervent school was prepared for France, in default of the Calvinistic Reformation, and very surely, despite the protestations of the Jansenists, under the influence of it, another reformation that might have transformed Catholicism and have rendered it truly national, under shelter of Italian servitudes and superstitions. The same policy that had as its maxim absolute unity in all domains, brought about the proscription of Port Royal after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Louis XIV. made himself the executor of the unjust condemnations of the Papacy. The sacred monastery, which had seen crowding within its enclosure the *élite* of French society, was destroyed, the religious inmates were dispersed, the recluses chased from their asylum. After its walls had been thrown down, its ideas were implacably attacked; and the eighteenth century was filled with mean and hateful persecutions of the unfortunate remnant of Jansenism, who were pursued even to their deathbeds, beset in their agony, and adjured to yield adherence to that famous bull, *Unigenitus*, which was the very charter of triumphant Jesuitism.

Brilliant victories these may well have seemed, they were none the less dangerous indeed to the very souls who made them subject of felicitation. As long as Louis XIV. lived, his prestige sufficed to suppress discontent and indignation; but irreligion augmented daily in the nation in the wake of that intolerant and odious policy. At heart the king dreaded irreligion much less than schism, even though imbued with the Christian sentiment. St. Simon relates in his "Memoires," that when the Duke of Orleans was taking leave of his uncle, to rejoin the Spanish army, the king indignantly reproached him for having among his *compagnons de voyage* a Jansenist. "No, sire," responded the young prince, "he is only an atheist." The king was at once appeased. To him atheism was much less abominable than Protestantism, or even Jansenism. And yet here was the enemy that was later to shiver his crown and to avenge upon his coffin the victims of his persecutions, by casting it on the highway in the days of the bloody revolution he was preparing by his attempts upon the human conscience. Scarcely had his remains been conducted with pomp to the vaults of St. Denis, when the public spirit, long repressed be-

neath that sceptre which, thanks to Madame de Maintenon, had become the rod of the Jesuits' wrath, escapes by every outlet like a schoolboy, free at length to shake off a galling regimen of restraint. Now we have all the transports of license; we have the regency and its orgies. Soon the reactionary movement against the régime of Louis XIV. became much more grave. The time had not yet come when institutions could be attacked, overthrown and rebuilt; the attack was made upon doctrines, upon ideas, and since it was impossible to be revolutionary in the domain of politics, the philosophical domain was chosen. At heart the French spirit had always been hostile to the Ultramontane tyranny. The writings that had been marked by its liveliest impress were stinging satires on the Romish doctrines, commencing with that famous book of Rabelais', which, like an immense implement of war, heaps the citadel of religious despotism with all sorts of projectiles, from those cast of the most precious metal down to the vilest bone. After him can be traced a whole line of satirical spirits who attack the same enemy—authors of Menippean satire, Molière with his "Tartuffe," and many others. Moreover, the same opposition was manifested with grave earnestness in the solemn sessions of the States-General, held unfortunately at intervals too irregular to become true parliaments clothed with sufficient authority to restrain the power of the throne. The deputies of the Third Estate, and sometimes those of the nobility, had not ceased to protest against the encroachments of Rome, and the great judiciary bodies which were the honor of ancient France were faithful guardians of those traditions. If royalty in the seventeenth century had been more reasonable, more moderate; if it had given satisfaction on this point to the national sentiment, the latter would not have exalted itself above measure—it would have readily allied itself with a religion at once serious and liberal. Unfortunately, as we have seen, it was violated by the centralizing fanaticism of Louis XIV. Thus when it was in a position to manifest itself anew, it did so like waves long confined behind a dike: it precipitated itself in raging billows when no longer held in check, and proceeded very soon to attack no longer the abuses merely of religion, but even religion itself. In the place of a Calvin or a Pascal, true emancipators of the conscience,

because attached to its divine principle, we have Voltaire—Voltaire, the fell destroyer of the society of old, whose aristocratic forms he respected, but only while sapping them at their base. Endowed with the liveliest, most piquant wit, having at his service a clear and sparkling style, he became the king of his century because he was its mouthpiece, and because he served his passion with inimitable talent, an indefatigable ardor, an animation by turns humorous or eloquent, which imparted life to all he touched, and a perseverance of effort that knew how to express the same idea of hostility to the old religion under a thousand forms, having recourse in turn to poetry, sportive or tragic, to science, to history, and to pamphlet literature. His truly immense correspondence scattered his ideas broadcast, from the palace of Frederick II. and of the great Catharine to the lowest of the *littérateurs*. Voltaire could truly say that his name was Legion, so many diverse faculties did he combine within himself. Not to do him injustice, it is necessary to recognize that he was a thoroughly convinced partisan, if not of the liberty of creeds, of which he understood nothing, at least of tolerance; and that he espoused with a grand courage the cause of the victims of persecution, such as Calas and Silven. Let us not forget that the religion he fought against was that which had provoked the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the destruction of Port Royal, and that it was represented by a church very little fervent, but always the persecutor, which, whenever it called together the general assemblies of its clergy, granted the king his subsidies only on condition that he redouble his severity against the Protestants. When a religion by reason of its deformity falls below the general conscience of the time, it is sick indeed. The day when it was said of the pagan gods, "They are going," it was because they were no longer up to the standard of their former devotees. The Catholicism of the eighteenth century for the same reason could not struggle with advantage against Voltaire and the Encyclopedists. Although Voltaire was commander-in-chief of the army of the philosophers, he saw himself very soon outstripped by those followers who rejected even the Deism he still retained. The expulsion of the Jesuits, pronounced by the Parliament of Paris in 1761, came too late to be a sufficient satisfaction to the public sense.

The positions were already taken. Moreover, the Jesuits were not taking away with them the decrees of persecution they had inspired; the Edict of Nantes was not re-established; the soldiers of the king constantly pursued Protestants guilty of worshipping God according to their conscience; the blood of their ministers still reddened the scaffold, and their wives and children were kept imprisoned in the convents until they should be forcibly converted. Thus there burst forth in the eighteenth century, for the reasons we have indicated, this conflict between the liberal spirit and a religion of intolerance and enslavement, which is the greatest misfortune of France, and which it was necessary to take up in its earliest manifestations in order to understand her moral history. From this epoch down to our own days we shall find it again and again aggravating itself, and revealing itself as the grandest obstacle to the consolidation of liberty.

II.

This disheartening divergence is less apparent at the epoch of the great French Revolution of 1789, because during several years it might appear that the anti-religions had decidedly crushed out Catholicism. We are not at all tempted to disparage or calumniate the great movement of emancipation that renovated a superannuated society in which right was sacrificed to privilege, and which consecrated in the Constituent Assembly the most precious liberties. At the outset of this revolution, which resistance and perils were to render so terrible, there was a magnificent surge of the most sincere and generous liberalism, alluring not only the victims of the old order of things, but a great number besides of its favorites, in the train of the brilliant noblesse Lafayette had associated in the heroic struggles for the independence of the United States. The declaration of the rights of man, which was the charter of the new régime, was pervaded throughout with the spirit that had inspired the American Constitution. The social verities it halloved were in reality only an application of the Gospel as understood by the Reformation, from which the philosophy of the eighteenth century had accepted and propagated them. Unfortunately, this philosophy had treated them as fruits that are

plucked from the tree on which they have grown, and no longer receive its sap. It is thus that while formulating principles of justice and liberty which proceeded from Christianity, the French Revolution, especially when the conflict had been joined against it by the "men of the past," imagined that in combating them it was making war upon Christianity itself, because it had only learned to know the latter as deformed in the Catholic Church, the ever-ready support of all abuses. We have not to retrace the history of the formidable struggle this revolution entered upon against the church which was offering opposition at home, and compounding with foes without. Its greatest mistake was in wishing to reform religion by decree, by voting that luckless civil constitution of the clergy which infringed upon the conscience of believers by officially fabricating a worship contrary to their beliefs. Numberless priests refused the oath it was desired to impose on them in favor of institutions that wounded their conscience. La Vendée revolted in the name of the Catholic Credo. The civil war deluged the country in blood. Then it was that the Convention voted the proscription laws against the priests who had refused the oath, and put them to death by thousands. It deserves to be acknowledged that they showed themselves full of courage, nor shrank from martyrdom. Thus their convictions were only exalted; and very far from being extirpated from the soil of France, religion was caused to take its root in hearts, by enlisting for itself the respect it had so much contributed to alienate. The Revolution, no longer knowing how to restrain itself in its fury, proceeded in the days of terror to attack the clergy who had adopted the civil constitution, and in a day of delirium voted the abolition of all religion, and the substitution for it of the worship of Reason. This frenzy could not last. Shortly after the death of Robespierre, the Convention itself took the wisest resolution in decreeing the great reform already accomplished in the United States—that is to say the entire separation of church and state.

Even though the men in power continued to show a strong antipathy to the manifestations of the religious sentiment, and sought too often to trammel it without wishing to renounce the iniquitous laws against the old non-conforming clergy, who had

scarcely gained any thing by the new régime but the exchange of the scaffold for exile, the liberty accorded to religion, although restricted, was still sufficient to make it flourish again, and, according to incontestable documents, the worship was restored in nearly forty thousand communes. Already the portion of the clergy that were disposed, after having given their oath to the new organization, to adhere to the institutions resulting from the Revolution were preparing to effect certain large reforms in its discipline, as any one may be convinced from the verbal proceedings of the two National Councils held at Paris at the close of the eighteenth century. Could the last trammels of religious liberty have fallen off, as the result of the pacification of spirits, the hostility between religion and enfranchised society would have promptly vanished, and the reconciliation between the Christian idea and the liberal idea would have been wrought out. Unfortunately, a man of a genius as vast as it was fatal came to turn aside the normal course of our destinies, and to prepare between the two great powers, the spiritual and the temporal, new and grave conflicts that were to fill this land, without our being able to foresee their end.

It is known that the first care of Napoleon, after his *coup d'état* of the Eighteenth Brumaire, was to conclude with the Pope a Concordat, according to which the Catholic Church was recognized and salaried by the state, in consideration of certain concessions of no great importance. Thus was destroyed the régime of independence that would have prevented so many fruitless struggles, baleful alike to the two conflicting powers. Napoleon, despot *par excellence*, could not consent to respect the independence of conscience. He saw in religion only an instrument of domination, and he counted much upon making use of it to the profit of his power, which nothing must elude. He hoped to make of the pope the grand almoner of the new empire, to whom he should dictate, by way of instructions, the oracles he might think useful to have proclaimed in support of his policy. We know what came of it. If he found in a portion of the French episcopacy a sordidness that surpassed the previsions of this great contemner of humanity, he met with unexpected resistance on the part of the Holy Father. "With the armies of France and with esteem, I shall always be in the

right," he had said. He was too mindful of having the armies of France at his command, and forgot the esteem. He spoke as absolute master to the old man of the Vatican, who refused to bend beneath his yoke, and informed him that the spiritual power, even mixed with many errors, is still most strong when fighting the unjust aggressions of the temporal power. Pius VII., dragged from his palace in Rome, cast into prison, driven into exile, remained indomitable. The concessions which violence extorted from him were immediately withdrawn, and he returned peaceably to his States after his terrible persecutor, in spite of the most unheard-of display of military genius the world had known, had been crushed by combined Europe. Napoleon was on the way to die at St. Helena, while Pius VII., glorified by the sort of martyrdom he had endured, was regaining an ascendancy which the Papacy had a long time lost, and by which he and his successors profited to augment their power beyond measure.

Unfortunately, even the crushing fall of the gigantic edifice constructed by Napoleon left intact the most fatal of his institutions. I mean the Concordat, the union of the throne and altar. He was heard, indeed, on the burning rock where he had all leisure to review the various acts of his reign, to declare that the Concordat had been his greatest mistake; it was no longer possible to repair it, and the deplorable consequences were about to unfold in the conflicts that were to be speedily revived between the secular spirit and the church.

These conflicts during the First Empire had been all the more deadened in the intellectual and moral domain, that they had been the more violent in the political. Napoleon loved liberty in philosophy no more than liberty in religion. He well knew that all that remained of the partisans of the French Revolution and of the true sons of the eighteenth century were strongly opposed to the Concordat. It is related that in the evening of the day on which he had caused it to be imposingly celebrated with a *Te Deum* at Notre Dame, he said to some of his generals: "Is it not true that to-day all seemed re-established in the ancient order?" "Yes," replied one of them, "excepting two millions of Frenchmen who have died for liberty and who cannot be brought to life again." All this

resistance was sustained in silence by the imperial police and covered by the artillery of great battles. One woman only essayed to protest: it was Madame de Staël, who has said, *à propos* of the Concordat, that Napoleon wished to have his priests as he had his chamberlains. She was exiled during the entire reign. The emperor was without doubt no great believer—he who said it was necessary “to take religion as a sort of vaccine against superstition”—but it pleased him not that any one should permit himself to rally or to criticise the established powers, any more those in heaven than those in earth. It was a bad example; and he wished to reserve to himself the right of reforming religion, if it were allowed to incommode him. No liberty of the press was tolerated, whether for books or for journals. Madame de Staël's book on *Germany* was put under the pestle after the censorship had authorized its publication. Cæsar would not that any importunate voice should disturb his imperial monologue, which was to give the universal word of command as well in the academies and salons as in the camp.

Restraint may for a while retard the outburst of thought, but does not destroy it. If the philosophy of the eighteenth century was reduced to silence, it was not dead. It was soon to lift its head again, and to enter upon a war with its old enemy, the Catholic Church. Scarcely was the empire overthrown, when the public spirit re-expanded, and ignited like a gas long time compressed. Conflicts of thought took the place of those of the battle-field, and the diversity between the liberal and the Catholic spirit, which we have signalized as one of the characteristic traits of our moral history, reappeared in all its intensity, singularly aggravated by the political circumstances on one side and the other, through the increased exaggeration of the principle of authority in the church. As far as the political situation is concerned, we shall content ourselves with recalling the fact that the restoration of the Bourbons coincided with a violent assault of the partisans of the ancient régime upon the conquests of the French Revolution. If Louis XVIII., enlightened prince and moderate skeptic, tempered somewhat during the first year of his reign those passions of the emigration that put on trial all the principles of 1789, his

successor gave to them unbounded scope. Charles X., who from the most frivolous of court gentlemen had become the most fanatical of kings, believed himself called to be the vanquisher of the Revolution and the restorer of the old French monarchy. It is known what hatreds such a policy engendered in all the liberal youth, in the bourgeoisie, and even amongst the people. The Catholic Church had not failed to associate itself with the attempts of the party of the emigrants and of the court. For her were all the favors, and she obtained all the repressive measures against her adversaries. She had extended a vast network of influence throughout society by means of the congregation, a kind of lay association which was recruited among the politicians, in the army, in the administration, wherever it could find any influence to take advantage of. It had for its avowed design the re-establishment of the church in its former privileges, and of the royalty in its exorbitant and absolute authority. It came about quite naturally that the opposition to the policy of the Tuileries became at the same time a formidable aggressive movement against the religion that was associated with it. Voltaire recovered his popularity. Cheap editions of his works were brought out which inundated city and country. *Paul Louis Courier* directed the most piquant shafts of his inimitable pamphlets against the clergy; and Béranger, the national poet, echoed the popular irritation in his songs, often profane, whose refrains flew from mouth to mouth in the workshops and the schools of the university. When the overthrow of the Bourbons of the elder branch, provoked by their own follies, had been effected by the revolution of July, one could attest what angry mutterings stirred to the depths the populace of Paris. They flung themselves upon the palace of the archbishop, who had had the impudence to perform a service in honor of the fallen king, and destroyed it in a few hours. The new régime was not in the least devout. Louis Philippe was imbued with the philosophy of the eighteenth century. Above all, in the contentions of his reign he showed no favor to the clergy of the Catholic Church, yet without persecuting them in any fashion. It should seem that under a moderate government, having no predilection for Catholicism, a great pacification ought to have been produced in the public

mind. This could have been hoped for in the first years of the monarchy of July, 1830; but the struggle soon revived, not by its own fault alone—for its policy in this respect did not cease to be tolerant and wise—but in consequence of the indiscretions of the Catholic Church itself, which precisely at this epoch formulates its most audacious pretensions and pushes every thing to extremes. We come now to the second cause that we have pointed out for the renewal of the conflict—the properly religious and much the more serious cause; for political circumstances are unsteady and changeful, whilst a fundamental modification in the constitution of a church cannot fail to have prolonged results.

This profound modification in contemporary Catholicism we shall designate with a single word: it is the triumph of *Ultramontanism*, the unbridled development of the papal power, annihilating all independence of the national churches, debasing the episcopacy before the omnipotence of the Holy See; transforming, in fine, Catholicism into *Romanism* or into *Papalism*. We do not deny that the Roman Curia has not always tended to this end. The *Society of Jesus* has had no other object of existence. Nevertheless, the Council of Trent took good care not to proclaim infallibility. If Louis XIV. yielded only too far to the influence of the Jesuits when he beat down Protestantism and Port Royal, he maintained, notwithstanding, the rights of the Gallican Church in the famous assembly of the clergy in 1782, when the grand voice of Bossuet proclaimed its charter in four articles which have always been the abomination of desolation to the Roman Curia. In the eighteenth century, the movement of opinion against Ultramontanism was so strong that, as we have said, not only the expulsion of the Jesuits by parliament was obtained, but even the suppression of the order by the papacy. We remember also reforms by Joseph II. in the most Anti-Roman sense, and in the interest of the civil power. It may be said that at the commencement of our century Gallicanism was the dominant idea in the church and in the state. The most considerable fact in contemporaneous religious history is precisely the triumph of Ultramontanism, obtained with a swiftness that belongs to the rapidity of motion, to the impetuous rush, of things and of

ideas, which characterizes our times. It would be very interesting to develop the causes that have brought about this triumph, and to unfold the skilfulness of policy by which the Roman Curia has come to effect a transformation so rapid and complete. A capital book upon the subject has just appeared, the history of the Council, by Friedrich of Munich, the disciple of Döllinger.¹ One sees in it how marvellously skilful is the policy of the Roman Monsignori, with what art they know how to profit by circumstances apparently the most adverse. Their chief endeavor has been to turn to their advantage that terrible French Revolution which seemed destined to bring to nought their design of universal subjection. The papacy has taken advantage of the shock and lassitude produced in many minds by bloody catastrophes, to offer them as a repose and refuge the acceptance of an absolute authority, dispensing with thought and will. Next it has dispelled the alarms of the episcopacy, deprived as it is of the support of the temporal power, since this pertains no longer to very Christian kings, but, when not in the hands of a stormy democracy, to princes indifferent or hostile. The bishops, no longer finding at hand the convenient support of a Catholic royalty that charges itself with extirpating heresy and assuring their privileges, have sought their protection from without, and have attached themselves closely to the See of Rome. It is thus that the new conditions of modern states have served Ultramontanism. It has had at times the art to assume a liberal mask, and even to cause this to be worn in all sincerity by its defenders, who imagined that in raising the power of the church above that of the state they were serving the cause of religious liberty; forgetting that the surest means of destroying it is to give all liberty and all latitude to the power that is its mortal enemy. Finally, Ultramontanism has known how to be all things to all, to yield to the necessities of the time, to use all the means of propagandism created by democracy, such as the press and associated effort. It has not contented itself with dull folios for formulating and defending its doctrine; it has left no stone unturned, and has had its pamphleteers, who have surely carried off the

¹ "Geschichte des Vatikanischen Konzils," von G. Friedrich.

palm for invective and outrage in contemporary journalism. It is certain that by this combination of means it has succeeded in getting control so completely of the preponderating influence in the church, that it has finished by triumphing over the most energetic and respectable opposition; and that when the Council of the Vatican was assembled, the 10th December, 1869, all was ready for the apotheosis of the Roman Pontiff. It is thus that the Catholic Church has pushed its principle to its remotest consequences. After having overthrown Protestantism in France and then Jansenism, it has levelled Gallicanism to the earth, and has thus achieved its evolution on the side of the most extreme absolutism at the very moment when free-thought was achieving its own in the opposite direction; thus reviving and pushing to the last extremes the conflict between the lay and the Catholic spirit.

As we have said, it was in France that the Ultramontane party commenced its aggression. Already under the Restoration Joseph de Maistre and Lamennais stated its boldest pretensions with burning and vigorous eloquence. Under the monarchy of July, Ultramontanism set out with a phase of liberalism that procured for it numerous and distinguished adherents. It was not a mere comedy. Even after the condemnation of Lamennais, Lacordaire and Montalembert believed it possible to reconcile the love of the public liberties with Ultramontanism, which they glorified in their generous illusions as the sanction of the independence of the spiritual power. They were at first tenderly treated at Rome, because they rendered great services, above all in laboring to restrain the rights of the state in the interest of the church. Lacordaire excited the liveliest enthusiasm in the youth of France by his brilliant eloquence and his liberal demands, which people were greatly astonished to hear in the choir of the Cathedral of Notre Dame, and from the lips of a Dominican clothed in the white robe. Montalembert put himself at the head of a political crusade which had for its object the opening to the Catholic Church of the field of public instruction, until then closed to its teachers. This attempt, seconded by an immense petitioning movement and an unexampled clerical agitation, which took advantage of the public liberties to run riot in all

quarters, ended by overtaking success in the train of the Revolution of 1848. The Legislative Assembly voted the too famous law of 1851 on public education, which secures much more than liberty of instruction to the church, since it assures to her exorbitant privileges in the superior councils that direct and supervise the University. The liberal Catholics had accomplished their task, once they had obtained this grand result of their parliamentary campaign. When, also, in the Second Empire the wind blew toward political reaction, they were abandoned by a considerable fraction of their old allies, who this time lifted the mask and declared that they wished no other liberty than their own, and that since they had secured the power and the privilege, they were well decided to make use of them against liberalism, that criminal product of the French Revolution, which could not be too soon destroyed. It was then that the famous Louis Veuillot, editor of *L'Univers Religieux*, expressed his mind in this cynical declaration addressed to the Liberals: "When you are in power, I demand of you liberty, for that is your principle. When I am there, I refuse it to you, for that is my principle." If there had been in this nothing but the sally of a violent pamphleteer, it could have had little importance; unfortunately, it just expressed the very doctrine of Rome. At heart the Papacy, save for short intervals, has not believed in any fact of political rule except theocracy, the complete subordination of the civil to the religious power, which has the absolute right over consciences, in order to impose religious unity by the sword of the state, and by the same means to punish heresy. Only this *ensemble* of superannuated doctrines has been laid aside during a certain time in the archives of the Vatican, as old armor of the Middle Age in a museum of antiquities. It was sufficient to render them from time to time a theoretical homage, and it might have been said of them, as Voltaire said of the sacred canticles of a bad poet :

"Sacrés ils sont, car personne n'y touche."

None the less these continued to be talked about, written about, acted about, as if they had no existence. This state of

things was to change, when an exalted pope militant should be seen to arise. He did not fail to drag out that old armor from its show-case, to refurbish it, and to array in it the church. The *Syllabus* is nothing other than the resurrection of the ancient Roman theocratic principle, as a maxim of universal government. A pope was found to undertake this crusade against modern society, crying out as did his predecessors of the eleventh century, "God wills it." This pope was the venerable pontiff who has just died at Rome, after a reign the longest known. Singular destiny his! Like the ancient Frankish king, Clovis, he has been seen to burn in the second period of his career that which he had adored, and to fulminate the most terrible anathemas against the liberal leaders whom he had seemed to make sit down with him upon the Holy See. When Pius IX. published his first encyclical, taking for its text the removal of the Jesuits from his pontifical court, the liberal Catholicism of the Lacordaires and Montalemberts was fain to believe that he was going to have the upper hand of the theocratic school. Brief delusion. The Papacy could not see its decisions submitted to the deliberations and the scrutiny of a parliament. At once, when the Italian war of independence broke out, Pius IX. entered into conflict with his Roman subjects who wished to have a part in it. It was not possible for the common Father of the Faithful to proceed upon that course. Chased from the Vatican by his revolted people, he found at Gaeta a sort of Patmos, where he was entirely transformed. He came off unreservedly attached to the theocratical party, to become the true pope after the Jesuits' own heart, called to raise their doctrines to the dignity of a dogma. A pure and ardent soul, nurtured in a sublimated mysticism which he was all the less able to resist that he was extremely ignorant in theology, Pius IX. believed that his divine mission was to cause the Papacy to mount the highest stages of apotheosis by the proclamation of Infallibility. Living in an atmosphere surcharged with Jesuitism and fired by bigotry, object of a kind of adoration, believing himself designed to crown the edifice of Catholic dogma by marvellous predictions and apparitions, he dedicated himself entirely to that task, nor allowed himself to

be arrested by any consideration of prudence, by any reason drawn from the tradition of the church or from motives of policy. Thrice he convoked at Rome large assemblies of bishops, a sort of official councils without guaranty and without right, which dared not resist him, and prepared the way for the fourth gathering, that of the Council, which was to be the last, since Infallibility was to embody all authority in his person.

The proclamation of the Immaculate Conception by the pope alone was an anticipative appropriation of Infallibility. When the promulgation of the latter had been exacted from a Council in which discussion was not free for a single day, the Roman system was achieved; and the Syllabus, retrospectively sanctioned by the recognition of the infallible authority of the Holy Father, was presented to the world as the eternal charter of Roman theocracy. Upon this charter was to be read: *Negation of the sovereignty of the people—Condemnation of modern liberties, to begin with that of the press and to end with that of the conscience—Right of persecuting and of burning heretics—Privileges of the church constituted as a monopoly.* In fine, *the condemnation in gross of all modern civilization.* We are not inclined to forget that a few months after the Council the Papacy lost the temporal power, and we are convinced that this grave event will have very grave consequences in the future. For the actual present it has only exalted Ultramontane fanaticism, which has shown itself so much the more intractable because it has no longer had any thing to manipulate in the political order, being much like the Jews driven from Jerusalem, who held all the more by their law since they had no longer any temple. Thus it is that Catholicism has arrived at the complete development of theocratical absolutism, which it bore in the germ, but which now the rivalry of the Reformation, now Jansenism, now Gallicanism, now mere political prudence, had held in check. To-day it no longer knows either circumspection or restraint; not content with condemning the whole liberal movement of modern society, it everywhere shows itself merciless towards the liberal Catholicism of Montalembert, who died with groans and indignant words against the idol of the Vatican. The pope has gone so far as to say that there was

less of peril in the Paris Commune than in liberal Catholicism. We do not think his death much alters the situation. It may be said of existing Ultramontaniam, as it was said of the Society of Jesus, especially since the former confounds itself with the latter: *Sit ut est aut non sit*.

That which makes the exceptional gravity of what may be called this shamelessness of Ultramontaniam, without speaking of the wrong it does to the piety of its adherents, which it ever more fully transforms into a miserable idolatry, is that it coincides with a very marked development of spiritual license, and of an incredulity that no longer stands abashed, even before the axioms of the conscience. We have not to discuss this fact; it is incontestable. Whilst the Papacy was preparing its apotheosis at Rome, the secular spirit was decreeing its own in being unwilling to recognize any authority, any power, superior to itself, whether in heaven or in earth. Intoxicated by the marvellous discoveries of contemporary science, it believed it would end very soon by surprising the secret of life itself, and that the retorts of its laboratories would effect the true transubstantiation, the transformation of inert matter into the living organism! Strange event! At the very moment when the human mind was proclaiming itself almighty, it came to the point of denying the divine idea, and of denying itself, in pretending it was the product of the grand alchemy of nature, the result of its blind forces conflicting in a desperate struggle, and giving birth in the end to superior life, without any intervention of a spiritual agent. Be that as it may, it is certain that free thought was expanding in the same proportion as Romanism, that a formidable shock was preparing between these two mutually exasperating tendencies, and that between them what was most to be compromised was true religion, which is at the same time liberty and submission.

As early as the end of the Second Empire this great duel was progressing violently. The Catholic party complained to the Senate of what materialism had almost everywhere laid hold upon of the higher instruction. The Vatican Council and the formidable crisis that resulted from the war of 1870 were to render this war of spirits still more impassioned.

III.

The year 1870 was a terrible day of reckoning for France. Then she learned what it costs to abandon one's self to despotism. Invaded, dismembered, levied upon with the implacable hardness of an all-powerful victor, her very heartstrings were wrung by a catastrophe which recalls the grandest tragedies of history. The only compensation for calamities so cruel was the downfall of that régime which had hurled her into the abyss, after having enervated and corrupted her. The Second Empire was more fatal to her in the days of its prosperity than in those of its adversity; for, like those bell-glasses of the gardener which hasten even to decay the maturity of the plants they cover and deprive of the refreshing air, it was only a suffocator in its period of good fortune and of luxury. There is no more sadly curious figure in history than that of the second of the Napoleons—that mixture of cold resolution and apathy, of German dreaminess and Italian duplicity; benevolent in the main, but capable in the service of his ambition of visiting grape and canister upon a city, and of proscribing thousands of people; socialist and autocrat at once, replacing the moral sense by faith in his star, and giving himself no trouble as to the difference of good and evil. He was indeed the Cæsar of an epoch such as this of ours, in which the enriched have taken the place of the freedmen of ancient Rome, in which the *Mirés* have replaced the Narcissuses. A final catastrophe had to result from the incoherent vagaries of a crowned Utopian, having at his service the milliards and the armies of France, nor meeting any sufficient check in a parliament of no independence, of which it has been said with reason that it was rather an ante-chamber than a chamber of legislation. It is related that one of the generals of the Second Empire, more suited to leading the dances of the Tuileries than to conducting campaigns, said one day, after an evening devoted to pleasures little edifying, "We shall some day very likely be kicked out of doors, but while waiting we intend to be well amused." France learned to her sorrow what it costs to amuse one's self with fate. The reign of Napoleon III. saw develop all license of manners and of literature in the suppression of all public

liberties. This was to be seen again in all its perfection in that boulevard journalism known throughout the world, in the *Figaro*, hireling chronicle of the theatres and boudoirs, which intersperses with its gallant narratives blustering protestations in favor of the good Ultramontane doctrines. This touch serves to paint the empire. Although by the Italian expedition, which prepared the fall of the temporal power at Rome, it may have done more harm to the Papacy than it has done it good by protecting Catholicism in France, it none the less, except in some moments of passing disagreement, accorded to the Papacy its favors. It was under French bullets that the Italian patriots, who were seeking under the lead of Garibaldi to overthrow the temporal power three years too soon, were compelled to succumb at Mentana. The Empress Eugénie, daughter of devout Spain, placed her gracious but dangerous influence at the service of the Ultramontane party. She signified much in the fatal Mexican war, and in the still more fatal war of 1870.

It might have seemed that our Ultramontanes, after the disaster they had contributed in part to bring upon their country, would not dare to raise their heads, and would leave the new republic to establish itself in peace, that it might dress the bleeding wounds of the fatherland, which M. Thiers compared to a noble smitten one that requires nursing back to health again. Nothing of the kind. We return to one of the most astonishing periods of our contemporary history. For the first time since 1859, Ultramontane Catholicism had the chance of possessing, in a parliamentary majority, the most puissant of the instruments of power. The National Assembly of 1871 was returned at a gloomy hour, when France thought herself in the agonies of death. She did as too many of her children do, who, lacking devoutness during their lives, call in the priest in the moment of danger. She turned in her anguish to the most authoritative representatives of the Catholic Church, as if she had wished to demand of them extreme unction. The elections were carried on under the cannon of the enemy, when the nation was weary unto death from the formidable struggle it had just sustained. They were not the expression of the national will in a state of calmness and reflec-

tion, but rather a convulsion of the country. Only a few months had flown before they no longer corresponded to public opinion, as could readily be perceived from the numerous partial elections, that ended by giving the majority to the republic. This preponderance, during several years, of Ultramontane clericalism in politics was none the less one of the gravest of facts. It might have been said that the Pyramids of Egypt had opened, to return veritable mummies to public life again. These were petty gentlemen, come from the depths of their Vendéan castles to give victory, at least with their votes, if not on the tribune, which they never mounted, to the opinion of their bishops. In consequence of the defection of former Liberals after the fall of M. Thiers, the majority of the National Assembly very nearly succeeded in restoring the Catholic monarchy of the Comte de Chambord. Fortunately, he was no compounder, and enveloped himself in the white flag as in a winding-sheet. Throughout the country, nevertheless, there remained from this attempt a profound irritation against Catholicism, which only increased when this same majority were seen to pursue resolutely the plan of delivering over France to the Ultramontane Church, of reintroducing its clergy into the superior councils of the University, of opening to them the barracks for the administration of the communion to the soldiers, of confiding to them the direction of public charities, and of permitting to them not only the establishing of universities—which is their right—but of conferring there the degrees which open the way to public careers, and which are within the province of the state, where the custom still obtains of demanding diplomas for openings of this kind. No legislative measure has more aroused public opinion than this law regarding higher instruction, which tends to constitute two nations in the same country. Finally, the same clerical majority had more than once nearly compromised the security of the country in its relations with Europe, by espousing the cause of the temporal power of the pope, which the bishops have not wearied of demanding by petitions covered with thousands of signatures, easily gathered in the rural districts, since there the women and children are made to figure without scruple. At the same time the clerical party in the National Assembly set itself athwart

all really liberal and urgent reforms, especially those bearing on the development of public instruction. This it is that has prevented the realization of the vow so energetically expressed on the morrow of our defeats, that primary instruction should be made obligatory; for all good citizens well knew that, as has been said, "France had been vanquished as much by the schoolmasters as by the soldiers of Prussia." We leave entirely aside the political question properly so called, although it is evident that the Ultramontane party has had its interest in the destruction of the republic, and has done every thing to accomplish this. We only take up, in the history of the National Assembly, the effect produced on public opinion by the clerical policy, which, God be thanked, has ended abortively, though not without leaving in the country a deep-seated animosity against the church, and also amongst the ignorant masses who are not able to discriminate between the Gospel and the church. It may be understood to what a pitch this animosity has been excited, from the late political crisis, which all but precipitated us anew into I know not what dictatorship of chance. It must not be forgotten that the true cause of this crisis of the 16th May was the opposition made by the Chamber of Deputies, which had taken the place of the National Assembly, to the intrigues of clericalism; these having become in the spring of last year truly a public peril, through the intemperate language of several bishops on the subject of Italian unity. Their provocative orders were all the more dangerous in that they were the effect of a watchword issued from the Vatican, and transmitted by the nuncios. The Chamber of Deputies, after a memorable debate, voted, the 5th of last May, an order of the day, which imposed on the government the duty of investigating and suppressing the clerical intrigues. "Clericalism, there is the enemy," cried at that time M. Gambetta, the veritable chief of the Republican majority. From that day the Chamber was condemned; and those whom it had denounced set every thing in motion to obtain from Marshal MacMahon its dissolution, commencing with the dismissal of the republican ministry, which had a majority of nearly two hundred voices to support it. It required all the blindness of Ultramontane fanaticism to counsel so insane a measure, which could not succeed excepting by a

coup d'état; it was to become apparent that Marshal MacMahon was indisposed to sully his white hairs by such a crime. And yet this crime was openly recommended to him by the most influential representatives of clericalism, beginning with Bishop Dupanloup, a Liberal pervert, who, since his submission to the new dogma, before so strongly combated by him, seems to wish to avenge himself for his defection upon all the steadfast Liberals. The journal inspired by him, called the *Défense Religieuse*, has not ceased to urge the chief in power to the highest crimes. This the bishops have done also, and the archbishops who have harangued him in his journeys through France. The clergy have rushed headlong into the electoral struggles, using the pulpit and the confessional to frighten the rural population, and, crucifix in hand, conducting them to the polls, as formerly the curés of the League led their parishioners to the Holy War. The chiefs of the Catholic party, of whom there were several in the Ministry, have favored and sanctioned the régime of violence, persecution, and fraud, that attempted to take by surprise the will of France in the last electoral struggle. The defeat has been signal, and we believe it to be decisive; but there remains nevertheless in the country a profound irritation against a church that has compromised itself on this point, and has seen fit, in a time when the wind of incredulity sweeps strongly enough of itself over the minds of men, to do all that was necessary to inspire the country with a most mortal hatred of religion, transformed in their view into an instrument of servitude to be turned against institutions dear to the nation. There is the serious side of this political crisis. It has in this way increased the disaffection we have so often remarked between the secular and the Catholic spirit.

It has been easy to mark in our political press to what an extent this disaffection is envenomed. Our great journals, with rare exceptions, are signalized by their stinging criticism of every thing relating to Catholicism; they seize upon every thing that can be unfavorable to it; they describe it to the public mind in a tone by turns decided and satirical. At the same time they direct more formidable attacks against religion by popularizing with feverish haste all the results of anti-Christian science, without giving themselves the trouble to test them.

Thus with wide-open hand they cast doubt, it may be, on the Gospel history, or it may be on the very foundations of spiritualism. They know how to give a piquant turn to their dissertations; they furnish them with the swift and airy wings of the French *esprit*; and as they find in the public mind, exasperated against the policy of Catholicism, a strong predilection to welcome all that serves its hatred, they succeed better than ever in an anti-Christian propaganda. In this they prosper the more readily, that Ultramontanism evades replying to them. It loves much better to rekindle the fanaticism of this ignorant people—not much more so, for that matter, than the clergy who direct them. For since in religion it all comes to passive submission, the shepherds stand for the sheep in the folds of Ultramontanism. A sadly curious subject, that of the history of Catholic piety in our time. It has become no less deformed than doctrine; it has been more and more invaded by the grossest superstitions. In the first place, idolatry has come to know no longer any bounds. *Mariolatry*, since the proclamation of the Immaculate Conception, has developed from day to day, making of the Virgin a divinity that dethrones God and Jesus Christ from the altars of Catholicism, to occupy the first place in the daily worship; as can be observed by hearing the favorite preachers and the canticles of recent date. The veneration for the pope has become a veritable adoration. "In him there thinks, through him there speaks, the eternal Word," said the *Civiltà Cattolica*, the principal organ of the Jesuits of Rome, accepted by the Holy Father as the orthodox sheet by eminence, since its redaction has been established in Congregation. M. Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, who formerly struggled against the invasions of Ultramontanism, complained then that they had substituted the name of *Pius* for that of *Deus* in the Roman canticles. In the lithographs reproducing those paintings of the masters which represent the captivity of our Lord, Jesus Christ has been replaced by Pius the Ninth. The worship that has been most in favor in France these latter years has been that of the *Sacred Heart* of Jesus Christ, addressing itself to the material heart of Christ with effusions of an almost materialistic mysticism that are altogether mischievous. Long repressed at Rome in the seventeenth century, this devotion

was permitted there, thanks to the efforts of the Jesuits, whose invention it was ; for it was one of their Fathers who was the confessor and inspirer of the unhappy Marie Alacoque, of whose nervous condition he took advantage in the interest of the favorite doctrines of his order. In fact, the pretended revelations of this poor ignorant woman amount to a glorification of the sacerdotal power. In one of her pretended visions, Jesus Christ says to her : " If I have given thee a commandment, and thy confessor giveth thee another, it is thy confessor whom thou must obey." These words are found in the *Life of Marie Alacoque* by Bishop Longuet. Nothing could put in a stronger light the real character of this devotion, altogether in favor, as it is, of the ecclesiastical authority, since it is set above the authority even of the Gospel. The adoration of the Sacred Heart has only reached its full extent within a decade ; it is celebrated with grand pomp in almost all the dioceses of France. Its centre is at Paray-le-Monial, a little place in Burgundy, where lived Marie Alacoque. Thither very numerous pilgrimages are annually made. There was composed the war-chant of the holy army, which has for its refrain :

" Sacré cœur de Jésus,
Sauvez Rome et la France ;"

or, in other words : Give us governors who will re-establish the temporal power of the Papacy in Italy, and the throne of the Catholic king in our midst. Of late years there has been organized an immense subscription for raising on the heights of Montmartre, which command Paris, a vast and magnificent sanctuary in honor of the Sacred Heart. The order of the Archbishop of Paris, designed to stimulate the subscription, represents the erection of this church as a protest against the French Revolution. It will be a sort of defiance in stone, set up, in the view of Paris, against all modern right. It will be, all said, the Cathedral of the Syllabus. This defiance has resounded in these last years in all the pilgrimages that have been multiplied in every part of France. It is necessary to have been present at one of these ceremonials to estimate the fanaticism which animates them. The pilgrims, ranged in squads, prostrate themselves before the holy images, howling canticles

that are very hymns of war. Priests, chosen for their vehement eloquence, inflame their zeal. In this state of super-excitation symptoms are produced that are made to pass for miracles. It is especially toward Lourdes and La Salette, where the latest apparitions of the Virgin have been claimed, that the current has been considerable. As the Lady of Lourdes and she of La Salette have not failed to glorify Pius IX., that pope has been eager to acknowledge the authenticity of the apparitions. Thus is formed a current of blind and violent superstition truly worthy of the paganism of the decadence.

Along with the saturnalia of popular fanaticism we have a complete and very skilful organization of Catholic work. Throughout all France, committees have been formed which direct a system of works of charity, of popular instruction, of distribution of good journals and books, of encouragement to religious art. All these committees are bound together, and sit in general committee in solemn assemblages, where the hatred that animates them against modern society is expressed without evasion. The most important of the works instituted by them of late years is that of the workingmen's circles, designed to occupy the leisure of the working class, and to impart to it good doctrine along with amusement. No enterprise would be more excellent, if it were purely religious. Unfortunately, they are endeavoring to make of it a means of combating our institutions. The most active man in this propaganda has been M. le Comte de Mun, to-day deputy, belonging to one of our first families, who in his uniform of an officer of cuirassiers traversed France, mingling with his religious exhortations furious declamations against our society. "We wish," he has said, in a memorable discourse, "to conduct the civil funeral;" that is to say, without any ceremony: We want a French Revolution of 1789.

This word is the *résumé* of the whole social doctrine of our contemporary Ultramontaniam, and it is the decisive evidence of that ever more determined opposition between the most powerful religion in our midst and modern, liberal France. How shall she respond to so many attacks? We cannot answer this question at the end of an article already too long. We limit ourselves to expressing the solemn desire, that in

guarding safely the rights of the state, she may not exaggerate them, nor make any attack upon the religious conscience. Let her prevent positive aggressions, but let her not make war upon ideas, however erroneous they may be. Let us recognize, moreover, that between these two hostile powers, Catholicism and free thought, there is an increasing number of minds that wish neither the one nor the other extreme. There is in the first place Protestantism, which, despite its actual miseries, would have a grand task to accomplish; for in its evangelical tendency, the existence of which it would be easy to establish by tracing a faithful picture of its situation, it would be able to reconcile religion and liberty. There is, besides, a goodly number of serious men who have recognized for several years that it is not by negations that the victory shall be won over the false Catholic authority, and that unbelievers are destined ever to be beaten by the Capuchins and the Jesuits. This tendency, which has had for a long time very important manifestations, and which is to have its journal, recommends the Liberals to turn towards reform. It is one of the most encouraging signs of the time. Later it will be highly interesting to make known its origin and development. This is indeed the side on which our safety lies; for if the growing opposition between a deformed religion and a liberalism without elevated beliefs is the secret of our misfortunes and of our powerlessness to establish any thing durable, the reconciliation of liberty and the Christian faith in the light of the pure Gospel would be our deliverance. We accept with joy these signs, precursors of that most blissful reconciliation.

EDMOND DE PRESSENSE.

EVOLUTION AND THE APPARITION OF ANIMAL FORMS.

IT is not the intention of this article to enter into the strife that rages around the standard of evolutionary philosophy, and which is no doubt destined to shift its ground from time to time as the tide of battle ebbs and flows. Its purpose is rather to state, shortly and as plainly as possible, for the benefit of those whose minds may be disturbed by these conflicts, the exact relation of modern doctrines of evolution to natural science considered as a collection of facts with inductions based thereon, and to give a few examples of what we know of the apparition of animal forms in geological time, as bearing on this relation.

The term "apparition" of such forms is used, because the history of their appearance on the stage belongs to geological and biological science in a very different sense from that in which doctrines as to the genesis or origin of organic forms can be claimed by any science.

A word may be useful at the outset as to the relation of evolution to theology, as it presents itself to a naturalist who consults the statements made in the first chapter of Genesis. When the first animals are introduced, we are told "God said, Let the waters bring forth *Sheretzim*," and somewhat similar statements are made respecting other organic forms. A naturalist recognizes here three powers or agencies, or perhaps, more precisely, one primary power and two conditions of its exercise. First, there is the Almighty fiat, "God said." Secondly, we have a medium or environment, itself a product of creation, yet necessary to the precise result; for when, for

example, God says, "Let the *earth* bring forth," different creatures are produced. Thirdly, we have the reproductive energy implied in the name *Sheretzim*; and this power of continuous reproduction once initiated is permanently active, and is the nearest thing we know in nature to the act of creation itself. It seems plain that, according to the Bible, these three agencies are implied in the creation of every organic being; that such creation thus expressed is not of the nature of a bald, isolated, miraculous intervention, as often represented; and that the question may in any case be raised by science, How much of the vital phenomena which we observe may be due to the creative energy absolutely, to the prepared environment, or to the reproductive power? Farther, while the element of divine volition is implied in the first cause, the element of material continuity, as a part of the divine plan, is inseparable from the two conditions of its exercise. The biblical idea of creation is thus that of creation according to law, and this in a threefold aspect: First, The law of the unchangeable divine will; secondly, The law of the surrounding medium; thirdly, The law of the organism itself. All these, or at least the second and third, are, of course, in the theological sense, limitations imposed by the divine nature on its own action in particular cases, which is perhaps the primary idea of creation; but they constitute objective realities to us in the world of science.

With reference to these theological ideas of creation, modern hypotheses of evolution present themselves in two phases—the theistic and the atheistic. The theistic evolutionist says, "God creates; but that which he has created may spontaneously, or under the influence of its environment, change in process of time into new forms which we cannot distinguish from original products of creation." The purely atheistic evolutionist goes farther. He assumes the self-existence of what we call matter and energy, and that these are inherently endowed with power to originate all things. He thus dispenses with a Creator, and reduces every thing to the action of atoms and forces supposed to be practically omnipotent. In other words, he makes of these atoms and forces his supreme God, attributing to them the same powers assigned by the theist to

the Creator. It is obvious, however, that many adherents of evolution have no clear perception of the distinction between these phases, or find it convenient to overlook its existence, since we often find them hovering in thought between the one and the other, or occupying one or the other position indifferently, as the exigencies of debate may require.

It is also to be observed that either of these phases of evolution may admit of modifications. One of the most important of these arises from the distinction between the idea of slow and uniform development maintained by Darwin and others, and that of sudden or intermittent evolution advocated by such evolutionists as Mivart and Le Conte.

Viewing the matter in this light, it is evident that neither the theological idea of creation nor the evolutionist notion, in either of its phases, can have any close dependence on biological and geological science, which studies the nature and succession of organic forms without ascertaining their origin; either hypothesis may, however, appeal to scientific facts as more or less according with the consequences which might be expected to follow from the origins supposed. It is further evident that should evolutionists be driven by natural facts to admit the sudden apparition of organic forms rather than their gradual development, there may be no apparent difference, as to matter of fact, between such sudden apparition and creation, so that science may become absolutely silent on the question.

Palæontology has indeed recently tended to bring the matter into this position, as Barrande and others have well shown. I have myself elsewhere adduced the advent of the Cambrian trilobites, of the Silurian cephalopods, of the Devonian fishes, of the Carboniferous batrachians, land snails and myriapods, of the marsupial mammals of the Mesozoic and the placental mammals of the Eocene, and of the Palæozoic and modern floras, as illustrations of the sudden swarming in of forms of life over the world, in a manner indicating flows and ebbs of the creative action inconsistent with Darwinian uniformity, and perhaps unfavorable to any form of evolution ordinarily held.¹

¹ In England, Davidson, Jeffreys, Williamson, Carruthers, and other eminent naturalists have strongly insisted on the tendency of palæontological facts to prove permanence of type and intermittent introduction of new forms, as distinguished from descent with gradual modification.

This neutral attitude of science has been strongly insisted on by Dr. Wigand¹ in his elaborate work "*Darwinismus*," in which he holds that this doctrine does not represent a definite and consistent scientific effect and result, but merely an "indefinite and confused movement of the mind of the age," and that science may ultimately prove its most dangerous foe. In like manner the veteran German physiologist Virchow, in his recent address before the Assembly of German Naturalists at Munich,² taking the spontaneous generation of organisms and the descent of man from ape-like ancestors as test questions, argues in the most conclusive manner that neither can be held as a result of scientific investigation; but that both must be regarded as problems as yet unsolved.

But in the face of such opinions as these, we are struck with the fact that eminent men of science in England and America inform us that science demands our belief in the theory of evolution, and this in its atheistic as well as its theistic phase. When, however, we ask reasons for this demand, we find that those who make it are themselves obliged to admit the absence of a scientific basis for the doctrine.

For example, I may refer to the able and elaborate address delivered last summer before the American Association by its President-elect, Professor Marsh. He says: "I need offer no argument for evolution, since to doubt evolution is to doubt science, and science is only another name for truth." In the sequel of the address he limits himself to the evolution of the vertebrate animals, admitting that he knows nothing of the absolute origin of the first of them, and basing his conclusions mainly on the succession, in distant times, and often in distant places, of forms allied to each other, and advancing in the scale of complexity. Such succession obviously falls far short of scientific proof of evolution; and other than this no evidence is offered for the strong assertion above quoted. In the conclusion of the address he asserts that life may be a form of some other force, presumably physical force; but admits in the same breath that we are ignorant of its origin; and finally he makes

¹ Dr. Albert Wigand, "*Darwinismus*," 1875-7.

² On the "*Liberty of Science*," 1877.

an appeal, not to facts, but to faith: "Possibly the great mystery of life may thus be solved; but whether it be or not, a true faith in science knows no limit to its search for truth." Plainly, if this is all that can be said as to scientific results concerning the origin of life, if this origin is still an unsolved problem, a "great mystery," it is a somewhat strong demand on our faith to ask us to believe even that science will in the future succeed in effecting the solution of this problem, and we should not have been told that to doubt evolution is to doubt science. This style of treating the subject is indeed much to be deprecated in the interest of science itself.

Another eminent apostle of evolution, Professor Tyndall, tells us, in a very recent public address, that "it is now very generally admitted that the man of to-day is the child and product of incalculable antecedent time. His physical and intellectual textures have been woven for him through phases of history and forms of existence which lead the mind back to an abysmal past." But however generally this may be "admitted," it is nevertheless true that the oldest known men are as truly human in their structures as those now living, and that no link between them and lower animals is known. In a previous address he had gone further back still, and affirmed that in material atoms reside the "promise and potency of life," yet in his capacity of physicist he has by rigid experiments in his laboratory done as much as any man living to convince us that science knows no possibility of producing the phenomena of life from dead matter.

Perhaps no example could more vividly portray the contrast between exact science and evolutionist speculations than the careful experiments on germs suspended in the atmosphere, made by Tyndall in the laboratory of the Royal Institution—experiments so complete, so convincing, and so eminently practical in their bearing on the conditions of health and disease—as compared with the quaint and crude imaginings of the same mind when, in the presence of popular audiences, it speculates on evolution.

But we should not too strongly denounce these speculative tendencies of scientific minds. They may point the way to new truths, and in any case they have an intense subjective

interest. Nothing can be more interesting in a psychological point of view than to watch the manner in which some of the strongest and most subtle minds of our time exhaust their energies in the attempt to solve impenetrable mysteries, to force or pick the lock of natural secrets to which science has furnished no key. The objectionable feature of the case is the representation that such efforts have any real scientific basis.

Whence, then, arise these strange inconsistencies and contradictions which infest modern science like parasites? The expression I have already quoted is the only solution. They represent "a confused movement of the mind of the age"—of an age strong in material discoveries, but weak in self-control and higher consciousness. The mind of our time is unsettled and restless. It has a vague impression that science has given it the power to solve all mysteries. It is intoxicated with its physical successes, and has no proper measure of its own powers. It craves a constant succession of exciting and sensational generalizations. Yet all this frenzy is no more the legitimate outcome of science than the many fantastic tricks which men play in the name of religion are the proper results of revelation or theology.

The true remedy for these evils is twofold. First, to keep speculation in its proper place as distinct from science; and secondly, to teach the known facts and principles of science widely, so that the general mind may bring its common-sense to bear on any hypothesis which may be suggested. Speculations as to origins may have some utility if they are held merely as provisional or suggestive hypotheses. They become mischievous when they are introduced into text-books and popular discourses, and are thus palmed off on the ignorant and unsuspecting for what they are not.

The man who, in a popular address or in a text-book, introduces the "descent of species" as a proved result of science, to be used in framing classifications and in constructing theories, is leaving the firm ground of nature and taking up a position which exposes him to the suspicion of being a dupe or a charlatan.¹ He is uttering counterfeits of nature's currency. It

¹ I am glad to observe that even Huxley, in the preface to the "*Manual of the Anatomy of the Invertebrated Animals*" (1873), now takes this ground.

should not be left to theologians to expose him; for it is as much the interest of the honest worker in science to do this as it is that of the banker or merchant to expose the impostor who has forged another's signature. In the true interests of science we are called on to follow the weighty advice of Virchow: "Whoever speaks or writes for the public ought, in my opinion, doubly to examine just now how much of that which he says is objective truth. He ought to try as much as possible to have all inductive extensions which he makes, all conclusions arrived at by the laws of analogy, however probable they may seem, printed in small type under the general text, and to put into the latter only that which is objective truth." To practise such teaching may require much self-denial, akin to that which the preacher must exercise who makes up his mind to forego his own thoughts, and, like Paul, to know nothing among men but God's truth in its simplicity. The mischief which may be done to science by an opposite course is precisely similar to that which is done to religion by sensational preaching founded on distortions of scriptural truth, or on fragments of texts taken out of their connection and used as mottoes for streams of imaginative declamation.

To render such evils impossible, we must have a more general and truthful teaching of science. It is a great mistake here to suppose that a little knowledge is dangerous; every grain of pure truth is precious, and will bear precious fruit. The danger lies in misusing the little knowledge for purposes which it cannot serve; and this is most likely to take place when facts are not known at all, or imperfectly comprehended, or so taught as to cause a part of the truth to be taken for the whole. Let the structures of animals and plants in some of their more prominent forms be well known, along with their history in geological time, and the attempt to explain their origin by any crude and simple hypotheses like those now current, will become unreal as a dream. It may be well to illustrate this, however imperfectly, by a few examples.

He says: "I have abstained from discussing questions of ætiology, not because I underestimate their importance, or am insensible to the interest of the great problem of evolution; but because, in my mind, the growing tendency to mix up ætiological speculations with morphological generalizations will, if unchecked, throw biology into confusion."

Most persons have seen the beautiful *Euplectella aspergillum*, or "Venus' Flower-basket," now somewhat common in museums and private collections, but few perhaps have minutely examined its structure. A little observation enables us to see its regular cylindrical form and graceful cornucopia-like curves, combining strength with beauty; its framework of delicate silicious threads, some regularly placed in vertical bundles, others crossing them, so as to form rectangular meshes, and still others placed diagonally, so as to convert the square meshes into a lace-like pattern. Without this framework are accessory spicules placed in spiral frills, and at top is a singular network of silicious fibres closing the aperture, while there are long silky threads forming roots below. This structure, so marvellous in the mechanical and æsthetic principles embodied in it, is the skeleton of a sponge—a soft, slimy, almost structureless creature, which we find it difficult to believe in as a veritable animal; yet it is the law of this creature, developed from a little oval or sac-like germ, destitute of all trace of the subsequent structures, to produce this wonderful framework. Can any one who studies such an organism summon faith enough in atoms and forces to believe that their insensate action is the sole cause of its being? But our *Euplectella aspergillum* is only one of several species, and there are other genera more or less resembling it, most of them inhabiting the depths of the sea. All of these build up silicious skeletons on what is termed the hexactinellid plan, but with differences of detail perfectly constant in each species, though we cannot trace these differences to any thing corresponding in the animals, nor can we assign them to any property of silica, whose crystalline forms are quite different.

These hexactinellid sponges have a history. They are widely diffused in our present seas. The chalk formation of Europe abounds with them, and presents forms even more varied and beautiful than those now existing, but which must have lived at a time when large parts of our present continents were in the depths of the ocean. Still further back, in the Silurian age they seem to have been nearly equally abundant. I have recently studied the microscopic structures of a large collection from the Niagara limestone, consisting of many species, each of which presents arrangements of spicules as beauti-

ful and complex as those of the modern kinds. Still farther back, in the Cambrian rocks of Wales, Salter has found a species having its delicate spicules still retaining their arrangement, and showing that this beautiful contrivance for the support of a gelatinous animal existed in all its perfection almost at the dawn of life. Through all these vast periods of geological time the hexactinellids have continued side by side with the Lithistid sponges, their allies; and contemporaneously with them the Rhizopods and Radiolarians, still more simple forms, have built up other styles of skeletons equally wonderful and inexplicable, and embodying other mechanical plans and other types of beauty.

It is scarcely too much to say that no sane mind, having presented to it, not as above merely in a few words, but in the actual facts as they might be illustrated with specimens and figures, all this unity and variety, mechanical contrivance and varied beauty, associated with so little of vitality and complexity in the animals concerned, could doubt for a moment the action of a creative intelligence in the initiation of such phenomena, or could believe that they have resulted from the fortuitous interaction of atoms.

Still, admitting this, we are not prevented from attributing something to environment and to reproductive continuity. The waters "brought forth" these animals of old, and it is true we cannot conceive of creatures so constructed as living out of the waters. The sea also furnished to them the material out of which to construct their skeletons, either directly or through the medium of still simpler organisms. All this and much more respecting the surrounding medium science can understand, though it does not thereby learn the origin of these forms or the reason of their complexity and variety. These do not depend on the properties either of the waters or the silica.

Farther, our sponge has the power of increasing and multiplying to replenish the waters. It begets new organisms in its own likeness, and with all its own wonderful powers of unconscious construction. Nay, more, we can see that in this continuous reproduction it has a certain versatility, enabling it to conform to circumstances, and so to present individual and race characters within the species. May not then the creative act

have been limited to the production of the first hexactinellid, and may not the others have originated by ordinary generation? Here we may admit that for aught that we know not only varietal forms, but even some of those which, as met with in successive geological formations, we regard as species, may have had a common origin in this way; but we have no right to affirm this till we have proved it, and we have no right even then to affirm it of other and distinct lines of beings, which have gone on parallel with our hexactinellids for indefinite times, and which the very fact of the persistence of the latter within their own cycle of characters would tend to refer to independent origins.

Such in short would be the bearing, not of metaphysical arguments, but of the testimony of facts as presented by the structures and history of any group of the lower animals.

Another instance may be afforded by the history of a special organ, which, perhaps as being a hard one to deal with, has sometimes been referred to in this connection by evolutionists. One of the leaders of this philosophy has insisted on the absurdity of supposing that eyes were contrived for the purpose of seeing, and no doubt on his theory this is sufficiently absurd. Yet the spontaneous origin of eyes in animals previously blind, and consequently without any reference to vision, is, to say the least, not very intelligible. Tyndall has, in his Belfast address, by a series of bold suppositions, endeavored to show how, by what he calls "the operation of infinite adjustments" (though proceeding in finite time and without any adjuster), certain assumed pigment-cells might reach "the perfection of the eye of the eagle." Let us test these random assertions by what we know of the apparition of eyes in our world.

The eye is a very remarkable instrument. Even in its simplest form it supposes a clear refractive medium, photographic pigment-cells, and a nervous apparatus capable of receiving the impressions produced and conveying them to a sensorium. An eye is, in fact, a self-acting and registering photographic camera, having its plates so prepared as to represent colors as well as light and shade. Yet, according to evolution, this organ must have originated spontaneously, with the same general arrangements but differences of detail, at least two or three times, per-

haps oftener, in geological time. Its first appearance is very far back. In the Cambrian age, we have marine crustaceans with those remarkable compound or faceted eyes, which this class of animals, as well as the insects, still present. It is true that some of the Cambrian trilobites do not show any perceptible eyes, but these are contemporary with those that are well endowed in this respect; and Sir Wyville Thomson has shown that in the depths of the modern ocean there are some crustaceans furnished with very large eyes, to suit the dim light of the abysses in which they live, while others, on the contrary, are destitute of eyes; and similar differences probably existed from the beginning. In the Upper Cambrian, we have the apparition of the cephalopod mollusks. Their eyes have not been preserved, but it would be fair to reason from analogy that their organs of vision resembled those of the modern cuttle-fishes, which are on a quite different plan from those of crustaceans.

Both styles of eye are constructed on the same general principles, and both may perform equally well as organs of vision; but in the one, a number of small and comparatively simple eyes are grouped in large masses radiating from a centre, so as to command a wide range of vision, and in the other there is but one organ, which may have its parts more complex, and adapted for more adjustment to distance and direction.

In so far as we know at present, the compound eyes had precedence in geological time, and in the trilobites they attained to a stage of perfection not subsequently surpassed, at least for subaqueous vision. I have not seen the internal structures of any trilobite eye of the Cambrian age, but these are so similar to those of the Silurian and Devonian in external appearance that no doubt can be entertained of their identical structure. In silicified specimens of *Phacops* from the Corniferous limestone, we often have the internal structures of the eye in part preserved, and these fully confirm the conclusion of Burmeister, that these eyes possessed the cornea, lens, vitreous humors, and other parts, seen in recent crustaceans. In these trilobites, indeed, the cylindrical tubes for containing the separate parts seem to have been of a definite shelly character, indicating very perfect ocelli. This kind of eye was therefore, in all probability, perfected in the Cambrian period; and so, it is likely,

were the eyes of the cuttle-fishes, though the facts with regard to these last may perhaps never be certainly known. Now, neither of these kinds of eyes could have given birth to the other. Their whole structures, and those of the animals to which they belong, forbid such a supposition. Farther, neither could have produced the eyes of the fishes, which appear in the Upper Silurian and Devonian. The eyes of fishes differ wholly in plan from those of crustaceans, and the resemblance between them and those of the cuttle-fishes is altogether superficial, the form, structure, and slinging of the lens being different, as well as the mode of introducing the optic nerve. It is interesting to observe here also, that though the cuttles are the lower type, their eyes are in some respects more ingeniously constructed than those of the fishes, this being no doubt connected with their greater disadvantage, owing to the want of a supporting skull. The oldest fishes known to us probably had eyes, though this has been certainly ascertained only in the case of some a little less ancient (*e.g.*, *Pteraspis*).¹ The precise structure of these eyes, however, is not known. The oldest piscine eye preserving structure, that I have seen, is one from the Lower Carboniferous shales of Albert County, New Brunswick, in which remains of fishes of the type of *Palæoniscus* are very perfectly preserved. In one of these fishes I found the crystalline lens represented by a globular whitish spot. On slicing this, it showed, under the microscope, distinct traces of the concentric layers and bands so well known in the eyes of modern fish. These modern fish eyes, in order to enable the animals to see in a medium so dense as water, are globular, and very firm in texture. They are built up of concentric layers, more dense toward the centre in order to avoid spherical aberration, and the individual layers are made up of little bands or strips arranged like the gores of a globe, but in a more complicated manner, not easy to describe without figures. Farther, the little bands or strips are locked together at their edges by minute projections or teeth. All this complexity, so much greater than in any artificial lens, is necessary to secure perfect vision in con-

¹ If, as usually held on the evidence of spines, found in the English Ludlow, cestraciant sharks existed in the Upper Silurian period, we can scarcely doubt that they had well-developed eyes.

nection with the life and growth of this living optical instrument. Now, distinct indications of these structures exist in the eye of my Lower Carboniferous fish; and they are more like those in the eye of the modern *Amia*, or mudfish, a near ally of the ancient *Palæoniscus*, than in those of the cod or mackerel. Thus the visual organ of this very ancient fish presents no approximation to the eyes of the trilobite or the cuttle, but resembles those of its zoological allies in modern times, separated from it by a far greater lapse of ages. General and vague assertions are easily made, but surely such facts as these, though roughly sketched in mere outline, remove the origin of eyes very far from the domain of spontaneous development.

A third and more general illustration may be sufficient here. The first varied development of life known to us is that of the Cambrian or Primordial age. It is preceded by a few low forms of life in the Laurentian and Huronian, most of them probably separated from the Cambrian by a long interval of time. In the Cambrian age we already find all the great groups of animals represented, except the vertebrates. Some of the forms, as *Lingula* and *Leperditia*, have continued substantially unchanged up to the present time. Some, as the *Trilobites* and the *Orthoceratites*, belong to high classes in their respective groups. On the one hand, it is not too much to say that, if some of these forms have continued unchanged up to modern times, they can scarcely have been developed from distinct and lower forms within a less lapse of antecedent time. On the other hand, some of the forms represented reach to the middle of the animal scale between *Protozoa* and man, which would lead to a similar conclusion. But few geologists would be prepared to admit, even as a possibility, that the Cambrian age is no older than the middle of the history of life. Even this admission would, however, scarcely suffice as to time, and it would do nothing to remove the difficulty as to the origin of *Protozoa* from dead matter, or the origin of crustaceans and mollusks from *Protozoa*. But if the evolutionist maintains that the varied Cambrian fauna came in suddenly, we may ask him what cause could have produced so varied and complicated and wide-spread effects; and also in what essential respect such supposed rapid and simultaneous introduction of varied forms differs from our old idea of crea-

tion, or is more explicable by any facts known to science. We are constantly told by evolutionists that creation means abiogenesis, and that there is no evidence that this has ever occurred. Yet evolutionists must admit that it has occurred at least once, and probably many times, while they have to demand an amount of metagenesis not only unproved, but in the highest degree improbable.

The moral of all this is, that the more one can learn and teach the facts of natural science in their marvellous variety and unity, the better we shall be armed against any hypothesis which eliminates God from the universe, or which seeks to reduce his complex procedure to accordance with any one favorite scheme or theory. It is well to allow free scope to all discussion and to all speculations of ingenious thinkers, but every attempt to impose unproved hypotheses on the ignorant as ascertained truths should be firmly opposed, and this by setting over against such hypotheses the stubborn facts which they cannot control or explain. Science, quite as much as religion, demands objective, not subjective, teaching; and when that which professes to be science assumes the latter type, it well deserves the old apostolic epithet—*Ψευδώνυμος Ἰνῶσις*—"science, falsely so called."

J. W. DAWSON.

A PERSONAL RESURRECTION AND MODERN PHYSICAL SCIENCE.

I.

IT is one of the undesigned proofs of our necessary belief in the future life, that even unbelief is not content to leave the question unanswered, but must, age after age, drop its sounding-line into the same deep waters. We have a marked example of it in the theories of our latest positive school on this subject. It rests its chief argument against the Christian faith on the ground of science ; but there are features in which it is wholly unlike the older scepticism. We have been wont to look on the denial of a future state as linked with the sensual view of a La Mettrie or D'Holbach ; yet our modern thinkers appear as teachers of a new ethics, and turn away with pity from a religion that needs the hope of another world to make it capable of virtue. In this claim of the school, I cannot doubt, we may find the charm which has drawn so many in our day into an acceptance of its theories. We have in Mr. Mill the most gifted writer who has guided English thought in this direction, especially in the essays published after his death as his last legacy to his time. In one of these, that on Immortality, he reviews the proofs drawn from natural or revealed religion ; he puts aside all knowledge of a life beyond the present, yet, with a moral earnestness that lends warmth to even his icy logic, he looks forward to the age when our faith in the progress of mankind shall replace the desire of a personal future. There

is a stoic grandeur in Mill that takes us back to the last days of Roman thought. He has torn up the ideals of the past; his universe is a lonely one, without a personal God or a hope beyond this world, yet amidst the ruins he clings sternly to the law of duty. It is this idea of an immortality in the progress of the race which is the pivot of the new ethics. We find it repeated, sometimes in the severer tone of science, sometimes in the more sparkling rhetoric of the English school of Auguste Comte; and many of our readers have met with the latest teaching in "The Soul and the Future Life," by Mr. Harrison, who has been held worthy of a symposium in the *Nineteenth Century*.

None, then, can doubt that such a subject should call out the earnest thought of those who have an interest in the Christian culture of our time. My wish is, in this paper, to study the truth of a resurrection in its relations with modern science. Far indeed am I from any fears that our school of so-called positive reasoners can ever shake a faith rooted in the most sacred convictions of men; rather, I hold, that a true philosophy will only end, after this partial eclipse is over, in revealing in fuller light a truth on which hangs every moral idea of a God, or human life or social good. But it is my earnest belief that we need a more thorough adjustment of our Christian view with the verified facts of science. The chief cause of the scepticism I have described lies in the mistake, on either hand, which has confounded certain past theories of soul and body with the truth of a resurrection. I hold that there is not only entire harmony between the Christian belief and the most exact induction, but that our latest science has opened at this hour the path of our noblest evidence.

In entering on this question I shall not state at length the argument for a future life, as it will be gathered, step by step, in our examination of the views urged by the modern sceptic. It will be enough to show briefly the ground on which I rest it, and the method of our inquiry. We may sum the various proofs given by thinkers, from the "Phaidon" of Plato to our Christian divines, in three classes: that from the nature of our spiritual powers, from the moral condition of human life, and from the Christian revelation. But it is, I hold, a fatal mistake to

think that such a truth rests for its ground on any theoretical or scientific reasoning. In the deepest sense, it is involved in the primary fact of our moral consciousness. It is not as a speculative knowledge that an existence hereafter concerns us, but as a practical one. And thus, as Kant rightly claimed, the conscious fact of our obligation to moral duty compels every man to recognize his freedom, his choice between evil and good, and with it the law of retribution which demands a life to come. Our scientific reason does not, then, create this conviction; it only brings out in clearer light this fact of our moral experience. We learn here the harmony of these varied arguments. All are the exposition of one truth as it is studied in differing paths. The analysis of our mental powers reveals the law of conscious thought, its unity and identity amidst the changes of mind or body. The facts of human life show the historic evidence to be found in the common experience of the race. The argument from revelation, while it could not prove immortality, if there were no capacity in man to reach any truth on such a subject, opens beyond the natural belief the whole meaning of the future existence, as it is connected with our moral condition, the life of holiness begun here in the redemption of Christ, and the problem of human destiny. But I will not enlarge on these ideas, which will be clear as we proceed. I do not propose to add another to the proofs of a resurrection, but simply to meet science on its own ground.

If, then, we fairly state the position of the best champions of the school who deny the knowledge of a future life, it is plainly this: Modern science, it is claimed, has shown the organic unity of all the phenomena of thought, feeling, and voluntary action with the physical structure, so that it is impossible to know of any save this undivided existence. Since, then, this organism is decomposed at death, there can be no ground for any scientific knowledge of a resurrection. Such is the careful statement of thinkers like Mill. There are among the bolder advocates of the material school those who push this view to the denial of the possibility of a future life. But we must justly understand the difference between such men as Moleschott or Haeckel and the wiser exponents of the creed. It is not the impossibility of a resurrection, Mill affirms, but

the impossibility of evidence. It is not dogmatic disbelief, but scepticism. We are not, then, concerned here with any direct answer to the materialist, since our whole reasoning will involve the refutation of his grosser error, but with the far more plausible position of the sceptic. Now it must be plain, at a glance, that this claim of science seeks to undermine the whole ground of evidence which we have before stated. If there be in our very structure an impossibility of reaching beyond the fact of organic life and decay, all reasoning is empty theory. Consciousness cannot pass its fixed limits of present experience. Moral probabilities are no more than an unreal craving of our poor human imagination. The miracle of Christianity cannot convince the mind which has resolved beforehand that the life beyond nature is a dream. And it must, therefore, be as plain that our only way to meet the argument of modern scepticism is to examine the scientific ground on which it claims to rest. If we can show that this has no validity, but rather that science itself gives us, in our organic unity, the proof of a law of permanence beyond the present, we can then see the moral truth of Christianity, and the emptiness of the ethics built on an assumption. Such is the method of our reasoning. I state it here, that the study I undertake may not seem a needless one. To learn what science can teach us as to the life hereafter, we must first learn what it teaches as to the character of our mental and moral and physical life here. It is to this first step in our inductive logic I now directly turn.

We accept, then, as our starting-point, the twofold fact of our conscious organic existence. It is admitted by all, that we have on the one hand certain phenomena of thought, feeling, and volition, which are directly known to us in the sphere of our mental observation. We recognize thought in the act of thinking, and perception in the act of seeing, and memory in the act of recollection. Consciousness gives its own evidence of these phenomena. Yet as we study the law of this mental action, we know that we cannot sever our knowledge of these inward facts from the organic conditions of our life. Every one who has become acquainted with the results of modern science must grant that the light it has thrown on this connection of the mind with the physical organism has enlarged

our method of inquiry. It has been clearly ascertained that we have a key to many subtle marvels of thought, memory, and will in the structure of the nervous system, with its branching centres leading to the cerebral mass, its responsive afferents and efferents. We find a rhythmical law, by which each sensation is passed onward through a series of complex changes, so that each perception, each act of reasoning, has its correspondence with the functions of our nervous activity. Nor is it less wonderful what light has been thrown on the abnormal phenomena of the mind. Instances of suspended intellectual power, insanity, hypnotism, have gone far to show that each faculty is affected by the health or disease of a specific organ. But we can only glance at the host of facts, gathered in all treatises from Bernard to Carpenter and Spencer; and we are merely anxious to recognize in the fullest sense their bearing on the problem before us.

What, then, is the conclusion we draw from these discoveries? It is, that this connection between the mental and physical powers reveals a law of unity, so constant in its operation that science has the right to affirm that to this extent it understands the relation of mind to body. It knows phenomena and force; a force manifesting itself as thought, feeling, and voluntary action under these conditions of its organization. And what further knowledge does science reach? Does our study of the physical phenomena tell us any thing of the nature of this organic connection? None whatever. Can it explain in what way the transition is made from the ultimate activity of the nerve-centre to the act of intellectual consciousness? No. We may take any of the cases in which physiology has explored this law. Take an act of perception, as, *e.g.*, that of the face of a friend. We find three successive steps in the process: the impression received by the sensitive membrane, the transmission of the stimulus through the nerve-fibres, and last, the conscious perception in the brain. Yet, while we can measure the time of transmission, and even the interval between the first impression and the result, the nexus by which the physical movement ends at last in a mental knowledge is as unknown as before. Or we may analyze another class, of voluntary phenomena. Suppose, with this per-

ception of the face of my friend, there rises in me a wish to enter his house. My act will again pass through three analogous reflex processes: the act of volition taking place in the brain; the passage of the motor impulse through spinal cord and nerves to their terminations; and the contraction of the muscular fibres. Now in this whole circuit, from centre to centre, till the message reaches the brain, is received and returned through this human telegraph, the one mystery is the unseen operator, yet the one essential fact in the case is that which is done by this unseen agency. Science cannot give even a hint. The transformation from the physical to the mental is the secret. Why, then, is this? Because our instruments are not keen enough to detect it? Not at all. Because no instruments of physical science can ever do so. Our conclusion cannot be better stated than by Mr. Mill, although we have yet to see how it can square with his own later reasoning: "Science gives no proof that organization can produce thought or feeling. The utmost it knows is, that all thought is connected with bodily organs." Although there is unity of action, the two classes of phenomena are so distinct that no analysis of the brain structure or functions can give us any knowledge of the essence of thought. Refine the nerve-fibres to their vanishing-point, suppose what molecular change you will in the infinitesimal cell, no physiologist can cross the line to what has no extension, form, or divisibility. All we can say is, that there is coexistence, co-ordination in time, coworking in the result. Science ends with phenomena and a force, in the last analysis known to be of intelligence, feeling, and will.

We can now apply this induction to the old and endless riddle, of which our positive sages think they have found the key. I beg the reader not to fear that I am about to weary him with a discussion of the rival theories of dualism, idealism, and materialism. My task is simply to show how the inductive logic disposes of them all with the same impartiality. I grant readily, then, the claim of science that the notion of two separate substances, spiritual and material, is no longer tenable. The theory seems to me far older than Aquinas, to whom Mr. Bain assigns it, and to be clearly enunciated by Augustin, in following out the Platonic view of ideas as entities. The phi-

losophy of Descartes, again, although a grand step in psychology, led to its severance from the study of the organic unity of mental and physical action. Science, then, dismisses the theory of two separate substances, simply because it does not explain at all the twofold phenomena of life, but only substitutes an abstraction for the fact. But the same reason holds good against all other purely metaphysical assumptions. Idealism, whether with Berkeley or Fichte, attempts to find unity only by denying one of the elements in the problem, and thus adds nothing to our real knowledge. But it should be equally clear that the theory of materialism is merely the other pole of the same fallacy. If the mental phenomena be, as we have found, unresolved in the last analysis by any study of cell or fibre, then the notion of "a physical basis," or by whatever name we reclothe the old figment of material substance, is precisely the same metaphysical assumption which science rejects.

But here I shall ask leave to pass a little into detail. Our positive sages will accept all we may grant as to the other abstractions, but they have a strange blindness in regard of the beam in their own eyes. I am concerned, therefore, to urge this last point, as it bears on the views so often and so loudly uttered by the champions of the "physical basis" to-day. We cannot find a better exponent than Dr. Maudsley, who, in his well-known work, joins so rare a knowledge of the nervous system with a scorn of all outside his dissecting-room. I need not, after the keen dissection of him in a late article of this REVIEW, do more than state the central error. Our mental and moral activities are the product of our physical structure. "The highest functions," in his language, "of the nervous system, those to which the hemispherical ganglia minister, are those of intelligence, emotion, and will." Nothing can be more undisguised than this statement. What is a function? It is an activity inherent in the structure of the organ. Circulation is a function of the vascular system; and the blood which circulates is a physical thing like the pump which sends it along. Thought, then, is in this view as material as the nerve-centre. If not so, the word function has no meaning. But we have now to ask, Where is the proof? Does science give the least trace of identity, or kindred, or resemblance between the hemispherical ganglia and the conscious

fact of perception? No. We may as well say that memory is a secretion of the gray or the white matter; that sorrow is of the same specific gravity or salt taste as the liquid of the lachrymal gland; that joy is of the substance of the spinal marrow; or that there is a relationship between the ganglionic knots and the working of the logical faculty in untying the knots of an argument. To talk of thought or feeling as a function of the nerve-centres is simply the denial of the very principle of inductive knowledge which such naturalists boast. It assumes a theory of substance more impertinent than that "incorporeal essence which science inherited from theology." Yet I need not push the criticism, but leave this philosopher to refute himself. We turn a little further, and we read, "that we know not what mind is, but we are bound to study the laws of its functions." Thought is first a function, and then the nervous action is the function of thought. Mind is resolvable into ganglionic structure, and then mind is an unknown quantity. It is surely the kindest counsel one can give to such sages, to say that when they venture beyond the dissecting-room, they had best take a few lessons in the science of ideas which they scorn. Nothing indeed can be worthier of a laugh than the same style of scientific wisdom, so constantly appearing in our modern essays on physiology. Not long ago, I read a lecture on the nerve-system by a physician, at the head of his profession, in which he told his hearers that thought was "a secretion of the brain." One is reminded of the Dutch sage, who held the seat of the conscience to be in the stomach, and the poetic faculty in the intestines. And why not, since we know, according to Emerson, that our theology, whether Calvinistic or other, depends largely on the biliary duct? Why not create a more perfect system of divinity by large doses of calomel, or a new Shakespeare by the skilful use of phosphates? But I should not stay so long on this, were it not that clearer intellects, when trained in the sensational school, fall into the same error. No better answer could be given to this materialistic theory than in the words of Mr. Mill, already cited: "Science gives no proof that organization can produce thought or feeling." Yet Mr. Mill quotes with seeming approval the fancy of a speaker in Plato's "Phaidon," who asks if the soul may not

be to the body as the music produced by the strings of the lyre. It is strange that such a thinker could suppose the unity of mind and body solved by a wave of sound, a phenomenon as purely physical as the instrument that sends it forth.

With this criticism I pass to the far truer statement of the leaders of the modern school. We have in Mr. Spencer, and, *longo intervallo*, in Mr. Bain, a very notable contribution to psychology. They have analyzed with much ingenuity the dual activities of our organic life, and find that at no point in the process can the mind and body be separated. We must accept this as the "ultimate experience." We have in each case of perception, memory, or reasoning, the "subjective side" of the same fact which we know on its "objective side" as sensation and nerve-force; and we can state the equation either "in terms of these" or "terms of those." Yet when we come at length to the definition of this "ultimate experience," we have two very unlike answers, to each of which I ask special attention. One is the conclusion of Bain. He tells us that "one substance, with two sets of properties, physical and mental, a double-faced unity, would appear to comply with all the exigencies of the case." But we are forced to say that this seems like a solution of the difficulty by a greater one. In what way are we helped, by calling it a double-faced unity of substance, to know the real nature of the facts? We may as well say that mind and body are tied together like the Siamese twins. Will he explain the superiority of his one substance, which joins "two distinct entities," two "distinct and wholly unsolvable natures," to the old notion of two substances? Are not *entities* substances? Are two of them one substance? Mr. Bain has told us that we are to deal with this "as with the language of the Athanasian creed, neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance." It is, of course, highly gratifying to a devout mind to see this modern sage going back to the most metaphysical of creeds as his standard; but even the Athanasian creed refuses to help him. His two entities are substances, not persons, and his substance is divided. Indeed, like most double-faced things, this unity is no unity at all. We turn with more satisfaction to Mr. Spencer. In closing his chapter on the "Substance of Mind," he reaches a very striking

result. It is this, that as the twofold phenomena of mind and body must be resolved into one force, this force may be either spiritual or physical ; yet if he must "choose between translating mental phenomena into physical, or physical into mental, the latter would seem the more acceptable of the two." It is a true step beyond "the double-faced unity." Mr. Spencer, it is true, retreats anew into his skepsis, and says that "substance of mind is the x of our equation." But I beg leave at this point to cross-examine the witness. Why does he grant at all that, if he must choose, he will accept the mental solution of the facts? It is plainly because the force, which in the last analysis remains to us, is the intellectual one. "If units of external force are regarded as absolutely unknown and unknowable, then to translate units of feeling into them is to translate the known into the unknown, which is absurd." "It is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms of outer existence." To translate this idea out of the scientific dialect of our author, compared with which the quiddities of the schools are simple, all our knowledge of the physical facts leads us at last to conscious thought and feeling, and therefore to think these a product of any other save a thinking and feeling power is absurd. This is admirable. But if it be so, then there is no longer room for any balancing of probabilities. We must choose, and we can only choose this result, that there is one substance or one force, call it what we will, which is the ultimate solution of the phenomena, and that is mind.

Here, then, we reach the meeting-point, where our study passes into the character of the mind itself. All along we have used the word science in the sense of physical induction, without quarrelling with its narrowness, until the fallacy should be laid bare by the scientist himself. We are now to complete the knowledge, to which natural science only leads. What do we mean by this mental or spiritual force? Let me take any fact which will be readily allowed by all. I am conscious of reading at this moment a sentence in Mr. Spencer's "Psychology," and I clearly remember six months ago having read the same passage. My act of memory binds the two states of thought in one continuous whole, so that I recall each thread of the twisted argument, each doubt and slow conviction of my own mind.

Such a process reveals a law of unity in myself, as the person in whom these separate states cohere. This law of personal identity is surely as much within my scientific knowledge as the tracing several sensations to their nerve-centres. Nay, more; it is the ground of all other knowledge. If there be no such mental identity, there can be no certainty as to the physical induction, since I cannot know myself to be the same man who, six months ago, travelled with much patience through Mr. Spencer's book. But this opens at once the secret of the mental and moral force. It reveals a personal, continuous life, which abides amidst all natural changes, whether of outward or inward existence. If it be said that this mental identity is no more a fact than physical identity, and is subject to the same conditions of organic structure or decay, I reply, that I am assuming no abstract or separate spirit, but simply tracing this undeniable organic law. This continuous life we know in our mental consciousness. It is well expressed in the words of Mr. Mill: "Feeling and thought are reality—the only reality." We shall ask hereafter how far his language is consistent with his denial of the reality of a future life; but it is enough here to say that he speaks in no figurative sense, but with scientific strictness. Without such reality, thought and feeling are a whirl of impersonal accidents. Without it life is a dream, and we as little concerned with it as with the fantastic shapes chasing each other athwart the *camera obscura* to vanish in a moment. It is here, in the assurance of this mental fact, we have our knowledge of the outer world, our unceasing growth from infancy to age in the study of nature or of man; it is here yet more we have the capacity of moral growth, and pass in the slow experience of the years to that fixed state of thought, feeling, will, which we call character. Such, I conclude, is the true result of our inquiry. In this light I accept gladly the method of modern science. If it have taught us to give up our older metaphysical abstraction of a twofold substance, of a separate immaterial entity which cannot explain the organic facts, our loss is a greater gain, for we have risen by its induction to a more spiritual as well as real truth. If the phenomena of sensation be thus traceable to the more subtle nerve-centres; if the life of the nerve-centres gain such "subjective validity"

that the physical ends in the mental act ; if, in a word, we find in the structure itself this abiding unity of thought, feeling, will, then our inductive science is one with the knowledge of a personal, intelligent, and moral being.

We can now pass, with a clear understanding, to the question of the future life. It will be seen, I trust, that each step of the analysis has been needful to meet the problem, and bears at once on the conclusion. What proof is there, from this present organization of our physical and mental powers, that there will be a resurrection? My answer is, that the fact of such a law of personal being, one and abiding amidst all changes, gives us the most reasonable ground of belief in its continuance hereafter. Let me at the outset guard this position against any just objections which may be urged in regard to some of our older theories. It is, I fully grant, impossible to reason, as has been so often done since Plato, from the inherent immortality of the soul as a pure, immaterial essence. That argument, indeed, was almost wholly given up by the early Christian fathers, although they were of the Platonic school, and it was held wiser only to affirm that our existence must depend on the will of God. Indeed that view must fairly involve our belief in pre-existence, as there is no more reason to infer an eternity after than before the present, from the nature of the soul. Science cannot know this separate, disembodied entity, which it truly calls an abstraction. I doubt not that every mind feels far more than all the subtleties of his logic the moral argument of Socrates when he says to his judges: "This one truth, O judges, you ought clearly to know, that for a good man there is no evil whether he live or die, nor is his welfare uncared for by the gods." Nor can we find, again, any resting-place in such theories as that of Bishop Butler, drawn from the indivisible character of ultimate atoms. It was probable, as he held, that the human being may be in its essential structure a unit, which can survive decay. Science justly rejects every such theory as outside its sphere ; and the Christianity which leans on it must part company with real knowledge. The argument of Butler has indeed the noblest force, as we shall yet see, when he reasons from the nature of human life as the sphere of moral growth.

But the scientific knowledge of his time, although his guess was enough to meet the objector, had not the clear method of our own. It is curious to see, in his notion of the eye as only a field-glass, or the leg as a walking-staff, his mechanical view of organic life.

We dismiss, then, all such theories beforehand, and meet directly the claim of the modern thinker. It cannot be more thoroughly stated than by Mr. Mill, and we shall take him as its best exponent. He holds, that as our real knowledge goes no further than the coexistence of the physical organism with the mental and moral powers, we have no ground whatever for the conclusion that these powers survive the decay of the body. Let us consider just what this claim means. It is not that a continuance of our being, under new organic conditions, is impossible. Our author, let me repeat, is not to be classed among materialists like Strauss or Haeckel. No one has more thoroughly answered them. It is, as he fairly reasons, wholly unscientific to go beyond the results of our induction. There is no necessity that our existence should end with the body; we cannot deny or disprove the possibility of a future. Such a belief cannot be dismissed among exploded superstitions, as in the case of witchcraft. Witchcraft is a belief which has been tested within our experience. But the future life is wholly beyond experience. Nay, he admits that such a faith may be allowed us as a noble aspiration, but it has no validity whatever as scientific knowledge. We come, then, at once to this clear statement, and test it by his own method. Why is it, by the admission of Mill, that the question leaves us any possibility at all? If it could be proven by inductive science that the mental and moral powers are, as the materialist claims, only functions of the physical organs, no such possibility could for a moment be granted. It is not merely our ignorance of the future, but the real knowledge we have of somewhat in the character of this organic life here that forces us to admit the idea of a possible continuance. Our inductive science has shown that the ultimate law of the organism is that of a force manifest in thought, feeling, volition; that while knit with the bodily structure it has a personal unity, a connected growth from infancy to age in knowledge and moral character.

Now, if this be so, why should not science grant, beyond a mere possibility, the most reasonable ground of our belief in a future? If the fact of this connection with the body have been shown to involve no necessity of decay, the whole weight of the scientific objection is lifted off, and the very character of this organic life makes it yet more a positive argument for a resurrection. The law of our existence is not affected by the flux and waste of years. "Thought and feeling," in the words of Mill, "are reality—the only reality;" and this reality implies that the power which creates them cannot be bounded by the span of our little threescore and ten. We may say, in the most literal sense, that we pass through the same process of resurrection constantly; that we are always dying in the flesh, always rising anew by virtue of this organic identity; and what we call death is but another step in the same unceasing growth. This law of our existence, therefore, is not broken, but only passes forward to its completeness. It demands a future as essential to it; and if not so, then thought and feeling are not reality any more than the waste particles of the skin. But it is answered, that science can only verify our actual experiences, and this in its nature is not, and cannot be, a truth of experience. Our whole argument ought to show the fallacy of this answer. I admit, of course, that experience cannot prove what is beyond experience. But it is the task of science to rise from the facts to the laws that explain them. The system of Copernicus is an hypothesis; and there are eccentric minds which doubt it now, as Bacon did; yet it is no guess, no unscientific belief, for it "solves phenomena." Belief in a future state solves the phenomena, and without it they are incapable of a just solution. To say that such a truth is not a demonstration, as in mathematics, or a verification, as in a visible fact of chemistry or physiology, is not to destroy its reasonable proof. It is to beg the whole question. And yet this is the very fallacy which runs throughout the reasoning of Mr. Mill on this subject, when he tells us that it is a sentiment, or a hope without any scientific basis. Nay, more; it is his own admission that such a belief may be "philosophically defensible." We ask no more than this. It is indeed the most cheering thought that, after all, the dreary denial of such a mind rested on a

narrow definition, and did not quench the real power of the truth. But we claim the full meaning of his admission. It is no belief to be dismissed to the shadowy realm of the subjective feeling. If it be what we have proved it, it is not only philosophically defensible, but it rests on a ground so firm that science must acknowledge its agreement with the physical, mental, and moral law of our being.

II.

We have thus far, in our study of this great question, examined the scientific ground on which modern scepticism rests its denial; and it has led us to the conviction that science itself gives us the most reasonable proof of our continued existence. But here we are to pass to a more positive view. I claim that we have in this result a new and most satisfying argument for the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. My essay will not allow me to offer more than the leading idea of so large a subject; yet enough if I make it clear. We have, then, in reaching the law of our organic unity amidst the changes of the body, met the central error out of which all doubt has sprung. It is because the future existence is regarded as a state without any analogies with the present, that death is held an annihilation of life. Here, then, we enter by the path of science itself on the ground of revelation. It has been, from the first, the teaching of the Christian church, as embodied in its oldest creed, that there is to be a personal resurrection of soul and body. But this truth, although most reasonable and most spiritual in its Biblical meaning, has been too often identified with the notion of a material body, compacted of the same fleshly atoms. There is a vast distance from St. Paul to the gross view of Tertullian, and of many of the traditional expositors of later days. Even a sober divine like Bishop Pearson could only answer the scientific doubter by claiming that Omnipotence can gather the scattered parts, so that "each bone shall know his old neighbor-bone." It was not strange that such an arbitrary marvel should seem absurd to the chemist, who knew that "the noble dust of an Alexander" might have played its part in the bodies of a thou-

sand meaner men; nor can we doubt that hence there has grown by degrees into the popular theology the vague notion of a disembodied state, a world of spirits without any real relation to this.

But if we rightly understand this sacred truth of the resurrection, it teaches us that very view of the future which has its confirmation in science. This undivided personality of the man, in its organic unity of soul and body, shall be the same in the future state. We can thus appreciate the masterly argument of the Apostle in his epistle to the Corinthians. Every seed shall have "his own body;" yet the body "that shall be" is not the natural body, for "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God." Each shall be the same in all that constitutes the organic personality, and this unchanging life will put on its nobler form under the conditions of its nobler state. In such a view there is nothing gross, but the very reality to satisfy the mind or heart. If we so look on the human form, as a Christian science can do; if we so recognize this mental and spiritual law of its organic unity, it becomes in the truest sense the incarnation of the inward man. It is no mechanism; it is our personal self. Who, indeed, has studied the mystery, shrouded in our daily life, by which our affections are linked with the faces and forms we love; who that has watched the transfiguration passing over the man, until the beauty of the soul has refined the plainest features, and vice, again, has furrowed over the fairest the lines of lust or hate, who, I ask, has not felt the meaning of that scripture: "Know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Spirit." "If any man destroy the temple of God, him will God destroy"? Or who that knows the power of unselfish love, of joy, of hope, of holy activity, lodged in these bodies, even in a world of decay, cannot conceive somewhat of their capacities in a sphere of riper growth? Yet I will not follow out such thoughts, although far from unreasonable, beyond my line of argument. Much may be within the range of philosophic opinion which is not of necessity truth. It is enough that our belief has its harmony with the best results of science. A Christian faith is no baseless sentiment. It completes the fact, graven on the moral consciousness of man, which all our scepticism cannot destroy;

it gives us no theories of an unknown world, but joins present and future as one living reality; it answers, with a divine revelation, to the necessary craving of the human soul for a truth which shall make this life the sphere of our growth, our hope, our labor for the life eternal.

Here, then, we can enter on the next division of our subject—the moral argument for the doctrine of the resurrection. The religion of Christ declares, that in this truth of a future life we have the only solution of our present existence, and the noblest motive of holiness. Modern scepticism declares such a faith an illusion, and the morality it offers a selfish one. I trust it will now be plain that it was necessary, first of all, to take up the scientific ground. It is with this the new ethics must stand or fall. In this light we can now examine the strange mistakes which all such thinkers have made in regard to the character of Christianity, and the doctrine they would offer us as the latest discovery of moral science.

Let us, then, briefly state the argument, as it has been urged by Christian writers. I have said, at the outset, that the conscience of mankind reaches the conviction of a future life in the growth of its real experience, and all our philosophy can do is to present this conviction of lettered or unlettered minds in more explicit reasoning. Our scientific argument was nothing more than the analysis of the fact of our personal identity given in every consciousness. Our moral argument is only its application to human life. It rests, in a word, on the knowledge of the imperfection of our present state, and our capacities of a good which the present cannot supply. We may state it, on its spiritual side, as the experience of our struggle with sin, our sense of retribution, and our need of that perfect holiness in which is the happiness of the soul. Pascal has expressed it in one sentence: "The present is never our end; the future only is our object. Thus we never live, but hope to live; and always aiming to be happy, we can never be, unless we seek another beatitude than we can enjoy here." We may state it, on its intellectual side, in that strong saying of Goethe: "The eternal existence of my soul is proved from my need of activity. If I work incessantly till death, nature is pledged to

give me another form of being, when the present can no longer sustain my action." We may state it on its social side, as the conviction that there must be a state where the riddles of this world, of immature death, of sickness, misery, inequality, and, most of all, the partial victory of goodness, shall be solved by a righteous God. None can deny the fact of such moral ideas; and so necessary, so universal are they, that they must point to a reality.

Now it is to this whole array of proof that our modern school replies in one sweeping denial. It does not deny the sentiments, but it claims that, so far from being proof of any reality, they are the growth of natural superstition, and the source of selfish action. The craving for another sphere of mental or moral existence gives us no more positive evidence than the desire of the old man for the happiness of his childhood can give him the hope of its renewal. The Christian paradise is a myth, like that of the fountain of youth, which led Ponce de Leon into the savannahs of Florida to find only death. All the facts of disease, of suffering, of unpunished wrong, are no evidence of a future; but rather, in the view of Mr. Mill, they show the non-existence of a God, or the existence of a weak or an evil power. Here, then, we have the whole question before us, on which the moral argument depends; and here we can meet it. It is granted that, if there be no ground for a reasonable belief that our personal existence survives this present organic condition, all such moral convictions are an illusion. We must accept the strange riddle of our destiny, and make the best of it. But if, as we have seen, science confirms such a belief, then to doubt the reality of such convictions is the insanity of the man who doubts his own identity. It is to suppose a nature without a purpose, a growth without a ripening, a life compelled to crave knowledge and goodness, yet in which each step is a curse.

We might, then, close the question of morality here; but there are so many points of interest in this new ethics, that we shall take up in brief detail the more important of them. It is the claim of our modern thinkers that the belief in a future life is not universal. We are told that our late researches into primitive history have exhumed many savage tribes without a

trace of such a faith, and that where it exists it has sprung from the notion of ghosts, suggested by the phenomena of dreams. But it is strange that such reasoners cannot see that the very fact admitted by writers like Tylor and Lubbock is itself the disproof of their assertion. The belief in ghosts is universal; and that belief, whatever its crudeness, is the confession of the deep-rooted conviction that in some way the dead yet exist. Could it be shown that a few tribes have never had even this faith, it will no more disprove the general fact than the blind fishes of the Mammoth Cave disprove the eyesight of the vast tribes in the rivers or the seas. We do not expect of the savage a defined or reasonable idea of the future life; we expect simply this childlike conception of it; and to ignore its meaning is to show ourselves incapable of understanding the character of any early religion. There is to my mind a nobler reason in the African who worships the shade of his ancestors than in him who, because he has unlearned his faith in ghosts, has concluded that there is no reality beyond the senses.

Nor is this less clear in those historic examples which Mill and others have cited of the Hebrew and the Buddhist religions. The absence of any belief in immortality, so often asserted since the treatise of the learned but inaccurate Warburton, is not allowed by the best Hebrew scholars. It was not strange that, in the youth of the Jewish people, the living faith in a divine Ruler and a present law of retribution should be the more prominent feature of their religion. A fully developed conviction of the future existence is always the fruit of experience with a nation, as it is with the growth of the child into the more thoughtful man. The Sheol, or underworld, to the Israelite of the heroic age, as to the Greek of the Homeric poems, was a region peopled with shadowy forms; yet there is quite enough in the Pentateuch and early history, as in the story of Enoch's translation, the raising of the spirit of Samuel, the ascension of Elijah, to prove that from the first such a belief existed. "History," says Mill, "does not bear out the opinion that mankind cannot do perfectly well without a heaven." History does bear it out with emphasis. It was this early faith which passed with the long, sad experience of the nation into a conviction so rooted that nothing could destroy it. Sadduceeism was at most a

sceptical sect ; but the lasting power of the Pharisee over the people lay in this, that he kept alive such positive truths. But Mr. Mill is yet more unfortunate in citing Buddhism. Apart from the quite uncertain claim that the Nirvāna means annihilation, it is clear that the religion could not stay with the silence of its founder, but has created a mythology as fanciful as that of the Brahman, and even incorporated the doctrine of transmigration. We may deplore the superstition, but it proves the fact.

We thus pass to the more ethical objections. It is urged alike against the heathen or Christian belief that it has been the parent of immoral and cruel fancies. We might answer, in the spirit of Bacon against atheism: I had rather believe all the fables of the Hindu than that this bodily frame is without a soul. Yet I prefer to say, that while we admit all the grossness mingled with the ideas of the future, it is surely the wisdom of the philosopher to allow both the intense power of the faith which created the mythology, and the witness it gives to the moral judgment of mankind. There is a kind of "wild justice" in each system. Each is a popular Theodicea. When I read the funeral ritual of the Egyptians in Bunsen's volumes, or the dark fancies pervading Hindu poetry of souls doomed to wander through ages of purifying, they speak of the eternal truth graven on the conscience, of the self-avenging power of sin. Or when I study the theology of the Latin age in the poem of Dante, all the stern or grotesque imagery cannot hide the ideal justice which metes out pain to wicked king or pontiff, and the immortal love that rewards the good. If I mourn over the strange religion which could believe in a "*limbus infantum*," I find that as often the moral truth corrects the dogma; Virgil is the messenger of Beatrice, and Cato, with other crowned worthies, can enjoy a place of honor in even the Roman Catholic underworld. A purer Christian knowledge will by degrees rid us of the gross notions that disfigure the truth, but it can never uproot this conviction, unless it can make evil good and good evil.

But it is urged again that the Christian doctrine of the future has led to a vast amount of selfish religion. It is said that one of the chief hindrances of social progress has been

found in the church, which taught men to submit to every wrong of slavery or caste, and flattered them in their trial with the unreal hope of a heaven to come. This is a favorite charge with our Socialists of the unchristian type. None need deny that there is a partial truth in it when it is urged against the code of monastic morals; nor do I doubt that it is a weighty charge against the like spirit in many later forms, the unmanly quietism that forgets the duty of the Christian as man and citizen. But when it is urged against the belief in a future life, as it is taught by the Gospel or witnessed in its real results, I cannot withhold a smile at its absurdity. Whatever else may be said of such a faith, it is folly to say that the heroism, the active benevolence, the humanity have been the marked virtues of the unbeliever. Let the sceptic beware of such dangerous comparisons. But a far more serious charge is brought against the Christian doctrine when it is called a selfish one. I can only feel a sad regret that a critic usually so fair as Mr. Mill should have so misread the New Testament, as to speak of the "Christ of the Gospels as holding out the direct promise of reward as a primary inducement to beneficence." Had it been simply his aim to unmask the selfish theories which have perverted the Gospel, I should grant them worthy of his rebuke. One might ask, indeed, if by the philosophy of his own school self-love be the original motive of action, why "the desire of everlasting happiness," as Paley held, should be called immoral? But I do not allow that the religion of the Gospel accepts that ethics, whether in the fashion of Bentham or of a base theology. The Christianity which has preached the dread of hell instead of the fear of sin, or the payment of a heaven to come instead of the life of holiness, has been the root of the worst falsehoods in theory and in practice. It has led to all arbitrary devices of salvation, to self-deluded hope, and to spiritual sloth. But it is strange ignorance that such moralists should not know that the unselfish doctrine they profess to teach is that of the Gospel they reject. It tells us that the happiness we seek is begun here in the holiness of the heart, and that the punishment of sin is in its own self-retribution. We learn it not only from Him who taught us to lose our life, if we would find it, in unselfish duty, but in all from a Paul to a

Xavier, a Fénelon, a Leighton, who have breathed his spirit. This is the essence of Christian morality. It does not take away all motive of action here by denying that there is any reality beyond the present, but it offers us the highest and purest of motives in the undying nature of holiness itself.

And here, then, we reach the point where we can unmask the strange falsehood of this morality. What is it that it offers instead of the faith it rejects? What is this new ethics of our time? I do not wish to undervalue its aim. It is a far nobler code than that of the sensual school, from the Greek Epicurus to Helvetius. I honor the virtue of Mill, as I do the Stoic grandeur of Marcus Antoninus, when linked with the same religion of despair; but I none the less maintain that the position of such thinkers is as untrue to the moral facts of life as to those of science. What is this morality which shall replace a selfish Christianity? We will look at the clear statement of Mr. Mill. He believed that as mankind grows in culture, the selfish desire of personal immortality will pass into a love of the race, and this he thinks "a better religion than any ordinarily called by that title." We have here the favorite doctrine of the school. I will not pause to ask how this pure "altruism" is to come out of the original self-love, which by the principles of the school is the motive of human action. The question is a far deeper one than such moralists assume. It is not whether virtue demands an unselfish love; it is whether there can be any meaning in the word at all, unless we have the assurance of a reality beyond the present. Pleasure and pain are the only realities. Truth, honesty, purity, are abstractions. If we believe that there is no moral governor of the world, that we are only insects of a day in this busy ant-hill, that all our efforts after wisdom or goodness are to end with ourselves, so far as any assurance of their reality is given us, what then is virtue? what is vice? what the possibility of such belief in duty as to uphold an earnest man in self-sacrifice for a dream? It may be that a sincere mind like Mill will scorn the base maxim, "Eat and drink, for to-morrow we die;" but it is no less sure that his virtue will be only the inconsistency of a moral faith that survives the scepticism. It may be that culture will teach us to husband our pleasures temperately, as Epicurus did; but it is sure that the

virtue of the best will be a selfish ease, and the bulk of men will be of the "*grex Epicuri*." And what, again, is this life for the race, which we are told is nobler far than the wish of a personal immortality? What is our hope of the permanent triumph of good for a breed of insects, that sprang we know not whence, and will vanish we know not when or whither? What shall keep down the fierce or sad pessimism which even now is the outcome of this latest morality, and has its utterance in that despairing jest of Renan, "*Nous sommes exploités*"?

Yet I need go no further than to the essays of Mr. Mill for his refutation. It must have been in a mood of strange human weakness he wrote this: "The indulgence of hope with regard to the government of the universe and the destiny of man after death, while we have no ground for more than a hope, is legitimate and philosophically defensible." "It allays that sense of the irony of nature, so painful when we see the sacrifices of a wise and noble life culminating only to disappoint. The loftier aspirations are no longer checked by a sense of the insignificance of human life, by the disastrous feeling of not worth while." Scepticism is indeed its own antidote. Could a Christian divine have given a nobler statement? But what becomes of the theory? If the desire of personal immortality be baseless, and the love of the race more unselfish without it, it is the duty of the sage to crush it forever. This is the logic of the ethics; and the only marvel is, that a moral sense so true had not swept from his brain the cobweb of unbelief.

But I must briefly pass, in closing, to the later ideas of the school. It is in Mr. Harrison that this doctrine of immortality in the race has found its fullest expression. I shall not dwell at length on his two essays on "The Soul and the Future Life," because he has only repeated with less clearness and more rhetoric the scientific views of Mill; but he stands alone as the author of a new and brilliant discovery in ethics. It is his position, that "the notion of a spiritual entity, other than this organism, needs no refutation now;" and thus, "at death the existence of the complex entity, to which we attribute consciousness, undoubtedly—*i.e.*, for aught we know to the contrary—comes to an end." But we are now to admire the upbuilding of a religion on this physical basis. We are told that this is not

materialism, but that he looks with horror on the irreligious science that makes "devotion a molecular change in this or that convolution of gray pulp." He is prepared to give us a hope of immortality, that shall be at once free from superstition, yet satisfy every spiritual longing. And what is this secret? It is the perpetuity of life in the organisms of other human beings. Let no reader turn from this startling paradox; but listen to our new St. Paul. Although this personal compound is dissolved, yet the intellectual and moral activities do not end; nay, they are not dispersed like the elements of the body, but "they continue largely in their organic unities," and "pass into the mental and moral being of a similar organism." Thus the organic activity of Newton is more real after death. Is not this, he asks in rapture, a nobler idea than that of "a ceaseless psalmody in an immaterial heaven"? "The Christian looks to a permanence of consciousness, which can enjoy," this to "a permanence of activities, that give others happiness." Make it "the basis of philosophy and religion," and this doctrine of our continued life in the race will be the "greatest of motives."

Such is the doctrine of the essay, and we can only ask, after much pondering, what does it mean? We can understand Mr. Mill's plain English of the influence of a good man after death. But what, we say with Socrátēs, what, O wonderful man! is this intellectual and moral activity, which, after the complex organism of nerves and cells and thought and feeling is decomposed, continues in its organic unity in a similar organism? Is it personal? if so, how can it pass into a second personality? Is it impersonal? how, then, can it continue in its organic unity? Are there several minds in one conscious entity? The Hindu idea of transmigration has its perplexities; but it is science compared with this. If this subject which is object, this personal impersonality, and impersonal personality, this me which is not me, and not me which is me, if this be the basis of the new alliance between science and religion, we may indeed grant that "ignorance is the mother of devotion." It is neither science nor religion. We could have wished that another Socrates had been at the symposium held over this essay; but certainly the dissecting-knife of Professor Huxley, no Socrates indeed, yet a keen surgeon, went to the medulla of it. "It is a

half-breed between science and theology; and, like most half-breeds, with the faults of both parents and the virtues of neither." Nothing can better describe it than the author's phrase touching the Christian doctrine: it is "a matter for dithyrambic hypotheses and evasive tropes." But we will stay no longer on this criticism. We can leave it with the comforting thought that at least our new scientists will teach us not to mistake for a lofty ethics a trick of speech, but to accept on the one hand the truth of a personal resurrection, or the plain fact that there is no life beyond the decaying body. This is the outcome of the philosophy, which boasts itself to be the flower-*erage* of all the knowledge of the centuries. It can give us at last only the dream of an immortality in the race, yet the race itself is but the series of mortal births into a world, which knows nothing of the future save the one certainty of death; nothing of our destiny save a struggle after a wisdom that ends in annihilation. Modern scepticism is its own best refutation. Its science is a false reading of the laws of organic life, and its ethics are the ethics of despair.

Yet as I close this essay, it will be, I trust, to leave the reader not only with the feeling that our Christian faith has nothing to fear, but that we have much to hope from the study of this great subject. If I have proved any thing, it is that science itself will, by its own just method, guide the mind of our time out of this dreary nihilism. The better knowledge of physical laws will lead to that of the intellectual and moral life. The Christian doctrine in its turn will be purged of the misty notions, and yet more of the selfish morality which have obscured it. I cannot doubt that this is as needful for the cure of scepticism as any direct attacks. And thus, last of all, I am persuaded, we shall learn the deeper lesson which this controversy should give us. It has always seemed to me an admirable logic in Cousin, when he proves that atheism is impossible in the nature of human thought, and that the sophistry of Lucretius, if we examine it, admits the Infinite Cause it verbally denies. As we have thus read the pages of Mr. Mill, vast as the chasm seems between him and Christianity, we have found the best answers to his theory in the admissions of his moral feel-

ing, which clung to the pure precepts of a Gospel he denied, and even held the hope of a future a source of comfort. In that light we may believe that many minds are nearer to the truth than they suppose; that the scepticism of our time is but a passing phase of thought; and that the faith which theories never gave, and can never take away, will abide as undying as the moral nature of man.

E. A. WASHBURN.

GOD'S THREEFOLD REVELATION OF HIMSELF;

IN THE UNIVERSE, IN MAN'S CONSCIENCE AND MORAL
NATURE, AND IN THE INCARNATION.

THERE is a widespread idea that a revelation of God to man must consist of a number of abstract truths and moral precepts, which have been communicated to particular individuals by various forms of supernatural enlightenment, and by them have been imparted to others; and that the voucher of the truth of such a revelation is a miraculous attestation. Probably this is the conception formed by the majority of Christians of the character of the Christian Revelation. Yet, although the Scriptures profess to contain the record of many divine communications imparted to particular persons, they afford no justification for restricting the idea of a revelation to communications of this description. On the contrary, the Bible affirms that God has made three great revelations of himself to man, of a wholly different character—viz., those which are enumerated in the heading of this article. Of these, the first two have an existence independently of its contents; and of the third, the Gospels contain the record, in their narrative of the life, actions, teaching, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ our Lord. On these three revelations the remaining contents of the Bible may be described as a commentary, unfolding their meaning and practical import. These, for the sake of distinction, I shall designate objective revelations; and the supernatural illumination which was imparted to the human authors of the Bible for the above-named purpose I shall call subjective ones. My observations will be mainly directed to the elucidation of the former.

The clear recognition of the distinction between these two classes of revelations is of the utmost importance, because of its intimate bearing on theology, rendering it necessary that the inductive method of studying it should be largely substituted for the deductive. No less important is its bearing on the entire range of Christian evidences; for, if the essence of Christianity, as distinct from its adjuncts, consists in the person and work of Jesus Christ our Lord, it will bring the real points of controversy between Christians and unbelievers within definite limits, instead of presenting, as they now do, an indefinitely extended front to the attacks of its assailants.

We must begin the consideration of this question by assuming that there is a God who is able to reveal himself, who is the Creator of all things, a moral Being, and not a mere impersonal force; and that he has endowed man with faculties which render him capable of attaining an adequate knowledge of his character and perfections. Scientific unbelief will, of course, affirm that this is quietly to assume the very point which we are bound to prove. I acknowledge, if we view the question as a purely philosophical one, that it is so; but I make this assumption under the firm conviction that, notwithstanding all the assaults of philosophical unbelief on this great truth, an overwhelming majority of men, including vast numbers of the wisest and the best, will ever be of opinion that the evidence on which the great principles of Theism rest, even if it does not satisfy all the demands of the speculative intellect, is amply sufficient to satisfy the requirements of our entire being. It is perfectly true, that it is an evidence which we cannot weigh in scales, or verify by experiment; but in this it only shares the fate of a vast preponderance of our practical knowledge. Minds of a peculiar structure may easily become hopelessly perplexed in mazes of impalpable metaphysical reasonings, about the contradictions which are alleged to exist in the conceptions of the infinite, the absolute, and the first cause, that of a personal God, and of a multitude of other profound speculations of philosophy. To others the loud affirmations of men eminent in one or more departments of science, who frequently favor us with oracular utterances on points which lie outside the limits of their special studies, may occasion perplexity. But the

overwhelming majority of men will be guided in their beliefs, not by the dictates of abstract philosophy, but by sound common-sense. With them the great practical question will ever be a very simple one, which may be stated thus: The universe, with its order and adaptations in numbers past all comprehension, is an existing fact. This being so, there can be only two alternatives respecting its origin: either its order and countless adaptations must have resulted from the eternal action and counter action of a number of blind forces, which have produced its harmonies by a succession of processes which defy the powers of the human mind to conceive; and its endless varieties of living organisms with their marvellous adaptations must have originated from a ceaseless struggle between them and their environment; and the adjustment of the former to the latter, without the intervention of a superintending mind; or they must have owed their origin to a Being who was possessed of power and wisdom adequate to have effected this mighty work. When the alternative is thus simply presented to the ordinary common-sense of mankind, there will be no hesitation on which side it will pronounce the balance of probability to be overwhelming, notwithstanding all the speculations of philosophers, and the affirmations of scientific specialists that the existence of a God is incapable of being proved by their methods of investigation; and, therefore, that it is a mere uncertain theory, incapable of taking rank among the practical realities of life.

Let me now place my position clearly before the reader. The Bible affirms that God has made three objective revelations of himself, whereby his character and perfections have been gradually manifested to his intelligent creatures.

Of these the first is a revelation of his eternal power and Godhead through his varied activities in the created universe.

The second is a revelation of the great principles of moral obligation, made through man's conscience and moral constitution, from which we infer that its Author must be a moral Being.

The third is a revelation of his inmost moral perfections, which are only imperfectly displayed in the two former revelations, through that manifestation of the Son of God in human

nature which we usually designate the Incarnation. Of this revelation the four Gospels constitute the record.

But, in addition to these three objective revelations, the Bible affirms that it contains the record of a large number of subjective ones. Those recorded in the Old Testament imparted an illumination which was slowly and gradually progressive, being intended to prepare the way for the great revelation of God's moral and spiritual character made in the Incarnation. Those contained in the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles were not intended to set forth a body of systematized theology which should constitute Christianity. This is proved by the totally unsystematic form in which questions of doctrine are treated of in the Epistles, which may be briefly described as commentaries on the great facts recorded in the Gospels, called forth for the express purpose of meeting the requirements of those churches to whom they are addressed. This position is also proved by the fact that every one of them presupposes a Christianity already existing, the general character of which was well known to the individual members of these churches.

I now proceed to consider the first of these objective revelations—viz., the manifestation made by the universe to intelligent beings of the eternal power and Godhead of its Author. I shall use the term "universe," throughout this discussion, to include all those forces and phenomena into which the moral element does not enter; but when I speak of the "moral and spiritual world," I shall employ this expression to denote the forces, facts, and phenomena in which the principle of self-determination, as distinct from that of necessary agency, is manifested.

Assuming, then, that the universe, its order and adaptations, cannot possibly have been the result of the action of a number of blind forces struggling together during the eternity of the past, it follows that all the varied forms in which it has existed must be manifestations of the power and intelligence of its Creator, and consequently must realize the purposes of his will. Its forces must be in some very real sense his forces, and must work his pleasure. From this it follows that all its varied activities must be manifestations of something which

exists in him ; or, in other words, they must constitute revelations more or less perfect of his character and being.

No other theistic theory is tenable ; for there are only two possible alternatives :

Either the whole universe must be the result of the action of a single Creator, and consequently realize the purposes of his will ;

Or, those portions of it which fail to effect this must be due to the operation of some being who works independently of him.

This last inference has been attempted to be evaded by assuming that there was something in the material which the Creator used in its construction which he was unable to control, and that he has done his best with those which he had at his command. But this is only to present the same difficulty in a modified form ; for, if there is any thing intractable in the materials which the Creator has used in the formation of the universe, this opposing principle must be a power which exists independently of him, and which thwarts him in the execution of his purposes. Consequently, the universe as it exists must be the result of the operation of two opposing powers. Either way it involves a principle of Dualism.

This principle, however, is no necessary consequence of the admission that God cannot work contradictions ; for these exist only in our human conceptions, and not in the realities of things. Consequently, the inability to work them does not imply the objective existence of any opposing principle. Theories of this description have in all ages possessed great attractions to speculative thinkers. They were propounded in endless variety by an overwhelming majority of those ancient philosophers, to whom blank atheism and pantheism formed an unsatisfactory solution of the origin of things, for the purpose of accounting for the various forms of imperfection with which this world abounds. In these latter days, not to speak of others, Mr. J. S. Mill informs us in his autobiography that a dualistic theory presented considerable attractions to the sternly logical mind of his father, James Mill ; and his Posthumous Essays render it apparent that his greater son would gladly have taken refuge in a theory of this description, if it had been logically maintainable as a solution of the many difficulties which the

existence of evil presented to his mind. But all such theories are hopelessly dashed to pieces against the rocks of modern science, all the great discoveries of which prove, with unanimous voice, the essential unity of creation, and consequently of the principle (be it what it may) out of which it sprung. This is shown most remarkably in the wide-spread tendency of modern thought to resolve all the forces of the universe into the manifestation of a single force, displaying itself in various forms. But, as an explanation of the suffering which exists in the universe, Mr. Mill found it still more unsatisfactory; for it is a certain fact that the same organisms which produce pleasure likewise produce pain, and the unity of the organism proves the unity of its author. Consequently it is impossible to assign the one to the action of a benevolent power, and the other to that of a being who is destitute of that quality. Mr. Mill, therefore, preferred to adopt the theory, that if the universe testified to the existence of a Creator, it only affords proof of the existence of one whose attributes are limited. The value of this position I shall consider presently.

Nor are many of the theories which have been propounded by Christian philosophers to account for the existence of physical suffering one whit more satisfactory. I need only refer to the mass of suffering which is caused by imperfections in the structure of men and animals. A popular theory endeavors to account for its existence by assuming that it was introduced into the world by the fall of man, and explains the possibility of the latter event as a necessary consequence of his being created a free agent. But as geological science has proved it to be an indubitable fact, that suffering existed in this world for ages anterior to the appearance of man in it, this theory is in collision with unquestionable facts. Nor had it ever the smallest logical value; for as suffering arises from the constitution of nature, the assumption that it was introduced by the event in question involves the presence and energetic action in nature of a power independent of God, who has been capable of remodelling it from one end to the other. Consequently, if we assume that the existence of suffering in the universe formed no part of the Creator's plans, we are compelled to fall back on some form of the dualistic theory, or to assume that the Creator, by a direct

interposition, has reconstructed the entire constitution of things. The truth is, that solutions of this kind leave us precisely where they find us.

From these considerations it follows, that the only real solution of these difficulties is to allow that God's creative plan must have contemplated the creation of a universe not perfect from its commencement, but one slowly and gradually advancing towards perfection ; and consequently, that the existence both of suffering and imperfection in it formed an original portion of his creative scheme, as part of the discipline necessary for the gradual growth of moral agents to higher degrees of perfection. This being so, the facts of the universe as we behold them are quite consistent with the assumption that it is the work of a perfect Creator.

Nor is there any real difficulty in this assumption, for if the principle were not true, it is evident that the Creator could not be a progressive worker. The assumption that a perfect Creator must at once create a universe perfect in all its parts, would render it necessary that he should produce one in which progress would be impossible. But whether such a universe would be an improvement on the present one is more than questionable ; for in such a case its Creator must have worked once for all in its production, and then have retired from every operation beyond what was necessary to maintain it in being. It follows, therefore, that a universe which is capable of indefinite progress is far more worthy of a perfect Creator than one in the production of which he has energized only once, and then has retired into inactivity for evermore. Such is the one which actually exists. This being so, the principles of theism compel us to arrive at the conclusion that the universe, in all the forms in which it has existed during the past, or it exists in the present, is the work of God, and exists in conformity with his pleasure. Consequently, those energies of God through which it was originally created, and through which his creative plan is gradually being worked out, must be revelations of him. The only possible alternative to this influence are the theories of agnosticism, which, while they affirm the existence of a primal force, which is the cause of all things, as a necessity of thought, declare that it lies absolutely beyond the limits of human knowledge, and

therefore is incapable of being formulated in thought. Consequently its God (for it frequently uses the language of theism) is a God who is unknown and unknowable, and therefore incapable of exerting any practical influence on man. The stronghold of this theory is the contradictions which are alleged to exist, when the pure intellect endeavors to grapple with the conceptions of the absolute, the infinite, and the first cause, as subsisting in a common entity, and the general inability of our finite minds to grasp the infinite. Such profound metaphysical questions it is impossible for me to discuss in these pages; nor is it necessary to do so, for they can never exert any appreciable influence on any but a few speculative intellects.

With respect, however, to the last objection, it may be as well to observe that, although we cannot grasp the infinite in its infinity, yet this by no means justifies the inference that we can attain no real knowledge of it. The proof of this is very simple. It is quite true that we can form no conception of an infinite number, or of infinite space. But infinite number and infinite space must be composed of finite numbers and finite space. Of these latter, however, we can form clear conceptions; and because they can be conceived of as running on to infinity, *i.e.*, as having no limits, this fact does not invalidate our conception of either number or space. If we apply the same principles to God, the same results will follow.

But with respect to the theory generally, while it appears that the first cause of the universe cannot be formulated in thought, and therefore that we can know nothing respecting it, it follows that all existing forces are manifestations of it. But of these latter we know much; therefore we can certainly know something about the former. In fact, the perusal of the works of such Agnostics as Mr. H. Spencer and Mr. Fiske proves that they consider that they know a great deal about it, and that the universe reveals something about this power which is real, though it may not be all that we desire.

If, then, the universe is a manifestation of the activities of God, there are only three possible theories as to the mode of the divine manifestation made in it.

Either God must be everywhere energizing in its forces; or,

in other words, while existing independently of the universe, he must be immanent in it.

Or, some other being must interfere concurrently with him: a supposition which involves the principle of dualism.

Or, he has created it as a piece of mechanism which, after he has once set in motion, is so perfect as to render all further supervision of it needless, and therefore he continues a calm spectator of its operations, while from its direct control he has retired forever.

There is one other possible theory: that the universe is a machine, in the operations of which God occasionally intervenes for the purpose of mending it, when it gets out of working order. To mention it, will be its sufficient condemnation.

The last of these three theories has been adopted by a numerous class of theists, partly for the purpose of accounting for the difficulties above referred to, and partly as affording an explanation of the unquestionable fact that as far as scientific observation has penetrated, no trace can be discovered of any interference from without of the forces of nature. There can be no doubt that there is a widespread tendency in modern scientific speculation, even where it admits the existence of an intelligent Creator, to relegate him to the greatest possible distance from his works. We may express this aspect of thought by a slight modification in the language of the prophet of old, "Am I a God at hand," says he, "and not a God afar off? Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him, saith the Lord? Do not I fill heaven and earth, saith the Lord?" Many modern scientific theists would put the question thus: I am a God afar off, and can I be a God near at hand? Must I not dwell in some portion of the universe remote from human vision, where I need not be immanent in those forces which come under man's observation, or be present in its mechanism? A theory closely analogous to this is propounded by the authors of "The Unseen Universe," both of whom are theists, but who affirm that it is the duty of science to remove the Creator to the greatest possible distance from his visible works, and to contemplate him as standing at the end of a long line of pillars remote from the visible creation. This theory has been

propounded for the purpose of escaping from the difficulties which scientific men suppose to underlie the idea of an intelligent Creator, who is also a moral Being, who is constantly present and energizing in the forces of the material universe. But, I ask, does such a theory really solve one single difficulty, intellectual or moral? If God is the Author of the universe, he must be responsible for all its developments during the past or in the present, whether he be a God afar off or nigh at hand, whether the visible universe be a mere machine, or he be continually energizing in its forces. Surely the one duty of scientific investigation is the discovery of truth. When science has investigated its phenomena, and the action of its forces, it is its duty to pause, and not to enter on questions which belong to a higher philosophy; for a rational theism must not only be capable of satisfying the demands of our intellects, but also those of our moral and spiritual being.

As the second of these theories, when carried out to its legitimate consequences, involves some one of the many aspects of dualism, I need not further discuss it.

We are thrown back, therefore, on the first, that while God is distinct from the universe and independent of it, he is yet always immanent in its forces, upholding them in being, and controlling them in such a manner that they realize the purposes of his pleasure. This theory satisfies the demands of reason far better than the mechanical one. When our conception of force is subjected to a philosophical analysis, we can arrive at no conception of an ultimate force, except as originating in volition. It is very convenient for the purposes of scientific investigation to speak of force as if it were an independent existence, or as a property of matter, or as a mode of motion. No error follows from such a use of language, as long as we keep in mind that we use such terms as symbols of thought only, and not as denoting things which have an objective existence. But if we inquire whence has the idea of force originated, the answer must be that it has been derived from our consciousness of ourselves as self-originating causes. Our primary conception of force is, that which intervenes between our purpose to will a thing, and the accomplishment of the result. This conception has been metaphorically applied to those agencies

through the action of which the changes in external nature are effected. But, as far as we know any thing of its real nature, it always originates in an act of intelligent volition. It follows, therefore, that the forces of nature must ultimately resolve themselves into the action of the will of an intelligent Creator, who is immanent in them, who controls them, for the effectuation of the purposes of his pleasure, and apart from whose will they can have no existence.

If the previous reasonings are correct, it follows that all the activities of the universe during the past and in the present must be manifestations of the energies of God; and in them he must ever be engaged in realizing the purposes of his creative and providential scheme. From this it further results, that the universe must be an objective revelation of God to those beings who are endowed with powers capable of investigating its nature, its forces, and the laws of their activity; and consequently every addition to our knowledge of its constitution is an enlargement of the information which this revelation is calculated to impart to us.

Let it be observed that this position is quite independent of any particular theory as to the mode in which God has operated in his creative work. All that is necessary for the purposes of theism is, that, whatever theory we adopt as the true explanation of its phenomena, he should be immanent in its forces; and whether he has acted in accordance with some theory of evolution, or by what has been designated immediate creation, is a matter of indifference, as far as the subject we are now considering is concerned. The outcry which has been raised against all theories of evolution, as if they are necessarily atheistic or pantheistic, is, to say the least of it, unwise. The only ones which are so are those which deliberately attempt to construct the universe, with all its wonders, without the intervention of intelligence.

A theism such as that above laid down is beyond all reasonable question the theism of the Bible. It is that adopted by every one of the writers of the Old Testament, who habitually view the activities of nature as manifestations of the energies of God. To this, psalmists and prophets, whether they write in prose or poetry, alike testify in almost every page. Wherever

second causes are referred to, God is invariably viewed as present and energizing in them. It is an error to say, as many unbelievers are in the habit of affirming, that the writers of the Old Testament represent God as ever interfering with the forces of nature; on the contrary, they describe him as always acting in them, and never absent from them. Nor is the same idea less distinctly set forth in the New Testament, although it is occupied with a very different subject—viz., God's revelation of himself in Christ. Thus our Lord affirms that "a sparrow does not fall to the ground without his Father;" and St. Paul not only declares that the universe is such a manifestation of eternal power and Godhead as to render those who fail to recognize it without excuse, but he enunciates the truth for which I am contending, in his well-known words: "In Him we live, and move, and have our being." According to his theism, therefore, God, while he exists independently of his works, is ever immanent in them.

What, then, is the testimony which the universe bears to God? I must answer this question very briefly.

1st, It witnesses to his existence.

2d. It testifies that the Being who made it must possess power and wisdom which are immensely great.

This brings us face to face with the objection, which of all modern writers has perhaps been most forcibly stated by Mr. Mill, that even if we arrive at the conclusion that the universe affords proof of the existence of a Creator, yet it by no means proves that his power or wisdom must be infinite; but that all it can assure us of is, that he must possess power and wisdom which were adequate for its construction. But with all respect for so high an authority, reasonings of this kind are little better than a useless expenditure of ingenuity. Whatever force they may exert on a very small minority of peculiarly constructed minds, that power which has originated and maintains in existence this universe of being, the vastness of which is such that the mightiest intellect of man utterly fails to assign limits to its immensity, must appear to the overwhelming majority of mankind to be so incomprehensibly vast as to deprive the question of whether it fully realizes our conception of the infinite, of the smallest practical importance. One thing is cer-

tain, such a power, if it is united with holiness, demands from man the feelings of wonder, reverence, and adoration.

But the apparent imperfection of things as they exist is a far more serious objection. From this the general inference has been drawn, that God has made them thus because he could not have made them otherwise. But when we pass from the abstract into the concrete, and examine any number of such apparent imperfections and compare them with the displays of power and wisdom which must have produced the mighty whole, it becomes evident, that to whatever cause they may be assigned, it cannot be owing to a deficiency of power or wisdom that they have been constructed thus, but that it must have been to effect some purpose which lies beyond the reach of our intellectual vision. Nor is this mode of viewing the question unreasonable; for when we consider the vast scheme of which the universe must be the development, it is strictly rational to assume that things must exist in it which lie beyond the limits of man's intellect to fathom. Again, it is not necessary to be able to unravel every secret of the Creator's plan before we can arrive at the conclusion that his power and wisdom must be for all practical purposes unlimited.

3d. The universe testifies to the fact that order is a principle inherent in the divine mind; and that in all his activities he acts not capriciously, or by fitful interventions, but that he carries out his purposes in a course of action which is regulated in conformity with invariable law. Hence it bears witness to the immutable character of its Creator.

4th. The sentient portion of creation affords testimony to his benevolence, though here I agree with Mr. Mill that it does not prove that his benevolence is perfect. Most thoughtful men will arrive at the conclusion that his picture of the amount of suffering not arising from moral causes which is endured by this portion of creation is drawn in colors which are unduly dark, and that, on the contrary, the preponderance of happiness over suffering is out of all proportion great. Still I allow that a dark cloud overhangs this portion of the Creator's works, which can only be expelled by our attaining a wider and a more comprehensive view of the divine plan. The testimony, there-

fore, which this portion of creation gives to the character of its Author is, that while it affirms that his benevolence is great, it is inadequate to prove that it is the sole regulating attribute of his being.

5th. Respecting the moral character of the Creator, the forces which energize in the material and sentient universe are silent. In fact, a moral revelation was impossible until a Being was introduced into the world who was a moral agent ; for such a manifestation can only be made in beings who are capable of morality. Up to this point, God's action in nature had been exclusively carried on through forces which energize in conformity with invariable laws, but these can disclose nothing about his moral character. This is true even of the highest forms of animal life ; for although such beings can discriminate between one object of desire and another, and within certain limits they can exercise a kind of intellectual choice, none of their actions exhibit that power of self-determination, without which responsibility, which constitutes the great point of demarcation between necessary and moral agency, is impossible. The only moral quality which can be manifested in them is benevolence ; but respecting the holiness, justice, mercy, and truthfulness of their Author, in a word, every thing whereby we could learn his moral character, they are silent. Disclosures of this kind can only be made through a being who was capable of morality. Man's conscience and moral nature constitute such a revelation. Let us consider its nature and character.

I must first lay down the broad distinctions which discriminate moral from necessary agents :

1st. Moral agents are those which possess in themselves a power of self-determination. No being destitute of this power can be a moral agent.

2d. The law which regulates moral agency may be briefly expressed by the words "I ought so to do." Moral agency, therefore, presupposes an ideal, at the realization of which the moral being is bound to aim. The idea of necessary agency is expressed by the terms "must," "cannot be otherwise ;" and, therefore, it can aim at no ideal.

3d. The conception of moral agency is inseparably bound up with a consciousness of freedom to choose one out of many

courses of action on the part of the agent. In all other agency this consciousness is wanting.

The reasons for believing in the existence of moral as distinct from necessary agency are very simple, and may be briefly stated thus :

1st. We have the direct testimony of our consciousness that we possess this power of self-determination. This testimony forms the highest of human certitudes, and into it all others must be ultimately resolved.

2d. All men, even those who deny the existence of free agency, invariably act on the assumption of its truth. Unless this were so, the whole course of human action would come to a standstill, and be dissolved.

3d. Its reality is affirmed by the universal experience of mankind, as that experience is embodied in the forms of language, which constitute a register of the innermost convictions of mankind. Nothing can be more certain than that the structure of language proves that languages have been formed by beings who believed in their own freedom ; and whether this belief was conscious, or only implicit, it makes no difference to the present argument.

4th. The recognition of responsibility in some form or other is universal among mankind, and is testified to by every part of the complex relationships of social life. Its practical denial would involve the dissolution of society itself.

The testimony which consciousness renders to the fact of our responsibility is one which it is impossible to overrate. We feel and know that we are responsible agents. But what does responsibility imply? The answer to this question is not doubtful. It involves the power to choose between two different courses of action. Where no such power exists in an agent, he is incapable of praise or blame ; the action which he cannot help is his misfortune, not his fault. To the reality of this distinction we have not only the universal testimony of mankind, but the direct witness of our own consciousness. We are directly conscious that we are the originating causes of two wholly different classes of events, one of which we cannot help, and the other, which we can. Let me illustrate my meaning by an example: Certain portions of our bodily frame act quite

independently of our wills. Over these we can exercise no control. When they get out of order from purely physical causes, although they occasion us the greatest inconvenience, we never think of blaming ourselves for the result. But if, on the other hand, the mischief has been occasioned by our own carelessness or intemperance, or in fact any cause over which we can exert control, the feeling of self-condemnation immediately arises. Our consciousness, therefore, directly discriminates between two classes of actions, of one of which we feel ourselves to be the self-originating causes, and the other, over which we exert no control. For the one we attach to ourselves blame, because we were the voluntary agents, and therefore responsible for their origination; and from the other we free ourselves from all responsibility, because we were incapable of exerting control over them. This constitutes a certitude which cannot be surpassed by that of those axioms on which all reasoning is founded.

These four considerations afford the highest certitude that man differs from other beings in that he possesses something within him which liberates him from the iron law of necessity, and constitutes him a free agent—that is, a moral being. Hence it follows, that if man is a moral being, he that made him must be so likewise, and that in the structure of man's moral constitution he has made a manifestation of his own moral character. If the possession of a moral nature by man does not prove that the God who made him must be a moral Being, then either the idea of freedom must be a delusion, or else free agency can be developed out of that which is necessary; the power of self-determination out of that which is devoid of it; the conception of "Ought to do so" out of "Must" and "Cannot help so acting;" and, in a word, our moral nature and moral consciousness out of that which is alike devoid of consciousness and morality.

As the existence of a moral nature in man forms the very key of the position of rational theism, we need not wonder that modern unbelief has concentrated all its power in attempting to explain away its reality. Numerous, however, as are the theories which it has propounded for this purpose, they resolve themselves into two principles:

First. That the idea of human freedom is nothing else than necessity in disguise.

Secondly. That man's intellectual and moral nature has been evolved out of elements which in their primary forms were destitute of intellect and morality.

Both theories in fact, when expressed in simple terms, resolve themselves into the following affirmation: That the phenomena of life, intellect, and morality are merely modes of motion, and the result of different arrangements of the primary particles of matter.

In behalf of this first theory it has been argued that the idea that man exercises any self-determining power over his own actions is a delusion, and that in reality the actions which we call moral are as necessary as the phenomena of matter. In support of this position it is affirmed that man cannot help acting in conformity with the dictates of the most powerful motive, and that that which we designate volition exerts no appreciable influence on the sum total of human actions. It will be sufficient to say of such a theory, that although it has been attempted to be bolstered up by an enormous mass of abstract reasonings, and by arrays of facts tabulated in the form of averages,¹ it is hopelessly dashed to pieces against the intuitions of consciousness and the facts of life. No amount of reasoning will avail to prove that we are necessary agents when our consciousness assures us that we are not, or to persuade us that virtue is impossible and responsibility a delusion.

The second theory involves all the difficulties of the first, and some which are peculiarly its own. If our moral being has been evolved in the manner which is presupposed, then it must be the result of arrangements of matter; and, consequently, unless we make the absurd assumption that some of these molecules possess a moral nature in themselves, we get again involved in the iron chain of necessity. But the distinction between moral agents and beings incapable of morality is, as I have said, not one of degree, but of kind. It is impossible, therefore, that the interval which separates the one from the other can be bridged over by those small variations which a

¹ See Buckle's "History of Civilization."

certain school of evolutionists propound as all that is necessary to account for the different forms of animal and vegetable life. The first moral agent who appeared on this earth was separated from the highest being who was not one, not by a narrow interval, but by a wide gulf. Can we believe that the moral being of which we are conscious is the mere product of a mass of matter, not one particle of which possessed a power of self-determination? But it will be unnecessary in reference to our present subject to argue the question further. It is sufficient that moral agents exist, as a matter of fact, whatever theory we adopt as to the particular manner of their production. If, therefore, there is a God, they must certainly be his work, through whatever agency he may have operated in their formation. This being so, they must exist in conformity with his pleasure; and consequently be a revelation of his character and purposes. The question for our consideration is, What does this revelation teach?

In investigating this subject, our appeal ought to be made, not to the conscience of a man in a state of moral degradation, but to that of one in the highest stage of elevation. This is the course which we should pursue in similar subjects of inquiry. If we wish to form a correct view of the ideal towards which the plan of the universe tends, we must contemplate it, not as it existed when there was nothing but nebulous matter, slowly consolidating into planets and suns, but in the highest stages of its advancement, which furnish the true key, which can alone enable us to unlock the secrets of the lower ones. In like manner, in investigating the nature and the powers of the human intellect, our appeal must be, not to the savage, who is incapable of counting seven, but to the intellectual giants of our race. The same principle is applicable, if we are endeavoring to ascertain what our moral nature really teaches, we must investigate it in its forms of greatest elevation, not in those of its lowest degradation. An inquiry into these latter as a starting-point through all the gradual stages of moral growth would be necessary, if we were investigating the genesis and development of man as a moral being; but in endeavoring to ascertain what are the teachings of conscience, it is evident that our appeal ought to be directed,

not to the lowest forms of degradation, but to the highest ones of moral elevation. Yet this principle has been generally overlooked in this controversy; and it has been affirmed that the utterances of conscience (which is only another word to express our moral reason) are uncertain guides to moral truth, because the consciences of individuals differ widely in their estimate of it, and the ideas of savages about duty are confined within very narrow limits. On the same principles, we might affirm that our intellects are worthless guides to intellectual truth, because there are savages who cannot count seven, and the judgments of mankind greatly differ on a multitude of intellectual problems.

Assuming, then, that if we wish to ascertain what are the real teachings of our conscience and moral sense, we must seek for them in elevated and not in degraded men, I observe—

First. They announce to man a law of duty, which is expressed in the conception conveyed in the words "I ought." This law is imperative, irrespective of all consequences. It reveals to us clearly that there is such a thing as duty, quite distinct from the consideration whether the act enjoined be agreeable to ourselves, and apart from all calculation of self-interest. Nay, more; it may demand the highest acts of self-sacrifice, even that of life itself; and there is something in man's moral nature that affirms that the sacrifice is due. Conscience, therefore, in unmistakable terms affirms that there is such a thing as duty, before the dictates of which every other impulse in man ought to bow. It may vary in its determinations as to what is duty in particular cases; but the history of human thought, as witnessed to by language, proves that the conception of it is inherent in a moral being.

This being so as a matter of fact, however we may account for its origin, the idea of obligation necessarily implies the existence of some being in whom obligation centres; for to say that it centres in ourselves is a misnomer. It is true that we sometimes say that "we owe a duty to ourselves;" but this is clearly a metaphorical expression. But, further, obligation implies responsibility, and responsibility one to whom we are responsible: in other words, obligation points to a moral agent, to whom we are responsible; for it is impossible to feel respon-

sibility to an impersonal force. From this it follows that it must centre in the Author of our moral nature, who must, therefore, be a moral Being.

From these considerations the following consequences result : The Being who has formed man's moral nature must possess in himself all the elements of that nature ; otherwise the principle of self-determination must have originated in something destitute of it, freedom in necessity, personality in impersonality, and the power of moral choice in necessary sequence. Hence, God must be a Being who is capable of self-determination, must be a Person ; in a word, must possess all those attributes which distinguish a moral from a necessary agent. Consequently, in all these respects our moral nature is a revelation of God.

Second. The consciences of all the elevated portions of our race concur in affirming the general reasonableness of the moral law. In this, Atheists, Pantheists, Agnostics, and Theists are agreed. In fact, the only thing necessary to make this universal among mankind is rational enlightenment. The precept, Do to others as you would that others in the same circumstances should do to you, becomes self-evident as a reasonable duty as soon as our reason clearly comprehends its terms. It is perceived, in fact, with all the self-evidence of a moral axiom. No amount of proof can add to its binding force, but it shines with an inherent self-illumination. This testimony of conscience, therefore, proves that the moral law must be the rule of the divine nature.

From these considerations I infer that as the material universe is a revelation of the eternal power and Godhead of its Author in various degrees of distinctness, so the moral universe is a similar revelation of his moral character, and affirms a moral law as obligatory on man. In using this language, however, I do not mean to imply that man's moral nature can be separated from the other complex portions of his being. Man does not consist of a bundle of separate faculties ; but his moral, intellectual, and animal nature are woven together into a complex unity, each acting and reacting on the other. Hence his moral perceptions have been frequently rendered imperfect by the deficiencies of his intellectual development, and still more frequently by the violence of his passions, not only darkening

the judgments of his intellect, but overbearing the decisions of his conscience. Hence it has come to pass that while conscience has proclaimed the obligation of the moral law, its power to enforce it, owing to the predominance of the lower portions of our nature, has been inadequate.

This revelation of God in conscience is not only presupposed from one end of the Bible to the other, but in numerous passages it is distinctly affirmed. Of these latter it will be sufficient to cite only one: "For when the Gentiles, which have not the law" (the context here proves that the word "law" is here used in a sense coextensive with "a written revelation"), do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another."

This passage is sufficiently explicit, being a distinct affirmation that the great principles of the moral law are revealed in the human conscience, quite independently of any supernatural illumination, which has been communicated to the minds of individuals. But, further, a large portion of the contents of the Bible are direct appeals to man's conscience and moral sense, and they are founded on the assumption that there is something in man which, when the great truths of the moral law are set before him, will at once recognize their reasonableness and affirm their obligation. Unless this were the case, all those appeals to conscience which are spread over the entire surface of Scripture might as well have been addressed to stocks or stones. "Why do ye not of yourselves judge that which is right?" says our Lord. This passage implies that the absence of that power is the result of a self-induced moral deterioration. Many Christian writers, with a view of affording stronger proof of the necessity of the Christian revelation, have endeavored to minimize to the utmost the amount of light which has been communicated by this revelation of God in conscience, and some have even affirmed that it is utterly obscure. But this line of reasoning has been most unwise: in the first place, because, as I have said, the teaching of the Bible is based on the directly contradictory supposition; secondly, because it is un-

true in fact, as is proved by the writings of the ancient philosophers and moralists, who, guided by the light of reason alone, have laid down the fundamental principles of moral obligation; thirdly, because it deprives the Christian revelation of the independent witness which is given to it by the conscience and the moral nature of man, Christianity being, in fact, its supplement and completion.

If it be objected that man's conscience and moral nature have not disclosed to him all moral truth, my answer is, that his reason and intellect have not discovered to him all intellectual truth. If again it be urged that its disclosures vary greatly in individuals, I reply that the same is no less true of their intellectual capacities. God's revelation of himself in the universe is plainly expressed; but it has taken man long ages before he has been able adequately to unravel its meaning. This has only been effected after careful study and the application of sound principles of investigation, by means of which its secrets have been gradually disclosed after many failures and errors. Why are not the same principles applicable to God's revelation of himself in the moral universe? His teaching in each requires careful study for its full appreciation, although its fundamental principles are obvious on the surface.

Further, while the conscience affirms that obedience to the moral law is man's reasonable duty, yet owing to the violence of his passions it has no sufficient strength to make it the regulative principle of his conduct, or to express the same idea in the language of St. Paul, "It is weak through the flesh." This affirmation of the apostle is fully sustained by the investigations of the philosophers and moralists of the ancient world. While they recognized the great principle of duty, their writings make it clear that they were acquainted with no power which was adequate to enforce it. All that they considered themselves able to effect by their teaching was to aid those already virtuously disposed in the practice of virtue; but they viewed the overwhelming majority of mankind as abandoned to be the hopeless prey of their appetites and passions. Nor has modern investigation succeeded in discovering any instrumentality whereby the regeneration of a morally degraded man can be effected. Hence the necessity of the revelation of

God in the person of Jesus Christ, the object of which is to impart to the moral law a power of sufficient strength to render it capable of dominating over man's entire being. My position may be briefly stated thus: God's revelation in conscience reveals a moral law as man's reasonable duty without communicating the power to make it dominate over the lower portions of his nature. His third revelation communicates the very power of which the former revelation was destitute. Its nature we will now consider. But before doing so, I must here clearly lay down the distinction between the two species of revelation of which the New Testament affirms that it contains the record. The first of these is a revelation of the divine character and perfections made in the person of Jesus Christ our Lord. The second consists of those discoveries of truth whereby the divine Spirit gradually enlightened the members of the Church as to the true character and import of this revelation. Of the former of these revelations, the Gospels contain the record. Of the latter, the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles. The one belongs to the class of objective, and the other of subjective revelations. As it is of the utmost importance that this distinction between the two classes of revelations which are contained in the New Testament should be clearly borne in mind, on account of its intimate bearing, not only on the study of theology, but on the whole range of Christian apologetics, the question, therefore, immediately arises: Is this distinction justified by the affirmations of the New Testament? As a full discussion of this subject would occupy the entire space at my command, I must refer those who wish to see it more fully treated, to the first supplement of my first Bampton Lecture, and for the importance of its bearing on the whole range of theology and apologetics, to the lectures themselves. All that I can do here will be to state briefly a few salient points.

1st. If St. John's gospel is admitted to be a portion of the canon, our Lord has made a number of the most definite affirmations that he, in his divine person, is the revelation of the Father. One citation must suffice. Philip says, "Lord, shew us the Father, and it sufficeth us." Our Lord replies, "Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me,

Philip? He that hath seen me hath seen the Father; and how sayest thou then, Shew us the Father? Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me?" Nothing can be clearer than that these words affirm that our Lord in his divine life, as it had been witnessed by Philip, was an objective revelation of the moral attributes of God.

2d. Equally express is the declaration of the apostle in the prologue of the Gospel and in the preface to the Epistle. It will be only necessary to cite the two first verses of the latter: "That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life; for the life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and shew unto you that eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us; that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you." Words could scarcely have been framed which could more definitely affirm that Jesus Christ in his incarnate person is the objective revelation of God.

3d. The affirmation that revelation is given in Jesus Christ is not only again and again made by St. Paul in express words, but the idea underlies the entire structure of his writings. Of the former I cite a single passage as an example: "For in Him dwells all the fulness of the Godhead bodily" (Col. 2 : 9). These words definitely affirm that the fulness of the divine perfections is manifested in the incarnate person of Him whom he elsewhere designates as the "image of the invisible God." But the extent in which this idea underlies the very structure of his epistles can only be appreciated by a careful study of them in reference to this very question; for there is scarcely a page in which it is not affirmed or implied. Three examples must suffice: "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself" (2 Cor. 5 : 19); "In whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge" (Col. 2 : 3); "The glory of God in the face (*i.e.*, the person) of Jesus Christ" (2 Cor. 4 : 6). These and innumerable other passages prove beyond the power of contradiction, that St. Paul's conception of Christianity was that its essence consisted in an objective revelation made in the Incarnate Person of the Son of God, through whom all the divine manifestations in creation and providence had taken place in former ages, and

in whom, through the Incarnation, he has made a discovery of those innermost perfections of his character which were only imperfectly revealed in his creative works and in the moral universe.

4th. Its objective character is further proved by the affirmations of the apostle, that the revelation of God in Christ was no afterthought of the divine mind, but that it existed in it coeval with his purpose of creation. The popular view of this subject on the contrary is, that it was a special intervention of God for the purpose of remedying the marring of his creative plan which was occasioned by the fall of man. But this was certainly not the view of it which was held by the apostle. On the contrary, he affirms that creation and redemption did not form two distinct schemes in the divine mind, but that they are parts of one and the same great comprehensive plan of divine manifestation, in which every thing was foreseen and perfectly provided for. Of these assertions, Rom. 16 : 25, 26, Eph. 3 : 8-11, Col. 1 : 12-22, Eph. 1, *passim*, are remarkable examples. In this last chapter, redemption is again and again ascribed to a purpose subsisting in the divine mind during the eternal ages, and gradually carried out in act during the ages of time. In fact, the entire Christology of the Pauline epistles is founded on the assumption that the place of the divine working, beginning with God's first creative act, carried on through the dispensations of Providence, and developed in the Incarnation, is a complete and perfect whole, of which the permission of moral evil must have formed an integral portion.

5th. The same consequence follows from the apostle's assertions respecting the effects which the revelation made in Jesus Christ will exert during future dispensations, and even on other beings than the human race. Thus he tells us (Eph. 1 : 10) that it is the divine purpose, "in the dispensation of the fulness of the times, to gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and on earth, even in him." To the same effect he writes in 1 Cor. 15 : 20, 28, that Jesus Christ will continue reigning until all things are placed in subjection under his feet. In passages such as these, the apostle affirms that the Christian revelation is destined to exert mighty influences in the ages of the future, and that it will form the common bond which will unite

the moral and spiritual worlds into one harmonious whole, in the same manner as the force of gravitation binds together the parts of the natural universe. A revelation which can exert such influences must evidently be an objective one, of which a living person, not a mere body of dogmatic teaching, constitutes the centre. From this we may safely draw the conclusion, that the mighty results of the Incarnation, which are spoken of by the apostle, will be the gradual working of the divinely attractive influence of the character of Him who uttered the memorable words, "I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me."

A similar result follows from the apostle's affirmation that the Christian revelation is a matter of supreme interest to other beings than man. A single citation must suffice as an illustration of his position. He is speaking of the high privilege conferred on him of preaching "the unsearchable riches of Christ; and to make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery, which from the beginning of the world (*ἀπὸ τῶν αἰώνων*, from the ages) hath been hid in God, who created all things by (*ἐν*, in) Jesus Christ: to the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known by the church the manifold wisdom of God, according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord."

Nothing can be more express than the assertions in this passage, that the revelation of God made in the person of Jesus Christ will be the means of communicating to other beings than men enlarged knowledge of "the manifold wisdom of God," and that it was God's eternal purpose to manifest this by means of the Incarnation. But the language of the apostle intimates that this knowledge will be largely disclosed by the study of the effects of the Incarnation on history, for he affirms that "the manifold wisdom of God" will be made known "through the church." From this the inference is certain, that the essence of the Christian revelation does not consist in a mass of dogmas or precepts, but in a body of objective facts, which are the proper subjects of study of the sanctified, rational intellect, and that in proportion as it is studied the knowledge of it will be gradually unfolded. These views, although pre-eminently Pauline, are not exclusively his, for St. Peter makes a similar affirma-

tion when, speaking of the mysteries of redemption, he says, "which things the angels desire to look into" (1 Peter 1:12). A revelation which is capable of this kind of study must necessarily be an objective one. It follows, therefore, that if we would understand the full import of the Christian revelation, we must abandon that narrow view of it which represents it as consisting merely of a body of doctrines and moral precepts, and study it as a great objective revelation of God, analogous to those made in creation and conscience, forming a manifestation of the innermost perfections of the divine character, which were only imperfectly disclosed in the two previous revelations. This, as is witnessed by every portion of the New Testament, forms the very essence and the innermost temple of Christianity, to which all its other teaching is subordinated.

This point being established, the following conclusion follows: If Jesus Christ be God manifest in the flesh, his various actions must be manifestations of the perfections of God, or, in other words, a revelation of his character. Hence it follows that the love of Jesus Christ must be a manifestation of that love which exists in God; his holiness, of God's holiness; his righteous indignation, of a corresponding attribute in God; his self-sacrifice unto death, of God's purpose of reconciling all things unto himself; and, in a word, his entire moral character, as manifested in his actions and teachings, of the moral character of God.

Assuming, therefore, the Incarnation to be a fact, it settles the much debated question whether our knowledge of God is absolute, or only relative; for if Jesus Christ is the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, such as is Jesus Christ such must be God. I have made this observation because the idea that we have only relative and not an absolute revelation of the divine perfections in the person of Jesus Christ would deprive it of all moral power to influence the human heart. We can only love that which is really, and not merely relatively, lovely; or, put trust in one whose attributes are really, and not merely relatively, to us worthy of our supremest confidence. What would become of the moral power of the precept, "Be ye holy, for I, the Lord your God, am holy," if our

conception of God's holiness was not as it exists in him, but only relatively to us?

It will be objected that the idea of an incarnation involves difficulties which are insurmountable. To discuss this question is incompatible with my present limits. I shall content myself, therefore, with simply observing that in reality there is no greater difficulty in the conception of an incarnation than there is in that of an infinite Being creating the finite out of nothing. Both belong to regions of thought into which the intellect of man cannot penetrate; but the conception of a God who is the Author of the finite universe, and yet as distinct from it, is essential to theism.

Let me here very briefly draw attention to the great purpose sought to be effected by this revelation. It is not merely a discovery of the divine perfections for the purpose of enlightening the understanding, but a manifestation of moral and spiritual power brought to bear on man's innermost being, as the great instrument for effecting his regeneration and moral and spiritual elevation. This forms the most important aspect, as it is presented to us by the writers of the New Testament. According to their teaching, Jesus Christ, in his divine person, forms the centre of all moral and spiritual obligation; and, as matter of fact, he has been the mightiest influence for good which has ever been brought to bear on mankind, immeasurably distancing that of all other powers united. To the reality of his regenerating and sanctifying power the history of the last eighteen centuries and a half bears a testimony which cannot be impeached. The spiritual influence which dwells in him has rescued multitudes of degraded men from their degradation, imparted strength to the imperfect, and elevated the holy to higher degrees of holiness. Still further, while his mighty influence has impressed itself indelibly on the civilization of all the progressive races of mankind, there is scarcely a nation of men so low and degraded on whom it is not able to exert an influence which is divinely attractive. The spiritual power which has been exerted by Jesus Christ has been a real and a mighty influence, account for it as we may. It has proved itself to be in fact what the writers of the New Testament affirm it to be, "the power of God unto salvation." Not merely a partial one,

capable of exerting an influence on a single race or nation, but one which is as universal as the family of man. After such a power the whole body of ancient philosophers, while they were deeply conscious of their need of it, vainly sighed. Conscience, while it affirmed the obligation of the moral law, was unable to enforce it against the violence of the passions. Yet the whole moral nature of man points to it as the ideal towards which it tends. Such a power it is the special glory of Christianity to have revealed in the person of Jesus Christ our Lord, who, in the words of Mr. Lecky, "has done more to regenerate and soften mankind than all the disquisitions of philosophers and all the exhortations of moralists."

I have now only in conclusion to add a few remarks on the important bearing of this view of the Christian revelation on theology and apologetics. If the divine person of Jesus Christ constitutes the essence of Christianity, theology must cease to be studied merely as a purely deductive science. On the contrary, a true Christian theology can only be arrived at as the result of a careful study of the facts of the Incarnation, and of its consequences as manifested in history during the eighteen centuries of the past, interpreted by the light imparted by those subordinate revelations of which the remaining writings of the New Testament constitute the record. To the theologian, therefore, the great objective revelation of God in Christ constitutes the innermost temple of Christianity; and his proper function is to study it in its great historic manifestations, to explain it, and to enforce it, as the mightiest moral and spiritual power which can be brought to bear on the conscience and on the heart.

Of equal importance is it to the Christian apologist. If the principles above laid down are sound, all that is necessary to prove Christianity to be a divine revelation is to establish the fact that a self-evidencing power manifests itself in Jesus Christ; that the influence exerted by him for good during the last eighteen centuries has distanced that of all great men united—an influence which he still continues to exert, eighteen hundred years after the termination of his earthly life; and that his teaching, which, if that of a mere man, must have been that of an uneducated peasant, has surpassed in profundity and

depth the combined wisdom of all the philosophers and moralists of the ancient world ; nor has the modern world produced his rival. If these positions can be established by an appeal to the facts of the past and of the present, the inference from them will be inevitable, that Christianity cannot be accounted for on the assumption that it has been the result of a mere evolution of the forces which energize in humanity ; but that the only rational account which can be given of its origin is, that it has been the result of a manifestation of the divine on the sphere of the human, in the person of Jesus Christ.

If the facts above referred to can be proved by historical evidence which is verifiable by the mass of ordinary men, it will effect a complete change in our mode of stating the Christian argument. The popular and hitherto approved mode of doing this has been by laying down that the proper attestation of a divine revelation is a number of miracles wrought for the express purpose of witnessing to its superhuman character ; and that these were the direct vouchers for the truth of its doctrinal and moral teaching. This renders necessary a long and complicated historical argument, for the purpose of proving that the miracles were actual occurrences, and that the belief in them was not due either to fraud or delusion. Hence it becomes requisite to prove that the Gospels were written by persons who were themselves eye-witnesses of the miracles, or who derived their narratives from those who were ; and that they were free from those various forms of mental hallucination which in subsequent times have unquestionably induced honest men to mistake subjective impressions for external realities. It will be readily seen that such a line of reasoning involves a long and complicated philosophical and historical investigation, of the validity of which comparatively few are competent judges. But if the above positions are correctly laid down, the order of stating the Christian argument must be reversed. The moral evidence to which I have referred, which has hitherto held a subordinate position to that of miracles, must be placed in the first rank, and that of miracles in the second.

But, further, the present line of our defence has been indefinitely extended over a wide range of philosophical, scientific, and historical questions, which expose a very extensive front to

the attacks of our assailants. Such a course, if not absolutely necessary, is a very dangerous one. But the line of argument above laid down enables us to concentrate the whole force of our defence on two definite issues—viz., that to which I have referred, and on the historic reality of the resurrection of our Lord, which the writers of the New Testament lay down as the great evidential miracle of Christianity. But if the superhuman character of our Lord can be firmly established on other grounds than a mere miraculous attestation, then it becomes far more probable that he was in the habit of performing those actions which we designate miracles, than that he performed none. Consequently, the *à priori* difficulty which is urged against miracles disappears in his particular case; and we may accept them on the same testimony as that on which we receive the great facts of history. This being so, it cannot be denied that the testimony of those epistles of St. Paul, the genuineness of which is allowed by an overwhelming majority of those critics who deny the authenticity of the other writings of the New Testament, affords a stronger attestation to the truth of the resurrection than that which can be adduced for any other event in the history of the past. If these two points, therefore, can be established, they constitute so firm an evidence of the divine origin of Christianity, that we need not disquiet ourselves about the array of difficulties with which this subject has been needlessly encumbered, but patiently wait for the solution of them which will be the result of the careful study of that three-fold revelation of himself which God has made in creation, in conscience, and in the person of Jesus Christ our Lord; which, when investigated on right principles, will be found not only to throw light on each other, but to constitute an harmonious whole.

C. A. Row.

THE DRIFT OF EUROPE, CHRISTIAN AND SOCIAL.¹

THE stirring events at Rome and Constantinople in the opening of the current year set loose again the tongues of the Cumming school of prophets—which had been silent since 1871—and the “times” of Daniel, the seals, trumpets, and vials of the Apocalypse, the beast and the false prophet, the dragon and the scarlet woman, Babylon and Armageddon, the mystic 666, were for the hundredth time paraded as witnesses for the imminent destruction of the world by the second advent of Christ. And, indeed, never before in our time had Christ’s warning of the coming judgment such pregnant signs as in these days of wide-spread commercial depression and bankruptcy, of war, tumult, and suspicion; “wars and commotions, nation against nation, kingdom against kingdom, distress of nations with perplexity, the sea and the waves roaring, men’s hearts failing them for fear, and for looking after those things which are coming on the earth.” But the Europe which has survived all the political commotions consequent upon the French Revolution, and all the fortunes of war from Austerlitz and Jena to Waterloo and Sedan in the west, and from Silistria to Sebastopol and to Plevna in the east; and that has twice survived the humiliation of the Papacy—in the enforced captivity of Pius VII., and the fictitious captivity of Pius IX.—is not easily to be shaken by forebodings of destruction to Religion or the State. Events which have stirred the enthusiasm of prophecy call rather for the sober judgment of philosophy.

¹ Throughout this article, the term Europe is used exclusively for the European continent; Great Britain, with its insular position and distinctive civilization, being left out of account.

Through all the changes of governments, nations, dynasties, institutions, powers, which this eventful century has brought to pass in Europe, two factors have remained constant—the Church and Civil Society. The relations of these to each other; their several gains, losses, modifications, conflicts; their mutual influences, perils, tendencies, hopes; and the general drift of Europe, Christian and social—are matter of profound philosophic thought, as affecting the future of mankind. Setting aside theories and prejudices, we shall find that convulsions which to the prophetic pessimist had threatened the dissolution of European society, and the end, not only of “Antichrist,” but of the Christian dispensation itself, were but the throwing down of the scaffolding behind which Providence had been shaping a new moral and social order. A study of what has fallen and of what has arisen in the place of this, will be a surer guide to the future of society and religion in Europe than any interpretation of Biblical prophecies that lacks their inspiration.

To the philosophic observer the most telling evidence of the advance of Europe in the past fifty years is given in the disappearance of absolutism and the rise of constitutional governments, with a popular element more or less pronounced. Absolutism has vanished from the map of Europe, with the exception of Russia, which remains more Asiatic than European. In the Congress of Vienna (1815), which attempted to adjust the map of Europe to the “balance of power,” Great Britain was the only one of the great powers which could with any propriety be said to give the people a voice in the government; and even in Great Britain, at that period, popular representation in Parliament was very limited. Austria, Prussia, and Russia were absolute governments. France had indeed the form of a constitution—as with various fluctuations she had had since 1791.¹ But the term Constitution, as used on the continent of Europe during the reaction which followed the Napoleonic wars, should not be taken as synonymous with an active representative government of the people. On the 4th June, 1814,

¹ See the Constitutions of 14th September, 1791, 24th June, 1793, 22d August, 1795, 13th December, 1799, and the *Senatus-consulte* of the 18th May, 1804. Prussia received a Constitution in January, 1850; Austria, her “Fundamental Law” in December, 1867.

Louis XVIII. had promulgated his *Charte Constitutionnelle*; but this constitution, by the restrictions upon suffrage, conceded the franchise to only 80,000 in a population of 30,000,000; and these could vote only for electoral colleges which chose the deputies to the Chamber; and the presidents of these colleges were appointed by the king. The peers and the judges were created by the king, and could be removed only by his will. In the short interval before the return of Napoleon from Elba, the king had already shown himself as absolute a Bourbon as if no charter had existed.

Of the three smaller powers represented in the Congress of Vienna, Sweden had had a Diet since 1809; but the government was largely vested in the king and the Council of State. In Spain the Cortes had proclaimed a liberal constitution in March, 1812. But almost the first act of Ferdinand VII., in resuming the throne, was to promulgate a decree (May 4th, 1814) abolishing the Cortes and all their acts; and soon after the constitution was publicly burned. Portugal, the eighth of the powers which sat at Vienna as the arbiters of Europe, did not have the form of a constitution till 1826.

Among the *Continental* powers in that memorable Congress of 1815—which marks the beginning of the European cycle now just closed—the secondary power of Sweden was the only one which had a constitutional government representing the interests of the people. In the proposed congress at Berlin in 1878, for the readjustment of the Eastern Question, every power to be represented, Turkey included, is a constitutional government, with the solitary exception of Russia. In that fact lies the political progress of Europe from Waterloo to Plevna. That one fact chronicles the revolutions of France from kingdom to kingdom, to republic, to empire, to commune, to republic; the vicissitudes of Spain under dynasties domestic and foreign, republican manifestoes and civil war; the emancipation of Italy, and her unification in Rome through the overthrow of the temporal power of the pope; the insurrections of 1848 in Germany; the abortive insurrection of Hungary; and the subsequent humiliation of Austria, and her reconstruction after Königgrätz. That fact is the biography of Stein, of Thiers, of Prim, of Cavour, of Deak, of Bismarck. Much more is it the

chronicle of Mazzini and Kossuth, of Victor Hugo and Karl Blind, and of the thousands of nameless patriots who, in the struggle for popular freedom, suffered in the dungeons of Florence, Rome, Naples, Venice, and the fortresses of Austria, Germany, and France, or toiled in exile in England and America—some of whom are now honored in the parliaments of Versailles, Buda-Pesth, Rome, Berlin, though to most liberty came only with death. Forty years ago, Silvio Pellico's story of his imprisonment moved the civilized world to horror of Austrian despotism in Lombardy. Even in Spain, so familiar with the cruelties of political and clerical absolutism, this refinement of tyranny was spoken of with a shudder. To-day both Italy and Austria are free to develop themselves under parliamentary institutions, and the name of Silvio Pellico adorns a street in the heart of Milan, adjoining the grand "Gallery of Victor Emanuel." When in 1815 at Paris the sovereigns of Russia, Prussia, and Austria signed that memorable convention, the "Holy Alliance," by which they declared their purpose of governing according to "the sublime truths taught by the eternal religion of the Holy Saviour," they spoke of themselves as "delegated by Providence to govern three branches of the same family, Austria, Prussia, and Russia," and declared that, "looking upon themselves, with regard to their subjects and their armies, as fathers of a family, they will govern them in that spirit of brotherhood with which they are animated for the protection of religion, peace, and justice."

This pompous declamation was put forth after the downfall of the first Napoleon, when "legitimacy" was made the salvation of Europe. Since the overthrow of the third Napoleon, there has existed an unwritten compact between the Emperors of Russia, Germany, and Austria, providing for a certain community of interest and of action in the affairs of Europe; yet not even the Czar of all the Russias would have the audacity to-day to proclaim himself, in the ear of Europe, the vicegerent of Providence for establishing the political and moral order of the continent. It is far more likely that the Czar will be compelled to follow the Sultan in granting parliamentary institutions and political reforms. He is perhaps even more sensitive to the opinions of the press and of parties, and more apprehensive of

popular demonstrations, than are the sovereigns of constitutional states. Come what may, in the modification of civil society in Europe, personal absolutism is at an end, from the Bay of Biscay to the Sea of Marmora. Hereditary sovereigns may cling to the fiction of "divine right," and, like the King of Prussia, may crown themselves in token of a direct commission from heaven; a usurper may take advantage of some popular commotion to install a despotism; but the principle of constitutional government and popular representation are too deeply planted to be displaced by any personal ruler, however cunning or bold. A Louis XIV., a Frederick the Great, a Napoleon Bonaparte, is no longer a possibility to European society. "*L'État c'est moi*," is as obsolete as the famous bull "*Unam sanctam*," which declared that "every human creature is subject to the Roman pope, and that none can be saved who doth not so believe."

It would be a rash inference from the repudiation of absolutism, that society in Europe is tending to republicanism. Outside of Switzerland and France there can hardly be said to be in any country of Europe a strong popular movement toward a republic; and in France it is too soon to determine whether the republic is definitively established by the national will, or is a temporary expedient between the rivalries of monarchical and imperial factions. Hitherto, the experience of republicanism in France has not been of a character to recommend the republic as a model to other nations of Europe. And, unhappily, the United States have utterly lost in Europe that influence for republican institutions which was so potent in the first half of the century. A costly civil war, heavy taxation, official corruption, high prices, the depression of industry and trade, the strifes of parties and classes, and, worst of all, a weakness for evading and repudiating debts, have estranged the liberals of Europe from the American republic, and have dispelled the illusion of the common people, that America was the paradise of the working-man. In countries which have already secured general suffrage, a popular legislature, and a responsible ministry, the liberals would have little to gain by substituting for the orderly succession of a constitutional sovereign the quadrennial strife of parties for a change in the executive head of the government. Liberal progress must lie rather

in the reform of laws and of local institutions, than in substituting the name of a republic for the reality of a representative government. And as for the masses, who are chiefly concerned about wages and taxes, the social democracy they crave is as far removed from a republic as is republicanism from absolutism. The one point made sure—the displacement of absolutism by popular constitutional government—names and forms are of secondary consequence to the future of free institutions in Europe.

Now that absolutism in the state no longer blocks the stream of progress, the drift of Europe is strongly toward the emancipation of civil society from ecclesiastical control. Autocracy had always in the Papacy either a jealous rival or a vigorous ally; and in either case the effect upon popular liberty was the same. If the Papacy was jealous of a prince, it was that the pope coveted a more absolute power over prince and people; if the Papacy upheld a prince, it was that spiritual despotism might be strengthened through political absolutism. An immediate effect of the abolition of the temporal power of the pope is that the head of the Roman Church no longer takes rank with sovereigns in discussing and determining the political affairs of Europe. No Catholic power, even, now thinks of inviting the pope to send a legate to a conference upon the Eastern Question, nor of looking to Rome for advice, much less for authority, upon any question of a political character.

To an absolute sovereign a strong alliance with the pope could be worth an army for keeping his people in subjection; but a constitutional sovereign finds it more important to court the favor of his people, even by forfeiting the good-will of the Papacy. This was the honest choice of Victor Emmanuel, and the nation ratified it by a homage to his memory never exceeded in the obsequies of a king. Since by the Syllabus and the assumption of Infallibility, Pius IX. set the Papacy in antagonism to all that distinguishes modern society, there has been a marked disposition, even in Catholic countries, to free political society from ecclesiastical control. This is shown in measures for the suppression or regulation of monasteries and ecclesiastical corporations, for withdrawing education from clerical influence, and for bringing the church under allegiance to the state. The

Italian clings to the church of his fathers, and would not have this shorn of its glories; he is proud of the Papacy as a symbol of the world-supremacy of Rome; yet he will suffer no meddling of priests in politics, and no dictation from the Vatican to the Quirinal. This curtailment of clerical interference in political affairs is not due to any abatement of political pretensions on the part of the Catholic hierarchy. Indeed, the Vatican Council enhanced these pretensions to a degree that necessitated a conflict of sovereignty with every government which would have its own authority respected by its subjects; and the proclamation of the infallibility of the pope stripped every official of the church of the last remnant of personal independence, and transformed him into an agent of the papal will for subjecting governments and peoples. To the state, as a "moral person," bound to follow justice and right, a certain ethical guidance from the teachers of religion is normal and needful. In times of national peril this influence has been most salutary in the United States—and there it has almost always been a leading power for freedom, integrity, and humanity. So long as the Roman Catholic Church shall stand, there will be thousands of its adherents in every land who will blindly obey the priest in politics and at the polls. Even in a republic this is one of the perversities of freedom itself. But clerical control in political affairs is henceforth doomed in Europe by the same causes which have banished absolutism from the state.

The relative decline of privileged orders and class prerogatives in the scale of European society, if less marked, is hardly less significant than the overthrow of absolutism and of clerical domination. Princes and prerogatives still hold their place in books of heraldry and court calendars; but in critical times it is the word of a minister, the vote of a parliament, the result of an election, that Europe waits to hear. Peoples are more than princes, parties than potentates. Since the French Revolution levelled all social distinctions, the attempt has been made again and again to reinstate in France an aristocracy either of birth as under the monarchy, or of preferment as under the empire; but, notwithstanding a Frenchman's innate affection for a title or a bit of ribbon, there is a charm in the motto "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," which no prerogative can lay.

Any aristocracy that may be built up in France can be but a children's card-house against the popular institution of the ballot-box. In Germany the cheapness of a "Von" has long been matter of ridicule; and the fortunes of war and the creation of the empire have so reduced the number of petty princes, that there are scarcely enough of these remaining to supply royal families with eligible suitors. Two of this class, with little beyond their titles to recommend them, were married in February at Berlin to princesses of the imperial family. The occasion brought together the aristocracy of Germany; and the visible splendors of the festival, the popular regard for the emperor and the crown prince, and the amiable qualities of the princesses, drew the eyes of the capital and of Germany with a curious sympathy toward this royal spectacle; yet all the while people were thinking and talking of what Bismarck should say the next day in Parliament upon the Eastern Question, in answer to an interpellation by the orator of the people. The princes serve for ornament—something to be gazed at; the parliament is looked to when any thing is to be done.

In the struggle of the sixteenth century with the Papacy, Luther looked to princes for countenance and support, and it was the league of princes that at last secured the Reformation to Germany. But in the struggle of to-day with Ultramontanism, the Emperor of Germany has looked not to a confederation of princes against Rome, but to his ministers and to parliament. The scales are turned. Bureaucracy and patronage in Prussia are yielding to direct representation and local autonomy. In Italy rank and title still serve to tickle the national vanity; but the spectre of the republic stands behind the aristocracy, ready to advance at any moment when the prerogative of birth should be asserted against the rights of manhood. Even in Spain nobility has been cheapened by the intrigues of factions, and in Austria by the jealousy of Hungary. Whatever the form of society, there must be some provision for the natural love of distinction and display. Democracies are not exempt from this infirmity of human nature. But European society has already reached a point where the table of affairs is provided and ordered by government as purveyor to the people, though sovereigns and princes may be retained to do the

honors, or as lay figures to lend a historic costume to the feast.

This brings into prominence the drift of European society toward national unity. As the map of Europe was settled by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the central belt from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, between the seventh and the twentieth degrees of east longitude, was divided into forty-eight distinct sovereignties for Germany and Italy alone. Of these, eight belonged to Italy and forty to Germany, including Austria. Seven different titles of sovereignty were represented in Germany: Kaiser, king, elector, grand duke, duke, prince, landgrave, and city; in Italy, king, pope, grand duke, duke, and the little republic of San Marino. These divisions gave occasion to unhappy domestic rivalries and contentions, and to mischievous foreign alliances. Germany and Italy were always open to invasion, and could at any time be made the battleground of Europe, through the alienation of petty states from each other, and the impossibility of a truly national sentiment under such territorial and political restrictions. Now this belt is occupied by two great nations—a united Germany, a united Italy—each based upon representative institutions, and pursuing with undivided aim its own industrial and political development, and the harmony of the two guaranteeing the peace and order of Europe. In Italy the national unity is simple and absolute. There is a single parliament representing the whole people, and all minor sovereignties have disappeared before the one constitutional king. In Germany, though the unity of the people is real and cordial, finding its appropriate expression through the *Reichstag*, yet the unity of the empire is a bit of complicated patchwork. The *Bundesrath*, which has both an initiative and a determinative voice upon measures of parliament, represents twenty-five local sovereignties; and the empire embraces four kingdoms and sundry duchies which still keep up their own interior administration. But the centripetal force of the empire preponderates more and more year by year, and the German people have become a nation with the consciousness of a new life upon their own soil and a new function in the politics of Europe. At the same time the humiliation of France through personal misrule has brought

out a fresh assertion of the national spirit, which is the most hopeful sign of vitality and growth which France has given since her first revolution. This rise of nationality in Europe marks the advance of the people from subjection to sovereignty. Political Europe is no longer a group of sovereigns, with territories and subjects as appendages to their rank and power; it is a family of nations whose organic life finds expression through the state. Even the stringent military service which so many states now exact, serves as a badge of citizenship, and enhances the life of the nation by the cost of its defence. The soldier's calling, which by turns has been the badge of feudal servitude, of despotic rule, of mercenary subjection, is now the mark of national unity and equality in burdens which the state imposes upon itself through the forms of law, and with honest though mistaken motives for the common weal. In the fact that war is no longer the game of princes but the defence of nations, Europe finds hope of peace.

That we have not sooner introduced popular education as a token of progress in European society is due to the fact that this is both cause and effect; and the contrasts of education upon the continent of Europe leave one in perplexity as to how far public education has stimulated political and social progress, and how far this progress, resulting from other causes, has encouraged public education. Americans of wide reading and travel no longer harbor the illusion—once the stock of Fourth of July oratory—that monarchs fear the spread of intelligence among their subjects, and that republics alone favor the general diffusion of knowledge. But so long as politicians in the United States who aspire to the Presidency indulge in such idle boasting, it is worth while to show how idle and pernicious it is. To-day nearly all the monarchies of Europe are in advance of the United States, in requiring that every district within their dominions shall maintain at least one public school, and in making the attendance of children at school obligatory up to a certain age, and through a prescribed course of study.¹

¹ Attendance upon the primary school, or its equivalent in private education, is compulsory in Prussia, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Those who have not access to the school laws of these several states, will find an excellent summary in the "Cyclopædia of Education," by Kiddle and Schem.

The century has not seen a sovereign more impregnated with the vice of absolutism, more averse to conceding a constitutional government, more set in the notion of personal government by divine right, than Frederick William III. of Prussia. He was one of the signers, if not the framer, of the "Holy Alliance"—one of the famous "three kings," who, though they made an ostentation of laying their crowns at the feet of Christ, were far from approving themselves to history as "the wise men" of their time. But after the bitter humiliations which Prussia had suffered from Napoleon, Frederick William III. looked for recovery to the intellectual elevation of the nation, and openly said, "Though we have lost territory, power, and prestige, still we must strive to regain what we have lost by acquiring intellectual and moral power; and, therefore, it is my strong desire and will to rehabilitate the nation by devoting the most earnest attention to the education of the masses of my people." Universal and obligatory schooling and universal and obligatory military service have made Prussia the leader of Germany, and Germany the arbiter of Europe. The theory that the citizen exists primarily for the state, and therefore the state must see to it that he is duly trained for all the services and duties which the government may exact of him, has made of political society in Prussia an intelligent machine, highly organized and wondrously effective, but still a machine, in which the care bestowed upon each particular part is made subservient to the working of the whole. The introduction of parliamentary institutions with popular suffrage, within the past thirty years, has given a new impetus to the education of the masses in Prussia, by enhancing their political importance; but it should not be forgotten that the theory of an absolute sovereign "educating the masses of his people" for the service of the state wrought out a more thorough and universal system of popular education than has been secured in the United States under the republican theory of the personal importance of the individual citizen.

Another popular illusion in the United States concerning education is worth correcting here—the assumption that education is the one panacea for the evils of society, the one qualification for active participation in government. That an average number of voters can be more relied upon to vote intelli-

gently if they can inform themselves by reading than if obliged to take all opinions at second hand will readily be granted ; yet the intelligence of a voter may depend quite as much upon what he reads as upon the fact that he can read at all. Hence there was little to be hoped for from general public education in Austria, when, by the concordat with the pope in 1855, the whole system of instruction was placed under the supervision and control of the clergy of the Roman Catholic Church. So, the "working man" in the United States reads only newspapers and pamphlets which teach that capital is his enemy, that a division of property is his right, and that it is the duty of the state to provide him with money, land, and home ; or if the "Granger" at the West reads only that banks, railways, and other corporations are oppressors of the farmer, and that government is bound to see that his produce is conveyed to market at rates below cost, his loans obtained below the normal rate of interest, and his debts paid in a "legal tender" below par ;—then to what extent has reading made him an intelligent voter, or lifted him above the Austrian or the Spaniard whose tuition is in the hands of his priest ? But though we cannot deify education as the "Saviour of Society," or find an exact measure of the intelligence and prosperity of a country in the percentage of its population who can read and write, nevertheless there is in popular education this grand element of hope for the future of society : that by reading, a broad free avenue is opened for the diffusion of knowledge, and knowledge, like light and air, once set free, diffuses itself. Hence the increase of popular education in Europe is both a sign and a promise of the renovation of political society. It may still be true in Austria, in France, in Spain, and even in Italy, that the apathy induced by long periods of repression, the stagnation of thought and inquiry within the Catholic Church by dogma and authority, and the limitations imposed upon the press by tyranny, tradition, or timidity, have caused the tangible fruits of popular education to fall below the legal provision made for it ; yet every new disclosure of the popular will, and notably just now in France and Italy, shows that knowledge is spreading itself by its own light, and that light carries health and vigor to political society.

For the old notion that ease and security in government de-

manded that the people should be kept in ignorance has succeeded the doctrine that the enlightenment of the people is the true support and defence of the state. Every government in Europe has openly declared for popular education as an obligation of the state to its citizens. Even the government of Turkey thirty years ago gave official encouragement to the schools of the various religious communities agglomerated within the empire, and in 1869 made a spasmodic effort to establish a general school system. And though this, like so many reforms in Turkey, has hardly gone beyond a project on paper, the bare project was a concession to the principle of popular education as the preserver and not the peril of the state. And Russia, too, within the last decade, has attempted to give universality to that system of primary instruction which had hitherto prevailed chiefly in great cities and in favored central districts. This accession of the Russian Government to the promoters of popular education by the state encourages the hope that the Czar is preparing a constitutional government for his subjects by preparing them to appreciate and administer a representative system.

Leaving Turkey out of the question, with the exception of Belgium, France, Holland, and Russia, every state in Europe now makes attendance upon the primary school—or its equivalent in private education—obligatory upon all children within a fixed term of years. The zeal of Austria for general education was quickened by the disaster of Königgrätz, which led to the reorganization of the empire, of the military system, and every department of the public service. The control of the clergy over the public schools was greatly abated, and primary instruction was made compulsory between the ages of 6 and 14. In Denmark, the compulsory school age is from 7 to 13, and attendance is enforced by fines. All Germany has now followed the example of Prussia in making the school obligatory. In Greece, school attendance is obligatory from 5 to 12; in Italy, from 6 to 14, enforced by fine. In Portugal, "every year the study commission publishes a list of all children of school age. The names of those parents who fail to have their children registered are read by the minister from the pulpit, and a list of them is nailed to the church door. Upon repeated offences, fines are imposed.

In the same manner, regular attendance is enforced."¹ In Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, attendance on the primary school is compulsory ; and the Russian Government has lately applied the system of compulsory attendance to the schools of St. Petersburg by way of experiment.

In Italy, the transition from the political tyranny of Bourbon, Hapsburg, and pope to the constitutional government of Victor Emmanuel has been so recent and rapid that the system of compulsory education has not yet brought forth its legitimate results, has not indeed been thoroughly set in order. Recent statistics show that in Italy there are in the schools but 70 in 1000 of the whole population, whereas in Denmark there are 135 in 1000, in Germany 152, and in Switzerland 155. France, which has not adopted the compulsory system, nevertheless has at school 131 in 1000 of her population, a marvellous increase since forty-five years ago. M. Guizot broached the scheme of public primary schools under the direction of the state. There are now in France upwards of 50,000 such schools, with more than three and a half million scholars.

In those countries where a school age is not fixed and made obligatory by law, it is made obligatory upon communes, corresponding to a school district in New England, to establish primary schools either at the cost of local taxation or by grants from the public treasury. And thus everywhere in Europe it is settled that the education of the people is a care of the state, and a primary education is brought within the reach of all, and in many states enjoined upon all. Thus, with absolutism abolished, clericalism curbed, caste and privilege curtailed, and education established, the cause of the people is fast being identified with European society.

Apart from schools, the democracy of Europe have had a training by experience which has both enlightened and sobered them. They have learned that society cannot be reconstructed in a day ; that, while political equality may be secured by law, social equality is a thing impossible to the nature of man ; that reform is better than revolution ; that theories of socialism and pronunciamientos of democracy cannot avail against the laws of trade and of labor that grow out of the wants of society, and

¹ Kiddle and Schem, *Cyclopædia*.

that represent not organized forces to be controlled by authority, nor the collective will of the community to be determined by the majority, but only the statistical agglomeration of myriads of individual wills ; in a word, the people are learning that liberty is a growth requiring time and care, and due regard to soil and climate and surrounding conditions ; that it may even grow best around and upon the whole framework of society, till it shall be strong enough to drop this and stand alone. In some conditions, liberty will thrive best if grafted into the old stock, drawing from this a vigor, tone, and flavor which one could not hope for by uprooting the old and planting anew.

Such is the better part of the education which the democracy of Europe have been learning since 1848. Few of the German revolutionists of that day would care to change the present order of things in Germany, where progress is assured under law, and the voice of the people is becoming more potent in parliament. Few of the Italian republicans of that time would care to overthrow the constitutional monarchy, if this shall continue to be administered in the good faith of Victor Emmanuel. The Paris Commune did not represent the true democracy of France ; and the elections of 1877 showed how the people have been sobered to a respect for order as the guaranty of liberty. Upon such a basis of experience popular education may erect a social structure that shall be enduring.

Parallel with the liberation of political society and the advance of popular education, the continent of Europe has witnessed also that industrial progress, and the consequent equalization of opportunity to the working-man, which in the last half century have been so remarkable in England and the United States. This enormous material development has not indeed been to the masses of society an unmixed good. Later on we shall show wherein the material civilization which the nineteenth century boasts, of necessity entails upon society evils hardly known to the Middle Ages. Every new application of science to the arts of life, every new invention substituting machinery for manual labor, must bear hard upon classes of workmen until society shall have increased its demand for the pro-

ducts of the new manufacture, and the workmen shall have learned to earn more with the machine than they once earned without it, or shall have taken up new occupations no less profitable than the old. But notwithstanding these drawbacks, the material progress of modern times has brought its most substantial benefits to the masses of society, and has tended especially to equalize their condition in respect of the comforts of life and of opportunities for advancement. With industry, prudence, and sobriety, the wages of the working-man enable him to share the comforts and enjoyments that were once possible only to the rich; while the increased facilities of education, travel, and other means of culture raise his children to a par with the nobility of former times in the means of personal improvement. The science of political economy, which concerns itself with the material prosperity of the nation, and seeks to enhance the comforts of society and of all its members, is a constant witness for the consideration which human life has attained in the view of philosophy and of the state. The abolition of slavery and serfdom; the growth of co-operation and arbitration between capital and labor; the care of legislation for health, safety, and comfort in mines and factories, and in the dwellings of laborers; the sensitiveness of governments to taxing the necessities of life or laying burdens upon the common people; the stupendous scale upon which governments and people encourage competitive exhibitions of industry and trade—these all show that labor, much more than the *man*, whom labor represents, has come to a position of influence, and even of honor in society, hardly dreamed of a century ago. “Industrial development” and “social amelioration,” once the watchwords of a few philanthropists and reformers, are now incorporated into the legislation of every civilized people.

That astute critic of society, H. Taine, has characterized this altered state of things in his comparison of old Italy with the new.¹

“Three quarters of the labor of humanity is now done by machinery, and the number of machines, like the perfectibility of processes, is constantly increasing. Manual labor diminishes in the same ratio, and consequently the number

¹ Taine’s “Italy: Florence and Venice,” chap. vi.

of thinking beings increases. We are accordingly exempt from the scourge which destroyed the Greek and Roman world—that is to say, the reduction of nine tenths of the human race to the condition of beasts of burden, overtasked and perishing, their destruction or gradual debasement allowing only a small number of the *élite* in each state to subsist. Almost all of the republics of Greece, and of ancient and modern Italy, have perished for want of citizens. At the present day, the machinery now substituted for subjects and slaves prepares multitudes of intelligent beings.

“In addition to this, the experimental and progressive sciences, having finally embraced in their domain moral and political affairs, and daily penetrating into education, transform the idea entertained by man of society and of life; from a militant brute who regards others as prey and their prosperity a danger, they transform him into a pacific being, who considers others as auxiliaries and their prosperity as an advantage. Every blade of wheat produced and every yard of cloth manufactured in England diminishes so much the more the price I pay for my wheat and for my cloth. It is for my interest, therefore, not only not to kill the Englishman who produces the wheat or manufactures the cloth, but to encourage him to produce and manufacture twice as much more.

“Never has human civilization encountered similar conditions. For this reason it is to be hoped that the civilization now existing, more solidly based than others, will not decay and melt away like the civilizations which have preceded it.”

The facts thus far presented would seem to indicate that political society in Europe is already beyond the drifting period, and has reached a stable if not a finished state of order, freedom, and equity; that it is no longer a privileged artificial construction, but a human institution reposing upon the rights and liberties of the people. With constitutional government, parliamentary representation, popular suffrage, religious liberty, universal education, the enfranchisement of labor, equality of rights and of opportunity—even woman having an unimpeded “right to labor,” to teach, and to talk—what is wanting to that which in America has always been held up as the ideal of democratic society? Alas for that ideal, when each successive step towards its realization seems to put farther off that perfection of humanity which social theorists had promised through rev-

¹ This does not hold absolutely. The whole civilized world is now suffering from over-production, and of course work and wages decline with the falling off in demand. Men can only eat and wear so much, and *too* much makes waste and trouble. Still the drift of M. Taine's argument is sound.

olution and reform ! One specific after another has been administered to the body politic—constitution, parliament, education, suffrage, liberty, have all been tried—yet the pessimist finds only symptoms of deterioration that threaten decay and dissolution. That European society is far from sound, that it has yet chronic evils to contend with, and occasionally exhibits violent and alarming symptoms, lies upon the surface. This is indeed a sign of the crisis through which political society everywhere is passing. But there is nothing in all this to qualify the view that the general drift of Europe is toward a better state of things, social and Christian. Some of the evils which remain, formidable as they are, it is within the power of society itself to throw off, or at least to hold in check, by its own action. Others belong to the ineffaceable elements and conditions of human existence, and these society can but hope to mitigate, though to keep them under control may demand an incessant warfare for its own life.

It is a great advance to have secured freedom of conscience and have liberated civil society from priestly domination. But *how* free the human mind from that tendency to superstition, that love of religious mystery, which shows itself even in cultivated circles and in the most enlightened times—which, for instance, for the miracles of the Middle Ages would substitute the fantasies of modern spiritualism ? It is a great advance to have secured freedom of scientific thought—to have reached an age in which a *Secchi*, as Director of the Observatory of the Roman College, could openly teach, as in harmony with religion, the very doctrines of nature for which Galileo was condemned. But with this triumph over dogmatism and bigotry, *how* to deliver the human mind from that skepticism which, in its reaction from superstition, is a tendency hardly less fatal to the search for truth ?

Now, these two tendencies, superstition and skepticism, divide in almost equal proportions the masses of European society. With the spread of general intelligence in the community, Roman Catholicism seems to address itself more and more boldly to the element of superstition in human nature, and to demand of its adherents a more absolute submission of reason and will to dogma and priestcraft. It was in the very face of peoples who

were thought to have come to their majority by the institution of constitutional government and popular education, that the first Ecumenical Council since the Reformation—heedless of the progress of three hundred years—put forth dogmas more arbitrary and absurd than those which drove Luther to revolt. And the same pontificate which promulgated the immaculate conception of the Virgin, the infallibility of the pope, and put its ban upon modern society and the state, received an unprecedented homage of gifts and pilgrimages from lands reputed to be free and enlightened, and witnessed also the revival of superstition and imposture on the stupendous scale of the pilgrimages to Lourdes, La Salette, and Marpingen.

On the other hand, the infidelity of the eighteenth century had died of inanition, as all purely negative skepticism must. The spirit of inquiry cannot long sustain itself upon *unbelief*. In some lands that era of infidelity was succeeded by an earnest revival of the religious spirit under various forms from Methodism to Mysticism. But the progress of physical research has revived the skeptical tendency in the form of materialism. And the materialism of a school of evolutionists is more dangerous than the infidelity of the Encyclopedists, in that it does profess to meet the yearning of the human spirit for the *Why* and *Wherefore* of things, and in denying a personal God does not leave the universe an utter blank, but finds in Nature enough to originate and to satisfy beings that are no longer conscious and accountable spirits, but agglomerated and dissolvable molecules. A most ominous tendency in European society is that of higher minds to dissociate philosophic and scientific thought, and of common minds to dissociate social reform from *religion*, as something quite outside alike of the intellectual and the practical in human life. And this calamity is heightened by the absence of any intelligent and persuasive religious zeal, whether in the university, the Church, or the family.

In Germany especially, the disputatious theology which for a long time deprived the pulpit of its fervor and power has produced in the community at large a state of indifference toward the Bible, the Church, and the system of Christian doctrine, except as family traditions or as political watchwords against Ultramontaniam. And this indifferentism is rather

hardened than relaxed by the revived orthodoxy of the pulpit, which expends its zeal more upon creeds and controversies than upon scientific thought and practical faith. Dr. Curtiss, in his recent plea for the divine authority of the Pentateuch, says, "It is claimed that Great Britain and the United States are far behind Germany in biblical criticism. While granting this, I trust that I may be pardoned for saying that which I have good evidence for believing in regard to England, and which I know in regard to America, that the Christian life in these countries, so far as human eyes can judge, is greatly in advance of that in Germany—a life which, with all its Christian activities and duties, can be more directly attributed to the reverence which men hold for the Scriptures than to any other cause."¹ Unfortunately of late in the United States so many church-wardens, deacons, Sunday-school superintendents, and "prominent Christians" have been sent to the penitentiary for fraud, forgery, perjury, and other crimes, that "Christian life in America," notwithstanding its periodical revivals and its spirit of evangelism, has lost its charm in the eyes of Europeans. We should be as slow to criticise their piety as to commend our own. Especially in social customs and in the observance of the Sabbath should we make large allowance for differences of climate and of race-temperament, and for the teachings of Luther, Calvin, and other continental reformers, who regarded the Sabbath of the Fourth Commandment as abolished by the Christian dispensation.² In Germany, France, Italy, is to be found, especially in families, a sincere if silent piety, which must command the respect and win the affection of even the most demonstrative and aggressive type of American Christianity. And one finds also benevolent and missionary activities which testify that everywhere the Christian life is one of self-denying service for mankind. Yet in regard to church-going, Bible-read-

¹ "The Levitical Priests." By Samuel Ives Curtiss.

² Much light is thrown upon the social uses of Sunday by the narrative in Luke xiv. A chief Pharisee made a great feast on the Sabbath day, to which many were bidden. Jesus had no scruple about going to such an entertainment. And when he healed the man who had the dropsy, he did not retort upon the Pharisees that this festival was a breach of the Sabbath.

ing, family prayer, and like symbols of positive faith and piety, there is among Protestants in Germany, especially the men, an indifference which it is hard to reconcile with any proper notion of a Christian people. In the city of Berlin, with a population of a million souls, there are barely seventy houses of worship, including Jewish synagogues as well as Protestant and Catholic churches, chapels, and suburban stations; and excepting on the days of church festivals, the majority of these churches are seldom half filled. Yet nobody seems to feel any concern or responsibility for this state of things. As for the community at large, religion seems to have no grip upon the conscience, no sway over the affections, no hold on the pocket, no place in the plans of life, and no control over its practices. - This is far from intimating that the common people are more wanting than others of their class elsewhere in virtue, integrity, fidelity, kindness; but their good qualities do not seem to spring from a sense of religious obligation or an impulse of religious feeling. To multitudes religion is just a thing of indifference; well enough for those who care for it, but in no way a necessity or an obligation to those who do not. As a political interest or a question of liberty, a church controversy may enlist the community at large; multitudes are willing to have the church remain an *attaché* of the state, because it has always stood there, and because on certain ceremonial and sentimental occasions it is convenient to have the church at hand. But aside from this, what the church teaches, what the church does, what the church needs, is to them of no concern.

With such indifferentism in the mass of its constituency, Protestant Christianity is feebly aroused against superstition and materialism. Now that the Turk is down, there is no place for a conflict of true and false religions, as when the Teutonic knights subdued the pagan Prussians, or the knights of Castile and Aragon drove out the Moors from Spain. Now that Protestantism and Catholicism have settled into their equalized positions with princes and peoples, the battle of the Reformation, as between a true and a false Christianity, cannot be renewed. Sects find too little encouragement, either from the laws or from the tastes and habits of the people, to stir the zeal of denominational propagandism in European society. And so it has

come to pass that Christianity, which should be the leader of society in ever-broadening lines of light, liberty, and love, seems to stand apart as a spectator of the contest between superstition and materialism for the control of the newly-emancipated peoples.

In Germany, it may be hoped that this indifferentism is but a passing phenomenon. Till within a few years the dogmas and usages of the national church were made obligatory in domestic and official relations, and even enforced by the police. The tyranny of ecclesiasticism over opinion engendered in the hearts of multitudes a hatred of the church. By degrees a legal emancipation from forms will reconcile many to the faith. At bottom there is in the hearts of the German people a sentiment of religion, which often shows itself in contradiction to a speculative skepticism, and which skeptics themselves allow, by separating faith from philosophy and making religion purely a matter of feeling. This sentiment, under wise direction, may yet be set in action against the current of materialism.

In the political philosophy of De Tocqueville, there is in democracy a logical tendency to pantheism. This he would counteract by reviving the principle of authority as this is impersonated in the Roman Catholic Church. Forty years ago, in reflecting upon the relations of modern society to religion, he had the sagacity to write that "our posterity [here having France especially in view] will tend more and more to a division into only two parts—some relinquishing Christianity entirely, and others returning to the Church of Rome."¹ Sooner, perhaps, than De Tocqueville anticipated, Ultramontanism and materialism have seemed to verify his prediction. Relying upon the superstitious element in human nature, Ultramontan-ism works the machinery of democracy for the restoration of spiritual despotism. And no combination more potent for the destruction of liberty could be devised than the infallibility of the head of the church backed by a *plébiscitum*—that invention of Napoleon for using the hands of the democracy to forge the chains of the empire. While superstition would crush society from above, materialism would explode it from beneath. The

¹ "Democracy in America," vol. ii., book i., chap. vi.

scientific materialism which serves the evolutionist as a speculative theory of the universe becomes in the common mind a social materialism for the practice of life. And such materialism is not only hostile to this or that institution of society, but would reduce society itself to anarchy by taking away those supreme motives without which it is impossible for human society to hold together—responsibility and hope. Without responsibility in the individual and in the whole, responsibility to authority, to law, to justice, civil society is an impossibility; and the atomic theory of man, which denies personality and resolves consciousness and conscience into mere physical or phenomenal experiences, leaves no place for responsibility.

Without hope, which is essentially a moral sentiment, society would stagnate, and man revert to the troglodytes from which the evolutionists would have us believe that he sprang. But hope is impossible to a mere equation of chemical elements subject to inexorable physical laws. To some extent, superstition and materialism will counteract each other in their effects upon the masses; but the just-budding liberty of Europe will be crushed between them, unless the Gospel of Christ shall intervene with its wise and benignant authority on the one hand, and its large and loving liberty on the other.

However serious may be the perils to society from superstition and materialism, the source of these mischiefs lies in human nature; and society, in its organic capacity, can do nothing against them except by legal restraints upon imposture and fanatical excesses, and by a wise combination of ethics with physics in the training of the public schools. History teaches that forms of superstition and skepticism pass away with time; and though we may not hope to eradicate the spirit of either—which, indeed, at bottom is one and the same—we may be confident that each succeeding form of superstition, each recurring phase of skepticism, though as threatening as the giant shadows of the Alpine mists, will melt as the day advances, or vanish when we cease to put our own doubts and fears between them and the sun.

But there is one peril to European society more formidable than these, which society has imposed upon itself, and now hugs in the delusion that its safety lies in this very danger.

The one common curse and woe of the leading nations of Europe is the military system, which maintains enormous standing armies and holds every man directly or indirectly to duty as a soldier. In every great state, the army on a peace establishment is reckoned by hundreds of thousands, in war by millions; the military appropriations form the largest item of the yearly budget; science and invention are taxed for the production of more effective implements of war; agriculture, industry, trade, are crippled by the withdrawal of young men in their prime from the field, the factory, the shop, to the barrack and the camp; the training of the family and the school must be surrendered to the discipline of arms; and the one lesson of law and of morals drilled into every man is that to be ready to fight is the first duty of the citizen, and to make every man fight is the first right of the state.¹ Germany set the example of universal compulsory military service, and Sadowa and Sedan are memorable witnesses to its efficiency. Germany pleads her geographical position as the necessity for adhering to this system, and for maintaining her large standing army. But France might plead her geographical position, open to invasion from Germany and England. Italy is vulnerable on the side of Austria and of France; Austria on the side of Italy, of Germany, and now of Russia or her satellites on the Lower Danube. Every nation uses the argument of Germany and pleads her example. Every nation is expending more and more upon its armament, and is increasing its public debt. Statesmen are at their wits' end to secure a revenue without aggravating the people; yet none dare nor will propose a congress for mutual disarmament, in the interest of national prosperity and of international peace. But unless this shall be effected, then, before the close of the century, Europe will witness one of three things—universal bankruptcy, sporadic revolutions against taxes and conscription,

¹ As an offset to this, it must be admitted that to boorish young men, such as miners and field hands, the army serves as a school—training them in habits of cleanliness, order, obedience, and expanding their knowledge of men and of the world. And it must further be admitted that the cost of suppressing the rebellion in the United States, through the lack of trained and efficient troops at the first, exceeded the cost of a standing army for a generation. Still a large standing army is a constant burden to society, a temptation to war, and a danger to liberty.

or a general war to relieve popular discontent, give occupation to armies, and win reprisals for filling bankrupt treasuries. Whichever of these ways society shall enter upon, the end is anarchy or despotism, alike the ruin of free institutions.) Mons. P. Broca, in reminding the French scientists of the troglodytes as their first progenitors in the arts of life, said: "Barbarous no doubt they were, but are not we also barbarous in some degree, we who can only settle our differences on the battle-field? *They* were not acquainted with electricity or steam, they had neither metals nor gunpowder; but wretched as they were, and with only weapons of stone, they carried on against nature no mean struggle; and the progress they slowly effected with such efforts prepared the soil on which civilization was hereafter destined to flourish."¹ But the civilization for which those scarcely human beings contended against nature now employs its highest intellectual and material forces in fighting against man!

(But the most formidable prospect to European society is the tendency of democratic civilization to crush the individual in the effort to raise the masses. The American doctrine has been, Give every man liberty, education, and the opportunity to rise, and there will be universal contentment and prosperity.) This doctrine seemed sound and sufficient so long as there was plenty of land, plenty of work, plenty of trade, and plenty of money. But now that years of stringency in the money market and the labor market have made land a burden and trade a loss and work a drudgery, it is recognized that individual freedom and universal equality do not create a paradise. Worst of all, the equality of the many presses down the liberty of the individual. One man being "as good as another," each man finds that the liberty and equality which make him of so much more account to himself make him of less account to society. He is but a single atom among millions of like atoms, and his neighbors have no scruple about jostling him out of place or even crushing him out of existence. The democracy which made its chief boast the emancipation of the individual from the "paternal care" of government, and asked only freedom for every man to make his own way, now turns about and offers to surrender all individu-

¹ Address to the French Association for the Advancement of the Sciences, at the Havre Congress, 1877.

ality to centralized power in the state, invoking government to supply work, to fix its hours and its wages, to create trade and money, to furnish capital and abolish interest, and instead of levying taxes to pay them in the form of largesses. Democracy has insisted upon the right of every man to the fruits of his own labor, enterprise, skill, or luck. But now the individual who has laid up capital must divide with the many, and the working-man is no longer at liberty to make his own terms for hours and wages, but shall be allowed to work only upon such conditions as the many have prescribed. In seeking the elevation of the masses, democratic civilization has incited vastly more aspirants for higher places than it can create places to be filled. It has overlooked the unchangeable law of nature, that society can exist only on the condition of subordinate places and a division of classes. No legislation, nor education, nor combination can alter this law. Though all the operatives may be equally competent to run the factory, there is room for but one superintendent at a time ; that every poor man may have cheap coal, somebody must mine it ; if cities are to be kept healthy, somebody must sweep the streets. In digging away old institutions in order to "level up" a mound upon which all society shall stand on an equal footing, there is danger of digging a pit into which many shall fall deeper than ever before. In Europe this danger is greater than in the United States.

"The magnitude of states, the development of industry, the organization of the sciences, in consolidating the edifice, prove detrimental to the individuals who live in it, every man finding himself belittled through the enormous extension of the system in which he is comprised. Societies, in order to become more stable, have become too large, and most of them, in order the better to resist foreign attack, have too greatly subordinated themselves to their governments.

"Moreover, in order to become efficacious, industry has become too subdivided, and man, transformed into a drudge, becomes a revolving wheel. It is sad to see a hundred thousand families employing their arms and thirty superior men expending their genius in efforts to increase the lustre of a piece of muslin.

"For these evils there are palliatives, perhaps, but no remedies, for they are produced and maintained through the very structure of the society, of the industry, and of the science upon which we live. The same sap produces on

the one hand the fruit, and on the other the poison ; whoever desires to taste one must drink the other."¹

The mischiefs of contemporary civilization in depressing the individual by attempting to raise the masses, and in spreading discontent by fostering expectations which society cannot fulfil, and the realization of which would render civil society impossible—are more serious and imminent in Europe than in America. By the tradition of centuries, and by experiences yet fresh in the memory of the present generation, the masses in Europe impute all their grievances to the oppressions of government. Their experiment in self-government is too recent to have weaned them from this prejudice. To the working-man in Europe, the government is still what the rain-doctor is to the African—at once the author of all mischief, and the only possible deliverance from them. The "hard times" are charged upon the government, and the remedy is to be found in surrendering all power to the "social democrats"! This feeling is aggravated by the ill-timed attempts of governments to repress socialistic discussion by force of the police—a course which is sure to provoke a day of reckoning. It will be long before the commonalty of Europe outgrow their hereditary suspicion of the officers of law as their natural enemies. For evils inherent in democratic civilization no remedy has been found by any political philosopher, nor even by any lady novelist who has yet appeared. Happily in the United States there is yet hope that all social mischiefs as they arise will be palliated by the "sober second thought" of the people, and by a speedy change of times. But in Europe every social evil is made more formidable by the attempt to organize the masses for a political action which would be destructive of society itself—as communism in France and social democracy in Germany. In the last resort, society must and will save itself from anarchy even by military despotism. The United States may yet save to mankind the principles of political liberty and legal equality by demonstrating that these do not deprive a people of common sense and common honesty.

JOS. P. THOMPSON.

¹ Taine's "Italy: Florence and Venice," book iv., chap. vi.

SCIENCE AND REVELATION.

SCIENCE is knowledge. The term is literally applicable to all knowledge, and its use might be extended to daily events and ordinary affairs without any departure from the peculiar or technical sense in which it is commonly employed. We have no knowledge of particulars. Singular terms of themselves contain no meaning, and convey none. The senses give us no knowledge. They merely put us in possession of the materials of knowledge. Actual cognition is, in every instance, the result of comparison, judgment, generalization. My merely seeing Peter or Patrick, hearing his voice, learning his name, gives me no knowledge of him. Whatever I know of him, comes to me from my comparing him with other beings or objects, and every thing relating to him must be expressed in general terms, in each of which he is referred to a class. Thus he is a man, a white man, a native American, with black hair, with gray eyes, well-dressed, ill-mannered ; each of these characteristics being as truly a class-name as is *felis* or *falco*, ape or lobster. Thus, also, if I hear an item of news, of paltry gossip, it of itself gives me no information. I understand the meaning of the words only by successive processes of classification. It is, we will suppose, some report to the discredit of my neighbor, Mr. A. Him I know by previous generalizations, and more or less intimately in proportion to the number of those generalizations. By a comparison of the report with what I know of him, I class it as true, probable, improbable, or false. By comparing the facts alleged of him with certain moral standards, I classify it morally as to kind and degree, as to quality and quantity. I very probably, at the same time, compare the alleged

act with some standard of taste, of custom, or of general opinion, and each of these judgments gives me added knowledge with regard to it.

The only reason why persons, objects, and events connected with ordinary life do not furnish materials for the exact sciences is, that they belong to so many of them that it would be hardly possible to assign to them any one place as pre-eminently theirs. Were my relations with a human neighbor as few as those which I have with the cows or hens that bear part in the supply of my table, what is called a scientific description of him would comprise all that I could need or want to know about him. But because he is my human neighbor, it concerns me to know his position in a score or two of different classes, some of which have, and all of which might have (so-called) scientific names. Thus, also, if I am acting merely as a moral censor, a single scientific classification of the report about Mr. A. as true or false, and another equally scientific classification of the alleged fact under its proper ethical head, will suffice; but if I am a lover of gossip, while the report is fresh in my mind, I shall make many generalizations, all of them potentially scientific, though not one in ten of them bears that name.

Classification includes the whole of human knowledge. We cannot know the intimate nature of things. In every classifying process we define each species by the name of the next higher species and the specific difference, till we reach in the ascending series a supreme species or genus (*summun genus*) which we cannot define, and whose name is only a term for our ignorance.

Each particular science embraces a certain section of objects or phenomena, with resemblances sufficient to place them in one group, and with peculiarities sufficient to distinguish them from other groups. Larger sciences may include smaller, as the whole includes its parts; and the same object or phenomenon may come within the scope of two or more sciences, as viewed in different aspects, relations, or uses. Yet the sciences cannot overlap one another, nor can conclusions with regard to an object or phenomenon in one science be of any validity with regard to it in another science, or in a recognized department of philosophy. For instance, physiology and psychology both include

man; but if there be any reason for the existence of psychology, it is because there are in human experience phenomena which cannot be classified under physiology, and therefore cannot be explained by it. It is absurd to say that, because man is an animal, therefore his physical structure must account for reflection, imagination, hope, love, and piety,—fully as absurd as it would be to maintain that, because the component parts of the human body all have their place in the nomenclature of chemistry, therefore thought, reason, and fancy are chemical processes.

A science becomes a science only when it is perfect within its proper scope, or when its adepts have at least good reason to believe it perfect. By *perfect* we do not mean *complete*. A perfect science is one whose classification embraces all known and knowable objects within its range; a complete science is one which neither admits larger generalizations within its own sphere, nor can itself be resolved into a more comprehensive science. We can conceive of the sciences of space and number as capable of completeness. It may be that all other sciences will in some far-off future be in the mind of man (as they doubtless are in the Supreme Intelligence) but branches of a complete ontology, of whose laws those that belong to the various departments of being will appear but equivalents or corollaries.

We have spoken of laws. It may be well to say here that a law of nature is simply a formula of classification, in which the time-element is recognized. By the name of a genus or species we designate a class of objects possessing certain common characteristics. By a law we designate a class of events or phenomena uniformly taking place under the same conditions, or of consequents uniformly following the same antecedents. The only difference between these two modes of classification is that the former, being statical, is absolute, and would be historically true, even though its objects were swept out of being; while the latter is only provisionally true, and, because affirmed in time, cannot be dogmatically affirmed of an unlimited past or of even the closely impending future, though it may authorize a more or less confident belief as to the past, and expectation as to the future.

Mere hypothesis is not science, however probable it may

seem, or however serviceable it may be in the investigation of truth. Hypothesis is what its name implies,—a *putting under*; a temporary support for similar objects or facts; a table on which they may be laid side by side, and compared with one another, and with other objects or facts of the same order. If it is large enough to hold a whole class of objects or facts, it remains permanent, and becomes a science. If it prove too small for the whole class, a larger one must be built, then perhaps a larger still; and in many instances this process has been often repeated, and each successive table has been thrown away because it has been found too short and narrow. A common farmer has an hypothesis with regard to the essential conditions of vegetable life, ample enough to embrace all forms of vegetation which he has seen or of which he has heard. But a half-hour's acquaintance with a collection of orchids would convince him that his hypothesis was too small; and the structure that would take its place in his mind would have in its turn to be thrown aside, should he become conversant with the pitcher-plants. In almost every science progress has been made in precisely this way. At every stage there have been those who regarded as final the very hypotheses which the next generation of inquirers have consigned to oblivion.

An hypothesis, then, has no validity against well-ascertained facts; while fresh facts, if authentic, may be fatal to an hypothesis, however plausible. An hypothesis may be intrinsically reasonable, and therefore likely to be true, and yet may be incapable of verification, from the very nature of the case, or from the inaccessibleness in space or time of large portions of the objects or phenomena which it ought to include. Such an hypothesis cannot be employed argumentatively, but is itself invalidated by any well-authenticated facts inconsistent with it.

There are departments in which science and hypothesis are popularly blended and confounded, but in which the distinction between them ought to be carefully observed and constantly recognized. Thus what used to be called *natural history* is now a fascicle of genuine sciences, with arrangements and classifications that seem adequate and exhaustive; but with these sciences are connected various and conflicting theories of evolution, which are not verified, are perhaps incapable of

verification, therefore are not science, and ought not to have the prestige of that name.

But how does hypothesis become science? It is absolutely impossible to examine all objects, phenomena, or cases in a class or under an alleged general law; how then can we deny that there may be exceptions? We reply that exceptions are always conceivable, metaphysically possible; and therefore is it that in logical nomenclature the only form of induction which deserves the name is qualified by the epithet *imperfect*. Yet it is virtually perfect, when specimen objects or phenomena have been observed in all supposable cases in which they can exist or occur. Thus the characteristics of the genus *man* may be regarded as absolutely determined, when those characteristics are found in every race and at every degree of culture, though it is conceivable that there may yet be discovered beings of human parentage who do not possess them. But the very elements of anthropology which are science now were mere hypothesis when first inferred from observation as to a single race, and would still remain so, had not observation been extended as to all continents, climates, and—so far as we know—nations.

What has been said may prepare us to determine wherein science is incompetent and has no right of utterance.

In the first place, science is but the knowledge of things that are. She has no right to infer the non-existence of things that are beyond her sphere. If her instruments fail to detect immaterial existence, it does not thence follow that the immaterial universe is a mere delusion. In the material world there may be, there probably are, properties beyond her ken. It may well be that an additional sense, without any change in external objects, would bring us into cognizance of a realm of sensation and perception as wide and rich, as fruitful and instructive, as that to which we now have access through eye and ear, and as entirely outside of our possible conception at this present as sounds or colors are to one born deaf or blind. Indeed, there are classes of perfectly authenticated facts which completely baffle science, and which scientific men therefore ignore. In the region claimed—falsely, as we think—by the (so-called) Spiritualists, including animal magnetism, there occur phenom-

ena which cannot be classed under now known physical laws. We believe them to have no connection with extra-mundane influence; but the superstition which claims them as its own has no so strong allies as the scientists who, because they cannot account for them, refuse to believe them. The truth is, science has no rightful negative beyond her own sphere. The anatomist, the physiologist, the chemist, the astronomer, is fully authorized to say: "With the implements and methods of my special department I have found no vestiges of other than material existence, and I am certain that my inquiries and those of my brother-scientists who think as I do have covered the entire field of my particular science." But they are as little justified in maintaining collectively that there is no existence outside of their united fields, as any one of them is in denying the reality of the departments specially under charge of the others.

Science has, at best, an imperfect command of the past. Her proper field is the present, and the past only so far as the present bears traces of it. Geology, indeed, deals with an antiquity beyond conception; but it is only by a calculus, all whose elements are furnished by existing phenomena and recent observations. Within the geological ages there are large portions of the physical history of our planet that have left no record, and many open questions that can never be answered. Geology, therefore, cannot claim to be a perfect science, and none are so ready to admit its imperfection as those who have made its advancement their life-work. The statical condition of successive periods may be determined by the position and contents of the earth's crust; but so far as the dynamic forces in the prehistoric past transcend those that have been at work within historic epochs, they must remain subjects of conjecture, not of knowledge.

Under precisely this category falls the evolution theory of organic being. It is not science, and we do not see how it ever can be science. Induction establishes the principle of evolution only so far as to show the probability of a common origin for congeneric species, which is an important gain for science in reducing the number of primitive types to a minimum. As much as this is legitimately inferred from transmutations and

developments that occur under current observation. But the descent (or ascent) of man from the ape, the tadpole, the microscopic insect or the vegetable spore has its reason in no observed facts. It cannot be shown historically that there has ever been an instance of transmutation from one family of animal or vegetable being into another. The theory has, therefore, no foundation in existing or traditional facts or phenomena. We have no quarrel with it as a speculative theory. Least of all would we object to it on religious grounds; for the very idea that blind, automatic nature, without a controlling will, could have blundered through these myriads of transformations with any show of success or regularity, bears absurdity on its face. The doctrine of chances would give in its favor unity against more thousands upon thousands than we could write out were we to fill all the pages of our REVIEW with ciphers. But this theory must be held—as it is held by some sincere and devout Christians—in abeyance to whatever rests on observation, experience, and testimony. It has no validity against any truths or facts that are proved or capable of proof by the ordinarily admitted laws of evidence.

From what has been said, it is obvious that, if there is a Supreme Creator and Ruler of the universe, science can claim no right of affirmation or denial as to those periods of past time of which there remains no physical record in existing phenomena. Nature is his embodied thought, will, and purpose, the shrine of his indwelling; and though we must regard him as immutable, his self-manifestation may, for that very reason, have varied indefinitely in time, as the terrestrial phenomena due to the light-beams of the unchanging sun are never the same for two successive days or hours. The Omniscient Love, which wills the order of the universe now for ages undisturbed, may, under different conditions, have willed the suspension of that order, or, even without suspending it, have subjected it at times to the normal action of superior forces,—perhaps of forces of a superior order, and such as are not now in direct operation on our planet. Science is not omniscience, and until it is so, it cannot know all that it is possible for God to do. Moreover, it is constrained to admit that there have been, in the past, eras so unlike the present, that the present course of nature cannot

be of intrinsic and eternal necessity. With a diversity of detail, indeed, hardly consistent with scientific infallibility, astronomers and physicists unite in maintaining that the earth will in the lapse of ages become uninhabitable under the operation of causes now at work; and the irresistible inference is that these causes had a beginning, before which the earth was not, or existed under other than its present conditions. We are assured that there was an era in the world's history when the entire planet was at so high a temperature that the hardiest germs of organic life could not have subsisted; and if so, there was a time when life began. It is very certain that for several thousands of years new types of being have not been evolved from pre-existent types; but according to the evolutionists, the laws of animated nature must have undergone an entire, anteriorly improbable, and utterly unaccountable change between the type-producing and the type-transmitting epochs. If these intrusions of a new order of things are the mere dice-work of unreasoning and soulless nature, no freaks of nature—not even those limned by the gorgeous fancy of Arab or Hindoo—would seem incredible, though we should feel little curiosity to search their record. But if they have occurred under the Infinite Providence of God, they show us that there is nothing intrinsically constraining or inevitable in the existing order, and authorize the belief that by the same power by which it began to be, it may, at exceptional epochs of its history or of man's history, have been suspended, reversed, or superseded.

This inference is confirmed by the inability of science to discover efficient causes in nature. For science, a cause is a uniform antecedent, and nothing more. Causation is not even a scientific concept, nor would it ever suggest itself to the mind of a scientist in that capacity alone. We can conceive of an intelligence equal to that of the wisest among men watching the course of nature for unnumbered æons, without cogitating any relation between allied phenomena other than that of invariable order in time. Causation is an idea imported into the material world from consciousness. Our wills are a causative power, and the sole causative power within our exclusive domain of action. Cause and effect form parts of our constant experience,—indeed, constitute our entire experience in the exercise of

our active faculties. But our consciousness teaches us merely the fact, not the mode of causation. How the will works upon the nerves and muscles we know not. That the nerves and muscles are not themselves cause, but merely instrument, is too obvious to need proof or illustration. The cause is intangible, untraceable, undiscoverable; therefore, what we are wont to term immaterial or spiritual. Equally little can we ascertain in external nature the *nexus*—except that of time—between the (so-called) cause and the (so-called) effect, or discover any reason in the former why it should be followed by the latter. We use, indeed, various names,—gravitation, affinity, polarization, and the like; but these names denote merely classes of phenomena, not known causes. They are now regarded as comprised in a larger generalization, which embraces also the physical part of causation in man; for the imponderable forces—mutually convertible—are evidently one and the same force, whether it holds the moon in her orbit, heaves the teeming earth with the breath of spring, bears tidings across the ocean, or throbs from brain to muscle or from muscle to brain in the human organism. But in ourselves we know that this force is not cause. If it were so, the intensity of the volition would be in proportion to the physical force possessed for the time being, while the reverse is often the case. The actual cause is, as we have seen, immaterial. But if the force manifested in external nature is identical with that by which the human will performs its functions, we have then ample ground for maintaining that in the outward universe, as in man, force is but the agent or instrument; will, which is immaterial, the cause.

Our own experience of causation thus leads us to the conception of a supreme, immaterial Cause of the universe and its phenomena. If this be so, then natural laws (so-called) are the outgrowth, not of unreasoning force, but of mind, will, purpose,—in fine, of a providence which may be discretionary. In this case we should expect general uniformity in nature, as thus alone could there be in intelligent beings accurate foresight, wise precaution, and hopeful industry. But we cannot conceive that the Supreme Creator should be the slave of his own laws. His very existence renders possible, adequate evidence may make probable, any departure from these laws, for the welfare of the

very beings who have a beneficiary interest in their general uniformity.

Still further, science and ontology are not coextensive. There are entire departments of being which elude, if they do utterly exclude, science, and in which men are no wiser now than they were five thousand years ago. The groups of phenomena commonly called mental, moral, and spiritual have neither determinate laws nor fixed classification. Those most profoundly versed in them profess to be explorers, not knowers. They claim for their pursuit the modest title of philosophy, which implies not the attained possession, but only the loving quest of wisdom. These phenomena, even were it admitted that they are wholly contingent on material organism, are, nevertheless, outside of the sphere of science; for confessedly they still await from her the explanation (*i.e.*, the *smoothing out*, bringing them on the same plane with other and well-known physical states and changes) which alone can vindicate her title to eminent domain.

Science, then, has not the universal jurisdiction claimed for it. There are provinces of being and experience, of time and space, of the actual and the possible, as to which it has the right neither of affirming nor denying; and it is in these provinces, if in any, that revelation has its place. The truths which revelation postulates are not physical truths, and therefore cannot be verified or disproved by physical tests. The abnormal facts connected with it, so far as they are historical, belong to a remote past, which has left no visible or tangible records of itself; and, so far as they appertain to present and current experience, they are within the sphere of philosophy, not of science. It purports to proceed from, and to relate to, an Infinite First Cause, and causation lies entirely beyond the scope of science. Its ethical and dogmatic contents, equally with its alleged facts of interior experience, belong to the department of philosophy. Its evidence (real or pretended) lies partly in regions of consciousness, of which science can give no account, and partly in human testimony, which may, indeed, be submitted to scientific tests, from which believers in revelation demand no exemption for the traditions and records of their faith.

It is only at this last-named point of external evidence that

revelation is in any wise dependent on science; and here the sole office of science is to apply to the books deemed sacred, with rigid impartiality, the canons of literary and historical criticism that are recognized in determining the genuineness and authenticity of other books. No favor is to be claimed for them on the ground of their reputed sacredness; but, on the other hand, they are not on this ground to be set aside as unworthy of credit. Do they relate things impossible? *Impossible* is not a word which science has a right to employ out of its own field. In the chance-world which some scientists postulate, all things are possible; and if there is a God, whatever is in harmony with his infinite attributes is possible. It is objected that these records relate things improbable, even if not impossible. We answer that the probable simply means that which is identical or parallel with our own experience, and that the facts most familiar to us bear as strong intrinsic marks of antecedent improbability as do the events in a fairy tale. Is it objected to the contents of the alleged history of revelation that they are at variance with the established order of nature? We ask, By whom or how was this order established? If by the Sovereign Creator and Ruler of the universe, it cannot rob him of his power or confine him within its routine. Moreover, it is at least conceivable that the true order of nature may comprehend intellectual and moral being, and that it may be in the strictest sense of the word as *natural* for the exigencies and interests of the human race at marked intervals to overbear and reverse the ordinary course of events, as it is for the ocean, with a spring-tide and a tempestuous wind, to sweep away barriers that have resisted it for unknown centuries.

Is it said that the uniformity of physical laws is an intuitive belief? If universality be a criterion of intuition, no statement could be more utterly false than this. The proportion of human minds, of well-developed and highly-cultivated minds, that think themselves conscious of such an intuition is infinitesimally small even now, and was never larger than now. Indeed, so strong is the appetency of mankind for the supernatural, that those who have not access to it by religious faith are singularly prone to seek it through less reputable channels, and among the foremost disciples and hierophants of modern necromancy in its most

superstitious forms are men and women who profess to regard the Scriptures as incredible. While we doubt not that there are intuitive beliefs, they must of necessity appertain to the interior consciousness and to the present ; for knowledge of the external world and of past time can reach the mind only through observation, experience, and testimony. The *ego* is not conscious of the *not-me*, and therefore can have no underived knowledge concerning it.

There is, then, nothing in the contents of these primitive Christian records which precludes the trial of their genuineness by the principles which are admitted to be applicable to other writings of like antiquity. We have space here but for a cursory notice of the leading points of the argument. As to our canonical Gospels, there is no vestige of evidence that they were ever known in the early time under other names than those of their now reputed authors. If the synoptical Gospels were not written in the first century, it is certain that there were then extant and in circulation books containing most of their narratives and many of their discourses ; and as to the fourth Gospel, it is easy from the history of Gnosticism to show that the proem could not have been written after the close of the first century. The tendency of recent sceptical criticism has been to the abandonment of the extreme ground occupied at an earlier stage of the controversy. Renan, in his last volume, asserts the undoubted authorship of the second and third Gospels by the very men whose names they bear, and maintains that there is a very large Johannine element in the fourth Gospel, which was written, he thinks, after the apostle's death by his disciples, and in great part from memory of his teachings. Were these books mere chronicles of ordinary events or monuments of the literature of their age, we doubt whether their authorship would have been called in question, unless by some such erratic genius as ever and anon denies that Shakespeare can have written "Macbeth" and "Hamlet." Indeed, the chief reason for the later date assigned to them by rationalist critics has been that such a conception as that of the Christ of the Gospels could not have grown out of an ordinary human life, except after an interval of two or three generations. The reason is conclusive on the

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hypothesis that the life described was an ordinary human life. But it has been found impossible to deny the genuineness of the principal epistles of St. Paul, which must have been written in the lifetime of most of the apostles, and which show the evangelic conception of the Christ full-grown.

But the question as to the general authenticity of these books by no means rests on their age or authorship. They might be thrown aside, they might never have been written, and we should still have unimpaired all the proof that we could need of the leading facts recorded in them,—of the theophany which they describe. On the other hand, they might be admitted as genuine, and as written with a good purpose, and yet their authenticity might remain more than questionable. Did they stand alone, were there no traces of their contents in the history of their times, they would justly be regarded as pious fictions. They did not make or constitute Christianity. They were its products. They came into being because the religion of which they are exponents was previously in being. They seem to have been written not because their authors had any official commission as biographers, but because there was a condition of things which created a demand for such writings. Luke expressly says this, referring to fragmentary narratives previously extant, which it was his purpose to replace by a connected story; and from the earliest tradition we have reason to believe that the other Gospels were written simply because they were needed and wanted, that is to say, because there existed such a state of religious craving and receptivity as we are apt to connect with the faithful reading and diligent use of these very books. We, indeed, regard the Gospels as of inestimable worth, as bringing us face to face with Him of whom they speak, and under the word-fall of his lips; but as to the historical questions with reference to Christianity, they are tokens rather than evidences; effects, not causes; proved authentic by their contents, rather than standing out the sole and independent witnesses of those contents.

The place of Christianity in the history of the world transcends all evidence except that which the individual believer derives from its place in his own heart. It is absolutely cer-

tain that in an age of unexampled moral corruption there started into being a body of men professing and maintaining a moral standard not yet transcended, or deemed susceptible of being transcended; and that at an epoch when faith was dead in the more intelligent, and superstition almost dead in the less intelligent, classes of the civilized world, this same body of men presented themselves as a band of earnest and devoted religionists, ready to yield up all things earthly, and life itself, in attestation of their belief in truths and facts which are at this day fervently cherished by thousands upon thousands. It is equally certain that without resort to other means than testimony, reasoning, and persuasion, and without concession or compromise, these ethical principles and religious beliefs were diffused with unprecedented rapidity in all accessible countries, and that their diffusion was to a very considerable degree among intelligent and cultivated persons, including not a few whose social position would have rendered them strongly conservative. It is admitted beyond dispute that in an amazingly brief period this movement of opinion and principle had become revolutionary, had seated upon the throne of universal empire the faith nurtured among Galilean fishermen, and had driven the established religion into the obscurity which gave it its indelible designation as paganism. It cannot be denied that the changes then wrought in human society are the most radical changes of which history bears the record, and that they constitute at this moment the most influential factor in the condition of collective humanity and in the differences between race and race.

This vast, world-wide, age-long influence can be clearly traced to one man, as to whose native estate, nurture, surroundings, and exterior biography there is no essential discrepancy of tradition or opinion. He was confessedly a peasant, without rank, culture, or social prestige, unable in his lifetime to obtain any but the most humble following, attracting from persons in office and power, when not utter neglect, only scorn and contumely, and in consequence of a brief success among the multitude—chiefly of rude provincials—who had come to a national festival, condemned to a death ordinarily decreed only for a felon slave. It is this man, whose name is the most

resplendent in the world's annals, whose influence immeasurably exceeds that of the greatest beside, whose era is the dividing-line of time, from whose birth-year civilized humanity reckons its own new birth to a life that shall last and grow while the earth shall stand, whose reputed shame has become the standard for all true worth and enduring honor, the emblem of whose ignominy surmounts crown, sceptre, tower, and palace, as alone giving heavenly consecration to terrestrial glory. Who was he? If he was no more than a son of the carpenter of Nazareth, we have not done with miracle. He himself was a greater miracle than any recorded of him. His posthumous influence, success, and fame can be brought into line with no other portions of history, have against them the most intense antecedent improbability, and can be accounted for only by supposing the laws that have else always governed human opinion and feeling to have been in this case utterly reversed. If we are not prepared to admit this multitudinous and permanent miracle of an uncaused moral and religious revolution, exceeding in magnitude any effect of like kind which has flowed from traceable causes, the alternative is presented in our Gospels. Here we see in Jesus Christ a divine humanity never beheld on earth before or since ; a manifestation unique as its influence, which could not but subdue and re-create the souls of men ; a power and love incarnate, which could not but leave in its wake long furrows of living light on the surface of all coming ages ; a cause fully commensurate with the effect realized in the past, portrayed in glowing prophecy for the unending future.

We, therefore, do not believe Christianity to have been a theophany because the Gospels say so ; but because we know that there must have been a theophany in that age, and the evangelists are its historiographers, with every external proof that they lived when they might have seen it, and with every interior mark of simplicity, honesty, and candor in their narratives. The books give us the only conceivable way of accounting for the history of the eighteen centuries from whose cradle they sprang.

In this view, the evidence for what, if true, is the most momentous fact in the biography of Christ and the annals of the

world—his resurrection from the dead—comes out in the strongest light. That this event was universally believed by Christians from St. Paul downward, has ceased to be a matter of doubt. Even Baur and Renan expressly say that the surviving loyalty and zeal of the apostles, and the labors and sacrifices of the earlier disciples, can be accounted for only on the ground of a settled and immovable conviction that Jesus had really risen. Had such an event been related in the Gospels, and we yet found outside of them no token of its influence on conduct and character; if, for aught that we could see to the contrary, the apostles had lived on as under the blighting and desolating shadow of the cross, as the disappointed disciples of a master slain in disgrace and hopelessly dead, we should be constrained to account the narrative, though genuine, as an allegory or a fiction. But when we find the life-pulse of the risen Saviour throbbing through the Roman Empire almost simultaneously with the tidings of his death; when we see his bereaved followers gladdened, inspired, empowered, as they had never been while He whom they had so dearly loved was with them; when we hear them proclaiming him alive—and believed by thousands—in the very city without whose gates he had died,—we then turn to the Gospels, and have the whole mystery of their confident, jubilant faith made clear. We learn that they had abundant reason for their undoubting assurance, in that their risen Lord had talked with them, together and one by one, by day as by night; had eaten with them and blessed their bread, had given them minute instructions as to their future ministry, and had passed from earth to heaven in their sight. All this we believe, not because it is so written, but because, had it not been, the history of the Church had been unwritten.

We have not adduced this line of argument because we regard the evidence of the genuineness of the Gospels as less than impregnable. On the other hand, after having read almost every thing that has been written for the last fifty years in disproof of their authorship by apostles and apostolic men, we see less reason for denying it than there is for maintaining that Virgil did not write the *Æneid* nor Cicero the *De Officiis*. But were the case otherwise,—were it proved that the earliest of the Gospels was not written till the middle of the second cen-

tury or the middle of the tenth, our belief in the substantial authenticity of their contents would be unchanged, so indubitably certain is it that a personage such as they describe lived and died in Judea, and that events such as they relate occurred there, in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius. Nay, if our Gospels did not exist in their present form till a hundred and twenty years or more after the death of Christ, there can be not the slightest doubt that records of like contents existed at a much earlier period; for Justin Martyr, at a time when it is pretended that our Gospels had not yet seen the light, cites from what he calls "*Memoirs of the Apostles*" nearly all the events and many of the discourses contained in our first three Gospels, with no greater verbal divergence from their text than was to be expected if he were quoting them from memory. Moreover, as to the fourth Gospel, there are several narratives—as, for instance, that of the raising of Lazarus, and some of the scenes between Christ's resurrection and his ascension—so manifestly bearing the marks of personal participation and remembrance, that, if not written by an eye-witness, they must have been copied, almost word for word, from the intensely vivid narrative of an eye-witness. For these reasons we think that an undue stress has been laid on both sides upon the date of the Gospels, and would be entirely willing to join issue with the adverse party as to the truth of these books, on their own ground as to their authorship.

We thus see that Christianity need not shrink from the scientific test of historical criticism. But there are grounds of religious and Christian faith, which lie wholly out of the jurisdiction of science, though not entirely beyond its province. Science addresses the understanding alone. But man has other apprehensive powers. The æsthetic sense, the imagination and the affections, have their own tests of truth, no less authentic and trustworthy than those employed by the reason and judgment. There are in the outward world many objects and properties which cannot be co-ordinated under scientific laws, which serve no conceivable use other than to minister to taste and feeling, and which, if the universe be the work of design, can be accounted for only by beauty-loving, joy-giving, sympathetic attributes in the Creator. According to the evo-

lution theory, every member and organ of the higher classes of plants and animals must have been generated by need and perfected by use. But in the ante-human stages of evolution, beauty could have answered no need and subserved no use. Whence, then, the superfluity of beauty all the world over, in flowers of richest dye and most graceful contour a hundredfold larger than is required to shelter the tiny seed ripening at their base, in iridescent plumage which gives the bird no added speed or power, in innumerable combinations of forms and tints, immeasurably beyond the reach of human art, in the gala-robcs which are Nature's working-day attire? In point of fact, the phenomena in nature which lie outside of any conceivable course of development or series of evolutions by far exceed in number and in magnitude those that fall readily into line under the wand of the modern scientist. His postulates, so far as they legitimately extend, he cannot indeed affirm with certainty, nor yet can we deny them. Nor have we any desire to cast discredit upon them, if he will claim for them only the ground which they cover. But blended with them, beyond them, above them, we have a universe full of refreshing, gladdening, beatific sights, sounds, flavors, fragrances, to which no theory of spontaneity or derivation from primeval or pre-existing types can be applied, and which bear unmistakable tokens of a benignant purpose in the constitution and order of the material world.

Now it must be conceded—or rather, it is gratefully acknowledged by the Christian consciousness—that in Christianity and its records there are marked and numerous deviations from the administrative routine which might be anticipated from a God who was the mere impersonation of mathematical precision and automatic law. There is incarnate poetry in the Word made flesh. There are traits of intense and vivid beauty in portions of his character and life which by an ordinary human standard seem abnormal. There are many incidents in the narrative that make their first appeal to the imagination and the emotional nature, though always through them to the conscience and the will. In fine, there is in the whole story a close analogy to the outward universe in those elements, which in the latter conceal, adorn, and enrich the nude outlines and

angular forms of rigid and frigid law, and in the former suffuse with a celestial grace, loveliness, and glory what were else a poor and slender human life. Now, supposing a religion planted on the earth by revelation from God, we should on *à priori* grounds expect to find precisely this correspondence with nature; for it is in this that such a religion must of necessity have its chief motive-power, its hold on those sentiments which lie nearest to the will, and its influence on the majority of the human race, who do not receive truth by argument and demonstration, but imbibe it through congenial tastes and affections. While, then, we contend that, by the modes of argument and evidence recognized as legitimate in all other departments of inquiry, Christianity and its records claim our belief and—as a consequence—our profound reverence, they derive added confirmation from the very traits, incidents, and characteristics which have been the most frequently assailed by scepticism, yet without which the religion would be crippled, maimed, and impotent.

We have written as if the issue at the present time were between Christianity and science. It is rather between Christianity and hypothesis. The really great men of science, those who have enlarged the area of the world's actual knowledge, from Copernicus downward, have with hardly an exception been Christian believers. They have discovered in the truths which they have ascertained and verified only types and foreshinings of the Divine manifestation in Christ. We would lay the strongest emphasis on the fact that in these days Christianity is set aside, and the being of a God ignored, chiefly in the name and at the behest of theories which, if destined to live, are still on trial for their lives, and which are not unlikely to follow the long line of their predecessors into unhonored oblivion. The position that they hold with reference to revelation, as compared with that maintained by really scientific men, gives no hopeful prognosis for their permanence.

But, whether they survive or not, let it be remembered that, in the same degree in which revelation is independent of science, science also is independent of revelation. It may be doubted whether, as the human mind is constituted, science can be a subject of a verbal revelation. When the Pentateuch

was written, a miraculous transformation of the minds of the Hebrews might have enabled them to understand the system of the universe as we understand it; but the mere words of a book could not have given them the conception. It was only by the education of centuries and by successive approximations that civilized man came at length to comprehend the Copernican system, and then, not without vehement protest, the Newtonian theory of gravitation. He with whom a thousand years are as one day, might, no doubt, have condensed these centuries in an hour, and flashed the light of modern astronomy on those nomad Israelites. This, however, was not done. But suppose that the revelation through Moses had been recorded in a narrative in which, whenever the earth, sun, moon, or stars were spoken of, the language was conformed to the now existing state of science, the phraseology thus employed would have been in part unintelligible, in part seemingly absurd, in part opposed to observation and experience, and would thus have been detrimental, perhaps fatal to the credibility and just appreciation of the book in which it occurred. Books written on that principle would perhaps be unmeaning even for us; for it may well be that our scientific place is but a station, not a settled stay, and that sacred scriptures adapted to the higher generalizations and broader science of coming centuries would entirely transcend our understanding and preclude our faith in their contents. If religious books—inspired or uninspired—are meant to be understood by the men living when they are written, they must use the phraseology of their time as to the laws and phenomena of nature. It is impossible for their contemporaries to interpret the scientific terms and phrases of a far remote future, while in that future there will never be lacking means of interpreting terms descriptive of the rude conceptions of a more ignorant past.

We therefore take no religious interest in the discussions about the scientific accuracy of the first chapter of Genesis. We do not believe that the author of that chapter meant to give, or was inspired to give, a lecture on geology. Whether there is a full and exact coincidence between the order of creation in the sacred text, and that made known by the strata of the earth's crust, or whether the resemblance exists only in

part, and is in part suppositious and imaginary, is a question which does not in the least affect the religious value of the book, or the tokens of divine inspiration in its contents. Its prerogative is that it alone, of all ante-Christian literature, reveals the Creator of heaven and earth. Its very first verse conveys more, higher, and deeper religious truth than was attained in all antiquity beside; for we find nowhere else an utterance which implies in the Godhead a designing mind, a discriminating will, a plastic energy, represented in the origin of the existing universe. The gods of the ancient world themselves began to be, and seem the products rather than the authors of nature; and even the monotheism of the more advanced philosophers was a virtual pantheism, a divine form carved, as in *alto rilievo*, on the bosom of the *cosmos*, never a detached, separate, and independent being. That one sentence, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth," coming down to us from a barbarous age and a people of the rudest culture, is in itself an adequate token of higher than human teaching, and stamps this primeval record with the indelible impress of revelation from God.

Moreover, in the succeeding portions of that chapter there seems to us so manifestly a theological purpose, and one of prime magnitude and moment, as to throw the scientific question into the background. In our more enlightened age the initial sentence might have been suffered to stand alone. But with the idolatrous surroundings of the Hebrews nothing less than a thorough, unsparing iconoclasm would have sufficed—and even that did not long suffice—as a preventive of false and degrading worship. Accordingly, the objects of adoration in the Gentile world are named one by one. Light, and the sun, moon, and stars, deified from the earliest time; earth, air, and ocean, which from reputed elements became gods; the forms of vegetable and animal life, first symbols, then substitutes for prolific nature in the Egyptian mythology,—all are specified individually as made by the Supreme Creator, and are thus formally divested of all attributes of divinity. The author pursues the same purpose in the ensuing chapters of his narrative, in which he brands with human parentage, and that, happily, in almost every case from Cain, the great inventors of the infant

race,—the potential Vulcans and Apollos, the Bacchi and the Ceres of the Semitic stock, whose godhead was thus crushed in the bud. In like manner, he gives in detail the names of the founders of tribes and dynasties, telling whose sons they were and whose fathers, how long they lived, and warding off their else inevitable apotheosis by the invariable close of their life record, “and he died.” If we consider when and whence this Book of Genesis had its birth, we have no need to vindicate its science; while its theology, its pure, simple, grand monotheism, betrays its only possible source in the Infinite Mind.

We find equally little trouble, nay, no little satisfaction, in the loose and disjointed chronology of the Pentateuch, taken as a whole. It is a birth-mark, which adds the strongest probability to the tradition of its authorship by Moses. Had it been patched together in the time of Hezekiah or of Ezra, these fissures and overlappings in the dates would have been avoided. But in the infancy of literature, especially in the dawn of history, as we may learn by the example of Herodotus, numbers were the least manageable materials of the record, and by the Oriental mind in particular they were grasped slowly and feebly. We can hardly suppose dates to have been a subject of divine revelation. But we cannot see God in the majestic march of the worlds through space more clearly than in the Decalogue, from which might be evolved the entire ethics of the Gospel; in the poor-laws in Exodus and Leviticus, as humane and tender as if they had flowed from the lips of Eternal Love incarnate; in the lofty moral tone pervading ritual and administrative detail, immeasurably transcending the temper and culture of the great law-giver himself, far beyond any possible conception of the fugitives from Egypt, whose leader he was, and first caught and echoed by the psalmists and prophets of their remote posterity.

We have taken our examples from the Old Testament, and have put accurate knowledge where in this connection it belongs,—under the same category with science. The considerations which we have presented apply to the New Testament, though in a much smaller measure. With reference to various natural phenomena and secular objects, it is manifest that the apostles and their associates held opinions which have now faded from

the general belief. We find, too, in their narratives, when covering the same ground, just such discrepancies as occur between other authentic biographers and historians. As to opinions extra-religious and belonging wholly to the realm of science, we cannot safely appeal to the words of Holy Writ, unless we are prepared to maintain that it was the purpose or one of the purposes of Christianity to correct scientific errors,—a work which, so far from being possible within a ministry of three or four years, has been prosecuted with unintermitted diligence for more than twice as many centuries, and is yet far from being finished. Nor have we any justifying reason for evading or wishing to evade a candid acknowledgment of the discrepancies between the Gospels. They are of great evidential value, inasmuch as they always relate to minor details as to which, after the lapse of several years, a failure or diversity of remembrance was perfectly natural; while they thus, as to the main events, give to each separate narrative the force of an independent testimony. At the same time, there is no discrepancy in the traits of divine humanity in the life of Christ, in the substance or the spirit of his teachings, in his words concerning God, duty, judgment, heaven. The entire harmony as to all points of religious moment and value between writers as dissimilar as the literal and unimaginative Matthew, and John with nerves full strung and soul in red-hot glow, in time at least a whole generation apart, and having so widely different plans and objects in view, demonstrates the veracity and life-likeness of both narratives; for had they not seen and known Him whom they describe, their ideal portraits could have borne little mutual kindred. But there is every imaginable token in their narratives of the literal fulfilment to them of Christ's own promise: "He [the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit] shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you."

In conclusion, let it be said emphatically that there is no good reason for antagonism between science and revelation. They are on different planes, which have nothing necessarily in common, except so far as science may claim jurisdiction in questions concerning the genuineness of (so-called) sacred books. But while there is no valid ground for their enmity, there is

abundant reason for their cordial alliance. Revelation has suggested the fundamental truths which science has verified, and in particular, by the monotheism which in full purity and grandeur is an exclusively Jewish and Christian conception, it has been the pioneer in those unifying generalizations which have been the mission and the glory of the greatest scientific minds. On the other hand, science constantly enlarges the scope of vision for the eye that Christ has opened, and draws out ever fuller, richer harmonies from nature for the ear which he has attuned.

ANDREW P. PEABODY.

CRIME: ITS CAUSE AND CURE.

DR. PROSPER DESPINE, an eminent physician and philosopher, of Marseilles, France, has made a prolonged and profound study of the criminal, from the stand-point of psychology. Some twenty-five years ago, his attention was attracted to this subject by reading reports of criminal trials in *La Gazette des Tribunaux*. A circumstance which struck him in reading these reports was to find continually, in persons who commit great crimes in cold blood, and in the major part of those who commit them when strongly excited by passion, a psychical condition characterized by the absence of all repugnance while meditating these acts, and by the absence, no less absolute, of remorse after their accomplishment. At first he thought that this special character must belong only to those criminals whom chance had brought to his attention. What most surprised him was the persistence of this fact, so contrary to the ideas which education and tradition had given him touching the moral consciousness thought to be common to the whole race, and the remorse considered as a divine chastisement inflicted on all criminals. It was then that he conceived the idea of reading the entire series of *La Gazette des Tribunaux*, extending, we think, through some fifty years. At first he had no idea of committing the result of this study to writing. However, in 1868, he published a work in three volumes octavo, entitled "Psychologie Naturelle," more than one half of which was devoted to a study of what he calls the "abnormal mental and moral manifestations of criminals." In 1875 he published another thick octavo volume, under the title "De la Folie au Point de Vue Philosophique, ou plus spécialement Psychologique," a

considerable part of which was also given to a study of the criminal. This work had the honor of being crowned by the French Academy. Altogether, in these two works, we have twelve hundred pages devoted to this study. The question is studied under two general divisions, viz.: 1. What is the function of science in the matter of criminality, and what aids has she offered towards the solution of this question? 2. What sort of treatment does science require to be applied to criminals in order to their cure?

In the present paper we propose first to give a short summary of what Dr. Despine has said on this subject in the twelve hundred pages in which he has examined and discussed it, and then to offer a short critique on the philosophy which underlies his views. In the first part of the article we simply report, in condensed form, what he has written, and are not to be held responsible for the views expressed, from some of which we respectfully dissent, and with others as cordially agree. Our personal responsibility is confined to the critique, which will form the second part of this paper.

RÉSUMÉ OF DR. DESPINE'S VIEWS ON THE CRIMINAL, AND ON THE TREATMENT PROPER TO BE APPLIED TO HIM.

What is the *rôle* of science in the matter of criminality, and what aids has she offered towards the solution of this question? The function of science is here perfectly clear. What is the office of science in the study of any natural phenomenon? She seeks to discover its interior nature and the laws which produce it, and thence to trace its cause. Now, the science which must enlighten us in regard to criminality, as in reference to all mental acts, is psychology. It is, therefore, to a psychological study of criminals that we must have recourse in seeking a solution of this question.

The importance of this subject appears from the fact that a knowledge of the criminal is an essential guide to a right treatment of him; a knowledge of him, not in his acts, which are but too well known, but in the psychical or soul condition which impels him to commit them. There must be something abnormal in the disposition of criminals, when they yield with facility

to desires which would excite the strongest repugnance in a truly moral man. This abnormal state reveals itself in the clearest manner when, contrary to what poets and moralists have represented, we see the wretch who has committed crime exhibiting no symptoms of remorse for the immoral act.

As the rational treatment of a sick man makes necessary a study of the organic disease by which he has been attacked, so is it necessary to know the abnormal psychical condition of the criminal—the moral disease which produced the crime. However, in speaking of the moral disease of criminals, it must be explained that they are not diseased in such a sense that, like the insane, they stand in need of medical treatment. Their mental state does not grow worse, like that of insane patients, in the sense of a gradual decay of all their faculties. The criminal, therefore, is not a patient, and in this respect he must not be likened to the insane.

But, although sound in body, the criminal none the less manifests psychical anomalies of a grave character. But these anomalies must not be sought in the intellectual faculties, properly so called—in the perception, the memory, the reasoning faculty; that is to say, in the reflective powers. Although many criminals are as scantily endowed with intellectual as with moral faculties, it is not the lack of intelligence which is the distinctive character of these dangerous beings, for there are among them persons of great intelligence, capable of forming ingenious combinations, which are the product, necessarily, of strong reflective faculties. The distinctive anomalies of criminals are found only in the moral faculties, in the instincts of the soul, out of which spring its desires and proclivities, and which constitute our principles of action; for it is these which impel us to act in one direction or in another.

In studying criminals, the first thing which strikes us, and which is obvious to all, is the perversity, the criminal thoughts and desires, inspired by the evil inclinations and vices inherent in mankind, but more emphasized in criminals than in other men. It is the violent passions, hate, revenge, jealousy, envy; it is also other passions which, without being violent, are no less tenacious in criminals, such as cupidity, the love of pleasure, profound repugnance to a regular life, and an intense dislike of

labor. It is these two last-mentioned vices, especially, that impel criminals to seek the means of satisfying the material wants of life and the enjoyments which they crave, not in honest toil, but in readier ways which are immoral and hateful—in theft, arson, and murder. These qualities in criminals are manifest to the eyes of all. But these malign passions, these immoral propensities and desires, do not really constitute an abnormal psychological state; and the proof is, that these evil tendencies, these wicked passions, these perverse and criminal desires, make themselves felt in the soul of the most upright man, without his ceasing to conduct himself in a virtuous manner, for the reason that he wages a successful warfare against them. There is no need to enlarge upon this point, which is so well known, that persons engaged in the study of the criminal, seeing in him only perversity, vicious inclinations, immoral desires, have considered him, in a moral point of view, as normally constituted. But his moral irregularity is to be looked for elsewhere.

To understand in what this irregularity consists, it must be considered what passes in the man, recognized as normal in his moral constitution, when he finds himself in presence of a perverse thought, an immoral desire. Every one sees it in a moment. The conscience, the moral faculties, the instincts of the soul—three forms of expression that mean the same thing—are roused; the moral sentiments, opposed to the vicious instincts, are shocked by these ideas and desires. Excited by the wound thus inflicted upon them, they react more or less vigorously, according to the degree of power they have in each individual. From this a moral conflict springs up in the soul between the good and the evil sentiments. In this moral conflict appear, according to the more or less perfect moral nature of the man normally constituted, three orders of good sentiments, antagonistic to the commission of the criminal act: 1. The sentiments which are developed and exert their force on the selfish side—that is to say, the moral sentiments which prompt to virtue, and withhold from vice, through a well-understood and well-considered personal interest, but with no other view than some present or future advantage; such, for example, as the fear of punishment, of public scorn, of the loss of liberty; the dread of being deprived of the enjoyment of one's possessions, of being

separated from his family, of leading a wretched life, a life full of privations, etc., etc. 2. The generous sentiments, such as sympathy, kindness, benevolence, and the like, which lead us to act charitably toward our fellows under the promptings of a loving nature, and with a view to the contentment of the sentiments of generosity and magnanimity with which the Creator has endowed us. 3. The conscience, the moral sense, the sentiment of right and wrong, accompanied by a feeling of obligation to do what is right, not in view of any satisfaction or advantage to be hoped from it, but because it is right; and to abstain from what is wrong, not on account of any suffering to be feared as a consequence, but because it is felt to be wrong. This unselfish and disinterested sentiment is the highest expression of the conscience, and its motive-power of action, instead of being some selfish satisfaction or some generous impulse, is duty. It is this lofty moral faculty which makes the man who is so happy as to possess it feel that he must repel a vicious or criminal act, however great the advantage to be gained by it, and however painful the course to be taken in doing so. It is this which drew from Kant, the great German philosopher and moralist, the exclamation, profoundly true: "Duty! wonderful idea, which acts neither by insinuation, nor by flattery, nor by menace, but simply by sustaining in the soul thy naked law, thus compelling respect for thyself, if not always securing obedience to thy commands."

Such are the three orders of sentiments, or moral instincts, with which the Creator has endowed us to combat the perverse sentiments or instincts which exist in our hearts; thus, as it were, putting the antidote at the side of the poison.

Now, by the side of men normally constituted, although imperfect because they are men, what do we see? Anomalies, monstrosities. In a physical point of view, we find by the side of men well-formed, strong, of robust health, of noble mien, beings ill-shaped, weak, sickly, of ignoble and sinister aspect. Viewing men intellectually, what do we see? The same differences. By the side of men of genius, who create sciences, who produce those marvels of the imagination which in literature and the arts kindle our enthusiasm and raise our admiration to the highest pitch, we find vulgar intelligences, insensible to the creations

of genius and the splendors of nature, incapable of lifting themselves above the material wants of life. Descending in the scale, we meet at last with the weak-minded, the imbecile, the idiotic. These imperfections, infirmities, monstrosities, which we see in the physical and intellectual world, we see also in the moral world, as marked, as numerous, and as varied.

The reality and nature of these moral anomalies have been heretofore either completely ignored, or their importance not sufficiently recognized. Because the man is intellectually intelligent, because he is in health, because he has command of his ideas, because he reasons, it has been thought that he must be also morally intelligent, that his moral faculties are in a sound state, that his conscience is capable of feeling and weighing right and wrong, and that he has the ability to repress his evil desires; and this belief is entertained without having ever dreamed of studying his moral nature, without having examined the state of his conscience, without having so much as once thought whether he is really endowed with those moral instincts which are antagonistic to the depraved instincts, and which alone have power to wage a successful warfare against them.

These infirmities, these moral anomalies, what are they? Where are they to be sought? In what part of the man do they reside? Is it in the depraved instincts, in the immoral proclivities, in the criminal desires even? Not at all. But why not? Because the perverse sentiments, and the depraved ideas and desires which they inspire, are as much inherent in humanity as the virtuous sentiments and their moral inspirations. The presence of perverted sentiments does not, then, of itself, constitute an anomaly. Whenever the antidote is found in the heart beside the poison, the moral state of the man is regular. But suppose the antidote, represented by the moral sentiments, is either too weak or wholly wanting. In that case the anomaly exists incontestably. The moral equilibrium is destroyed, for the virtuous instincts of the soul, and the moral thoughts inspired by them, can alone serve as a counterpoise to the power of evil passions, of perversity. It is this psychical or soul anomaly, this moral feebleness, this absence of conscience, with which criminals are stricken. It is this which makes the crimi-

nal. It is this which renders it possible for a man to commit acts that wound profoundly the moral sense. The intellectual faculties are incapable, by themselves, of serving as a counterpoise to depravity. They take part in the combat against it only when they are directed in their activity by the moral faculties.

The psychical anomalies under consideration, the complete or partial absence of the moral faculties, which, connected as it is with the presence of the immoral proclivities, makes criminals, are often hereditary, as are all the other vices that inhere in human nature. How often do descendants receive from their ancestors the moral anomalies out of which crime for the most part springs. The organic condition connected with these grave moral anomalies, without being a real disease, since it coexists with a healthy state of the body, has nevertheless a relationship, more or less close, with the pathological conditions of the brain, which produce the different varieties of insanity. The cases in which the children of the insane become ordinary criminals are too numerous not to attribute the origin of this fact to an hereditary organic influence.

The sentiments, whose feebleness or absence makes the moral idiot, may be divided into three classes: The moral sense, the noblest element of man's higher nature; the generous sentiments, pity, respect, benevolence, charity, all having regard to others, and all operating as a restraint upon criminal desires through such regard; and the sentiments of prudence, foresight, fear, the love of approbation, operating on the selfish side—that is, the side of a well-considered personal interest.

1. The absence of the moral sense in criminals may be readily made apparent. The conscience of the man who is so happy as to possess this high moral faculty is wounded by his depraved thoughts, desires, and acts. It is therefore evident, that he who experiences no moral repulsion in presence of his criminal desires, and who, after having satisfied these desires, has no feeling of remorse, is without a moral sense. This absence of moral recoil from criminal desires, and of remorse after the commission of crime, is a fact of observation confirmed by many observers in many different lands.

2. The generous sentiments are wanting in criminals almost

to an equal degree with the moral sense. Nature has endowed most men with sentiments of pity, of commiseration, of goodwill, and of charity towards other men. But great criminals are an exception to this rule. Without pity for the victims whom they rob or assassinate, the commencement of the criminal act awakens no kindly sentiment within them, nor does it recall them to moral reason, or arrest them in its execution. They destroy every thing which forms an obstacle to their rapacity, and they do not cease to strike till their victim is without life. Nor, after robbing him of life, do they ever bemoan his fate. They even insult his corpse, cast ridicule upon it, and eat and drink tranquilly beside it. They have no sense of the value of human life. They murder for the veriest trifles, for a few pieces of money, for a momentary gratification ; and not a thought or an emotion is wasted on the anguish they will cause to the family of their victim. Insensible to the evil which they commit, regardless of the sad fate of their victims and of their victims' families, they are equally indifferent to the punishments to which their accomplices may be subjected. It is marvellous to observe the facility with which criminals who have been arrested denounce their accomplices who are still at liberty, and how willingly they aid in their arrest. They do this either with the selfish aim of transferring to them the responsibility of the acts whose pressure they feel, and of being themselves less severely treated, or with the wicked purpose of involving them in punishment, and of not suffering alone the chastisement with which they are menaced. The bond which unites these wretched beings is interest alone, and not affection. Thus, the moment this selfish bond is broken, they treat each other as aliens and enemies.

3. The sentiments which stand connected with a well-considered self-interest are conspicuously wanting in these exceptional beings, so abnormally constituted in regard of the natural instincts of the soul. The lack of prudence is notorious in persons destitute of the moral sense, and in whom the selfish fear of punishment is stifled by some violent passion, such as hatred, jealousy, vengeance, and sometimes even avarice. In that case we see these madmen threaten, either publicly or privately, the person who is the object of their passion, with the fate to which

they have doomed him. There are criminals so devoid of the sentiment of prudence, that they talk coolly of appropriating what belongs to others by brushing aside all the obstacles which they encounter, so that when the crime has been committed the author is instantly recognized. Improvidence is strongly characteristic of the greater part of criminals. It is owing to this singular trait, which belongs more or less to the whole class, that they are entirely absorbed by the desire which possesses them at the moment. One would say that they do not so much as cast a thought towards the future, which for them is as though it would never be. The consequences of the crimes which they meditate make no impression upon them, and if they think at all of punishment it seems to them that they will never be overtaken by it. Their mind is intent solely on satisfying present desires, in regard to which their conscience has no reproaches. This extreme improvidence and this absence of fear give to criminals an audacity and effrontery truly surprising. Without moral curb, and scarcely held in check by the well-considered self-interest which fear inspires, how should they not be daring, audacious? But this blind audacity is not born of true courage, which foresees danger, which fears it, which provides against it, and which confronts it under the sole impulse of duty. The man who can sell at so cheap a rate every thing which a rational regard to his own interest would prompt him to desire, must necessarily be but feebly endowed with the sentiments which that interest inspires, and especially with fear. For trifling and transitory advantages he exposes himself to the hardest chastisements—to the loss of personal liberty in places of detention, to the severe treatment of the prison-house, to be separated from his family, to be scorned, to die a violent and ignominious death, which wounds to the last degree the dignity of man. In a word, he prefers a vagrant, precarious, turbulent existence to a life calm and regular, full of serenity and peace.

In presence of these various sorts of moral insensibility, which are found in different degrees in all criminals, can there remain a doubt, asks the author of these "studies," that these wretched beings are the subjects of a grave moral anomaly? Can there be a doubt of it, when the absence or deficiency of the moral faculties shows itself so palpably in its effects; first,

in the absence of all reprobation of the criminal thought or desire, and then in the absence of all remorse after the criminal act?

The understanding, however great it may be, does not prevent or diminish the shock caused to the moral reason and the moral liberty of the criminal by his moral insensibility; it does not hold this man back from crime. Far from it. The understanding, when guided exclusively by perverted moral instincts, becomes, on the contrary, a power all the more dangerous in proportion as it is developed. Intent solely on the satisfaction of these instincts, it devises criminal projects and seeks the means of carrying them into effect; it produces, above all, malefactors fertile in criminal inventions, able chiefs of criminal gangs.

Mere intellectual knowledge has very little influence in holding back these morally insensible natures from the perpetration of the crimes to which they are urged by their evil instincts; in proof of which our author adduces the following fact. Criminals, he says, know that what they do is forbidden by the laws, and that they are menaced by punishments. They know even the kind of penalties to which they expose themselves by such or such a crime; for professional criminals are well acquainted with the articles of the criminal code which concern themselves. But does this knowledge hinder their attempts against society? Not in the least. Society is none the less assailed by them. Laws and punishments are alike powerless, when the moral idiocy of these criminally-inclined beings extends to the imbecility or absence of the sentiment of fear—a thing by no means rare. This fact has long been known, for it is an old experience, that “laws without good morals profit nothing.”

Hitherto we have given only the views held by the author concerning criminals who commit crime in cold blood. We add a short *résumé* of what he says concerning criminals who commit such acts under the influence of violent passions, such as hatred, revenge, jealousy, anger. In most of these, he says, we find a moral insensibility as great as in cold-blooded criminals—an insensibility proved by the absence of remorse after the crime. Still, a small number of these persons may possess

the moral sentiments to a sufficient degree. Suddenly overborne by some strong passion, which instantly stifles and paralyzes the nobler sentiments, they find themselves for the time morally insensible, and they commit the crime at a moment when all they feel and think pushes them on to it, and when none of the virtuous sentiments has sufficient force to combat the criminal desire. But when once the passion is satisfied, it loses its power, and no longer holds complete possession of the soul. Then the moral sentiments, momentarily stifled, resume their activity, and, shocked by the depraved act, they produce a feeling of remorse, and at the same time of regret that an act has been done contrary to their own interest; a remorse and regret all the more vivid, because the sentiments which felt the shock, and which now cause these pangs of repentance, are stronger and more powerful than the passions which had obtained a temporary victory. In some cases the moral suffering is so violent that it plunges the person into despair, and impels him to suicide.

Dr. Despine cites, in his second work, a passage supporting his theory, from Dr. Bruce Thompson, resident physician of the prison of Perth, in Scotland, as follows :

“ All the conclusions from the investigations I have made are confirmatory of those reached by Dr. Despine. However surprising these conclusions may be, if the facts are authentic, they must be honestly accepted, and, agreeably to the dictum of Virchow, ‘we must take things as they really are, and not as we imagine them to be.’ The work of Dr. Despine, fortified by our own study, affords important lessons, to wit : that criminals present a low psychical nature ; that the instinctive, that is, the moral faculties, in great criminals and in recidivists, are so feeble that they cannot resist the tendency to crime ; that in the major part there is a great lack, and in a considerable number a total absence, of the moral sense. These views may appear exaggerated, but they are the result of a tolerably wide study of the psychological nature of criminals. Two authorities lend confirmation to the corollaries drawn from these researches. Mr. Frederic Hill, for many years inspector of prisons in Scotland, and Professor Laycock, of Edinburgh, who have both given great attention to the study of criminals, affirm that nearly all of them are morally imbecile.”

Here, then, is a first point established by science. It is a profound moral anomaly, perfectly characterized, which is the cause of crime.

But science can push its researches and discoveries yet

further. Back of the psychological there lies an organic cause, which produces it; and science is able to enlighten us in regard to this also. Starting from the principle that our psychical or soul faculties manifest themselves through an organic intermediary—the brain—and that these faculties, the moral as well as the mental, are profoundly modified in their nature by the modifications which take place in the modes of activity of the brain, as is seen most clearly in insanity and under the influence of alcoholic drinks, which in a few moments modify profoundly the moral nature of man by the action which they exercise on the mode of activity of the brain, it cannot be doubted that the moral anomalies which produce criminals proceed from an anomaly in the mode of activity of the brain. This organic emanation is equally demonstrated by the fact of the transmission by inheritance—itself an organic effect—of the psychical anomalies which make criminals. How often do the descendants of criminals inherit from their criminal ancestors the unhappy moral anomalies which are necessary in order to be able to commit the great crimes, and become criminals themselves. The facts which prove the hereditary descent of these moral anomalies are of very frequent occurrence. Sometimes this heritage is direct; sometimes it leaps over a generation; sometimes it is collateral.

The cerebral condition, which causes a manifestation of the moral anomalies with which criminals and those who are susceptible of becoming criminals are affected, is not a disease properly so called, for the individuals in whom it is found may continue all their life in good health. This condition, though compatible with health, ought nevertheless to be placed in the category of organic infirmities; and this particular infirmity is closely related to the cerebral diseases which give rise to insanity, for it sometimes slides into those diseases. Moreover, the cases in which the children of the insane show themselves to be viciously constituted in a moral point of view, and become criminals, are extremely numerous.

The relationship which exists between the organic condition that gives birth to the moral anomalies necessary to the production of crime and that which causes insanity, is so intimate, that crime and madness often spring from the same stem. The

fact, attested by all medical men who have made the treatment of the insane a specialty, that insanity is much more frequent with criminals than with other men, is a further proof that crime and madness (it may be added suicide also) have organic ties, which bind them very closely together. Dr. Bruce Thompson, after his long experience, comes to the conclusion that the inmates of prisons and lunatic asylums have so many points of resemblance, that it is often impossible to fix the boundaries between them; that the principal study of the physician of a prison ought to be the mental state of the prisoners; that the diseases and causes of death in prisons depend very much on the nervous system; and that the treatment of crime should be made a branch of psychology.

Here, then, is a second point established by science; and the two points may be epitomized thus: Crime is due to a grave moral anomaly, characterized by the absence, to a greater or less degree, of the moral sense, in presence of desires inspired by evil inclinations; and this moral anomaly has its principle and source in a defective cerebral activity, closely allied to that which is the producing cause of insanity.

Such is Dr. Despine's study of the criminal; such his theory of criminality. His next inquiry is, What sort of treatment does the science of psychology, as thus developed in its relation to criminals, require to be applied to them, in order to effect their cure?

He answers: Science, considering crime as the natural effect of a moral disease, which, as we have seen, he calls a psychological anomaly, can have but one aim—that of curing this malady, and so of preventing its consequences, which are so disastrous to society. If it refuses, to a certain degree, to recognize the moral responsibility of beings more or less deprived of the moral sense and of the other elevated sentiments of humanity, if it denies that punishment is the end of the treatment to be applied to criminals, it nevertheless looks upon them as civilly responsible for the injuries which they have caused to society, because, in principle, he who inflicts an injury ought to bear its consequences, and to repair it as far as that may be possible; and society, attacked in its dearest interests by crime, not only has the right, but is in duty bound to defend itself. But what sort of person

is it, against whom society has this right of self-defence? Is it against a man who has in his conscience, like other men, the necessary means to combat and conquer his immoral desires? According to the description given of the abnormal state, of which it is claimed that all criminals are more or less the subjects, it is plain to be seen that the moral faculties, which are pre-eminently the antagonists of the vicious sentiments, are wanting to them in different degrees. If, then, these men, the subjects of a real moral idiocy, are dangerous, they are at the same time deserving of our pity. To shield ourselves from the danger with which they menace us, we are under a necessity of separating them from society. This separation, with the hard conditions necessarily involved in it, constitutes in itself a punishment. But the treatment which aims only to punish for the sake of punishing is dangerous both to society and to the criminal; it rarely improves the criminal, and often makes him worse; in France it produces from forty to forty-five per cent of recidivists.

If such is the fact, observes our author, we may rest assured that it is because we have pursued a wrong road; it is because, having hitherto taken as our guides on this question only fear and vengeance, and not scientific data, we have had in view punishment alone; it is because, never having studied the moral state which leads a man to crime, we have ignored this abnormal condition altogether, and we have not been able to perceive that, in order to arrive at a favorable result, we must aim to bring down to the lowest possible point this anomaly, which is so fruitful a source of crime. The criminal is a being apart; he is different, in a moral point of view, from other men. If this is so, the best way to prevent crime and protect society would be to cause this difference to cease, if not wholly, since that is impossible, at least approximately, enough to render the criminal a safe member of society. The legislation which takes this point of departure will surely attain a degree of perfection and success which has no existence at the present moment; for, as Beccaria has said, "All legislation which stops with the punishment of crime, and does not aim to prevent it, is imperfect."

The direction which society should take, under these circumstances, is based on a knowledge of the moral anomaly with

which criminals are affected, and on the just necessity of protecting itself against the perils which they offer. In this view, its first duty is to segregate them, to place them under the dependence of the penitentiary administration, not for a period fixed in advance, and determined by the nature of the crime committed. It is rather the moral state of the criminal that is to be taken into account, for a very dangerous criminal may have committed acts of no serious gravity, while another, whose moral state is far less depraved, may have committed an aggravated crime in a moment of uncontrollable excitement. Society has the right to defend itself against the wretches who attack it, and to keep them segregated, not for a time determined in advance, but as long as they continue to be dangerous.

Here we have a first point in reference to the treatment of criminals—that of the time of sequestration, established by science, and which is thoroughly in accord with what is demanded by common-sense. Under the system which fixes the time in advance, a system which recognizes, in the prisoner's sequestration, only the element of punishment, we see daily set loose in society a multitude of malefactors, who are known to be dangerous, and who prove themselves to be so by the frequent relapses, which take place shortly after their liberation. Does not such a mode of action wear absurdity on its face?

In taking as a starting-point the principle that we have here to deal with persons afflicted with a moral anomaly, which is of the nature of a disease, it is evident that to cure or at least to lessen this malady should be the supreme aim in their treatment. It is to this end that all the means employed ought to converge. Further, as the moral anomaly with which criminals are attacked varies almost infinitely, it would be as irrational to treat all these varieties in the same manner as it would to treat all the ailments of the body alike. As regards systems of treatment, Dr. Despine considers that of life in common, duly regulated, as better adapted to human nature than life in the cell, which, however, he admits, may be exceptionally employed for a time. The general conditions in which criminals should be placed in penitentiaries are stated by the author in the three following specifications: 1. Not to allow isolated communication between these perverse and morally incomplete beings, who, having only

the germs of *evil* in them, would but become the more perverse by immediate contact with each other. This end might be effected by a division into small groups, by the employment of a sufficient number of overseers, and by placing the more dangerous in the groups of prisoners already reformed, and who are nearest their liberation. 2. Not to leave too much alone and by themselves these unfortunates, more or less morally imbecile, who possess in their own conscience no means of amendment, or have only such as are insufficient to that end. It is commonly thought that, during his isolation in the cell, the criminal enters within himself, and that, through his self-communion, he conceives at length the desire and purpose to reform. This error proceeds from ignorance of the fact that the criminal is not possessed of the moral sentiments which inspire the wish and the will to pursue an upright conduct. Abandoned to his own proper forces, he either corrupts himself still further, or he becomes brutalized by losing in inaction the little that he has of moral force, or insanity supervenes more readily than in association. 3. To study the instinctive nature of each prisoner, and to take advantage of the knowledge thus gained to lead his thoughts to good, to inculcate ideas of order, and to give him the taste and the habit of labor.

It is not worth while, according to the conception of our author, to dream of the impossible as regards the moral amelioration of prisoners, and, above all, as regards that of the great criminals. All that can be hoped of them is to cause to spring up in their soul the desire to change their life, to cause to speak in them a material interest well understood, instead of such an interest ill understood; that is, to excite in them sentiments which are not, indeed, very elevated, but which are, nevertheless, almost the only ones which they are capable of feeling. We must seek to give them, by long practice, the habit of professional labor—a trade—by which they can earn an honest living after their release, and, by suitably rewarding their labor even during their imprisonment, to induce in them a love of work and the definitive purpose to lead an industrious life. To restrict them to a labor stupid in itself, a labor which teaches them nothing, which disgusts and irritates them, and from which they will afterwards be able to derive no advantage, is a miscon-

ception of the whole aim and end of prison treatment. To deal with them in this manner is, in some sort, to force these wretched creatures, who have no means of living, and who are repulsed on all sides, to return to a life of crime, or to perish with hunger. Chief among the good sentiments, which it is needful to excite in the heart of the criminal in order to lift him from the condition of moral debasement in which he is found, are the religious sentiment and family affections.

There are other sentiments of great power over the human spirit, which are too much neglected in prison treatment. Fear is very much relied upon for the maintenance of discipline, and to lead the criminal to change his life. It is a bad agent. The psychological study of criminals shows that they are but little accessible to fear. Instead, therefore, of treating the criminal as simply a degraded and abject being, we must seek to raise him in his own eyes; we must sustain him by encouragements and by hope. He must be made to know that his imprisonment and the severe discipline under which he is obliged to live, are less a punishment than a treatment, having in view—to ameliorate his moral state, to give him the habit of a regular and laborious life, and to inspire him with respect for himself, for his fellows, and for their life and property. All these are things which he can readily be made to understand. We must cause to resound without ceasing in his heart the sweet name of liberty. We must give him to understand that he holds his fate in his own hands, and that he will not be liberated till he shall have proved, by his industry and his good conduct, that he can maintain himself in society without wounding it afresh. He must know, also, that the authorities are on their guard against hypocrisy, and that after the rational and humane treatment to which he has been subjected, if he returns to his former life, he will be regarded as incurable, and will be kept in prison till he shall have given more complete proofs of reformation. The sentiment of personal dignity and self-respect must be re-awakened in the breast of the criminal; his manhood must be treated with respect, even when under punishment for infractions against discipline. Nothing will tend more to make him feel the respect which he owes to others. Instead of pursuing such a line of conduct towards the criminal, what is the course

actually taken with him? We treat him with the profoundest disdain; we array him in a repulsive and humiliating garb; we seek to make him forget that he belongs to a family, to humanity; we designate him by a Number, instead of a Name! The principle of emulation should be brought into play in our dealing with prisoners. They should be stimulated to good conduct by means of rolls of honor, by good marks, by premiums even, which should be distributed to them with a certain solemnity, in order to strike their imagination. The safety of society is profoundly concerned in such a treatment of prisoners.

There is in the Gospel a parable with which we are all familiar; a parable most admirable in a psychological point of view, since it involves the entire treatment proper to be applied to criminals. It is the parable of the Good Shepherd. The author earnestly presses upon all the friends of prison reform a careful study of this parable. We may say to society: "You desire, in your own interest, that the lost sheep be brought back to the fold. Provide for him, then, the means of doing so. Make it possible for him to return from his wanderings. Do not, by useless and dangerous punishments, sow with disgust and hatred the path that leads back to the fold, and which you desire him to take. Give to the criminal the possibility, when once he is free, of loving labor, and of thereby procuring the means of existence. Encourage him, sustain him, watch over him, during the first years of his freedom—a work so well performed by the patronage or aid societies, which cannot be too warmly commended or too generously supported.

To the intent that a penitentiary asylum may fulfil the end here proposed, it is desirable that it should not contain too large a number of prisoners. The *rôle* of the director in these houses ought to be altogether different from that which he is called actually to fill. The chief of the establishment ought to know thoroughly the special moral ailment of each one of his prisoners, and to find himself often in contact with them, to the end that he may, while directing them in the right path, inspire them with courage and hope. The under officers ought to be well instructed in regard to the psychical condition of criminals, and also on the duties of charity and firmness which they will be called upon to discharge. It is, therefore, much to be de-

sired that normal schools for the special instruction and training of prison officers be everywhere established.

Such is a rapid exposition of the views put forth by Dr. Despine touching the cause and cure of crime. He insists, with the utmost earnestness, that the essential point in this question lies wholly in the psychological principles which belong to it. These principles once admitted, the practical consequences will flow from them as from a fountain, and it will be the office of experience to fix them definitively.

Although this rational and scientific treatment of criminals has not yet been generally adopted in prisons, yet, here and there, eminent men, inspired by the noblest instincts of the heart, by pity towards beings morally feeble, have undertaken, by gentle and loving means, to lead them to a regular and virtuous life. In employing a system opposed to official rigor, they have succeeded in their attempt. What these benefactors of the human race have essayed, under the sole inspiration of their feelings, is precisely, our author affirms, what is taught by cold, hard science—that is to say, a criminal treatment inspired and guided by a knowledge of the psychical state of criminals and of the laws which govern the moral world. In truth, it is impossible that science should find itself in antagonism with the highest moral teaching, viz., to render good for evil. Science demonstrates that society, in its own interest, should employ towards the man who has injured it a treatment which, though marked by the utmost firmness, shall be at the same time humane and charitable.

Our author cites, in illustration, three instances of this sort of treatment: that of Demetz, in France; that of F. Despine, in Savoy; and that of Sir Walter Crofton, in Ireland. Happily there are many others, to which he has made no allusion. It is thus seen that reformatory treatment, applied to criminals, is not a Utopia born of the imagination.

M. Demetz was the first who practised this treatment in France, which he did with rare perfection and success in the juvenile penitentiary of Mettray. While these juvenile delinquents, when thrown into the central prisons pell-mell with adult criminals, showed seventy-five recidivists in every hundred, they have shown only four per cent under the strict but paternal

direction of M. Demetz. It has been generally believed that the whole system at Mettray consists in agricultural labor, and that its extraordinary success is due to that fact. This is a profound error. That system is based upon the psychological axiom, that human nature is controlled by the sentiments, and not by force and violence ; and this it is that has gained for it the pre-eminent success which has excited the wonder and won the applause of mankind. The catastrophe in the juvenile penitentiary at the Isle of Levant, where occurred a fearful revolt, accompanied by assassination and incendiarism on the part of the young criminals, who, equally with those at Mettray, worked on the soil, is a clear proof of this axiom.

A scarcely less interesting experiment, though of much shorter duration, was made, some thirty years ago, by Mr. F. Despine, a relative of our author, at Albertville in Savoy, while that province belonged to the crown of Sardinia. Here the application of the system was made to adults, which necessitated some modifications, the base, however, remaining the same. Imperfectly as the system was applied in this case (for M. Despine was not allowed to carry out his ideas fully), it yielded, nevertheless, very remarkable results. His administration was full of mingled firmness and gentleness. He governed his prisoners by awakening in them virtuous sentiments. By this means he obtained such an ascendancy over them, that he did not hesitate to let them go outside of the prison premises, single or in companies, under the surveillance of a keeper, to execute various labors. In this manner he so held them to duty by the bond of gratitude and love, that he was never compromised by a solitary escape, or even an attempt to escape ; for the prisoners well knew that, by running away, they would compromise the responsibility of their friend and benefactor. On one occasion, a snow-plough had been made in the prison, which was not finished till midnight. It had then to be carried outside of the prison premises, for it was to be put on board the early train of the following morning, to be conveyed to its place of destination. It was a heavy machine, and had to be taken outside in pieces, and afterwards put together. M. Despine took twelve of the most stalwart of the prisoners for this job, and alone superintended the work. There, in that dead

hour of night, with no light from moon or stars, these stout, brawny criminals wrought faithfully for a full hour; and when, at one o'clock, they re-entered, and the prison gate closed behind them, turning to M. Despigne, they smiled and said: "The director is too confiding." Nothing could have been easier than for the whole twelve to effect their escape. Did they refrain because they had no desire of liberty? We shall see. One of them did escape by stratagem a short time afterwards. When captured and brought back, he was asked why he did not run away while working outside on that dark night. His reply was striking, and even touching. It was in these words: "It would have been a baseness to the director." Compelled at length by the administration to carry out, in all their rigor, mere official and routine regulations, and that, too, despite the exceptional morality and the habit of willing, cheerful work, which he had introduced into the prison, this model director preferred rather to resign his position than hold it at the cost of putting in practice a discipline which he felt to be detestable.

Dr. Despigne takes his third illustrative example from the system devised by Sir Walter Crofton, and applied to the convict prisons of Ireland, and does the writer of this article the honor to cite from a report made by him, in 1871, the following passage:

"Never have I seen elsewhere any thing comparable to the intermediate prison at Lusk. Here is a prison which is not a prison, consisting of two iron tents, capable of accommodating a hundred inmates, and a farm of two hundred acres—an establishment without bars, bolts, or enclosing walls, and yet, in fourteen years, not a dozen escapes have taken place, thus proving anew the dictum of Dr. Wichern, that 'the strongest wall is no wall;' in other words, that a wall of influence is stronger than a wall of granite."

To the above citation Dr. Despigne adds: "This is precisely what has been said by M. Vacherot, of the Institute: 'Attraction in the realm of mind is the greatest directing force—the surest means of government.'"

REMARKS ON DR. DESPIGNE'S PHILOSOPHY.

We have left but small space for the critique proposed as the second part of the present paper, and must confine ourselves

to a general indication, without much discussion, of the points of divergence between our author and ourselves.

1. Dr. Despine takes no notice, and makes no account, of the biblical doctrine of the fall of man, by which the whole race, having lapsed from its "original righteousness," has fallen into an abnormal moral state of stupendous proportions. But though philosophy, in its pride of knowledge and wisdom, may disdain such a doctrine and stigmatize it as the offspring of theological dogma,¹ it is none the less a fundamental fact of humanity, revealed, with infinite variety of expression, in Holy Scripture, and attested by every page of human history.

2. Dr. Despine's doctrine of free-will (*libre arbitre*) we find ourselves unable to accept. Not every volition, in his view, emanates from the will. He lays down three limitations, or cases, in which free-will has, in his view, no proper play, viz.: 1. When the desires and motives are not opposed by contrary desires and motives. From this it results that, if a person feels the desire to steal, and that desire is not met and overcome by a stronger countervailing desire, though the individual who is the subject of it actually commits the theft, it is not by a proper act of the will that he does it, but under a sort of necessity, a compulsive force, which he is unable to resist. 2. When the desires and motives have no relation to moral good or evil, and consequently the conscience has no concern in the choice. Thus, if I live at Princeton, and wish to go to New York or Philadelphia to make some purchase, free-will has no concern in the choice of the one place rather than the other. 3. When the desires and motives which oppose an immoral action are stronger than those which favor it, it is not by an exercise of free-will that the person decides; it is by the desire alone, or the desire which is strongest. The decisions or choices, resulting from the desires in these three sets of circumstances, in which the sentiment of duty or moral obligation has no play, are altogether in the nature of things, and therefore a matter of course, since in none of these cases has the man any motive to act otherwise than according to his desires. In all of them the decisions, being invariably determined by the stronger desires—

¹ We do not say that Dr. Despine does this; it would be an injustice to him.

desires which the person does not give to himself, but is merely the subject of—are not really free. According to Dr. Despine, it is only when the desire which impels to evil is stronger than that which inclines to good, and yet the individual chooses the good instead of the evil, that free-will decides and chooses the course to be taken; because then the man has a motive to choose the one or the other, and is not necessitated to decide invariably according to the strongest desire. He can choose the evil because he desires it most, and he can choose the good because he feels it a duty so to do. This is the only conjuncture of circumstances where, in Dr. Despine's system, free-will has any *rôle* to perform, any *raison d'être*. Free-will, being thus called upon to decide only in cases where the sentiment of duty intervenes, has its seat in moral liberty alone, and not in the other liberties, which consist simply in the power of doing what we desire, when not prevented by others; a liberty possessed by children, insane people, and even animals.

We find it impossible to accept this philosophy, and equally impossible, in the space left us, to consider and discuss it. But we may remark, in passing, that the sentiment of duty is itself a motive, and creates a strong desire, arising from the pleasure which its performance always brings with it. To say that the Creator has not tied the purest and highest happiness to a conscientious discharge of duty, would be to arraign at once his wisdom and goodness; for what could be more derogatory to these attributes than to suppose that the Deity would bestow a greater degree of happiness on the man in an abnormal than on the man in a normal relation to him? What is there, then, to differentiate the desire and motive created by the feeling of moral obligation from other desires and motives, whose strength, according to our author, destroys free-will and draws after it the consequence of converting men into machines? If the motive supplied by the love of ease or pleasure, dominating a man, destroys his moral liberty and his free-will, what reason can be assigned why the motive supplied by the sentiment of duty, dominating another man, does not equally destroy *his* moral liberty and free-will? Dr. Despine suggests none, and it is not easy to conceive any. But this would rob the race of moral liberty, banish free-will from the earth, and destroy all moral

responsibility among men. Automatism would then become the one universal law of human as of animal action.

See, too, what a restricted sphere this philosophy leaves to virtue. There is no virtue and no merit in any human action which is not performed in the presence of two opposing desires, the one towards evil, the other towards good, the former being the strongest and being overcome by the naked sentiment of duty, the desire of doing right solely because it is right. Not only does this consequence flow from our author's philosophy, but it is formally avowed and taught in his books. A child obeys his father and mother because he loves them; but there is no merit, no virtue, in such obedience. A man obeys his God from a like principle; but his obedience is equally devoid of any meritorious quality. We like better the philosophy of the great English poet who wrote the "Night Thoughts:"

"Talk they of morals? O thou bleeding Lamb,
The grand morality is love to thee!"

We like better the philosophy of Paul, who taught that "*Love* is the fulfilling of the *Law*"—that is, the principle and spring of all acceptable obedience. We like better the philosophy of the Master, who declared, "*I love them that love me;*" which must mean, also, that he is most delighted with the obedience which springs from affection. Indeed, love to the authority commanding is the only force that will hold men steadfastly to duty, as magnetism is the only force that will hold the needle steadfastly pointing towards the north, and gravity the only force that will hold the planets secure in their orbits.

3. Dr. Despine maintains that all great crimes are committed in a state of moral irresponsibility, either because the perpetrators are wholly destitute of the moral sense, or because, though possessed by them to a greater or less degree, it is, for the time being, held in abeyance by their being in an impassioned state (*l'état passionné*); dominated, beyond all power of self-restraint, by some violent passion, such as anger, rage, jealousy, revenge, or the like. Even drunkenness is held to work a like result, and to render morally irresponsible the man who commits a crime in that condition. At the same time he holds that the minor crimes may be committed by persons normally consti-

tuted in a moral point of view, and that these persons, being morally responsible, are justly liable to punishment properly so called; while the great criminals, not being morally responsible, are not liable to punishment in the strict sense, though he admits that they are civilly responsible, and may be submitted to a curative moral treatment in asylums. This theory is certainly liable to other exceptions; but an objection sufficiently grave is suggested when it is asked where shall we find human tribunals capable of drawing a line so ethereal and impracticable, so vague and intangible, especially as our author himself admits that persons wholly devoid of the moral sense often commit the minor as well as the greater crimes? In such cases the courts would be compelled to sentence to punishment persons who are not properly amenable thereto.

4. Our author does not appear to make any account of a process, which all observers of human nature and human conduct must have noticed times without number, by which the conscience, which originally existed in full strength, becomes gradually enfeebled and incapable of its normal action through long indulgence in evil courses. St. Paul applies to the conscience, when thus voluntarily brought into this state of numbness and inaction, two epithets equally apt and striking, "*defiled*" and "*seared*"—*defiled* meaning so corrupted by vicious and criminal habits that it no longer performs its proper office, so blinded and perverted by sin that it can no more judge aright of the moral quality of actions; *seared* meaning utterly hardened, extinct as it were, having lost all sense and feeling of right and wrong. Can the doctrine be accepted that such persons have no moral responsibility for the criminal acts done by them? We think not; and we think, also, that our author pushes his doctrine of the absence of the moral sense too far, and gives it too sweeping a force. The cases cited by him, though striking, and some of them even appalling, do not prove, to our satisfaction, that this faculty is wanting or deficient to any thing like the extent claimed by him. As yet we cannot but hold to the old belief that there are few persons (we believe there are some) entirely destitute of the moral sense; few in whom there does not exist some germ or flickering of conscience; few in whom there is not a moral capacity, which

may be developed by education, or perverted by miseducation.

Dr. Francis Wharton, in his "Treatise on Mental Unsoundness, embracing a General View of Psychological Law," has given a *résumé* of our author's theory of criminality, which we think our readers will be glad to see, and which we therefore transcribe for their perusal, as follows :

"The moral sense, Despine declares, is not the result of knowledge, and cannot be acquired. Some men are destitute of it, and these men are not to be taught. Such a deficiency constitutes moral insanity or moral idiocy. There may be intellectual clearness and the capacity to reason accurately, coexistent with this derangement of the moral sense. To sustain this position, Despine is obliged to start a new definition of free-will (*libre arbitre*), which he informs us can only exist when there is capacity to act from a sense of duty. *He who acts from other motives than a sense of duty, is not a free agent.* Hence, from the category of free agents are to be removed, (1) the person who does acts which appear to him indifferent—*i.e.*, neither good nor bad, and (2) the person who does an act which appears pleasant to him, because it is pleasant.¹ Duty he declares to be the great moral motive of life, compared with which all other motives are coarse and egoistic. He alone who acts in obedience to duty is free from selfishness and egoism. He, for instance, who obeys his parents from love is egoistic and selfish. He obeys from the pleasure he receives in obeying. He who obeys from duty, on the other hand, acts irrespective of his own pleasure and advantage. He alone is unselfish. Yet duty is the high prerogative and the exclusive test of a moral agent. Except by those who are governed by a sense of duty, there can be no moral agency. He who is governed, not by duty, but by affection, or by any other form of feeling (the author forgets that the sense of duty is also a feeling), simply follows the lower animals in the points where they differ from man. Hence it is, according to Despine, that he alone who acts from a sense of duty is responsible. These propositions are supported by a very copious list of criminals, whom Despine announces to have been destitute of the moral sense ; which, with a boldness of assumption, like that which characterizes his other psychological assertions, he declares to be proved by the absence in such cases of remorse or repentance for their evil deeds. In other words, where there is no remorse, there is no moral sense ; and where there is no moral sense, there is no responsibility ; and where there is no responsibility, there is no proper punishability. And this is then carried a stage further by the declaration, that absence of moral sense is to be inferred from the commission of all gross and cruel crimes, and hence that such crimes imply irresponsibility. In other words, every great criminal is, at the moment of his crime, morally insane ; and it is as unjust to punish such, as it is unjust to punish lunatics. The fallacy of this reasoning, it need

¹ This is hardly a fair statement of Despine's views. See above.

scarcely be said, lies in the assumption that 'sense of duty,' like the various other faculties and properties of the mind, is contained in a separate and hermetical compartment; and that, when this compartment is empty, it cannot be filled by reason. But there is no such separation of the mind's several faculties and functions; and it is notorious that in persons most destitute of a natural sense of duty, this faculty may be supplied by reason. A man may naturally, for instance, be destitute of a sense of duty to government; but let government show that it means to be respected, and this sense of duty will soon spring up. So a child who, under a lax and indulgent mother, shows no sense of duty to parents, will soon, on the intervention of a firm and wise father, learn that there is such a duty, and act accordingly. Enlightened duty is, in fact, often the creature of positive law. Of course, as to the insane there is no capacity to determine this law, and no material, therefore, from which duty can be deduced. But in the sane, it is the business of the law to create and guide this sense of duty, and this must be done by precept and penalty."

We agree with Dr. Wharton in his dissent from the doctrine of free-will and the moral non-responsibility of criminals, as taught by Dr. Despine; but his own philosophy, when he attempts to refute him, seems to us not a little at fault. To say that coercive measures employed by governments or individuals to enforce obedience to their laws originate a "sense of duty," and that it is "the business of law to create this sense of duty," appears very inexact, and lacking in philosophical discrimination. No law, no authority, no external force whatsoever, however vigorously applied, can "create" any moral sentiment, any inward affection, in the soul. Such is neither the office nor the intent of the applications of force. Their aim and their operation is to produce fear; and, if successful, they have the same apparent effect: that is, they produce the same external obedience, as the sense of duty, or love to the lawgiver, or any other inward sentiment or impulse of the soul. And it is precisely this egoistic sentiment, this dread of pain, this enlightened regard to self-interest, in one word, this fear, that Dr. Despine maintains must be given to criminals by the use of a right treatment, a right education, during their imprisonment, to the end that it may, in a certain measure at least, supply the place of those higher sentiments, which hold to duty and to virtue beings more highly endowed in a moral point of view.

Nevertheless, despite our inability to accept, in full, the philosophy of Dr. Despine, we gladly recognize a great element of truth in it; and we thank him cordially for his books, which are

as original, profound, and able, as they are replete with sympathy for human nature in its weakness and for human progress in its best and noblest aspirations. His view of the family likeness in the three grand elements of man's constitution—the physical, the mental, and the moral—we receive in principle without hesitation, since every day's observation and experience attest its truth. In man's bodily structure we see, on one side, a perfect animal organization, as represented in the Apollo Belvidere and the Venus dei Medici, and, on the other, little more than a lump of flesh, as depicted in Shakespeare's Caliban; and between these two extremes we find every possible, every conceivable, gradation of perfection and imperfection, the lines of separation melting into each other by imperceptible degrees. In man's mental constitution we see the same differences and the same gradations repeated, from the men so highly endowed intellectually that they create sciences and produce works of imagination, history, and philosophy, that instruct and charm the ages, down to the drivelling idiot, who lacks the intelligence necessary to meet the simple necessities of his physical existence. In the moral constitution of man, why should we not expect to meet with divergences equally great and striking? Such, in point of fact, is the case. We see, at one extreme of the moral scale, beings so finely organized, that we instinctively feel them to be as incapable of committing a criminal act as they are of plucking the moon from her seat in the heavens, and at the other extreme we behold creatures of so coarse a mould, that vice and crime seem to be their natural, normal element; and between these two extremes we find the same gradations, separated by the same inappreciable lines, as in the realms of physical and intellectual organization.

Few have lived to adult age without having observed cases of this sort. The writer of this article recalls several such, two or three of which stand out with such prominence in his memory, that he cannot refrain from a brief reference to them. We once met with a burglar in one of the county jails of New York, a man in middle age, of robust physique, and of more than the average grade of intellectual acumen and vigor. In the course of a long conversation, he maintained, with the utmost coolness and with evident sincerity, that burglary is as proper a

business as the profession of law, medicine, merchandise, or any other of the ordinary callings of life. He said that he had no natural propensity to take human life, and he would rather not do it if it could be avoided. But he declared that if, in the execution of a burglary, it became necessary to the success of the enterprise to kill a man, he would take his life as readily as he would that of a dog, and would do it without the slightest feeling of compunction. All men, he said, overreached each other when they could, and the trade of a thief or burglar was as honest as that of a merchant or a lawyer; he saw no difference.

Another case was that of a youth of twelve to fourteen years of age, who was the inmate of a boarding-school for lads, kept by the writer at an earlier period of his life. This child, for he was scarcely more, belonged to one of the most illustrious families in America. He bore a name honored in the nation's history from colonial times to the present day, a name distinguished in Revolutionary times, and also in the late civil struggle between the Northern and Southern States of the Union. He had a keen and brilliant intellect, which worked with remarkable quickness and intelligence; and he possessed extraordinary conversational powers. He could take an active part in general conversation, while engaged in rapid composition on some other subject. These gifts won the admiration of older persons, and, when he was in jail in New York, brought numbers of cultivated people to his cell, especially members of the bar and the bench, to witness their play. But he was the very incarnation of evil. Had he lived in the time of our Saviour, he would certainly have been classed among persons under the power of demoniacal possession. He was absolutely and incontrovertibly without any such faculty as conscience. His cunning, too, was equal to his wickedness, and both were without bounds. He remained in the school only for a few weeks, for it was impossible to retain him; his stay would have been perdition to all the others. His schoolmates, even, stood aghast at his deviltry. After he had been sent home, he was placed by his father, an honored and influential citizen in the community where he lived, in an insane asylum; but the writer has always thought that this was done only as a cover to mortified family

pride. We visited him while he was in the asylum. In a long conversation had with him, we could detect no trace of a disordered intellect. The father rather blamed the writer for not discovering the boy's insanity while the latter was still under his guardianship. But it so happened that, while confined in prison, he had been sick for several days, and had been attended by one of the most distinguished medical practitioners in New York, who gave a certificate that, during his attendance on the lad, he had detected no symptoms indicating any thing like mental disease in him.

One other case we will mention : it was that of another inmate of the boarding-school. The sentiment of egoism, of self-interest, was so strong in this youth, that it was a thing extremely rare for him to violate any of the established rules and regulations of the institution ; and, accordingly, he always stood high on the roll of honor for obedient and orderly deportment. But he was none the less ever plotting and working in the dark to undermine the authority and influence of the Principal, and to lead other boys into infractions of the discipline. Though there was never any thing overt in his conduct to take hold of, and especially nothing to be used as a ground of dismissal, at the end of his first half-yearly term we declined to receive him back for a second term, though his friends occupied a high social position, and, to carry out our purpose, it was necessary to resist their urgent entreaties for his retention.

As concerning the treatment recommended by our author to be applied to criminals during their imprisonment, we have only words of approval and praise to bestow upon it. He regards such treatment as flowing naturally from his theory of what the criminal is in himself, and from that of the causes which have made him what he is. We do not wish to contest this point, for if his theory is correct, the consequence is legitimate. All we now claim is, that his philosophy is not necessary to its birth. The rational and humane system of criminal treatment, the system of *organized persuasion*, as Maconochie calls it, existed long before the "Psychologie Naturelle" made its appearance. It was first announced by Pope Clement XI. in the very beginning of the eighteenth century (1703), in the motto placed by him over the door of the prison of St. Michael, at Rome : "Parum est

improbos coercere pœnâ, nisi probos efficias disciplina"—*It is in vain that we restrain the wicked by punishment, unless we reform them by education.* This principle was made the basis of the discipline introduced into the prison of Ghent by its founder, Viscount Vilain XIV., more than a century ago. It was equally adopted by Maconochie at Norfolk Island, by Montesinos at Valencia, by Obermaier at Munich, by F. Despine at Albertville, by Crofton in Ireland, by Sollohub at Moscow, and by Demetz, Wichern, and all others in charge of juvenile penitentiaries and reformatory institutions for children and youths. The principle is now recognized by almost all prison disciplinarians, the world over, who are worthy of the name, though, alas! the practice yet lags far behind the theory.

But, in any case, we give a hearty welcome and a fervent God-speed to so intelligent, learned, earnest, and able an adherent and advocate of this principle, as the illustrious author of the "*Psychologie Naturelle*" and "*La Folie au Point de Vue Philosophique*" has shown himself to be. May his labors in this field yield an abundant harvest!

E. C. WINES.

AMERICAN ART: ITS PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS.

THE progress of art in this country is a subject of decided interest at the present time. Not only are a large number of people engaged in the production of art, in some form or other, but the critical mind is occupied with the subject of art to a degree that is unprecedented.

The numerous works issuing from the press indicate how general is the demand for instructive and critical art-literature; while the multiplying forms of art-manifestation, not only in the main departments of sculpture, architecture, and painting, but in the numerous branches of decorative art; in the lighter forms of domestic use, in household furniture and ceramic ware—all point to the fact that the art-idea has full possession of the public mind: if the public *has* a mind; for what is possessed in this collective sense is not uncommonly a very unreflecting organ, energized and controlled mainly by fashion. And since the time of Phidias, it is doubtful if the public mind has ever held other than very fitful and feverish notions of art; while it is said that Phidias himself suffered much at the hands of an Athenian public, under the flings of false suspicion which valued his art less than a paltry pennyweight of gold.

One cannot place much reliance upon popular estimates, nor upon popular tastes, which may at one moment be filled with an excessive admiration for Dutch tulips; at another, with an unsatisfied craving for "old blue." A correct taste is not a popular, but an individual possession. The public occupies itself with what is easily understood, and the best art is not always easily understood. Those things, therefore, which demand some correspondence of thought for their right recep-

tion, appeal to the individual, for it is the individual solitary who thinks. Within a few years we have seen our own popular estimates vary with the fickleness of a weathercock. It is not many years since we placed so extravagant an estimate upon certain examples of our own landscape-art, that fabulous prices were freely paid for works which now do not sustain this estimate. Then a free importation of foreign art filled the public mind with a feverish craving for the productions of a particular school of painting, with which, with little discrimination, it stultified itself. Boudoir scenes and pretty little superficial elaborations, with the accident of an occasional masterpiece, filled the public eye and gratified the popular taste. Then followed the decorative mania, which ran wild on Eastlake, and presently was diverted by the puerilities of painted pottery, which has eventually been supplanted by the rage for "old blue" china.

Yet this diversity of taste, though exercised somewhat indiscriminately, has had some good results. We have learned the deficiencies of our own art; we have learned to discriminate between that which is really excellent, and that which is meretricious and false, in foreign art. We have learned, too, something of decoration in the correct sense; so that we can even discriminate between the true and the false in Chinese and Japanese art. Indeed, we even know something—very little, to be sure—of the history and development of art among these Oriental peoples. We distinguish between their ancient and their modern contemporary products; and it may be that we shall yet learn to apply their principles of art without adhering to that servile copying of their productions which has made London and Paris manufacturing centres for the imitation of Chinese and Japanese porcelains.

It is seldom that the public does not derive some indirect benefit from its eager though indiscriminate liking for the dainties set before it by fashion. If the popular taste attains indirectly the end of perceiving the substance and value of true merit, even though remotely, by exhausting that superficial prettiness of which it soon becomes weary, it has made some progress, and acquired some knowledge which may be applied judiciously in promoting a more healthy feeling for art.

The products of art, in common with every other production of the human mind, fall under the general law governing the nature and relations of supply and demand. If the public, or at least that portion of the public which forms the true audience of the artist, demand with intelligence and discrimination a better quality of art, the demand is all that is requisite to create this art. This is no less true now than it was at the time of Pericles. But if the public is satisfied with that which is foreign to its native sympathy, and to the sincere experience of its own *milieu*, and adopts foreign tastes, manners, and habits of thought—partly for the reason that they are clothed with authority, and partly because they afford scope for the exercise of insipid affectations—then the public aids in that general mimicry which is so crushing to the true art-instinct. Our critics should recognize the responsibility which properly belongs to them, and to the public they represent. The responsibility for inferior art-production does not rest with artists alone: it is equally shared by those who create the demand which occasions this kind of production. At least, this is true in a general sense. Upon higher grounds it is a true function of the artist to direct and lead the public, to elevate the taste, to prove himself, by his works, a true missionary, or evangelist of art, even though it cost him a martyr's penalty and price.

It will be generally conceded that we have not lacked this element in the development of American art. Allston was a conspicuous example of it, but not a solitary one. It is creditable to American art that there have always been those among us who have had this high aim, and who have adhered to it with commendable strictness. If we estimate their pictures by standards entirely foreign to the purpose, we may declare them to be but indifferent works of art. If we apply to the art of fifty, forty, or even twenty years since, the standards that obtain to-day, we are easily led into the false position of detraction and ridicule. But, on the other hand, if we judge these works by the light of their contemporary surroundings, by the circumscribed opportunities afforded the artist for his discipline and development, we cannot but respect his solitary efforts and marked achievement under existing conditions. True criti-

cism always recognizes these conditions, and respects the aim that is even partially obscured by them.

At the close of the last century—immediately following the Revolution—and at the beginning of this century, we find solitary instances of a very extraordinary art-instinct manifesting itself. There were Copley, Trumbull, West, Stuart, Allston, Leslie, Morse, Sully, Inman, Cole, and others, who originated and gave some permanence to the art-movement, which has steadily pursued its way to this day. Following these men, and linking them with the living representatives of American art, among whom they stand, are Durand, R. W. Weir, Page, Huntington, and others—with the deceased painters Elliot, Gray and Kensett—who fill a conspicuous and leading position in the advancement of American art in its several departments of painting. Other leading contemporary artists it is not essential to our object to name. They, together with those just mentioned, are prominently before the public.

Now without specifically inquiring into the relative merits of these artists, or determining the character of their individual works, we may see in their art, particularly in landscape painting, something of a march of progress, broadening and deepening with the acquisition of skill and insight, that has placed us where we now stand—not upon the highest pinnacle of art, by any means, but just at that height where we catch the gleam of an effulgence which portends the dawn of a new day.

This may be accepted as a mere fancy, or it may contain the reasonable promise of a fact. If it be urged that some substantial grounds other than mere idle prediction are necessary to this conclusion, they may be supplied.

We have now, filling the arena, two generations of living artists—a generation either at its prime or about passing into shade (who have achieved in some respects a distinct development for American art—freshness, individuality, and a sincere aim centred in nature); and a new generation of younger men, recently returned from abroad, where they have been schooled in the methods and discipline of Munich and Paris. Here, then, are two, not necessarily opposing, but certainly distinct, phases of art-development existing among us. The situation is both novel and stimulating.

It is very easy to allow the sympathies to warp the judgment in weighing the respective merits of these two bodies of artists. Extremists of either class will not hesitate to denounce the other in strong terms, exaggerating weak points and disallowing merit even where it is most conspicuous. Let us study the more serious types that are really representative of these two distinct phases of American art.

Individuality in art, and those methods and principles common to schools, have always been more or less hostile. Every reform in art has begun at the point where these opposing views or principles for artistic guidance have broken out into open hostility; generally brought about through the attempt to circumscribe genius with a strait-jacket—and genius being often mistaken for abnormal eccentricity, considering the object of this garment, the simile is not a bad one. If we follow these opposing views of art-discipline far enough, we will find they originate in two radically distinct opinions, underlying all art-education. These two general opinions may be thus distinguished: One theory holds that the student should have within reach what is necessary for his development; that, in the absence of this, his faculties may supply the deficiency; but that he should be left to follow the bent of his individual inclinations with respect to aim and selection, on the ground that these inclinations are valuable indications of personal aptitude; and that, rather than force upon him prescribed disciplinary studies, instruction should be confined to guiding and encouraging these tendencies.

The other theory has *for its end* discipline. It ignores the particular bent or inclination of the pupil, and proceeds to subject him to a rigid course of training in the principles and practice of art, with a view to his mastering the means and materials for art-production. In short, the latter theory assumes that, as art is simply a means of expression, like any common language, it must be inculcated grammatically. It holds that the student must master the methods and implements with which he is to express himself or his subject with accuracy and clearness.

The aim of the first theory centres in the ultimate purpose of the artist; that of the second is centred in discipline or

method, ignoring, for the time being, this ultimate purpose. In the first case, only the instincts of strong natural talent can be the guide to success, which is rarely attained but by exceptional genius; in the second case, mediocrity of talents may be made respectable by accuracy of method; and mannerism is not uncommonly the result of such enforced discipline, unless carefully guarded against. It is claimed by some that mediocrity in art should have no place, while mannerism is the complete throttling of the true art-instinct—"art made tongued by authority." Here, then, is the *hard-pan* on which these opposing theories rest—art as a means of expression, and art for the sake of art.

Now, when we identify the work of many of our older artists with the aim to interpret nature as they find it revealed to their eyes, true to their native inborn instincts, seeing in the existing conditions of our life and time all the elements requisite for true and noble art-expression; when we see in their work some sincere attempt, very adequately made, to draw from this source an inspiration—we must respect their sincerity and their aim; nor should we withhold our reasonable admiration of their success in creating an art which is now recognized as in some respects distinctively American, and possessing certain qualities of excellence that are unsurpassed. Along with this, however, we find that which is open to unfavorable criticism. We find a general lack of thoroughness of method. While there are some noted exceptions to this, the general effect of our exhibitions suggests a want of executive skill, a thinness of method which has often the appearance of weakness. It is seldom that we meet with accurate drawing, strong effects of chiaroscuro, depth and richness of coloring. These are qualities in which our art is often lacking; while, on the other hand, the intellectual and dramatic conceptions of a subject are rarely vigorous or profound. Our artists have too often been content to treat of the milder phases of nature and of human character; and these milder phases they have rendered with feeling. It cannot be said that we Americans do not feel very deeply. Our lines of character may not always be the strongly-marked furrows of experience, but they are the well-defined evidence of hopeful, earnest purpose, of high aspiration, which, in spite of

our weaknesses and our faults—that are but too apparent—command the respect of every civilized people. Our true character, to be understood, needs to be aroused by those deeper convictions which great emergencies call forth. But in the hum-drum of everyday life we easily lapse into superficial moods; and unless our daily life and our general habits of thought are serious, we cannot expect to find very great earnestness in our art. It would be unjust to underrate that sincerity of aim which does exist, and which has always existed among certain of our leading artists—a sincerity of aim which commands the highest respect. Let us take Kensett for an example. Whoever enjoyed the privilege of Kensett's friendship must have been struck with his devotedness to his art. Not only did he himself exhibit an entire devotion to every thing that could advance the profession, but in his own personal character and life he made every one with whom he came in contact respect the dignity of that calling of which he was a worthy representative. He was an untiring student of nature. The walls of his capacious studio were not only literally lined with his studies, but large stacks of canvases leaned against them—the records of many a summer's work, of a life's labor. His nature was an exceedingly sensitive one, yet manly and true. His pictures reflected his character. Every one is familiar with them. They are full of tenderness and pathos—if they *are* landscapes—and there is a grace and charm of manner in his art which inspires reverie. His aim was absorbed in those simple, pastoral truths of nature which require for their right expression delicate feeling and a sensitive touch.

Now, while we recognize these finer qualities in his art, and yield them our hearty praise, we must acknowledge the fact that this praise is growing more and more qualified as it becomes discriminative. We find our standards of estimate are changing, perhaps maturing. We now declare that Kensett's pictures, while possessing sincerity of aim, truth of expression, and fine feeling, are lacking in body and force. His method is thin, flat, monotonous—his landscapes have often the appearance of a stained film or mist suspended between the observer and the reality. Of this we are growing more and more impatient. Art, in common with literature, is now seeking to get nearer the

reality, to "see the thing as it really is," to grasp the object with palpable truth in its expressive values and characteristic facts. We need not conceal this change of feeling, for it is grounded in sincerity and truth. We see, then, that a generation of artists of whom we have selected Kensett as a representative, is receding into the past, and a new generation, full of promise, but as yet lacking in fulfilment, is pressing forward. One word more of simple justice and praise for the old, before considering the characteristic tendencies of the new generation.

These men, who have collectively lifted our art upon that elevated plane which a just criticism freely accords it, have not been lacking in true art-faculty, nor are they likely to be surpassed in sincerity of aim by the new generation. They have achieved their praiseworthy position in spite of a general absence of thorough technical discipline—a misfortune that is shared equally by every other profession in America, when contrasted with the severity of prolonged discipline essential to success in the leading nations of Europe. They, too, have won for it the distinction of originality, which has given our landscape art a character that is peculiarly its own. They have not sought to mimic the virtues of an art that is foreign to our national instincts; but they have steadfastly adhered to those instincts which spring out of our own peculiar conditions of life. This is a true function of art. That quality in art which endures throughout all the changes of fashion and of ephemeral thought, is the touch of nature which is self-forgetful and absorbed. If the new generation rival the old in this, and yet superadd greater thoroughness of technical qualities, then will our art make one more step forward toward that elevated plane which can only be attained by larger sympathies and deeper convictions than have yet manifested themselves pervasively in our national life.

Now, let us consider the characteristics of the new generation, who have unfurled their banner most auspiciously with an exhibition in New York, designed as an offset to the National Academy—the accepted representative of the existing condition of American art, before the advent of these young men as an organized body of artists. We will not include with them certain older artists, with whom they have chosen to associate

themselves, for the reason that these older artists are members of the Academy, and doubtless have been accorded an honorary place among their younger brethren on the ground of their having studied abroad.

The majority, then, of these young men have studied in the schools of Paris and Munich—the latter influence perhaps predominating—and after several years of arduous discipline, and the breathing of an art-atmosphere that has well filled and expanded their artistic lungs, they have returned home to put in practice the knowledge and technical skill they have thus acquired. The merest glance at their united display suffices to kindle enthusiasm and stimulate hope. There is a tone and vigor in their art which offers decided contrast to similar exhibitions with which we have long been familiar.

But it will not do for the critical sense to lapse into quietude, and yield up its judicial aim in the presence of these first impressions. Let us weigh the impressions as they enter the mind. Let us avoid those rude contrasts which only admit the extremes of black and white, without recognizing the infinite shades of half-tone that hold the finer truths and comprise the juster relations of merit in art, as in every thing else. Let us avoid, likewise, those hasty conclusions which say of the new, "It is true," and of the old, "It is false." What we conceive to be true may contain the false, and what we deem false may be in part luminous with truth. Our art will not be overturned by this new upheaval, though it may be greatly shaken by it. It is not revolution; it is rather hoped that it *may* mean progress. This is yet to be determined. When men's sympathies are deeply enlisted in a cause, they are impatient of that cooler judgment which only yields them a half recognition, which withholds in part that full agreement with their views which they demand. These young men are deeply in earnest; that is plainly apparent. But earnest men have lived and died in art—are now living among us—whose passionate devotion to the highest ends of art is none the less true, though they may not be banded with their associates of either class, but silently pursue their steadfast aim.

If we were to contrast briefly the discipline of Paris and Munich, we should say that the former school appears to aim at

thoroughness of form, and those values which rest in form as a basis of art ; while the latter school is largely occupied with the technicalities of painting—effective methods of brush-work, and the clever use of vehicle. The former attains results which are perhaps more permanently valuable to the student, and which subject him less to the danger of mannerism ; while the latter gives him an immediate facility of method, which is both attractive and brilliant. Neither system ventures even remotely, so far as we can detect, to direct the art-faculty toward any very original or profound insight of nature, and the uses of nature in effecting true creations of art. That is—and our judgment may be very inadequate, for it is entirely founded upon the productions of these young men—these works, comprising the first exhibition of “The Society of American Artists,” seem to suggest that these young painters—not all, but most of them—have before them and filling their minds, *a master*, through whose eyes they see nature ; while nature is adapted by them, in their choice of subject as well as treatment, to this conventional, or, at all events, mannered method of viewing her. We do not here, therefore, escape the evils that our art has been charged with ; but we are in danger of merely having one mannerism—and that foreign to our natural instincts—substituted for another, which, whatever may be said of its shortcomings, was of a less artificial growth—one remove, not *two* removes, from nature. Is there not, we may ask, some decided similarity in the work of these young men who have studied in Munich ? Is there not a surprising equality of grade, of technical manner, of artifice, of choice of subject for its mere picturesqueness and adaptability to the ends of their *technique* ? These are questions forced upon us by the deliberate study of their pictures, and reluctantly asked. We do not believe our motives will be impugned for this frank questioning of these technical surprises, with which these younger men have stormed the walls of the old academy and blown their bugle note of challenge to honorable competition. They have the sympathy of every academician whose sympathy is worth having, and no true artist can withhold his admiration of their pluck and promise. They have returned as students just entering on their career as artists. The true test of their merits will rest in their ability to subject their at-

tractive technical methods to the expression of that which lies about them ready to be quarried from our everyday life ; that simple nature, without strain or affectation, which made the Greeks true artists of the Beautiful, inasmuch as they were the interpreters of their own life and time. Let us not forestall criticism, but allow time to determine what shall live on after our feverish fashions and half-fledged opinions shall have perished. Perhaps the effigies of these younger men may then fill the niches from which older statues have fallen ; perhaps not.

There remains to be considered, then, this fact : Is there indication of a renewed vigor and life put forth by these younger men ? There certainly is. Is this in the right direction—namely, that of advancing, with distinctive individuality, American art as such ? Not American art as a mere mimicry of French or German art, or as an imitation of the style of this master or that, be he Piloty or Michael Angelo ; art, not merely “for the sake of art,” nor yet as the “mere vehicle of thought,” but as an impassioned expression of emotional impulse addressing the moral sense through the sensibility, and finding the means for this in the visible commonplace of everyday life. This is the problem, not yet completely solved by either the old or the new generation of artists ; but that they both are guided and animated by earnest purpose, is not to be doubted. We are not yet prepared, however, to abnegate that excellence in our maturer art which is hardly surpassed, in certain particulars, by the art of any contemporary people. Allston’s “Spalatro,” and Trumbull’s “Death of Warren” and “Death of Montgomery,” are not excelled anywhere for impressive action, dramatic interest, absorbed natural expression of feature under strong emotion, on a plane quite superior to that of the merely picturesque. They are conceived with a certain elevation of thought, just conception of character, and true regard for spontaneity of action, which is very unusual, and quite unsurpassed in recent art. In technical qualities, also, these pictures are surprisingly skilful.

We have had, likewise, portraits by Stuart, Elliot, Page, Furness, Hunt, and Huntington, which would command attention and respect in any *salon* ; while in landscape there have been individual works by Cole, Inness, Gifford, Church, McEntee,

Colman and others which have not their superior in this branch of art; marked by decided individuality, grandeur of conception, and adequate thoroughness of rendering, which will place them permanently where they belong, only to be surpassed by a profounder genius than has yet inspired contemporaneous landscape-art. We do not mean to say that these artists are always equal, or that even their individual, representative works are above criticism; we do not mean that they are faultless—mature and adequate in every technical quality—for they are not; indeed, in every one of them we might point out conspicuous faults, inadequacies, want of skill. Faultlessness of execution is not the highest end of art. The compensation rests in their aim, and in their power to move the sensibility effectively and naturally; while it would be difficult to conceive of wider diversity of style and greater individuality of methods than these works suggest. Let us not forget this in praising the promise of the younger artists.

There are certain almost deceptive imitations of Corot, Diaz, Turner, Piloty, Fichel, Gérôme, Daubigny, Cabanel, and so on, among the works of these younger men, which will not actually deceive or lead astray the cooler judgment of reflecting people, who have their own estimate of the merit of originality in art. This truer merit is not lacking among the younger artists. Among these weeds and parasites just cited, we see genuine, hearty plants erecting themselves and putting forth the promise of flower and fruit. Education will not alone effect this end; thorough method and discipline will not bring it about, however these may aid and equip the artist. There must be, as well, high thinking, individuality of aim, and a purpose to attain that great and true end of art which kindles the moral sense while it delights the feeling. Not that dry, unartistic, and merely illustrative aim with which a Kaulbach would render art merely a vehicle for the expression of prosaic thought; nor yet, on the other extreme, that equally partial misconception which would make painting mere decoration—a bouquet of color, an æsthetic spot of chiaroscuro. Decoration has its place in art, and the power of painting to express thought has its place; but emotional ideas, directed, but not too rigidly shaped, suggestive, stimulating, elevating, and breathing the moral sense

through the avenues of feeling—palpable and palpitating, yet spiritual and pure—this is a higher and truer aim, and this alone makes the artist a poet and a seer, and art one of man's noblest legacies to man.

Now what is the artist's place in the social economy of life? He is not a mountebank; he does not cater to *idle* amusement. Whatever notions Shakespeare may have entertained respecting the management of his Globe Theatre, he did not compose his plays and create his stupendous characters with an ephemeral end in view. The artist must certainly gratify the senses; but should he stop there? Will he not rather say that through the windows of sense he will create an image that will make melody in the mind and heart?

“Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard
Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;
Not to the sensual ear, but, more endear'd,
Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone:

When old age shall this generation waste,
Thou shalt remain, in midst of other woe
Than ours, a friend to man, to whom thou say'st,
Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.”¹

It is so simple a thing to say, in a general way, what art should do, and what it should not do; what the artist should seek, and what he should avoid, that one grows weary of these platitudes. But let us endeavor to be more specific in defining our ideas.

We have seen Americans settling abroad as artists, not for honest purposes of study, but that they might bask in what they are pleased to term “a congenial art-atmosphere.” There they linger out a sort of exotic existence—browbeaten by the overmastery of minds occupied in the same pursuit, having the advantage of successive generations rooted in the soil—until individuality, courage, national identity, and even common manliness of character is endangered. One is reminded by them of Emerson's wisdom:

“Who bides at home, nor looks abroad,
Carries the eagles and masters the sword.”

¹ Keats' “Ode on a Grecian Urn.”

The very choice of subjects engaging the attention of many of these artists grows out of a sort of epicurean diletteism. And how should it be otherwise; for are they not removed out of the flow of vital conditions in which they were born and reared? Art does not consist of merely picturesque conceptions of costume; of painted contadinas decked in spangles and ribbons; nor is its truest function the merely intellectual, carefully wrought-out stories of times out of mind, full of interesting archæological research, but no longer accepted with the faith and conviction that is essential to art. A panathenaic procession had once a meaning for the Athenians, kindling a glow on their cheeks and sending the life-blood bounding through their veins on those serene mornings in Greece; but we can only understand this through our intellectual sympathies coldly awakened. It has no intensity of meaning for us, no real hold on the heart, no faith, no hope, no promise. Our lines of art cannot enwreath these glad forms with that tenderness and pathos which doubtless caused the Greek artist's hand to tremble with suppressed delight as he chiselled them in marble. We look in upon all this "askance and strangely," not really understanding it, but pretending to a sympathy we do not, cannot feel.

And the same may be said of our modern mediævalists. We cannot revive that peculiar religious fervor which found natural and spontaneous expression in the ecclesiastical art and symbolism of the middle ages. If we affect this, it becomes mere sentimentality, an intellectual sentimentality it may be, but none the less removed from true sentiment, however curious and learned. In art, it will not do to let the intellect work without the heart. The feelings, the impulses, the passions, these are at the root of all true art, as they are the moving, underlying energies of life itself. We cannot doubt that human life has everywhere, now as in times past—in America as in Greece, as in Italy, as in France—all the requisites for great art. If the art-instinct be properly directed—not to seeking in nature for that which corresponds to our preconceived notions of what makes a picture, but rather with the conviction that what interests us in nature will surely interest us in the picture, and *make* the picture—in spite of all that may be said about masters, and

schools, and discipline, and method, and vehicle, and what not, which have their place but not the pre-eminence. While the earnestness and study that are directed to technical acquirements are sure to perfect these means and render them attractive, yet, for the real advancement of American art we must look to those who, while they value the means of pictorial art, direct their principal earnestness and study to seeking those higher values in character and beauty which have far greater significance for those who constitute the great body of lovers of art, and who form the true audience of the artist; otherwise we must take the ground that poetry is not for the people, but for the grammarian who can dissect the verse and designate its quantities. Art is not alone for artists, but for man; and it is needless to add that man, in the most intelligent sense, knows where to place the pre-eminence.

Let the artistic insight search deeply into nature and human action, and it will find pictures in stones—certainly in that toil and labor which consecrate and render even religious, as well as beautiful, such simple subjects as engaged the art of Jean François Millet, who, while he took nature for his model, did not mistake his model—if he ever employed one—for nature. Our own life is equally teeming with similar subjects, perhaps less happily clothed with quaintness, but far more worthy of engaging the thought of the painter than that “picturesque material” which is often so cleverly and gracefully disposed in the pictures and workshops of inferior artists. The æsthetic should doubtless have its place, but the deeper impulses should likewise manifest themselves in art, if it is to have any permanent hold on the affections or on the mind. Our older artists have not all lost sight of this, and in the work of some few of the younger men there is evidence of its hearty recognition.

JOHN F. WEIR.

THE MIRACLE OF CREATION.

THE account of the creation of the world, as given in the first chapter of the Bible, has always been greatly admired for its beauty and sublimity. The sentence with which it commences, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," is a grand rhetorical synthesis which brings the whole subject under a single view of the mind, and the subsequent analysis unrolls the vast picture in a succession of animated scenes. But this is only one of its least remarkable traits. Hence we find that even a heathen rhetorician and philosopher, the amiable and accomplished Longinus, could not withhold from it his meed of praise; for in his celebrated work on *The Sublime* he thus speaks of it in comparison with the beauties of Homer: "So, also, the Jewish lawgiver, who was no common man, exhibits the power of the Deity in a manner worthy of its excellency, as follows: God said—what does he say? 'Let there be light, and it was; let the earth be, and it was.'" The sublimity of this representation of the infinite power of God is probably unrivalled in the literature of the world.

The great theme which it presents for contemplation is the creation of the universe. The expression, "In the beginning," carries the mind back through all the dim ages of the past, in order to portray to the imagination the origin of all created things. Its indefiniteness is eminently suitable to the subject. For it does not chronologically determine any particular time when the creation took place, nor, indeed, is there in the subsequent Scriptures any information from which it is possible to form a satisfactory estimate of the age of the world. There has been no science of chronology revealed from heaven, any

more than of other things which are the legitimate subjects of scientific investigation. There is no reason to think that the apostles or writers of the New Testament regarded the Scriptures as containing an inspired chronology. For they quoted from the Septuagint translation as freely as from the original, notwithstanding, if a full chronology could be made out from the sacred records, this version of the Old Testament would give nearly fifteen hundred years more for the age of the world than can be gathered from the Hebrew. They did not even notice this, nor similar discrepancies, which seems to warrant the inference that they did not regard them as of sufficient importance.

It is true, indeed, that learned and able men have taken the greatest pains to work up a sacred chronology from the data supplied in the Hebrew Scriptures. But no two of them agree in their results, so that these are of no authority. Nor can this be a matter of surprise to any one who will take the trouble to examine for himself the materials out of which these elaborate systems are constructed, which are nothing else than the genealogies interspersed here and there in the historical records, and which a child may see were never intended, and are totally untrustworthy for any such purpose. For they freely apply the terms father and son to grandfathers and grandsons, and even to remote ancestors and descendants; and they leave out, or skip over, two or three, and sometimes as many as thirty or forty generations at a time. Thus in the genealogy of our Lord himself, Matthew leaves out many links in the chain, which are elsewhere supplied. The first words of his Gospel are, "The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham." Now, if this statement stood alone, it would appear that Christ was the son, and not a remote descendant of David; and so of David with respect to Abraham. In this case, there are at least thirty-eight or forty generations omitted, and how many more there are no means of determining. Hence it appears that the attempt to construct a final chronology out of such materials is preposterous. That great and good men should have wasted so much labor, learning, and ingenuity in building up these imaginary schemes, is one of those things which must be classed with the many attempts which have been

made, and which have not yet ceased, to discover or invent a perpetual motion.

The Holy Scriptures leave science perfectly free within her own sphere—as in all other things so in this—to determine by her own methods the age of the world and the length of time during which it has been inhabited by man. They teach nothing opposed to any conclusions upon these and similar questions which may be established upon strictly scientific evidence. If it should be proved that the earth is millions of years old, and that it has been inhabited by man for a much longer time than has been supposed, Christians may accept these results with entire satisfaction, and without the least detriment to their faith in the Scriptures.

Another thing in this account which seems worthy of observation is, that it assumes the being or existence of God, without attempting to prove or account for it in any way. For, in this respect, there is a striking contrast between the Christian Scriptures and other ancient books which pretend to divine inspiration. In those counterfeits of the true coin there are often the most labored attempts to trace the genealogies of the gods, which are always absurd because it is manifestly impossible to conceive of an origin for that in which all other things originated. One cannot even make an effort to form such a conception without involving himself in the labyrinths of an infinite series, in which there is always something of whose existence no rational account can be given. Instead of leading into the mazes of this inextricable perplexity, the sacred writers begin with God in the exercise of all his personal and creative attributes, and simply refer to “the creation of the world,” as being in itself such evidence of “his eternal power and Godhead,” that none but “the fool” can say “in his heart, ‘There is no God.’”

The reasonableness or validity of this assumption is denied by none but atheists, who are shut up to one of the following alternatives, namely, that the universe came into being of itself, or that it has always existed. But the former of these is utterly inconceivable, for it is a necessary truth that whatever begins to be must be produced by some cause exterior to itself. All science rests upon the foundation of this

truth, so that, if it be not such, there is no such thing as science. The other alternative, that the universe has always existed, is a possible conception, and one which can hardly be refuted to the satisfaction of those who hold it. Yet it has been rejected by the great mass of mankind in all ages, including the noblest minds and most eminent characters the world has ever known. Without undertaking to refute it here, it is assumed that the world has not always existed; consequently, that it had a cause or Creator. What follows will have no force with any who cannot proceed upon this assumption. For, after all that can be said upon this subject, it is "through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that the things which are seen were not made of things which do appear."

It is now proposed to examine this primary fact of creation in its bearings upon the vexed question of the probability of the occurrence of miracles in the subsequent history of the world; in other words, to contemplate the subject of miracles from the point of view of the primal miracle of creation. This is a high vantage-ground; for skepticism or faith, with respect to such manifestations of the power of God, turns very much upon one's stand-point. Considering only the uniformity of physical laws, miracles are altogether improbable, and the burden of proof rests upon their defenders. But standing where the world is placed, at the opening of God's revelation to man, on this first and greatest of all miracles, it will be seen that the antecedent probability is all in favor of the truth of later miracles, and that the burden of proof rests upon those who maintain that they have never been wrought. For miracles must be expected to occur in the subsequent history of a world which originated in a miracle.

The first thing, then, to be considered is, whether the creation of the world was a miracle in the true and proper sense of the word. The solution of this question will depend, of course, upon the conception of what a miracle is. The simplest definition is the following: a miracle is an act or work of God in the external world which cannot be comprehended under the law of uniformity in physical causation, and to which the power of created beings is inadequate. But in referring such

manifestations exclusively to the power of God, it is neither affirmed nor denied that inferior and even wicked spirits may produce results having all the appearance of miracles; for the present purpose does not require the discussion of this curious question. A miracle, as here defined, can be wrought by no other than the power of God acting in a manner extraneous to the uniformity of nature's laws. Yet does it in nowise imply their abolition, violation, or suspension. Even in the raising of the dead, the laws of gravitation, chemical, capillary and electrical attraction and repulsion, polarity of light, correlation and conservation of forces, together with all other physical laws which have ever been discovered or named, remain in full operation and retain their absolute uniformity. Let any one who speaks of a miracle as a violation or suspension of the laws of nature be required to name the particular law which is supposed to be violated or suspended, and he will immediately see that no such thing is implied even in the greatest miracle that was ever wrought. But a true miracle cannot be ranged under any physical law, nor ascribed to any physical cause, whether light, or heat, or electricity, or chemical attraction, or any other of the forces which operate uniformly in nature. A fact called miraculous, if attributed to any of these, even if possibly it may hereafter be accounted for by some as yet undiscovered physical law or force, ceases thereby to be regarded as a miracle in the sense here defined.

It is sufficiently obvious that the distinction between miracles and natural phenomena which is given in this definition does not turn upon the conception of a different power or cause in the two cases. The power is regarded ultimately as the same in both; its mode of operation only is different, as being either uniform or abnormal. The forces of nature are conceived of as ultimately depending upon the uniform action of the power or will of God, and physical phenomena as the final results of his agency, no less than miracles themselves. But this conception requires to be verified

Either, then, the forces of nature are ultimately to be referred to the energy of the divine will; or they are the acts of inferior spirits; or they are the properties of matter; or they

are entities in themselves. For no other conception of them has ever been, or can be, formed; nor, indeed, can all these. For as entities in themselves they are absolutely inconceivable, notwithstanding many scientists are accustomed to speak of "matter and force" as if these two were co-ordinate existences. It is impossible to form a conception of force otherwise than as the act or property of some being or substance. As material properties they are conceivable, but that this is not the true conception of them may be evinced by many considerations—especially by this, that it is inconsistent with the inertia, or essential passivity of matter, upon which all astronomical and physical science depends. For if a body cannot move itself, how can it by its own power move other bodies? Hence it was maintained by Sir Isaac Newton that the attraction of gravitation, for example, could not be a property of matter, but must be conceived of as a force acting from without upon matter. Moreover, the primary conception of force is derived from the consciousness of one's own voluntary acts in moving his hands or feet, or other members of the body. But for this consciousness of voluntary causality men would know nothing whatever of causation or force; in all the on-goings of the universe only precedence and sequence would appear as the bare succession of phenomena. Now, this conception of force, so obtained, cannot be legitimately extended to any substance or being that is incapable of volition. Consequently there is no evidence that original causality, or force, can be exerted by any but voluntary beings; in other words, all such force must ultimately depend upon will-power. Hence it is necessary to ascribe the forces of nature to spiritual agency, mediate or immediate—either to that of God himself, or to that of created spirits, such as angels or demons. This latter view, with respect to angels or demons, is held by some eminent modern theologians, as it was also by Proclus and the eclectic philosophers of ancient times, and perhaps by Plato himself; but it appears extremely fanciful, and altogether inconsistent with the precision and uniformity, but above all, with the unity and infinite power which these forces manifest. The only conception of them which remains is, that they depend, in the last analysis, upon the uniform energy of the will of God; and this view is held

and strenuously maintained by some of the most eminent physicists of modern times. It will be seen in the sequel that it is altogether scriptural.

Now, with this conception of the forces of nature, it is manifest that the phenomena of light, heat, electricity, gravitation, and the like, the germination and growth of plants and animal bodies, the productions of nature, differ from miracles especially in this, that they fall under the law of uniformity in causation. For every such phenomenon there is an antecedent physical cause, which is always the same for the same effect. The force of gravitation is the one such cause for the falling of a body to the ground wherever it occurs. Hence there is absolute uniformity in all the operations of nature, strictly so called. This is their specific character.

This definition also regards false miracles as phenomena produced by uniform or physical causation, but which men ascribe to non-uniform spiritual agency, either because they are themselves deceived, or because they seek to impose upon others. For, whenever any thing occurs of which the true cause is unknown, it may either be ascribed to some occult physical force or regarded as a miracle. The former is characteristic of science, the latter of superstition. The scriptural view is the golden mean between these two extremes, namely, that there are such things as miracles, but that nothing is to be received as such, except phenomena for which natural causes are not only undiscoverable, but rationally inconceivable.

This definition of miracle may be still further illustrated and confirmed by the historical relations between science and superstition. For it is the specific function of science to explain the phenomena of nature by ranging them under the laws of uniform causation; while superstition consists in ascribing them to non-uniform spiritual agency. Consequently wherever superstition has reigned science has been feeble; and as science has made progress superstition has declined. Thus in the earliest ages, and still wherever the light of science or Christianity has not penetrated, the people are under the dominion of gloomy and cruel superstitions. The negro population of the west coast of Africa is diminishing at the present time from the enormous destruction of human life constantly going on by

the poison-ordeal for the detection of witchcraft. For the belief in witchcraft seems to be the only religion of the people, and every case of natural sickness or death is ascribed to supernatural agency. Even among the Jews of the Old Testament, with all their light of divine revelation, the worship of the golden calves was with difficulty suppressed, while that of "Moloch, horrid king," prevailed to a late period, with other similar abominations, all resting upon pretended miracles. Among the Greeks and other pagan peoples, in the earlier stages of their history, almost every natural phenomenon was ascribed to supernatural agency and regarded as a miracle. Hence that rabble of divinities which were the objects of their superstitious worship—gods of the earth, air, and ocean; gods of the sun, moon, and stars; gods of the day and of the night; a god for every season, stream, and tree, and for every passion of the human heart. But when science began to make progress among them, when the true causes of natural phenomena began to be discovered, the gods retired to the tops of the mountains. If now you would find one you must ascend the steep of Mount Olympus or Mount Ida. And when it was discovered that uniform causes, the same as in the populous plains and along the fertile banks of the streams, were in full operation upon the summits of the loftiest mountains, the gods took flight to the skies, and dwelt in their golden palaces above the firmament. Yet even there they were not allowed to rest, but were warred upon by the earth-born Titans; in which final conflict, however, these last enemies were overthrown, and paid the penalty of their crimes. Such Titans are the materialists and pantheists of modern science, who would banish the Creator from the world he has created, and who may read their fate in this old heathen prophecy.

Yet one can well afford to be patient with these painful negations into which foolish scientists are betrayed by their excess of zeal, especially when the inestimable benefits of science are seen in every department of human life, but most of all in religion. For both these grand sources of truth and human well-being, religion and science, are from God, though in different ways; and their reciprocal influence is such that neither can do without the other. On the one hand, the intellectual faculties

of man have their deepest roots in his moral and spiritual nature, through which they draw their richest nourishment from the infinite of truth ; and thus, in distinction from the mere animal mind, they are rendered capable of growth and development from generation to generation, from age to age. And all science, properly so called, is the intellectual grasp of the raw material of truth, subjecting it to the forms and laws of thought. Science itself, therefore, is truly a blossom and fruit of faith, and cannot attain to its utmost and permanent development except upon the soil of religion. On the other hand, scientific culture is the most powerful and effectual means of developing and purifying the intellect, in order that it may become capable of appreciating the evidences of true religion in distinction from baleful superstitions. This, doubtless, is the reason why Christianity, with its transcendent claims upon the faith of mankind, always prevails wherever science is cultivated, and why there is not even a possibility of any other religion in the bosom of modern civilization.

The benign influence of science upon faith, however, is most conspicuous in the emancipation of the human mind from the paralyzing terrors and hideous cruelties of superstition. For unenlightened faith does not teach men to discriminate between true and false miracles, nor in any other respect between truth and falsehood in religion. Consequently it cannot effectually guard mankind against the influence of superstition. Nay, inasmuch as faith mightily stimulates the imagination, it predisposes the mind, in some sort, to accept as miraculous, phenomena which can be otherwise explained. There is abundant evidence upon this point in the idolatries of the Jews in ancient times, in the superstitions of mediæval and modern Romanism, and in those which yet remain in the Protestant Church. The overthrow of superstition is one of the grand results of science, as stimulated, quickened, and developed by the Scriptures ; and this it accomplishes chiefly by discovering the physical causes of those phenomena which otherwise are sure to be regarded as miraculous.

Having thus defined and elucidated the nature of the miracle, as an act or work of God which is not in uniformity with the course of nature, it will be seen at a glance that the crea-

tion of the world falls under this definition. For "in the beginning" there was no pre-existing course of nature in uniformity with which the creation could stand, and consequently no physical cause by which it can be explained. The supposition of any such cause involves a palpable contradiction, inasmuch as it implies that nature, which is the system of uniform causation, existed before it began to exist. Nor does it matter how far back in time the first creative act of God may be sought, whether six thousand or six millions of years, nor how different the things originally created may have been from their present condition. It may even be conceded here, what on mere scientific evidence can be strenuously denied, that all existing things have been developed by uninterrupted uniform causation from the elemental star-dust of the astronomers, yet that star-dust, if it was the first thing created, must have originated without a physical cause—that is, by a miraculous act of the Creator.

Thus, supposing there ever was any creation at all, if matter be not eternal—although there had been no other miracle in the history of the world—yet here in its origin there is one at least, and one which covers a great deal of ground. For this miraculous origin of the world pours a flood of light upon the question whether the occurrence of miracles in its subsequent history is, or is not, a credible or probable thing; and, in fact, affords a strong presumption against absolute uniformity in all the subsequent operations of divine power. For since God, as in this case, has once acted in a manner not in uniformity with any thing in the past, such exercise of his power is established as one of the modes in which it is competent for him to act; since he has wrought one miracle, he may, for aught that appears, have seen it equally wise and good to work others; and since that one miracle was the creation of the world, it is reasonable to expect its subsequent development, or history, would partake, in some degree at least, of the miraculous character of its origin; in other words, the antecedent probability, or presumption, stands not against miracles, as is commonly supposed, but strongly in their favor.

But in order to estimate this presumption at any thing like its full value, it is necessary here to take into consideration

the old and commonly received truth, that the natures, characters, or essences of things are in their beginnings. The peculiar nature of the oak is in the acorn, and so of all other plants after their kinds. The nature of the lion is in the lion's cub, and so of all other species of animals. The nature of man was in the first man, and so of all other created beings. Moreover, the peculiar natures of things often stand out unveiled in their origin more conspicuously than in any subsequent stage of their development. A beautiful example of this may be observed in the young of some domesticated animals which bear the precise and uniform marks of their former wild state, although these had long previously disappeared from their progenitors under the modifying influences of domestication. This principle is well understood, and has been applied with magnificent results, by the men of science. Hence that flood of light which the lamented Agassiz, by his studies in embryology, has poured upon the physical constitution of man, upon the whole subject of natural history, and, it may be added, upon the most fundamental truths of religion. For his work on Classification is incomparably the greatest argument in natural theology the world has ever seen. Paley, in comparison, is as the watch which one carries in his pocket to the whole world of living creatures.

This principle holds equally good in all historical developments. For what is Protestant history but the progressive realization of those ideas of individual liberty and personal responsibility in which it originated? Nor is it possible to understand the history of the American Republic apart from the ideas, purposes, and character of those refugees from civil and religious oppression who first landed on these shores and founded American institutions. Thus, also, the idea that might makes right is one upon which heathen Rome was founded, in consequence of which it dominated through all her vast history, from the rape of the Sabine virgins to the conquest and plunder of the world. In like manner, the history of the Jews—what is it to this hour but that of the Abrahamic covenant, in which it had its origin? And with what admirable insight Paul, in his discourse to the Athenians, seizes upon the germinal principle of Greek idolatry, in which it originated, and in the development and realization of which its life consisted, namely,

that the gods were like men, and therefore could be worthily represented and worshipped in human form under images of gold and silver and stone, "graven by art, and man's device"!

This truth, that the beginnings of things contain their natures, of which their history is the development or unfolding, applies with all its significance to the creation and history of the world. For since it originated in a stupendous miracle, the miraculous exercise of divine power must be conceived of as entering into its constitution, as required for its conservation, and as certain to manifest itself in its history. Would it not be a strange and incomprehensible thing if the most essential and striking characteristic of the universe in its origin should from that moment and for ever disappear—owing its very existence to a miracle, if it should never, in the whole course of its subsequent history, manifest any thing of a miraculous nature? While the nature of the oak is in the acorn, is the nature of the acorn not in the oak? Jewish history originated in the covenant of Abraham, but the principle of that transaction may not be expected ever again to manifest itself in the life of the Jewish people. Greek idolatry sprang from the belief that the gods were like men, but it must not be anticipated that it will ever produce a likeness or statue of any god in human form. Protestantism originated in the principle of individual liberty and responsibility, but it is against all probability that there should ever be another exercise of this principle in Protestant history. Such is the preposterous assumption of those who, while they admit a primal creation, maintain that the occurrence of miracles in the history of the world is against probability, and incapable of being substantiated without such an array of evidence as is required for no other class of facts.

But it may be objected to this argument that it proves too much, namely, that the whole history of the universe, in so far as it depends upon the operations of divine power, should partake of a miraculous character. For since the principle in which Protestantism originated reappears at every step of its progress, the miraculous exercise of the power of God which gave birth to the universe, ought, not occasionally but constantly, to manifest itself. Now this is a perfectly fair objection, and requires to be fairly met. The solution of the difficulty,

however, is not far to seek, but is found in the conception of a miracle already given, and the objection tends to a further confirmation of the definition itself.

For this definition includes, along with others, these two distinct and separable elements, namely, an act of God, and such an exertion of his power as cannot be comprehended under the law of uniformity in physical causation. Now, if the whole agency of God in nature had been of a non-uniform character, it is evident, since all the physical forces depend upon his power, that there could have been no such thing as law or order in the universe. Consequently science, which is the knowledge of laws, would have been impossible; neither could there have been any such thing as a rational creation. For reason in man involves a recognition of the uniformity of such laws as that fire will burn and water will drown, that food nourishes and poison kills. It is insanity to think there is no such uniformity; nor can it be doubted but that, if the uniform laws which now govern the forces and phenomena of nature should be broken up, universal insanity in rational creatures would immediately ensue. Moreover, upon this supposition the creation itself could never have passed beyond its first stage of chaos, if it could have reached even that; for law and order are the fundamental ideas of the universe as a cosmos, apart from which it could never have existed. But beyond all this, it is an inconceivable thing that the whole agency of God in nature should be of a non-uniform character; for if it had been such, this would have been the uniform mode of his operations. The supposition itself, therefore, is self-contradictory. Thus there were the best of reasons why the universe was made subject to law, why a departure from uniformity in all its phenomena was impossible, and why this element of miracle must necessarily be of comparatively rare occurrence.

But, now, with respect to the other of these two elements of miracle, the action of the power of God, the case is altogether different; for this is everywhere and always present throughout the universe. One form of its manifestation is that of the divine sustentation of existence. For God did not only create, but he upholds all things by the word of his power, "and by him all things consist." The continuance in existence of that which

has been created depends upon the direct and immediate action of his will as truly as did the creation itself. But for this all things would immediately cease to be, as if they had never been. This rock-ribbed earth with all its marble bones, however solid and indestructible it may seem, would lose its solidity, would melt and dissolve as a vapor, and not even a vapor would be left. This glorious arch of the heavens, this firmament whose very name in all languages is significant of its immovable stability, would immediately disappear. What stability in these laws of nature, by which the planets revolve, the seasons return, the sun rises and sets, and the earth brings forth all her productions ! What conservation of the forces of nature, so that in all the infinite changes which are constantly taking place, not one particle of force is ever expended or lost ! Yet, if God should cease for one moment to act in nature, that moment all this would cease to be. And this subtle essence in man—this mind, soul, or spirit, by which he thinks, feels, and acts—is no less dependent upon uninterrupted sustentation by the power of God than his physical organism.

But the presence and action of divine power in nature are not limited to sustentation. For the physical forces which act upon matter and produce most of its phenomena are ultimately dependent upon the uniform energy of the divine will ; so that whatever is done by them, God is the doer of it as truly, whether or not as immediately, as in miracles themselves. God is the ultimate source of all working power in and throughout the physical universe. The uniform modes or methods in which he chooses for good and sufficient reasons to work, are called the laws of nature. But these laws are not to be confounded with the forces of which they are simply the modes of operation ; nor are these forces to be identified with the properties of matter, the chief of which is inertia. For the conception of nature as a vast machine, having its powers within and from itself in the properties of matter, or otherwise, which God created a great while ago, and which he now stands by, or afar off, to watch and direct, as an engineer superintends and manages the machinery of a factory, would, if it were exhaustively analyzed, be found as self-contradictory as that of a perpetual motion. But its moral conse-

quences are those which are most to be deplored. For if the machine be perfect and self-sufficient, as surely the work of infinite wisdom and power ought to be, what need or place is there for God even as an engineer? Thus by this conception the Creator is banished from his own creation. The omnipresent and ever-active God of the Scriptures becomes little more than the deity of the ancient Epicureans, withdrawn into some remote corner of infinite space, too far off to concern himself with earthly affairs—a god of eternal idleness. And, indeed, if he were ever so much concerned for the welfare of men, what, according to this conception of him, could he do for them, even in their utmost need, subject as they are to the immutable and fatal forces of nature, with whose operations God has nothing whatever to do? Such views of God render the faith of prayer, and all expectation of help from him, simply impossible. It is a doctrine of despair.

The sacred writers know nothing of nature as a system of mere matter and force, or of forces originally and independently inherent in matter. They everywhere represent the phenomena of the natural world as ultimately dependent upon the action or will of God. There has been in these days a wide departure from the forms in which the Scriptures express and reveal his omnipresent agency. For where men are accustomed to say, it thunders, it rains, the storm rages, the wind blows, and the like, in the word of God it is: "The fire of God. . . . God thundereth marvellously with his voice. . . . He commandeth and raiseth up the stormy wind. . . . He maketh the storm a calm, so that the waves thereof be still. . . . He sendeth the springs into the valleys. . . . He watereth the hills. . . . He giveth rain upon the earth. . . . These wait all upon thee, that thou mayest give them their meat in due season. . . . Thou sendest forth thy breath—they are created. Thou openest thy hand—they are filled with good. Thou takest away their breath—they die and return to their dust. . . . Behold the fowls of the air. . . . Your heavenly Father feedeth them. . . . Consider the lilies of the field. . . . Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. . . . If God so clothe the grass of the field . . . how much more shall he clothe you? . . . Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? . . .

and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father."

Such is the scriptural representation of the divine agency in nature, in accordance with which it is ultimately the power of God which works according to the method called the law of gravitation, and which moves the planets in their vast elliptical orbits around their focal suns. It is God who shines in the light of the sun, and quickens the earth with his genial influences. He sprouts the germ in the ground, and draws the juices of the earth up through its capillary tubes, and nourishes therewith the growing plant. He stretches out its branches, puts forth its leaves, blooms its flowers, paints their petals with his own varied and beautiful colors, and forms and ripens its delicious fruit. The thunder is his voice now as of old. He speaks in the sound of the cataract, the storm, and the troubled ocean as truly (though in a different manner) as he spoke from the midst of the cloud and flame on the summit of Mount Sinai to the many thousands of Israel. In the motions of the planetary worlds, in the blooming of the flowers, in the fall of the sparrow, his agency is manifested as truly (though in a different manner) as it was in the raising of Lazarus from the dead. All this he does now, whether mediately or immediately, by his own free choice and voluntary action, though in a uniform manner, as truly as he created the world. For within, under, behind—or howsoever otherwise it may be expressed—all the processes, methods, or laws and forces of nature, is the power or agency of the one only living and true God, upholding and moving all things that are characterized by the property of inertia, except so far as they may be acted upon by other spiritual agency, as they are upheld and moved.

And not only in the phenomena of nature, strictly so called, is this ubiquitous action of the power of God, but also in the sustentation and government of the human soul, and of all other rational and voluntary creatures, even in the exercise of their own freedom and responsibility. For although man's acts are his own, and in no sense the acts of God, yet, in the freest exercise of his faculties, he is not independent of God, but subject to his influence and under his control. "The

king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, and as the rivers of water he turneth it whithersoever he will. . . . Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee, and the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain." In this way, that is, by his sovereign control and direction of man's faculties and energies, God is in all human history working out his wise and holy and benign purposes, no less truly than in the world of nature. And, in fine, the direct and immediate agency of God is manifested in the regeneration and sanctification of human souls, and in all the phenomena of spiritual life, in such wise that they would all have to be regarded as miraculous, in the full sense of this word, if it were not that in them the human agency is inseparably blended with the divine, and that, though of special grace, they partake of something approaching to uniformity.

Now with these scriptural views of the divine agency in nature and in man—views which are held by many distinguished physicists at the present time—it seems that one element of miracles, namely, the action of God, is in divers ways present throughout the universe in its whole history. The other element, namely, departure from uniformity, was not possible nor conceivable except in abnormal and rare cases. Hence the objection, that, if the true nature or constitution of the world be represented in the miracle of its creation, its whole history ought to be miraculous, is of no force; while, at the same time, it is found to embody one of the most important of all truths, and one which confirms, instead of invalidating, the presumption, that miracles, in the full sense of the word, would occur; thereby laying a still heavier burden of proof upon those who maintain that there never have been any such manifestations of divine power.

Moreover, the counter-presumption of absolute uniformity in all the divine operations, upon which over-zealous and one-sided scientists lay so much stress, is wholly gratuitous and inconsistent with the most exalted and perfect ideas that can be formed of the Divine Being. For there is not a shadow of proof that by such uniformity the best possible results in the government and history of the world could be attained. God, in the exercise of his infinite wisdom and all-comprehending foreknowledge, for aught that appears, may have the best of reasons for

varying his methods of procedure. One such reason may be here suggested, namely, that occasional departures from strict uniformity would be the most striking and conclusive evidence conceivable of his free personality. And there is manifestly a great need of just such evidence; for that which is afforded by the uniformity of his operations in nature is incomplete or obscure; at least there are many whom it fails to convince. Hence it is that those scientists who deny the possibility or the fact of miracles gravitate, as by inevitable necessity, towards either materialism or pantheism; in other words, to the denial of the personality of the First Cause; while this can never be doubted by any who admit the fact or the possibility of miraculous phenomena. Also, it is evident of itself that the conception of the cause of all things as a free, moral, and personal Being, is a nobler and more exalted idea of him than that which represents him—or it—as an impersonal and fatal force; just as a person is higher in the scale of existence than a thing—as a man is a nobler being than a steam-engine. The truth is, that absolute reason, which is the principle of uniformity in the divine operations, and absolute free-will, or personality, without which no variation from such uniformity is conceivable, are both equally essential to the noblest idea of the Creator, to whom men, as the work of his hands, are bound in reason to ascribe all that they can conceive of excellence or perfection. What, then, is more reasonable than that he, being such, should reveal to man the perfection of his reason, wisdom, and foreknowledge of all contingencies, by the uniformity of his operations in nature, and by miracles, the fullness of his free personality?

The conclusion which, in all the preceding discussion, has been kept steadily in view and indicated from time to time, is that, antecedently to all inductive evidence, it is more probable that miracles have occurred in the history of the world than that they have not; and, consequently, that the phenomena which claim to be such require no more or better evidence to substantiate them than other facts for which no such claim is made. The burden of proof does not rest upon those who advocate miracles, but upon those who maintain that they never have occurred; just as it would rest upon him who should

maintain that there never had been any such thing as an earthquake or a tornado. For the evidence which has produced the common belief of mankind that there have been tornadoes and earthquakes and miracles must stand good until it is overthrown. Whether, indeed, the facts called miraculous are truly such, is always an open question until it has been finally decided by science whether or not they can be accounted for by natural causes, or referred to uniform laws. If in this way they can be rationally explained, they must cease to be regarded as miracles and remanded to the domain of natural phenomena, whatever may be the consequences. But to deny the facts themselves, simply because they cannot be so accounted for, while the antecedent probability stands in favor of non-uniform manifestations of divine power, is unscientific and preposterous.

It does not enter into the object of this discussion even to touch upon that vast array of inductive evidence which might be, and has been, given for the miracles of Scripture, especially for those wrought by our Lord Jesus Christ. All that has been attempted is to show that they are in perfect harmony with the miraculous creation of the world, with the most rational conception that can be formed of what its history would be, and with the noblest ideas of the perfections and character of the Deity. The belief of them is inseparable from, and is a chief corner-stone of faith in the Christian religion. Whoever denies them, especially the resurrection of Christ, or supposes that possibly they may be hereafter explained by some as yet undiscovered law of physical causation, denies Christ; and, if he be sufficiently strong in logic, he must inevitably become a pantheist or materialist. Stop short of this he cannot, except by rejecting the legitimate consequences of his principles; by halting in those very processes of thought which have led him to his present conclusions. Hence this argument may fitly close with some suggestions—for no more need be said—of the enormous difficulties under which they labor who maintain that the forces of nature not only originally spring from matter, but that from the uniform operation of these forces the existence of all things may be rationally explained.

First, then, they who stand on this ground can give no account whatever of the existence of matter with these proper-

ties. Whence did it come? How came it to be thus mysteriously and wonderfully endowed? They do not pretend to answer otherwise than by saying, with a frankness which is worthy of all praise and imitation: "We do not know." How much easier is it to believe in a God who created matter! In which case, there is the stupendous miracle of creation coming back, with all its consequences, as these have been exhibited. Secondly, they have no rational account to give of those innumerable correlations and adaptations in the world or cosmos which evince intelligence, purpose, design, as clearly as it is conceivable that these should be manifested. The physical, intellectual, and moral correlations between the two sexes; the mother's bosom and the nourishment of her child; the stomach and its food; the heart and its blood; the lungs and the air; the eye and the light; the motions and order of the stellar worlds; the light and heat of the sun in their relations to the production, support, and development of organic life; the intellectual faculties and their objects—all these, together with innumerable similar correlations, result—if men are to believe the materialist or pantheist, whether avowed, or veiled under development theories, from the operation of blind, unintelligent causes, the forces of nature, the properties of matter. How much easier is it to believe in a God of infinite wisdom, power, and goodness, who created all these things in their beautiful adaptations to the purposes which they subserve! Again, the human soul, with all its wonderful faculties or powers of intellect, sensibility, and will, is produced, according to these men, by the operation of the same forces of nature, or properties of matter, which themselves have no will, no sensibility, and no intelligence. Is not this an effect without any adequate cause? Is the maxim, that "The quality of the effect is antecedently in its cause," which has always been regarded as a necessary truth, and which is a part of the foundation of all science and knowledge, no longer a truth? Can that which has no intelligence be the cause of intelligence? Can that which has no sensibility and no will be the cause of sensibility and will in man? How much easier is it to believe in a God who created man in his own image! Finally, these men affirm that Christ and his apostles were either fanatics or

impostors; that he himself never rose from the dead; that his mind and soul have utterly perished, and are now as if they had never been. *Credat Judæus Apella, non ego.* And again, how much easier is it to believe in God, who raised up Jesus Christ from the dead!

In the leisure of a summer vacation a person once read over almost consecutively Renan's *Vie de Jésus*, carried away for the time by the magic of its sensuous style. When he had finished it, he took up the Gospels, and read for an hour or two, and he bears record that it was like coming up out of the sulphurous darkness of hell into the clear light and vital air of heaven. Again he sat at the feet of Jesus, on the shore of the Sea of Galilee. Peter and James and John were there, and Mary Magdalene, and Mary, the ever-blessed mother of the Lord. Once more with them he looked up into his dear face, and beheld there the wisdom, power, and love of the heavenly Father revealed. There, in the face of Jesus Christ, God manifest in the flesh, he saw that his soul was immortal, and that it was an object of the compassion and love of Christ. Ah! how the tears flowed from his eyes! He was a lost sinner, yet he could trust in Christ as his Saviour, whilst he heard him say, with what voice! "O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt?" It was as if he had stood on the banks of the river of life, which flows through the streets of the New Jerusalem, in the shade of the tree of life, which bears twelve manner of fruits, and yields her fruit every month, and whose leaves are for the healing of the nations. And there he resolved that, God helping him, he for one would go down into hell no more.

J. H. MCILVAINE.

DISPUTED SCRIPTURE LOCALITIES.

OURS is emphatically an age of discovery and invention, which opens a new epoch in the onward march of civilization. It resembles in this respect the latter part of the fifteenth century, when the art of printing was invented and America discovered, to prepare the way for the great work of the Reformation under the banner of freedom in its westward course of empire. Alexander the Great carried the language and learning of Greece to Asia and Egypt on his march of conquest. So Napoleon, by his Egyptian expedition, opened the access to the hidden treasures of the East, which the patient industry and research of scholars have ever since been digging from the dust of the past. Egypt, the Sinaitic Peninsula, Palestine, Assyria, have been traversed, examined, and re-examined, and brought to our very doors. Hieroglyphic and cuneiform inscriptions are a sealed book no longer, and have added vastly to our stock of knowledge of antiquity. A lonely convent in the desert at the foot of Mount Sinai has furnished the oldest and most complete copy of the Greek Bible, which is of the greatest service in determining the original text of the New Testament. The temple of Ephesus brought to light may now be studied from its massive ruins on the spot, and in the British Museum. Cyprus has given up its works of art, which enrich the Metropolitan Museum of New York. The heroes of Troy and Mycenæ have risen from the dead to bear witness to the facts which underlie the immortal poems of Homer. Olympia is just now yielding its contributions to the masterpieces of Greek sculpture, from the days of the Olympian games. Even in Rome we have only by recent investigations acquired a full knowledge of the Palace of the Cæsars, the Forum, the Coliseum, and the Christianity of the cataconibs.

The effect of these modern researches and discoveries upon the proper interpretation of the Scriptures is incalculable. Palestine has not improperly been called by Renan "the fifth Gospel" ("un cinquième évangile, lacéré, mais lisible encore"). It is the framework of the canonical Gospels, and greatly facilitates their historical understanding.

The first scientific explorer of Palestine was the late Dr. Edward Robinson, of the Union Theological Seminary in New York, and his "Biblical Researches" are still the highest authority, as is acknowledged even by Germans¹ and by Englishmen.² Enterprising and enthusiastic travellers, like Carson,

¹ See Ritter's high estimate of Robinson in his classical "Erdkunde," vol. xv. p. 73: "Die Verbindung der schärfsten Beobachtung topographischer und Ortsverhältnisse, wie bei Burckhardt, mit vielen Vorstudien, zumal dem gelehrten Bibelstudium, philologischer und historischer Kritik, wie der Landessprache durch den Reisegefährten, den viele Jahre in Syrien practisch einheimisch gewordenen Eli Smith als Missionar, zeichnet diese auf das gewissenhafteste, mit grosser Körper- und Geisteskraft durch geführte Arbeit von allen früheren aus, wodurch die wissenschaftliche Behandlung des Gegenstandes erst einen sichern Boden gewonnen hat, auf dem die folgende Zeit mit mehr Glück als zuvor weiter fortzubauen im Stande sein wird. Kein früheres Reisewerk hat einen grössern Schatz neuer und wichtiger Beobachtungen und (historisch-kritischer) Untersuchungen über Palästina an das Licht gefördert, sagt der competente J. Olshausen; die darin entwickelten und befolgten trefflichen Grundsätze der Forschung werden ein Leitstern für alle künftigen Reisenden bleiben die im heiligen Lande selbst die Kunde des biblischen Alterthums zu vervollständigen unternehmen wollen, weshalb dieses Werk Epoche macht in der biblischen Geographie." Dr. Titus Tobler, likewise a very competent judge, says that Robinson's work surpasses all the performances on the geography of Palestine, from Eusebius and Jerome to the present time ("Topographie von Jerusalem," vol. i. p. 75).

² The Editing Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund, in "Our Work in Palestine" (London, 1873), pp. 7 and 8, say: "The first real impulse, because the first successful impulse, towards scientific examination of the Holy Land is due to the American traveller, Dr. Robinson. He it was who first conceived the idea of making a work on biblical geography, to be based, not on the accounts of others, but on his own observations and discoveries. He fitted himself for his ambitious undertaking by the special studies of fifteen years, mastering the whole literature of the subject, and, above all, clearing the way for his own researches by noticing the deficiencies and weak points of his predecessors. He went, therefore, *knowing what to look for*, and what had been already found. . . . We shall not go into the question here of his theories, and his reconstruction of the old city, on which he has had both followers and opponents. Let it, however, be distinctly remembered that Dr. Robinson is

Niebuhr, Burckhardt, Robinson, Cesnola, Schliemann, Bahrdt, Livingstone, and Stanley, have accomplished more than many geographical societies. Faith and enthusiasm are the pioneers in every great undertaking. Dr. Robinson, accompanied by his friend and countryman, Dr. Eli Smith, a worthy American missionary and excellent Arabic scholar, visited the East twice, in 1838 and 1852. He travelled through the Sinaitic Peninsula and the Holy Land with an independent, critical, and judicial mind and a devout heart. He was a full believer in the truth of the Scriptures as the divinely revealed record of revelation and the way of salvation, but thoroughly skeptical in regard to monastic legends and traditions. He followed the principle "that all ecclesiastical tradition respecting the sacred places in and around Jerusalem and throughout Palestine is of no value, except so far as it is supported by circumstances known to us from the Scriptures or from other contemporary history." The soundness of this principle cannot be disputed by Protestants, whatever may be thought of its application in detail. The Bible is unquestionably the best guide-book in Bible lands, and whenever tradition, however ancient and venerable, comes into conflict with its statements, it must be abandoned. Moreover, these monastic traditions can seldom be traced beyond the fourth century, which was an utterly uncritical age, and already too far removed from the time of the occurrence of the events to be of any decisive value. Not a few of them date from the time of the Crusades. And finally, they are often contradictory; the Greek tradition neutralizes the Latin; the Latin tradition neutralizes the Greek; so that a skeptical Protestant, in rejecting the Latin version, is supported by the Greek Church, and in rejecting the Greek version, has the support of the Latin Church. The most that can be said is that the traditional site, especially when confirmed by the biblical name of the place or its equivalent in modern Arabic, has a presumptive claim to be genuine, unless disproved by valid objections from the Scriptures or the nature of the locality.

the *first* of scientific travellers. His travels took him over a very large extent of ground, covering a large part of the whole country from Sinai north, and his books are still, after thirty years, the most valuable works which we possess on the geography of Palestine."

Since Dr. Robinson's first visit, a number of works on Palestine have appeared, of more or less value to the biblical student, from travellers, as G. H. von Schubert (1840), E. G. Schultz (1847), Dr. Wilson ("The Lands of the Bible Visited," 1847, 2 vols.), G. Williams ("The Holy City," 1849, 2 vols.), W. H. Bartlett (1853), Titus Tobler (monographs on "Bethlehem," "Nazareth," "Jerusalem," 1845-1867), C. Tischendorf (1846), W. F. Lynch (on the "Dead Sea Expedition," 1848), Van de Velde ("Syria and Palestine," 1854, 2 vols., with a valuable map), Dean Stanley (who was twice in the East, in 1852, and with the Prince of Wales in 1862, and whose "Sinai and Palestine" is the most readable of all books on Palestine), W. M. Thomson ("The Land and the Book," 1859, 2d ed., 2 vols.; 3d ed., in 3 vols., now nearly ready for publication in New York and Edinburgh), F. Bovet (1864), K. Furrer (1865), H. B. Tristram (1865, etc.).¹

A new period in the history of biblical geography and archæology began with the labors of the English Palestine Exploration Fund, established in 1865, and the cognate American Palestine Exploration Society, founded in 1870. Robinson and his successors till 1865 knew only the over-ground Jerusalem, while the city of the days of Christ lies buried under the rubbish of ages. The Palestine Exploration Fund has, at great labor and expense, uncovered some parts of Jerusalem, explored the Lake of Galilee and the Sinaitic Peninsula, and prepared a map of Palestine west of the Jordan, which will soon be issued. Its labors are published, in quarterly statements, in the illustrated volume "The Recovery of Jerusalem," with an introduction by Dean Stanley (1872), in Palmer's "The Desert of the Exodus" (1872), and in a convenient summary under the title "Our Work in Palestine" (1873).

The American Society has confined itself to the exploration of the East-Jordanic country. It embraces the part of Palestine which is the least known, and is in territorial extent three times as great as the country surveyed by the English. It

¹The most careful and complete lists of books on Palestine are given by Ritter, till 1850, in the 15th volume of his "Geography;" by Robinson, till 1856, in Appendix i. to vol. ii. of his "Biblical Researches," pp. 533-555; and by Tobler, till 1866, in his "Bibliotheca Geographica Palestinæ" (Leipzig, 1867), pp. 265. Tobler enumerates more than one thousand writers on Palestine from A.D. 333 to 1866.

abounds in Roman ruins, inscriptions, and objects of great interest, and its exploration, if vigorously pursued, will throw much light upon biblical history and the history of the whole country lying midway between ancient Assyria and Egypt. It was here that the Moabite stone was found, the interest of which was not only the record of long past events inscribed upon it, but the fact that it sheds light upon the invention and history of the art of alphabetic and syllabic writing. It is to be hoped that the Society may soon be able to resume its researches, and to complete the promised map of Palestine east of the Jordan.

But, much as has been done by the combined labors of individual scholars and exploration societies, a good deal more remains to be done. Dr. Porter, in the last edition of his valuable "*Hand-book for Travellers in Syria and Palestine*" (London, 1875), pp. 611-616, gives a list of no less than five hundred and two Scripture localities which are not yet identified. Of course the vast majority of them are insignificant. The list of sites mentioned in the New Testament is much smaller. The report of the English Palestine Exploration Fund for October, 1876, enumerates twenty-two New Testament sites. To these my colleague, Dr. Hitchcock, the President of the American Exploration Society, has added thirteen, and kindly furnishes me with the following completed list :

NEW TESTAMENT SITES.

- | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------|
| *1. Aenon. | 14. Chorazin. |
| *2. Antipatris. | 15. Dalmanutha. |
| *3. Arotus. | 16. Emmaus. |
| 4. Bethabara. | *17. Ephraim. |
| *5. Bethany. | *18. Gaza. |
| *6. Bethlehem. | *19. Gergesa. |
| 7. Bethphage. | *20. Jericho. |
| 8. Bethsaida. | *21. Jerusalem. |
| *9. Bethsaida-Julias. | *22. Joppa. |
| *10. Cæsarea. | *23. Lydda. |
| *11. Cæsarea Philippi. | *24. Magdala (Magadan). |
| 12. Cana. | *25. Nain. |
| 13. Capernaum. | *26. Nazareth. |

- | | |
|---------------|----------------|
| *27. Salim. | 31. Sychar. |
| *28. Sarepta. | *32. Tiberias. |
| *29. Shechem. | *33. Tyre. |
| *30. Sidon. | |

Twenty-four of these sites, marked by a *, Dr. Hitchcock says are identified, most of them beyond dispute; two of them since Robinson (Gergesa by Thomson, and Aenon by Conder). Five sites are sharply debated, viz.: Bethabara, Bethsaida, Cana, Capernaum, Chorazin. Of Bethphage, Dalmanutha, Emmaus, and Sychar, the neighborhood is known.

But if we include among the holy places the particular spots of an important event, the number of doubtful or uncertain sites is much greater. The Cave of the Nativity, the site of true Calvary, the place of the ascension, are sharply disputed. Very often we must be satisfied with general localities.

It is, of course, impossible in a review article to go over the whole ground. We shall discuss only the most important and most interesting of the unsolved problems in biblical geography and topography as far as we had an opportunity to examine them for ourselves on the spot in a recent visit to Bible lands. We begin with the Sinaitic Peninsula and the route of the Israelites.

THE LOCALITY OF THE EXODUS OF THE ISRAELITES.

It is almost unanimously agreed among modern Egyptologists—Bunsen, Lepsius, Ebers, Brugsch, among the Germans; De Rougé, Mariette, Naville, Vigouroux, among the French—that Rameses II., the famous conqueror and master-builder, and altogether the greatest among the tyrants of old Egypt, was the Pharaoh of the oppression who made the Israelites build the treasure cities or fortifications of “Pithom and Raamses” (Exodus 1:11); and that his thirteenth son, Menephthali, was the Pharaoh of the Exodus, who pursued them to the Red Sea, and ran his army into destruction.¹ The monumental pictures rep-

¹ This view has now been adopted also by Reginald Stuart Poole, who formerly advocated the other theory, which puts the oppression and the Exodus earlier in the eighteenth dynasty, under Amosis I. and Thothmes II. Comp. his article, “Egypt,” in the eighth and ninth editions of the “*Encyclopædia Britannica*,” vol. vii.

resent Jews as making bricks, and certain papyrus documents from the reign of Rameses II. certify to the delivery of provision to the Aperiu, or Apuriu (the Egyptian name for Hebrews), while engaged in building the fortifications of the city of Rameses, which is probably only a new name for the old capital of Goshen, Tanis, or the biblical and hieroglyphic Zoan (the modern San). Quite recently ruins of brick buildings and of an immense temple with twelve obelisks, also a statue of Rameses II., seated between two gods, have been discovered there.

But no monumental inscription or papyrus roll, as far as we know, mentions the Exodus of the Israelites. Manetho probably alludes to it when he speaks of the expulsion of "the lepers," or "foreigners," in a fragment preserved by Josephus. But we cannot expect from the Egyptians a truthful account of the story of their defeat and disgrace. The hieroglyphic inscriptions usually record only their victories, and are full of fulsome self-laudations of the Pharaohs and their provincial governors. No trace of a chariot of Pharaoh's host has as yet been dug up, or is likely to be dug up, to indicate the spot of its overthrow.

We are, consequently, as far as this most important event is concerned, confined to the narrative of the Book of Exodus, chapter 14, where it is recorded in the following words: "And Moses stretched out his hand over the sea; and Jehovah caused the sea to go back by a strong east wind all the night, and made the sea dry land, and the waters were divided. And the children of Israel went into the midst of the sea upon the dry ground: and the waters were a wall unto them on their right hand, and on their left."

There are three or four theories about the locality and mode of the Exodus:

1. We will begin with the recent theory of the famous Egyptologist Dr. Brugsch¹ (previously suggested by G. H. Richter and Schleiden). It is based upon a thorough knowledge of ancient Egypt, and therefore entitled to respectful consideration; but it is so novel that it excites doubt and suspicion. Brugsch

¹ Henri Brugsch-Bey: *L'exode et les monuments égyptiens*. A paper read before the International Congress of Orientalists in London. Leipzig, 1875. With a map of Lower Egypt, giving the supposed route of the Israelites.

locates the Exodus far north of the Red Sea, on the usual short route from Egypt to Syria, between the Mediterranean Sea and the Sirbonian Lake. This lake was a long and narrow sheet of water, now filled with sand, but well known to the ancients, and is described by Diodorus as being overgrown with seaweeds and papyrus, so as to deceive travellers who might easily mistake the surface for dry land, and perish in it. The Israelites passed safely over the narrow strip of land between the waters of the sea and the waters of the lake, and then suddenly turned, by divine command, southward, and arrived in three days at Marah—*i.e.*, the Bitter Lakes of the Isthmus; while the Egyptians, on their hot pursuit, were overtaken by a sand-storm, lost their way into the Sirbonian Lake, and perished there. Dr. Brugsch supports his theory by the supposed identity of the Hebrew camping stations with supposed old Egyptian localities. He identifies Rameses, from which the Israelites started, with Tanis or Zoan, locates Pihahiroth on the western end of the Sirbonian Lake, and Baal-Zephon at the eastern end of it; he identifies the Sea of Weeds (which in our version is always translated the Red Sea) with the Sirbonian Lake, Marah with the Bitter Lakes, and Elim with Aalim (Fishtown) or Heroopolis, north-east of Suez.

But these identifications are mere conjectures, and inconsistent with a natural interpretation of the Bible. The Mosaic narrative evidently assumes a direct route to the Mount of God. For it is expressly said that "God led them not through the way of the land of the Philistines, although that was near, . . . but through the way of the wilderness of the Red Sea" (Ex. 13: 17, 18). Dr. Brugsch's theory dislocates the whole itinerary of the Israelites before and after the Exodus, and does away with the miracle altogether, or resolves it into a mere providence.¹

2. The Arab tradition (defended by many of the older commentators) locates the Exodus south of Suez, between the promontory of Atakah and the opposite shore of Ayun Mûsa, where the Red Sea is several leagues (Robinson says twelve miles, Porter seven miles) broad. This would best accord with a literal meaning of the narrative, that the waters were *divided*

¹ He says himself (p. 32): "Le miracle, il est vrai cesse d'être un miracle; mais la Providence divine maintient toujours sa place et son autorité."

and stood up like a wall, or like entrenchments, on *both* sides of the passing army. But it seems impossible that 600,000 armed men, with women and children, and their herds of cattle, could have crossed such a distance in one night, without an unnecessary accumulation of miracles. And would the Egyptians have dared to follow the Israelites through the deep sea, and in view of such an amazing and overpowering interposition of God? Could the east wind or any wind have such an effect on the sea so wide as it is here? And if not, why is it mentioned at all as an agent?

3. Dr. Robinson locates the Exodus at the head of the gulf, near or probably some distance north of Suez. The gulf has the shape of a horn, and is a shallow channel less than a mile wide and about four miles long, running from north to south. In it are several small islands and sandbanks, bare when the water is low (J. L. Porter). It once extended further north, perhaps as far as the Bitter Lakes. The crossing took place during the time of an extraordinary ebb, which was hastened and extended by a continuous night-storm blowing from the east (north-east) against the water, and laid bare the whole ford for the passage of the Israelites; after which the sea, in its reflux, returned with double the usual power of the flood tide, and overwhelmed Pharaoh's army. In ordinary times many a caravan crossed the ford at the head of the gulf at low ebb before the Suez Canal was built; and Napoleon, deceived by the tidal wave, attempted to cross it on returning from Ayun Mûsa in 1799, and nearly met the fate of Pharaoh. But a whole army of two millions could, of course, never have crossed it without a miracle. The question is only whether the miracle was immediate or mediate; in other words, whether God suspended the laws of nature, or whether he used them as agencies both for the salvation of his people and the overthrow of his enemies. The express mention of the "strong east wind" which Jehovah caused to "blow all the night" decidedly favors the latter view, which is also supported by an examination of the spot. The tide of Suez, which can be watched from the top of the Suez Hotel, is very strong and rapid, especially under the action of the north-east wind.¹ The north-east wind often prevails there and acts powerfully on the ebb tide, driving out the

waters from the small arm of the sea which runs up by Suez, while the more northern part of the arm would still remain covered with water, so that the waters on both sides served as walls of defence or intrenchments to the passing army of Israel. In no other part of the gulf would the east wind have the effect of driving out the water.

This view is adopted by several modern scholars, including the members of the English Ordnance Survey. It does not diminish the miracle, it only adapts it to the locality and the natural agency which is expressly mentioned by the Bible narrative. Robinson calls it "a miraculous adaptation of the laws of nature to produce a required result." Prof. Palmer says: "From the narrative in Exodus 14, it would seem that the Egyptians came upon them before they had rounded the head of the gulf, so as to compel them either to take to the water or fall into their enemies' hands, equally fatal alternatives, from which nothing but a miracle, such as that recorded, could have saved them. But natural agencies, miraculously accelerated, are mentioned as the means employed by God in working out this signal deliverance, and we need not therefore suppose any thing so contrary to the laws of nature as that the children of Israel crossed between two vertical walls of water in the midst of the deep sea, according to the popular mode of depicting the scene. Some writers have imagined that a great change has taken place in the level of the sea since the time of the Exodus; but recent examination does not at all confirm this hypothesis, while there is abundant evidence that the northern end of the Gulf of Suez has been gradually silted up, and that in consequence the shore line has steadily advanced further and further southwards. It follows from this that, if, according to the view held by many modern authorities, the passage took place at the head of the gulf, as it existed at the time of the

¹ Dr. Ebers says ("Durch Gosen zum Sinai," p. 101): "Bei einem starken Nordostwinde der nicht selten weht, werden die Wellen nach Süden zu in den schmalen Meerbusen geradezu hineingepeitscht, so zwar, dass die in horizontaler Linie nördlich von Sues sich hinstreckenden vier Inseln nur durch Lachen getrennt zu sein scheinen, jedoch thatsächlich durch tiefe Wassergraben von dem Festlande und von einander geschieden sind."

Exodus, the Israelites must have crossed at a point several miles north of its present limits."¹

SERBAL OR SINAI?

The route of the Israelites from the Red Sea to Mount Sinai can be identified with tolerable certainty; but the Sinai question is still sharply disputed. There are two claimants to the honor of being the Mount of God, which witnessed one of the greatest theophanies in the history of religion and the proclamation of the most influential code of morals in the history of legislation. These are Mount Serbâl and the traditional or monastic Sinai, called Jebel Mûsa, or the Mount of Moses, in the southern part of the Sinaitic Peninsula. Serbâl rises above Wady Feirân, Sinai from Wady Er Raha, about forty miles further south-east. Burckhardt, Lepsius,² Ebers,³ and Sharpe⁴ (author of the "History of Egypt") strongly plead for Serbâl; Robinson, Ritter, Tischendorf, and the members of the English Ordnance Survey, for Sinai, with a slight difference as to its precise peak.

The Bible calls the mountain of legislation "the Mount of God" (Ex. 18 : 5), or "the Mount of the Lord" (Num. 10 : 33), or simply "the Mount" (Ex. 19 : 12, 14; Deut. 9 : 15), or "Mount Sinai," and "Sinai" (Ex. 18 : 18; 24 : 16; 31 : 18; Deut. 33 : 2; Judg. 5 : 5; Ps. 68 : 8, 17). It is agreed that Mount Horeb, which Elijah visited, and which is also called "the Mount of God" (1 Kings, 19 : 8), is identical with the scriptural Sinai (Ex. 3 : 1; 17 : 6; 33 : 6; Deut. 1 : 6, "the Lord spoke to us in Horeb;" 5 : 2, "the Lord made a covenant with us in Horeb"). Even now the names are used synonymously, with the difference that the one signifies the whole

¹ "The Desert of the Exodus" (1871), vol. i., p. 36.

² "Briefe aus Aegypten," etc., 1852, and "Reise nach der Halbinsel des Sinai," 1876.

³ "Durch Gosen zum Sinai," Leipz., 1872, pp. 380-426. See also Bâdeker's "Aegypten" (1877), vol. i., p. 522, where Ebers defends the same view. He accounts for the transfer of the sacred traditions from Serbâl to Jebel Mûsa, by the bad repute of Pharan for heresy in the fifth century.

⁴ "Hebrew Inscriptions from the Valleys between Egypt and Mount Sinai," London, 1875, p. 4.

mountain, the other a part. The question is, whether the mountain which at present bears the name of Sinai (Jebel Mûsa) is the Sinai or Horeb of the Bible. The question must be decided by the essential requirements of the Mosaic narrative. These requirements are the following :

1. A sufficient supply of water and pasturage to accommodate and support two millions of human beings for many months.

2. The Mount of God must be a prominent mountain, rising abruptly from the plain, and easy of approach ; for the people came near and "stood under the mountain" (Deut. 4 : 11), and the mountain could be touched "at the nether part" (Ex. 19 : 12, 17).

3. It must have been surrounded by a plain or wady large enough to enable the whole people of Israel, amounting to two millions, to see and hear the giving of the law. For the Lord came down "in the sight of all the people upon Mount Sinai" (Ex. 19 : 11, 20) ; and "all the people saw the thunderings, and the lightnings, and the noise of the trumpet, and the mountain smoking ; and when the people saw it, they removed, and stood afar off. And they said unto Moses, Speak thou with us, and we will hear" (20 : 18, 19).

In favor of Mount Serbâl much may be said. Mount Serbâl answers the first requirement fully, the second in part, but fails entirely in the third. However much it may be suited for the *giving* of the law, it was impossible for the people to *receive* it there in the manner described by the Mosaic record. Sinai answers all these requirements completely.

But let us examine the matter in detail. Serbâl has the requisite water and pasture in the neighboring Wady Feirân, which is several miles long and contains the largest and most fertile oasis in the whole Peninsula, with fountains, running streams, and an abundance of palm-trees, tamarisks, acacias or shittim-wood (of which the tabernacle was built), and plots of wheat and barley. Moreover, Serbâl equals Jebel Mûsa in boldness of feature and rugged outline. It is not as high, being only 6734 feet above the level of the sea, while Jebel Mûsa is 7359, and Jebel Catharine 8526 feet high, but it looks as imposing, if seen from one of the neighboring hills, and presents a

most extensive and magnificent view from its five lofty peaks. And finally, it must have had a certain sacredness from very early times, and is supported by strong tradition. It is identified with Sinai by Eusebius, Jerome, and the monk Kosmas, who was there himself in 535; but the tradition for Jebel Mûsa, after all, seems to be stronger.¹ It is full of Sinaitic inscriptions, but these are found also in Wady Mokatteb (the Sculptured Valley), on the Pass of the Wind, round Jebel Mûsa, in the Wady Leja, and other remoter parts of the Peninsula, and have not yet been satisfactorily deciphered. Lenormant traces them to post-Christian origin; Beer, Tuch, and Ebers, mostly to heathen Nabatheans who worshipped the sun and the stars on Serbâl and other high mountain-tops; Sharpe (in a monograph of 1875), to Egyptian Jews before and after Christ. Sharpe finds in many of them the name Jao (Jehovah) and lamentations over the destruction of Jerusalem. There is no doubt that Serbâl was early regarded as a sacred mountain. It attracted a large number of pilgrims and anchorites, who settled in the neighboring caves; and an episcopal city and convent of Paran, or Feirân, was built at its feet before the date of the convent of St. Catharine; but these early settlements are very natural in view of the fertility of the district. It seems strange, moreover, that this mountain should not be mentioned in the Exodus, if it is not the Mount of God, since the Israelites reached it first; but the route of the Israelites from their encampment "by the Red Sea" (Num. 33 : 10) is not certain. Several scholars besides Lepsius and Ebers, namely, Stanley and all the members of the English Ordnance Survey (except Rev. Mr. Holland) identify Feirân with the Rephidim of the Scriptures, where the battle was fought with the Amalekites, who would naturally defend so fertile a district against intruding strangers (Ex. 17 : 8, 16; Num. 33 : 14, 15). But granting this identity, it does not prove the claims of Serbâl, since this is only two miles off from the alleged field of battle; and yet it is said that there was a day's march from Rephidim to Sinai (Ex. 19 : 1). Rephidim, however, was

¹ Palmer (p. 5) came to the conclusion "that the claims of Serbâl are comparatively modern, and that tradition points to the neighborhood of that mountain rather as a site of Rephidim than of Sinai, and that the true traditional Sinai is Jebel Mûsa."

probably situated further east and nearer Sinai, as Mr. Holland assumes; in the Wady esh Sheikh, where the Arabs point to a detached rock as the seat of the Nebi Mûsa (the Prophet Moses), which he may have occupied during the battle with the Amalekites.

The conclusive argument against Serbâl is the unsurmountable geographical objection, namely, the entire absence of any open space below and around Serbâl, where the people could assemble so as to stand "under the mountain," and to touch the "nether part" (Deut. 4:2; Ex. 19:12, 17). Its magnificent peaks can be seen only from one of the neighboring hills, or in glimpses from a few spots of Wady Feirân.

The traditional Mount Sinai, certainly its northern peak, meets this geographical necessity, and is equally appropriate in every other respect. Mount Sinai consists of two peaks; the southern peak is called Jebel Mûsa (the Mount of Moses), the northern peak Ras Sufsâfeh (the Head of the Willow, so called from a willow-tree below the summit). The southern summit is the traditional Mount of God, and its claims are defended by De Laborde, Ritter, and Tischendorf. It is suited in every respect, except the want of accommodation at its base; for the Wady Sebaijeh below is narrow, broken, and uneven, and does not run up close to the foot of Jebel Mûsa, so that this might be touched and surrounded by the people. On the other hand, Ras Sufsâfeh is surrounded by the vast Wady Er Raha (Valley of Rest), which can accommodate, as ascertained by actual measurement, more than three millions of people in such a manner that they could approach and touch the mountain, look up to its summit and behold the wonderful theophany which accompanied the giving of the law.¹ This space is nearly doubled by the broad and level area of Wady esh Sheikh on the east. For this reason, chiefly, Dr. Robinson, who first

¹ "A calculation made by Captain Palmer, from the actual measurements taken on the spot, proves that the space extending from the base of the mountain to the watershed, or rest of the plain, is large enough to have accommodated the entire host of the Israelites, estimated at two million souls, with an allowance of about a square yard for each individual."—*The Desert of the Exodus*, vol. i., p. 117. Robinson likewise measured Er Raha and found it to be two geographical miles long, and from one third to two thirds of a mile broad ("Biblical Researches," vol. i., p. 95).

ascended Ras Sufsâfeh, suggested it as the true spot of the giving of the law. He gives the following description of his ascent and impression ("Biblical Researches," vol. i., pp. 106, 107): "While the monks were here employed in lighting tapers and burning incense, we determined to scale the almost inaccessible peak of es-Sufsâfeh before us, in order to look out upon the plain and judge for ourselves as to the adaptedness of this part of the mount to the circumstances of the scriptural history. This cliff rises some five hundred feet above the basin; and the distance to the summit is more than half a mile. We first attempted to climb the side in a direct course, but found the rock so smooth and precipitous that after some falls and more exposures we were obliged to give it up, and clamber upwards along a steep ravine by a more northern and circuitous course. From the head of this ravine we were able to climb around the face of the northern precipice and reach the top, along the deep hollows worn in the granite by the weather during the lapse of ages, which give to this part, as seen from below, the appearance of architectural ornament.

"The extreme difficulty and even danger of the ascent was well rewarded by the prospect that now opened before us. The whole plain er-Râhah lay spread out beneath our feet, with the adjacent wadys and mountains; while Wady esh-Sheikh on the right, and the recess on the left, both connected with and opening broadly from er-Râhah, presented an area which serves nearly to double that of the plain. Our conviction was strengthened that here or on some one of the adjacent cliffs was the spot where the Lord 'descended in fire' and proclaimed the law. Here lay the plain where the whole congregation might be assembled; here was the mount that could be approached and touched, if not forbidden; and here the mountain brow, where alone the lightnings and the thick cloud would be visible, and the thunders and the voice of the trumpet heard, when the Lord 'came down in the sight of all the people upon Mount Sinai.' We gave ourselves up to the impressions of the awful scene; and read, with a feeling that will never be forgotten, the sublime account of the transaction and the commandments here promulgated, in the original words

as recorded by the great Hebrew legislator (Ex. 19:9-25; 20:1-18)."

The same view is adopted by Dean Stanley,¹ Professor Porter,² and by all the members of the English Ordnance Survey Expedition of 1868-1869, including Captains Wilson and Palmer.³

It was my privilege a few months ago to visit the memorable spot. I ascended Jebel Mûsa and Ras Sufsâfeh, which are separated from each other by deep ravines, and I fully satisfied my mind that Ras Sufsâfeh is the best pulpit in the world for the proclamation and the hearing of the law, which threatens death and damnation. It answers all the conditions of the description in the book of Exodus. Such a scene of awful beauty and solemnity I never saw before, nor expect to see again. The view from Jebel Mûsa is more extensive, though obstructed towards the south by the neighboring peak of Jebel Catharine (the highest mountain in the Peninsula), but the view from Ras Sufsâfeh is equally sublime and impressive. I wish I could describe this unrivalled panorama of death and desolation. No sound breaks the stillness unless it be the voice of storm and thunder when heavy clouds gather around the summit and the lightning flashes leap down into the darkness; no lake nor brook nor waterfall, no meadow nor forest, no snow nor glacier delights the eye as on the Swiss Alps, but only rocks, rocks, rocks, from nature's primitive foundery, each standing out in its rugged outline and distinctive color—now yellow, now purple, now black—in the dazzling brightness of the sunlight; and right beneath the fearful precipice is stretched out the Wady Er Raha, like a gigantic encampment, the adjoining Wadys of Leja and esh Sheikh, and beyond the amphitheatre of barren mountains which wall them in. As I

"Sinai and Palestine," p. 76 (Am. ed.): "I am sure that if the monks of Justinian had fixed the traditional scene on the Ras Sufsâfeh, no one would for an instant have doubted that this only could be the spot."

² "Hand-book for Travellers in Sinai and Palestine," p. 71 (ed. of 1875): "The mountain, the plain, the streamlet, and the whole topography correspond in every respect to the historical narrative of Moses."

³ "See the Report of Rev. F. W. Holland in "Recovery of Jerusalem," London and New York, 1871, and Professor E. H. Palmer's "Desert of the Exodus," Cambridge and New York, 1871, part i., pp. 112 *sqq.* Holland visited Sinai four times, and Palmer travelled on foot over the Sinaitic Peninsula for eleven months.

sat on that majestic peak, which stands up like "a huge altar unto heaven," and is visible from every point in the large plain below, I read as I never read before those Ten Commandments which still rule the public and private morals of the civilized world, and imagined the details of that wonderful theophany, "the thunders and lightnings, and the thick cloud upon the mount, and the voice of the trumpet exceeding loud, and the mount quaking, and the smoke ascending from it as from a furnace, and the people in the camp trembling, and the infinite Jehovah talking with Israel face to face out of the midst of the fire, of the cloud, and of the darkness, with a great voice, through Moses his servant." But at the same time I felt more thankful than ever before that we are born, not under the mount of legislation, which reflects the terrible justice and majesty of God, but under the mount of beatitudes, in the sunshine of his goodness and mercy. "The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ."

A visit to the Sinaitic Peninsula goes far to strengthen one's faith in the truthfulness of the Mosaic narrative against the attacks of skeptical critics who have never been there. A recent explorer, who accompanied the English Ordnance Survey Expedition, closes his account with the statement that "not a single member of the Expedition returned home without feeling more firmly convinced than ever of the truth of that sacred history which he found illustrated and confirmed by the natural features of the desert. The mountains and valleys, the very rocks, barren and sun-scorched as they now are, seem to furnish evidences which none who behold them can gainsay, that this was 'that great and terrible wilderness' through which Moses, under God's direction, led his people."¹

From 'Ayûn Mûsa to Mount Sinai we can verify the account of Exodus and the invaluable itinerary of the thirty-third chapter of Numbers in every essential feature. We find them supported and illustrated by the striking correspondence of the present localities with the biblical descriptions and the character of the events which took place there. The wild Arab traditions, too, are full of 'recollections of the great Nabi

¹ Rev. T. W. Holland, in "The Recovery of Jerusalem," p. 429.

Mûsa, and testify to the indelible impression which the leader of Israel made upon the inhabitants of the Peninsula and their descendants to this day.

After their departure from Sinai followed a long period of uncertain wanderings, murmurings and punishment of the children of Israel, which is devoid of mighty events, such as took place during the first year in the western and southern part of the Peninsula. It is impossible to identify all the camping-stations of Numb. 33 : 17-48, with the exception of Hazeroth (which is no doubt identical with Ain Hudherah), Mount Hor, Edom and Moab. The recent exploration of a great portion of the Desert Et Tih, Idumea and Moab, by E. H. Palmer and Tyrwhitt Drake in 1869 and 1870, has shed some light on this part of the itinerary, but leaves much to be done yet by future explorers.

We now leave "the great and terrible wilderness," and enter the Holy Land, once flowing with milk and honey, and stop at the chief places of interest, beginning with Hebron.

THE MACHPELAH.

There is no doubt about the identity of the present Hebron (El-Khalil, "The Friend," namely of Allah, as it is called by the Moslems in honor of Abraham, "the friend of God") with the city of that name so often mentioned in the Old Testament (though nowhere in the New). It is the most ancient in Palestine, seven years older than Zoan or Tanis in Egypt (Num. 13 : 22), and as old as Damascus. It is the city where Abraham communed with God, where he buried Sarah his wife, where he himself was buried, where Isaac and Jacob spent a great part of their lives and were buried with their wives, where David reigned seven years and a half before he transferred his residence to Jerusalem. It is one of the most certain localities in all Palestine, and the surrounding luxuriant vineyards, olive groves, pomegranates and fig-trees even now call vividly to mind the report of the spies which they brought from the valley of Eshcol (The Valley of Grapes) to the camp of Israel in Kadesh-Barnea. The famous Oak of Abraham—about half an hour's ride west of Hebron, one of the most majestic and venerable trees in the world—whether it be on the precise spot or not where Abraham received and entertained his celestial guests,

testifies to the mighty impress which the father of the faithful left upon the place of his sojourn and upon the memory of Jews, Mohammedans, and Christians alike.

But the most interesting spot in Hebron, and one of the most sacred spots on earth, is still concealed from the eyes of Christians and Jews, and perhaps even from the Mohammedans. We mean of course the Machpelah,¹ or double cave, which Abraham bought from Ephron, one of the sons of Heth, as a burial-place for his family, and which was the only piece of ground which legally belonged to him in the Land of Promise. The story of the purchase is told in the twenty-third chapter of Genesis, with all the solemnity, carefulness, and minuteness of an important legal transaction, and in remarkable conformity to Oriental habits as they prevail to the present day on such occasions. In this venerable tomb Sarah was first buried, then Abraham, then Isaac and Rebekah, then Leah, and at last Jacob, whose body was brought from Egypt at his own dying request, in these words of touching simplicity (Gen. 49: 29-32): "And he charged them, and said unto them, I am to be gathered unto my people: bury me with my fathers in the cave that is in the field of Ephron the Hittite, in the cave that is in the field of Machpelah, which is before Mamre, in the land of Canaan, which Abraham bought with the field of Ephron the Hittite for a possession of a burying-place. There they buried Abraham and Sarah his wife; there they buried Isaac and Rebekah his wife; and there I buried Leah. The purchase of the field and of the cave that *is* therein was from the children of Heth."

Since that time Machpelah is no more mentioned in the Bible. Josephus, however, speaks of admirably wrought marble monuments of the patriarchs as existing at Hebron,² and it is universally believed by the followers of the three monotheistic religions that the patriarchal tomb is within the precinct of the

¹ Always with the article הַמַּכְפֶּלֶה, Sept. τὸ διπλοῦν, τὸ σπηλαῖον τὸ διπλοῦν, Vulg. *duplex*, *spelunca duplex*.

² "Bell. Jud.," l. iv. c. 9, § 7 (ed. Oberthür III., 778): τὰ μνημεῖα μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει δέκνται, πάνυ καλῆς μαρμύρου καὶ φιλοτίμως εἰρχαθμένα. Josephus mentions also Abraham's Oak, or Terebinth, which was supposed to be as old as the creation (δείκνται δὲ ἀπὸ σταδίων ἑξ τοῦ ἁσπεως Τερέβινθος μεγίστη, καὶ φασὶ τὸ δένδρον ἀπὸ τῆς κτίσεως μέχρι νῦν διαμένειν).

great mosque of Hebron, which was originally a Byzantine church with a massive wall dating probably from the time of David or Solomon. This mosque, one of the four most sacred mosques (the others being those of Mecca, Jerusalem, and Damascus), was rigidly closed against foreign intrusion till January 1862, when it was opened by a special firman and as an extraordinary favor to the Prince of Wales and his party, including Dean Stanley and the Prussian Consul, Dr. Rosen, a distinguished archæologist. Dean Stanley gives an interesting account of this memorable visit, in his "*Sermons on the East*" (pp. 141 *sqq.*), and in a second appendix to the first volume of his "*History of the Jewish Church*" (New York ed., pp. 535 *sqq.*)."¹ Since that time the Marquis of Bute was also admitted to the mosque in 1866, and the Crown Prince of Germany in 1869.

But none of these distinguished visitors were allowed to enter the subterranean Machpelah. The sarcophagi of the patriarchs and their wives, which they saw, are merely empty monuments, like similar monuments in Westminster Abbey and St. Paul's. Their mortal remains sleep beneath the pavement. "One indication alone," says Dean Stanley, "of the cavern beneath was visible. In the interior of the mosque, at the corner of the shrine of Abraham, was a small circular hole, about eight inches across, of which one foot above the pavement was built of strong masonry, but of which the lower part, as far as we could see and feel, was of the living rock. This cavity appeared to open into a dark space beneath, and that space (which the guardians of the mosque believed to extend under the whole platform) can hardly be any thing else than the ancient cavern of Machpelah. This was the only aperture which the guardians recognized. Once, they said, 2500 years ago, a servant of a great king had penetrated through some other entrance. He descended in full possession of his faculties, and of remarkable corpulence; he returned, blind, deaf, withered, and crippled. Since then the entrance was closed, and this aperture alone was left, partly for the sake of suffering the holy air of the cave to escape into the mosque, and be

¹ Compare also Fergusson's account in "*The Holy Sepulchre and the Temple of Jerusalem*," London, 1865.

scented by the faithful; partly for the sake of allowing a lamp to be let down by a chain, which we saw suspended at the mouth, to burn upon the sacred grave. We asked whether it could not be lighted now. 'No,' they said; 'the saint likes to have a lamp at night, but not in full daylight.' With that glimpse into the dark void we and the world without must for the present be satisfied. Whether any other entrance is known to the Mussulmans themselves, must be a matter of doubt. The original entrance to the cave, if it is now to be found at all, must probably be on the southern face of the hill, between the mosque and the gallery containing the shrine of Joseph, and entirely obstructed by the ancient Jewish wall, probably built across it for this very purpose."

On a visit to the Mosque of Hebron, a few months ago, I only ventured to the threshold and looked through a hole in the wall; but even this was deemed a desecration by a number of fanatical Moslems who just came out from evening devotions, and threatened and actually committed violence, while the children began to curse the "Christian dogs" and to throw stones at us. The governor of the place, on being informed of the insult by our dragoman, promptly put the offenders in chains, sent his secretary and a detachment of soldiers to our camp, and offered us every honorable satisfaction. I regret now that it did not occur to us at the time that we might have asked permission to visit the interior of the holy mosque, and to peep at least through the hole to the tombs of the patriarchs. Perhaps at no distant future the embalmed body of Jacob will be found there in a good state of preservation. The body of Joseph is also said to rest there, having been removed hither from Shechem, near Jacob's well, where it was originally deposited and where a monument still marks the spot.

BETHLEHEM.

Bethlehem is the first place in southern Palestine which blends the memories of the Old and the New Testaments. It figures in the history of Rachel, who there gave birth to the son of her sorrow and died on the road, still marked by a white mosque; in the charming idyl of Ruth, who, returning with

Naomi, gleaned after the reapers in the grain-field of Boaz, and became the ancestress of David and of David's greater Son and Lord; in the history of David, who was born and raised there, watching his father's flock and musing over the Good Shepherd who "maketh us lie down in green pastures, who leadeth us beside the still waters;" and in the infancy of our Lord, whose birth in the humble manger made Bethlehem a household word all over the Christian world. It is generally conceded that the modern town of Beitlahm ("House of Flesh"), seven miles south of Jerusalem, and inhabited entirely by Christians (mostly Greeks), is the biblical Bethlehem ("House of Bread"). Its fertility, its location and surroundings answer all the conditions of the descriptions and sacred events attached to the place.

But this does not settle the question of the exact spot of the nativity of our Lord, which marks the turning-point in the chronology and history of the race—the close of the old era and the beginning of the new. Monastic tradition, both Greek and Roman, points to the cave beneath the Church of the Nativity, which is illuminated by thirty-two lamps, and bears the simple but pregnant inscription, "*Hic de Virgine Maria Jesus Christus natus est.*" Dr. Robinson, as usual, is skeptical; while William Hepworth Dixon, on the other hand, constructs an ingenious argument not only in favor of the identity of the cave with the stable where Christ was born, but also for the identity of the inn in which his parents found no room with the former mansion of Ruth and Boaz and of King David.¹ Without going to this extent, we think there is no good reason to doubt the tradition. St. Luke, it is true, says nothing of a cave, but only of a manger, in which Mary laid her first-born son, "because there was no room for them in the inn" (Luke 2:7). A manger presupposes a stable. In Palestine, grottos, which are very frequent, are even now used for stables, as they afford easy shelter and protection, and man and beast are not so widely separated in the East as in the West; you find them often, especially in Egypt, dwelling in democratic equality and friendship under the same roof. In Bethlehem there was no doubt only one inn, or khan, for inns are rare and far apart in a country where trav-

¹ "The Holy Land," chapters xii.-xv. (Tauchnitz ed., 1865, vol. i., p. 99 sqq.)

ellers live mostly in tents. Joseph and Mary, finding the inn overcrowded, sought temporary shelter in the adjoining stable in the cave, but soon afterwards they must have moved to the inn, for the Magi visited them "in the house" (Matthew 2 : 11).

So far, then, there is nothing intrinsically improbable in the monastic tradition. But in addition to this it has a claim to our respect by its antiquity. It can be traced two hundred years beyond the age of Helena and Constantine, when most of the other traditions of holy places originated. Justin Martyr, who was himself a native of Palestine, and knew the localities and habits of the country, before the middle of the second century, distinctly locates our Saviour's birth in a grotto (ἐν σπηλαίῳ) near Bethlehem (*"Dial. cum Tryph. Jud.,"* 78). Origen, a century later, speaks of this as a matter well known to the heathen as well as the Christians (*"Contra Celsum,"* i., § 1). Eusebius mentions the same fact several years before the journey of Helena; and Jerome, the best biblical scholar among the Latin fathers, in this belief took up his abode in an adjoining cell, where he finished his Latin version of the Scriptures and died (419). The cell of Jerome, which is still shown, is no doubt genuine. But all other surroundings of the Cave of the Nativity—the Chapel of the Manger (an imitation in marble of the "genuine" manger which was found by Helena and carried to Rome), the Altar of the Adoration of the Magi, the Chapel of the Slaughtered Innocents (whose number is swelled by the monks to the incredible number of 20,000)—are of course fabrications of pious fancy and fraud.

JERUSALEM—THE TRUE CALVARY.

Jerusalem, the religious metropolis of the Jewish and Christian world, the witness of the greatest events that ever happened or ever can happen to the end of time, is also the centre of superstitions, which cluster around its sacred spots since the days of St. Helena and her son Constantine the Great. For many centuries superstition had undisturbed possession of the supposed sites of Mount Zion, Mount Moriah, Gethsemane, Calvary, and it would have been considered irreverent and impious to call any one in question. They are still held to be

authentic by Greek and Latin Catholics. I do not know a single Catholic scholar of repute, with the exception of Professor Scholz, of Bonn, who disputes the claims of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre to be the true Calvary. Many Protestants share the same feeling, especially among Episcopalians, and Rev. George Williams could not conceal his holy indignation at what he deemed to be the profanity of Dr. Robinson's treatment of ecclesiastical tradition; so much so that in the preface to the second edition of his "Holy City" he felt constrained to apologize for it.

The first doubt about the accuracy of the tradition was uttered by a German bookseller, Korte, A.D. 1738. But it was the independent American research of Dr. Robinson, in 1838, which revolutionized the opinion of archæologists and biblical scholars on the true site of Calvary, by denying with solid arguments the claims of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre (in his "Biblical Researches," vol. i., 407-418; iii., 254-263, Boston ed. of 1856; and in "Bibliotheca Sacra," for Aug. and Nov., 1847). He came to this conclusion reluctantly, by calm topographical investigation on the spot; for he went to Jerusalem, as he says, with a strong prejudice in favor of the traditional view, and impressed with the plausible argument of Chateaubriand. He was followed by Dr. Titus Tobler (a practical physician of Switzerland and a most accurate archæologist, who visited Palestine four times, 1835, 1845, 1857, and 1865, and wrote separate works on Jerusalem, Nazareth, Bethlehem, Palestine Bibliography, etc.), Herm. Hupfeld (1861), Fr. Arnold (1864), John Wilson, Barclay, Bonar, Meyer, Ewald, Sam. J. Andrews, and other Protestant scholars.

On the other hand, the old tradition was defended with great learning and zeal by George Williams, for several years Anglican chaplain of Bishop Alexander in Jerusalem ("The Holy City, or Historical and Topographical Notices of Jerusalem," London, 2d ed., 1849, 2 vols.; see vol. ii., chs. 1-3), Dr. E. G. Schultz, Prussian Consul in Jerusalem ("Jerusalem," Berlin, 1845), W. Krafft, Professor in Bonn ("Die Topographie Jerusalem's," Bonn, 1847, a very able discussion, with maps, plans, and inscriptions), Ritter ("Die Erdkunde," vol. xvi., 1852, pp. 297-508), Raumer ("Palästina," Leipzig, 4th ed., 1860,

pp. 285-360, 421-446), Dr. Rosen, Prussian Consul in Jerusalem (1858 and 1863), De Vogué and De Saulcy, both French Catholics (1853 and 1863), Prof. Sepp, a German Roman Catholic (1863), Konrad Furrer, a Swiss scholar who travelled through Palestine on foot (*"Wanderungen durch Palästina,"* Zurich, 1865), von Schubert, Tischendorf, Olin, Lewin, and others. The scholars of the Palestine Exploration Fund have likewise thrown their influence in favor of the traditional site. The champions of this view are just now more numerous than those of Robinson's theory.

We do not intend here to enter into the argument. It has been pretty well exhausted already, by Robinson against, and by Williams in favor of, the traditional view. It turns chiefly on the course of the second wall of Josephus, whether it ran west or east of the present Church of the Holy Sepulchre, in other words, whether it included or excluded it. The evangelists distinctly put the crucifixion outside of the city; but the Church of the Holy Sepulchre lies inside the present city, which is much smaller than it was at the time of Christ; consequently the defendents of the traditional site must prove that the second wall, which began at the gate of Gennath, near the tower of Hippicus, and ran to the fortress Antonia, on the north of the Temple, excluded the church, but this has not been satisfactorily done. It is not impossible, but it is very improbable.

In other respects the traditional topography of Jerusalem is now in a more unsettled state than ever before. Of the eight topographical points of Robinson, only one is now generally admitted, namely, that Mount Moriah is the site of the Jewish temple. Even the site of Zion is disputed. Fergusson locates Calvary on Mount Moriah, near the Golden Gate, but has found no followers.

Mr. Schick, a German architect, and superintendent of an industrial school connected with the Anglo-Prussian Mission, who from about thirty years' residence in Jerusalem is perfectly familiar with its topography, and who constructed the best models of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, of the Tabernacle, and of Jerusalem (shown near the Protestant Church on Zion), locates Calvary about ten minutes' walk north-west of the Damascus Gate, near the Grotto of Jeremiah. He kindly

showed me the spot, and I must confess that it answers all the conditions of the biblical narratives: it is outside of the city (John 19 : 17; Matt. 28 : 11; Heb. 13 : 12); yet near the city (John 19 : 20); near a thoroughfare and exposed to the gaze of the passing multitude (comp. Mark 15 : 29 and John 19 : 20); on an elevation (hence the name "Skull," or "Place of a Skull"), and surrounded by rocks and caves well suited for tombs (comp. Matt. 27 : 60; John 19 : 41). A sarcophagus was dug up there (as he informed me) a short time ago in building a Moslem house. Rev. Mr. Heffter of Christ Church, likewise a long resident of Jerusalem, who was with us, and Bishop Gobat are of the same opinion.

But after all this is merely a conjecture. God buried his servant Moses out of the sight of men and the reach of idolatry. So it may be best that the real locality of the crucifixion and resurrection is unknown, and thus kept from desecration by idolatrous superstitions and monkish impostures and quarrels, such as from the age of Constantine to this day have disgraced the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, to the delight of the Saracens and Turks and to the shame and grief of Christians. The apostles and evangelists evidently made little account of the earthly spot; they fixed their eyes of faith upon the great facts and upon the ever-living Christ in heaven. The Crusaders sought him among the dead, and thousands of pilgrims do so now. But the voice from heaven declares, "He is not here, he is risen."

NAZARETH.¹

The holy places of Nazareth, the residence of our Lord for thirty years, are even more doubtful than the site of Calvary.

The Mount of Precipitation, from which the Nazarenes attempted to cast Jesus down headlong, when, emerging from the obscurity of a carpenter's shop, he first preached unto them the glad tidings, is shown two miles off from the town, in flat contradiction to the narrative of Luke (4 : 29), who says that it was "the brow of the hill whereon their city was built." There is

¹ The best book on Nazareth is by the indefatigable Palestine explorer, Dr. Titus Tobler, "Nazareth in Palästina," Berlin, 1863, 344 pages, with a topographical map drawn by Rev. Mr. Zeller, a son-in-law of Bishop Gobat of Jerusalem, and for some time evangelical missionary in Nazareth.

a steep rock behind the Maronite church which answers the description, and as I visited the spot in company with a German Protestant missionary of Nazareth (Mr. Huber), we came to the conclusion that this was in all probability the true rock of precipitation.

We are shown in Nazareth two Chapels of the Annunciation, one Latin and one Greek; the kitchen of the Virgin Mary (the house was transferred by angels to Loretto in Italy centuries ago); the suspended column above the spot where Mary received the angel's message, according to the Latin tradition; the workshop of Joseph and Jesus; the synagogue in which Jesus taught, and the stone table on which Jesus often reclined at meal before and after the resurrection. But there is not the slightest foundation for their genuineness. The traditions are neutralized by the conflicting claims of the Greeks and Latins. Everybody knows that most incredible of legends (first mentioned in 1518 in a bull of Leo X.), the miraculous removal of Mary's house by angels through the air from Nazareth to Greece, and then to Italy. It has its pendant in the Greek legend of the transportation of the body of St. Catharine from Alexandria to the top of Mount Catharine in the Sinaitic wilderness. The Protestant may be safely allowed to reject both, as in one case he is supported by the Greeks, in the other by the Latins. Dean Stanley (*"Sinai and Palestine,"* p. 436, Lond. ed. of 1868) gives from actual measurement the plan of the Holy House of Loretto, and the plan of the Grotto of Nazareth,¹ from which the former is said to have been removed. A comparison proves the utter impossibility of their original congruity or fitness. "The position of the grotto," says Stanley (p. 447), "is, and must always have been, absolutely incompatible with any such adjacent building as that at Loretto."

There is but one spot in Nazareth which we may safely connect with the life of the holy family: it is the famous "Fountain of the Virgin," or, as it is also called, Gabriel's Spring, and Jesus' Spring, where the women of Nazareth, still celebrated for their beauty, like their sisters in Bethlehem, gather in the

¹ The plans of this edition are superior to the rough sketches of the earlier editions, and are drawn with much care by the late W. H. Hutchison, a Roman Catholic priest of the Oratory.

morning and evening, gossiping and quarrelling, and filling their large water-jars, gracefully poised on their heads or shoulders. As it is the only fountain in Nazareth (excepting a very little one in another part of the town), it is quite likely that Mary, with the infant Jesus, may often have resorted to it for her supply of water. The modest retirement and beautiful surroundings of Nazareth are, of course, the same as in the time of our Saviour, and were favorable to his quiet training, away from libraries, colleges, the commotion of commerce, yet within sight of some of the most interesting scenes in the history of Israel.

The view from the hill above the town is one of the most extensive and charming in Palestine. Towards the south we see the fertile plain of Esdraelon, the historic battle-field of Israel; towards the north, the snow-crowned Mount Hermon; towards the east, Mount Tabor and Mount Gilboa, where Saul and Jonathan fell; towards the west, Mount Carmel, where Elijah triumphed over the false prophets; and in the far distance beyond, the waters of the Mediterranean Sea, which was to become the highway of the Gospel of peace to all mankind. These associations may have afforded natural advantages even to Him who—though neither man-taught, nor self-taught, nor God-taught in the usual sense, but coming out from God, and revealing God's secrets from his personal communion with the Father—"grew and waxed strong in spirit," and "increased in wisdom and stature."

TABOR OR HERMON?

These are the two claimants for the scene of the transfiguration, which marks the height of the public ministry of Christ and the introduction to his passion. Tabor is the traditional, Hermon probably the real site. The former is the Rigi, the latter the Mont Blanc of Palestine.

The place mentioned by the evangelists is an high mountain (*ὄρος ὑψηλόν*). Peter calls it "the holy mountain" (*ἐν τῷ ὄρει τῷ ἁγίῳ*, 2 Pet. 1 : 18), from which we may infer that it was well known, and had acquired a halo of glory from the event. The Lord was wont to withdraw to a mountain for prayer (Matt. 24 : 13; Luke 21 : 37; John 6 : 15), and several of the

greatest events in the history of revelation, from the legislation on Mount Sinai to the ascension from Mount Olivet, took place on mountains. But as the mount of transfiguration is not named, we have to infer it from the surrounding circumstances, and geographical and chronological considerations.

1. Mount Olivet has the oldest tradition in its favor; but is entirely out of the question, since Christ was in Galilee before and after the event, and a journey to Judea in the intervening time could not have been left unnoticed. The mountain must be sought in the province of Galilee.

2. Mount Tabor (the Itabyrion of the Septuagint, the Jebel et-Tûr of the Arabs), an isolated, beautiful, dome-shaped mountain, wholly of limestone, on the southern border of Galilee, on the plain of Esdraelon about 1800 feet above the sea.¹ Owing to its isolation it looks twice as large as it really is. It rises gracefully like a truncated cone or hemisphere from the plain. It is six or eight miles east of Nazareth, and can be easily ascended on foot or on horseback in an hour. It is often mentioned in the Old Testament (Judges 4:6, 14; 8:18; Ps. 89:12; Jer. 46:18), though nowhere in the New. The tradition that Tabor is the mount of transfiguration dates from Jerome in the fourth century, and gained almost universal acceptance. It gave rise to the building of churches and monasteries on the summit of Tabor, which should correspond to the three tents which Peter desired to build—one for his Lord, one for Moses, one for Elijah—forgetting himself and the other two disciples, and “not knowing what he said” in his dreamy state of mind. It also gave the name *τό θαβώριον* to the festival of the transfiguration in the Greek Church. There is a poetic fitness in this tradition. No mountain in Palestine was by nature better suited for the event than Tabor. It lies in the very centre of the country, and commands from its flattened summit one of the finest views over many historic scenes of sacred history: the hills of Nazareth and Mount Carmel in the west, the lake of Tiberias and Mount Lebanon in the north, the mountains of Moab and

¹ According to Ritter (vol. ii., p. 311, Eng. ed.), Tabor is 1750 Paris feet above the sea; according to Tristram (“Land of Israel,” second ed., p. 125, and “Topography of the Holy Land,” second ed., p. 232), it is 1400 feet from the base, and the base about 500 above the sea.

Bashan in the east, beyond the Jordan, and the Little Hermon and Gilboa where Jonathan fell, and the plain of Esdraelon, or Jezreel, in the south.

But two arguments may be urged against this view, which make it at least very doubtful. (*a*) The fact that the summit of Tabor was employed without intermission between the times of Antiochus the Great, 218 B. C., to the destruction of Jerusalem, A. D. 70, as a fortification, and hence was unfit for quiet seclusion and meditation. See Polybius, v., 70, 6; Josephus, "Ant.," xiv., 6, 3; "Bell. Jud.," i., 8, 7; ii., 20, 6; iv., 18. (*b*) The time of the transfiguration, which occurred only "six days" (Matt. 17: 1; Mark 9: 2; or more indefinitely, "about eight days," Luke 9: 28) after the confession of Peter at Cæsarea Philippi, on the northern border of Palestine. After the transfiguration and the healing of the lunatic it is said that Jesus went to Capernaum (Matt. 17: 24; Mark 9: 33). Now it is barely possible, but not probable, that he should in a few days have gone from Cæsarea Philippi to Mount Tabor, passing Capernaum on the way, and gone back from Mount Tabor to Capernaum. Dr. Lange ("Com. on Matt.," 17: 1, p. 306, Am. ed.) remarks that "it is exceedingly improbable that Christ should so suddenly have left his retreat in the highlands of Gaulonitis and transferred the scene of one of his most secret revelations to Galilee, where he was everywhere persecuted."

3. Mount Hermon (now called Jebel esh-Sheikh, *i.e.*, "the chief mountain"), the highest peak of the Lebanon range. It rises in three summits very majestically to a height of ten thousand feet above the Mediterranean, is covered with eternal snow, and can be seen for many miles in every direction. I saw it from Gerizim and Tabor, from Damascus, from the northern heights of the Antilebanon and Lebanon, and the plain of Cölesyria. Moses could see it from the top of Pisga in Moab, when "the Lord showed him all the land of Gilead unto Dan" (Deut. 34: 1). It reaches down to the northern borders of Galilee. Cæsarea Philippi or Banias lies at its base. The way from Banias to Damascus leads over it and presents magnificent views. In favor of Hermon as the mountain of transfiguration are (*a*) its location at the very place where Christ was a few days before; and (*b*) its retirement

from the busy crowd. "There are several retired platforms on Mount Hermon," says Tristram, "behind the last recess of Palestine, where the scene of transfiguration may have occurred, with the disciples apart by themselves."

It is worthy of note that this event, as well as the confession of Peter, and Christ's great prophecy concerning his Church, which the powers of Hades cannot overthrow, should be attached to the border region between the Jews and the Gentiles, as indicating the point when the Gospel left Palestine to become the religion of the whole world.¹

KHAN MINYEH OR TELL HUM?

The question of the true site of Capernaum, the flourishing city on the Lake of Gennezareth, the home of Christ's manhood, where he spent the greater part of his public ministry, taught his parables and performed many miracles, is still unsettled. In this case we have no ecclesiastical tradition to guide or to confuse us. We are left to pure conjecture from geographical and topographical considerations, Arab names, and ancient ruins. Bethsaida and Chorazin are closely connected with Capernaum and involved in the same uncertainty.

It is not strange that it should be so. The fearful prophecy of Christ has been literally fulfilled (Matt. 11: 20-24), and the fate of those three cities which witnessed his mighty works has been more terrible than that of Tyre and Sidon. They have utterly disappeared from the face of the earth.

There are chiefly two claimants for the site of Capernaum, the chief of those three cities, *Khan Minyeh* and *Tell Hum*. Robinson, Porter, Macgregor, Selah Merrill, plead for the former; Ritter, Thomson, Captain Wilson, Bädeler, for the latter. A third place, Ain Mudawarah, or the Round Fountain, near the south end of the plain of Gennezareth, a mile and a half from the lake, has found an advocate in Tristram, but he has recently given it up.

¹ The leading modern writers on Palestine have pronounced in favor of Hermon and against Tabor. So Ritter, "Comparative Geography of Palestine," ii., 312, English translation; Robinson, "Biblical Researches," vol. ii., 330, 358 (Am. ed.), and his "Physical Geography of the Holy Land," p. 26; Stanley, "Sinai and Palestine," p. 351 (Eng. ed. of 1868); Trench, "Studies in the Gospels," p. 192; Tristram, "Topography of the Holy Land," pp. 233, 280.

The arguments for Khan Minyeh are chiefly geographical. It is situated close by the sea-shore (which corresponds to Matt. 4: 13), at the head of the triangular plain of Gennezareth (now called El-Ghuweir; comp. Matt. 14: 34; John 6: 17, 21, 26), and on the highway to Damascus—a good place for a custom's station where taxes might be gathered (Matt. 9: 9; Mark 2: 14; Luke 5: 27). The "Spring of the Fig-tree" (Ain et-Tin) is supposed, by Robinson, to be the same with the spring of Capernaum mentioned by Josephus (who, however, says nothing of the town), though this is more probably to be sought in the much larger fountain Et Tabigah (as Captain Wilson has shown). The considerable remains of an aqueduct above the khan, which carried the water down to the plain, seem to indicate that there was formerly a large town there. But there are no ruins of any account in Khan Minyeh, except the large caravansary from which it has its name, and which is of Saracen origin. Robinson accounts for this by the neighborhood of Tiberias, to which the ruins may have been removed by water. But a synagogue and a large town are not so easily transported. The excavations of the English Exploring Expedition in 1866 have brought nothing to light except some fragments of comparatively modern masonry and pottery.

Tell Hum has in its favor the name and the ruins, two very important arguments. It means the same as Capernaum, viz., the town of *Nahum*, except that *Caphtar*, village, is exchanged for *Tell*, hill. The ruins discovered then, and more carefully examined by Captain Wilson in 1866, are certainly very remarkable, especially those of a large and elegant synagogue, called the "White Synagogue," which, at all events, betokens the presence of a considerable city. If Tell Hum be Capernaum, then this synagogue was in all probability the same which the Roman centurion built (Luke 7: 18; Matt. 8: 8), and in which our Lord frequently taught and delivered the wonderful discourse on the bread of life (Mark 1: 21; Luke 4: 33, 38; John 6: 59). The broken columns lie in confusion a little beneath the surface of the soil. I was so fortunate as to secure the capital of a column for the Biblical Museum in the Union Theological Seminary.

Wilson's description of the synagogue in "The Recovery of

Jerusalem" is as follows (p. 268): "The synagogue, built entirely of white limestone, must once have been a conspicuous object, standing out from the dark basaltic background; it is now nearly level with the surface, and its capitals and columns have been for the most part carried away or turned into lime. The original building is 74 feet 9 inches long by 56 feet 9 inches wide; it is built north and south, and at the southern end has three entrances. In the interior we found many of the pedestals of the columns in their original positions, and several capitals of the Corinthian order buried in the rubbish; there were also blocks of stone which had evidently rested on the columns and supported wooden rafters. Outside the synagogue proper, but connected with it, we uncovered the remains of a later building, which may be those of the church which Epiphanius says was built at Capernaum, and was described by Antonius, A.D. 600, as a basilica, enclosing the house of Peter. It may be asked what reason there is for believing the original building to have been a Jewish synagogue, and not a temple or church. Seen alone, there might have been some doubt as to its character, but, compared with the number of ruins of the same character which have lately been brought to notice in Galilee, there can be none. Two of these buildings have inscriptions in Hebrew over their main entrances; one in connection with a seven-branched candlestick, the others with figures of the paschal lamb, and all without exception are constructed after a fixed plan, which is totally different from that of any church, temple, or mosque in Palestine."

If Tell Hum be not Capernaum, it must have been Chorazin; but there is still a site of the name of "Kerazeh," two and a half miles north of Tell Hum, where the ruins of a synagogue of black basalt and several dwelling-houses are found. "The ruins of Kerazeh," says Captain Wilson, who has no doubt of its identity with Chorazin ("Recovery of Jerusalem," p. 270), "are as large, if not larger, than the ruins of Capernaum (Tell Hum). . . Many of the dwelling-houses are in a tolerably perfect state, the walls being in some cases six feet high. . . On the north, we found traces of the paved road which connected Chorazin with the great caravan road to Damascus."

It is quite possible that future excavations may bring to light

an archæological argument for Khan Minyeh ; but till then we must give the preference to Tell Hum.

Tell Hum is three miles north-east of Khan Minyeh, and there miles from the Jordan at its entrance into the lake. It lies on elevated rocky ground, half a mile from the sea-shore, to which it may have extended in the days of its prosperity. We had to make our way through thickets of thorns and briers, and tore our clothes badly. There we spent about an hour on the ruins, lost in sad reflections on the terrible results of neglected opportunities and abused privileges. Even in its ruins and fearful desolation the land is a striking commentary on the Book which has nothing to fear from the attacks of unbelief, but comes out stronger from every conflict.

PHILIP SCHAFF.

ENGLAND AND HER COLONIES.

IN the present article, I will discuss a practical subject of the present day ; a subject on which, till recently, few people in England have felt more than a languid interest ; a problem which we have allowed to pass by as not concerning us, which we have left to take its chance and work out its own solution.

Yet it cannot really be a matter of indifference to us on what terms our colonial fellow-subjects, men of our own blood, our own nearest kindred, are to remain related to us. There are ten millions of them now. By the end of this century there will be thirty or forty millions. They are in possession of territories larger than Europe, with every variety of soil and climate. There is no limit to their possible expansion. Are they to continue under the British flag ? Are they to become independent nations ? That is the question, and a more important question can hardly be asked.

The history of English colonization is profoundly interesting. It was in the sixteenth century ; it was in connection with the mighty intellectual movement of which the Reformation was only a symptom, that the English race burst through the barriers of their island home and spread over the world, founding new settlements, establishing trading companies, and developing a system of universal commerce. In the time of Edward VI. there were at most but five million souls of us in this island, and the largest merchantman which sailed out of the Thames was but two hundred and fifty tons burden. Before the sixteenth century closed, we had stations in Russia and in the Levant, in Persia, in India, and in China ; we had rooted ourselves in the New World ; we had a fleet, thanks to Eliza-

beth's ministers and the energy of the people, which hunted through the Channel the mightiest armament which ever floated on the seas; and we had carried terror among the far-off Spanish settlements on the western shores of South America. So much had been accomplished in fifty years. To-day the Queen rules peaceably over two hundred million subjects in India. We are thirty-three millions at home. Ten millions more of us are scattered in communities over the fairest portions of the globe. Across the Atlantic are forty-five millions more, sprung from the same stock, with the same laws, the same language, the same literature. A seed carried away from Britain has grown into a great state, which rivals in power and resources the proudest monarchies of the Old World. If I were asked to say what England had done to command the admiration of future ages, it would be enough if I were to point to America.

Before the Reformation, England was still a great country. Her European position was nearly the same as that which she holds to-day. She held the balance between France and Spain. *Cui adhæro præest*—"the power to which I adhere prevails"—was the proud motto of Henry VIII. English ambition, English interests, were still European. We had annexed France in the century preceding, and had never acquiesced in being driven out of it. Till recent times, our sovereigns bore the *fleur-de-lis* in the royal arms. At times our expectations took even a higher flight. I have seen a horoscope of Henry which foretold that he was to die Emperor of Constantinople; and from that day to this, we have never ceased to make and meddle in one part of Europe or another. France was not allowed to have a revolution without our leave. We must needs subsidize all Europe to put down what we were pleased to consider dangerous principles. English politicians clung to the track of inherited tradition. The English people were otherwise occupied all this time. The English people were busy building up a new world, with slight help or countenance from the ruling powers. A few eminent statesmen, Lord Chatham especially, flung their eye into the future. Lord Chatham, in the midst of his European conflicts, rescued America and India from French interference. But for the most part, crown and cabinets looked indifferently on the outward progress of our

race, or interested themselves in it merely as a means of increasing the revenue. Europe and the European powers remained the central objects of their policy. Reigning families are allied by intermarriage. Aristocracies have more affinity with one another than with the untitled middle classes in distant settlements. We have our European alliances, our European obligations and responsibilities. Nothing may happen in Europe but what we are to have a voice in it. A few years ago it was difficult to form a House for an Indian debate. As to our colonies, Lord Palmerston was once at a loss for a colonial secretary. He consulted my friend Sir Arthur Helps about it, and not being able to hit on any one exactly to his mind, he said, "I think I will take the office myself. Come up-stairs with me, and we will look at the maps, and see where these places are."

Very strange all this! Yet easily explicable. The English official mind is governed by traditions. Our Continental entanglements are legacies from old days, from which it has never tried to disengage itself. She has held on in the old ruts while the New World has been growing. We have something to show for it. We have the national debt for one thing: eight hundred millions for which we pay interest, and a treaty binding us to defend Belgium, which may cost us a few hundred millions more before all is over. We are still restless as ever when any fighting is going on in Europe in which we have not a share. Enthusiastic people are saying now that it is the mission of England to be the general policeman and guardian of European peace. I congratulate the English taxpayer on his prospects. I think he will tire of his office before he has held it for many years. We are ready to fight for our own real interests: we are ready (or our governing classes are ready) to fight for interests which have no existence but in name—for phantoms bred out of the inheritance of a dead past; and those who go to war for shadows, if they win, get a shadow for their reward.

There are interests and interests. I do not say that we have no interest on the Continent of Europe; but Europe is not the only continent. Our first duty is to our own people at home and in our colonies. Abroad, our first and most natural ally ought to

be America. Whatever may have once been the importance of our connection with Europe, that importance has ceased. The Channel cuts us off, and science can make our shores impregnable. We have as little to fear from the great military powers as America has to fear, and as little to gain by meddling in their concerns. We are no longer a European power. We are an Asiatic and an ocean power. The politicians by their interference have brought us glory and have brought us a national debt, and little else that I know of. The English people, by their own enterprise, have brought us a new and more real dominion—an empire on which the sun never sets; and this is our true sphere, large enough, one would think, for the most greedy ambition.

Yet here, too, one fears to see our politicians meddle. America was once ours, and they contrived to lose it. They regarded the Americans in the last century as "poor relations," whom they might use at their pleasure. The Americans claimed to be represented if they were to pay taxes. We refused and appealed to force, and America was lost. The English people have repaired that act of stupendous folly. They have formed a second group of colonies, which may in time be as magnificent as the first. Will the politicians lose these for us also? There are signs that look that way. We have not repeated the first mistake in the same form, but we have made another in the same spirit. We misgoverned the colonies, and they complained; and instead of trying to govern them better, we told them in a tone of impatient contempt that they might govern themselves, and that if they did not like to remain connected with us they were at liberty to go. I suppose that under the circumstances it was necessary to grant them self-government. Franklin and Washington, before the Revolutionary War, would have been contented with representation in the British Parliament. They were not alarmed by the then tedious ocean passage; they were proud of the name of Britons, and proud of the reality which the name implied. Had George III. and his ministers consented, the American colonies, and all colonies which we might afterwards have formed, would have glided into their places in our representative system. The unity of the commonwealth would have been assumed as a matter of course, and the separation of a colony would have been

as little thought of as the separation of Wales or Scotland. I do not know that it would have been better for America in the long-run. The Providence which watches over the affairs of men works out of their mistakes at times a healthier issue than would have been accomplished by their wisest forethought. But the attachment of all people of English blood to home and to one another is so instinctive, that I do not believe the bond would have been ever broken, had we not broken it by injustice. The chance was lost; America went her way, and other colonies, when they grow impatient, look naturally to America for their example. They have not asked again to be represented at home. They know, perhaps, that they would still ask in vain. They have demanded free constitutions, and they have got them, with all which free constitutions may involve.

What follows, then? Australia, Canada, New Zealand, are free. They are still nominally under the crown, but they add no strength to the crown; their country, their wealth, their resources, are their own. We have no more power over them than we had over France when it was counted in the list of George III.'s kingdom. We cannot take back what we have given. If any colony shall desire hereafter a closer union with us, it may abandon some portion of its liberties, as Scotland did, and Ireland. But the resignation must be its own act; and is it likely that any colony will volunteer it? The answer of history to such a question is singularly distinct. Despotic nations can hold colonies for an indefinite time under an imperial system, if they do not produce a revolt by misgovernment. Free nations can sometimes hold colonies subject to them if they keep the colonies under authority. There is no instance to be found of any colony with free institutions of its own which ever remained for any time in connection with the parent state. Carthage, a free city, founded colonies in Spain and Sicily; she kept them in her own hands, and held them, till she was overthrown by the Romans. Athens, Sparta, Corinth, Thebes, sent offshoots into Asia Minor, into the islands in the *Ægean* or the *Adriatic*, and on the coasts of Italy. These colonies took their freedom with them, and clung to it tenaciously. Conquerors overran them. They were subject successively to Persians, Athenians, Spartans, Macedonians, and

Romans, but they never willingly parted with the smallest of their liberties for the sake of remaining attached to the mother country.

The Roman colonies were military settlements—detachments of legionaries quartered on conquered territory as an addition to its garrison. Had the Romans granted free institutions in such places, they would have lost them as surely and immediately as we should lose Oudh or the Punjaub if we were to set up Parliament there with a native franchise. In later times, the successful colonizing nations besides ourselves have been the Dutch, the Spaniards, and the Portuguese. The Dutch have, on the whole, done well. Their colonies are loyal and prosperous. The Dutch Government, by some extraordinary means, even draws a revenue from them, and there are no quarrels and no complaints. But the Dutch, though they made a splendid fight for their own freedom, do not extend its blessings to their colonial subjects; they govern them as we govern India, and they govern well. Spanish and Portuguese colonization has a grander history. The people of the Iberian Peninsula have planted their language and their religion over the vast continent of South America, in Central America, and in Mexico. The influence which the Spaniards especially have exerted over the fortunes of mankind has been enormous, for they peopled the whole of those countries, and held them till they were themselves overrun by Napoleon. But they had no free institutions of their own, and they granted none. The moral is obvious. A people unaccustomed to liberty will not ask for it as long as they are well governed, and will be content without it. The first steps being once conceded, the instinct of freedom aspires to complete independence. Thus my friend Mr. Brand, the President of the Orange Free State in South Africa, insisted to me that the whole Cape country must soon be freed of the English dominion. Experience showed, he said, that the separation of free colonies from the mother country could only be a question of time. I could not wholly acquiesce. Experience is a good guide, but it is not infallible. Times change, and we learn something by living. Ocean steamers and telegraphs may make things possible in the future which hitherto have not been possible. But I was obliged to admit to Mr. Brand that the obsta-

cles to a continued union were many and serious, and that unless, on our part and on the colony's, there was a determination to overcome them, they might easily prove insuperable.

I will mention generally what the chief obstacles are, and why a colony finds the connection with the mother country, even in its lightest form, oppressive and injurious.

In the first place, the original colonists have carried away feelings more or less resentful against the mother country. They have left it either on account of religious persecution or political persecution, or because they could find no work at home, or land to cultivate; because, in one way or another, they had found the old country a stepmother and not a mother.

Next, the parent state never regards her colonial children as the equals of those at home. She tolerates them, but she treats them as if they existed for her advantage and not for their own. She hampers their commerce, she misuses their revenues, she deports her convicts to them; and, when the grosser forms of oppression become unsafe, she quarters on them her own inefficient public servants. And free states often behave worse in these respects than despotic states. A republic built up the Roman empire, but it perished itself in building it. The provinces became the prey of party leaders and political adventurers. The administration of the republican proctors was too corrupt to be endured, and the alternative lay between an imperial constitution and the dissolution of the Roman dominion by its own vices. Our own experience in the last century was not very dissimilar. We drove America into revolt. We governed Ireland as a colony, and Ireland was the disgrace of British statesmanship. We have mended our ways; but in colonies where we retain power we can never mend our ways completely, so long as party government continues; for the party in office inevitably employs its patronage to attract adherents at home. A noble duke wants a place for a younger brother. He commands a vote or two in the House of Commons, and may not be refused; so the younger brother must be made a colonial governor. Some serviceable lawyer must be provided for. Give him a colonial judgeship. Nay, I have heard of a governor being appointed for a still stranger reason—because he was the greatest bore in Parliament, and both sides were eager to be rid

of him. Ministers are but mortal, and as long as they have the power of making appointments, they make them more or less on these principles.

✓ America is wise in declining to annex territories which she does not mean to admit into the Union. Except for this principle of hers, Mexico and Cuba and St. Domingo would have been long ago subject provinces under the Stars and Stripes. But the Americans will not raise the motley population of these countries to a level with her own citizens, and she knows how fatal might be the consequences if she took charge of them on other terms. These mischiefs are removed when a colony obtains self-government and nominates its own officers, but other mischiefs remain. When a child grows into a man and earns his own living, his father ceases to interfere with him, and their relations thenceforward are of affectionate equality. The analogy is supposed to hold in the relations between a grown-up colony and the mother country. But there is this difference, that the son comes into complete independence; the colony is still in tutelage. In the eyes of foreign nations it has no existence, and is only known to them as part of the state to which it belongs. Thus it is liable for the consequences of a public policy in which it has had no voice. Its towns may be bombarded, its shores invaded, its commerce paralyzed, in a quarrel for which it cares nothing and in which it has not a single interest at stake. Naturally enough, the colonies think this arrangement a hard one for them. The mother country is bound to protect them, but they are far scattered, and the English fleet cannot be omnipresent. At the moment of need the protection may not be forthcoming. Already at more than one great colonial seaport there has been mention of neutrality in such cases: but neutrality is impossible, a suspended connection is worse, and a connection which carries so serious liabilities with it, and with few corresponding advantages, cannot be of very long continuance.

Further, the self-governed colonies are not wholly free even internally. They make their own laws; but the crown has a veto, which is exercised through the colonial minister of the day. They cannot alter their constitution without the help of the Imperial Parliament. They cannot extend their boundaries

without the crown's permission, and consent is sometimes refused. Worst of all, there is the question of the management of the colored races, on which English opinion insists on making itself felt.

Again, we have ships of war all over the world to protect our commerce and our other properties. Ships of war require naval stations, and naval stations require fortifications. The natural position of such stations is in the English colonies, and in the largest and best provided of them. But who is to pay for the fortifications? Who is to garrison them? Under what jurisdiction are they to be? The Imperial Government receives no contribution from the colonies for the maintenance of the fleet. It does not know how long the colonies will remain under the British flag, and does not see why it should spend money on defensive works which may soon belong to others. The colonists say that the Imperial Government is bound to defend them anyhow, and that it is not for them to provide the means; while, as to allowing us to occupy fortified positions of our own with our own troops, and out of the control of the colonial ministry, an eloquent Cape patriot once told me we might as well expect to have garrisons in the planet Venus. The result is that the work is not done: Melbourne and Sydney are unprotected. In the whole Pacific we have no naval station where ships can refit, which can resist a single iron-clad. Simon's Bay, at the Cape of Good Hope, is perhaps the most important naval position in the whole globe. The power which holds Simon's Bay commands the African coast, east and west, for three thousand miles, and has at its mercy three quarters of the sailing commerce between the East and Europe. When I was in Simon's Bay there was one battery there of five old rusty six-pounders, which it was scarcely safe to fire, even for salutes. At Cape Town itself, the fortifications are so obsolete that the commander-in-chief told me that if an enemy's squadron came into the bay it would be his duty to withdraw. Both Simon's Bay and Cape Town are under the colonial authorities. The home government tells them that they must not expect the British taxpayer to find money for their defences. The colonists have a large revenue, raised mainly through import duties on British goods; but they will not contribute a sixpence, be-

cause they say that it is only their connection with us which can expose them to attack. Unfortunately, it is not their connection with the British Empire which creates their danger, but the tempting character of the position which they occupy. If we were out of the way, the first disturbance of the general peace would be a signal for one or other of the great powers to possess themselves of so rare a prize. A pretext would not long be wanting. The Cape is not a British settlement, but a conquered country. The Dutch, who form the majority of its inhabitants, have not ceased to regret their independence and to resent their subjugation. The English and the Dutch provinces would immediately separate, and in the general anarchy would fall an easy prey.

I am not speaking of these problems as insoluble. They can be resolved easily if we set our minds to them; but the setting our minds to the work is the real difficulty. The colonies are still "poor relations," and poor relations who have not been as forward as they should be in sacrificing themselves to the head of the house. So long as we could make use of them to provide for younger brothers or party politicians or convicts or other inconvenient and troublesome persons, some attention was paid to them. When they refused to accept these contributions to their welfare we ceased to think about them. Even Mr. Gladstone could speak not long ago of the colonial office as having *once* been among our most important public departments. The word "*once*" was most significant. He and Liberal statesmen generally assumed that the colonies would soon leave us, and that in the intervening stage they were an embarrassment more than an advantage. Colonists when they came to England found themselves considered as aliens. Colonial deputations met cold words and scanty courtesies in Downing Street, and the colonial minister, who has a seat in the cabinet, is appointed for any reason rather than for his acquaintance with the duties which he has to discharge.

What has happened within these last few weeks? We had at last in Lord Carnarvon a colonial minister who had studied the subject with real anxiety, who was alive to the enormous importance of our colonial empire, and had given his whole mind to the preservation of it. During the four years in which

Lord Carnarvon held office, he had won the confidence of every British dependency. Deputations from more than one great colony have told him that he had recovered the affections of millions of British subjects which had been almost totally estranged. I have heard the valleys in the Cape mountains ringing with cheers for Lord Carnarvon, from rugged Dutchmen who, I will answer for it, never cheered an English minister before. If ever the more intimate union between Great Britain and the colonies, which so many of us desire, becomes a fact, Lord Carnarvon will have done more to bring it about than all other secretaries who ever ruled in the Colonial Office; yet in the midst of his success Lord Carnarvon's career is broken off. The victorious general is recalled because he disagreed with the prime minister as to the internal arrangements of Europe. I blame no one. If the responsibility for the loss to the country of the services of such a man lay with individuals, there would be an easy remedy. But the cause lies in the estimate of the comparative value of our different interests. Whether Russians or Roumanians shall own a strip of territory at the mouth of the Danube, or some other arrangement of equally mighty moment to us, is of more consequence than the attachment of ten millions of our own fellow-subjects. The colonists are made to feel that they are nothing to us, when weighed against the imagined exigencies of European politics.

Further: The uncertain attitude which English ministries assume toward the colonies is infinitely trying and irritating. The people at home have no views of their own, and leave their rulers to do as they please. Cabinets go in and out on party questions of a totally different kind; and a colonial minister is left to follow his own fancies. He is appointed perhaps, knowing as much about the colonies as Lord Palmerston knew, and having to look in the map to see where they are; but he has his theories, and he wishes to distinguish himself. He thinks the colonies an encumbrance, or he wishes to preserve them. He wishes to extend the empire or to limit it, to diminish the responsibility of the crown or to strengthen the crown's authority. He recalls troops, or he sends them out. He takes the native races under his protection, or he leaves them to their fate. He annexes territory, or he abandons what has been annexed

already. In a few years he goes out of office. The opposition comes in. His successor reverses all that he has done, and the colonists are kept in a perpetual fever. They know not what to expect, and it is no wonder that many of them have thought it would be better to be rid, once for all, of our caprice and instability.

Again, if the great colonies continue attached to us on the existing terms, an evil will show itself by and by, when they grow larger, of a precisely opposite kind. In times of excitement, when great principles are at stake, the colonies will be affected as we are. Parties will form on the same lines in combination with parties at home, but they will not go in and out of office together. The Liberals may be in power in the colonies, and the Conservatives at home; as happened in Ireland and England at the end of the last century. The constitution in Ireland resembled closely the present constitution of the Canadian Dominion, and Mr. Grattan and his radical majority in Dublin lent their help to their English friends to embarrass the government of Mr. Pitt. George III. went out of his mind, and it became necessary to appoint a regent. The Prince of Wales, if not the worst man living, was not far from it; and Mr. Pitt very properly considered that if the prince was to take his father's place, some restrictions must be laid upon him. The Irish Parliament saw no occasion for restrictions, and acted for themselves. They nominated the Prince of Wales Regent of Ireland, without waiting to see what the English Parliament would do; and the two countries might have found themselves under different sovereigns if the king had not recovered in time. Great questions will again be battled over, in which the colonies will be as much interested as ourselves; and it is easy to foresee what embarrassments will follow if the Cabinet of England finds itself in collision with the cabinets of half a dozen powerful communities calling themselves British subjects, in close correspondence with the minority at home. Such a danger may seem far off, but it may be upon us before this waning century is ended, and the inevitable consequence will be the immediate dissolution of the empire.

Again, if the colonies are at no distant time to become independent nations, there is another reason why the probation

period should not be prolonged. Where countries are politically united on equal terms, the blood circulates freely through the system. There is no inferiority of Scot to Englishman, or Englishman to Scot ; the same spirit of nationality penetrates the whole body. Where no such union exists, where there is acknowledged superiority on one side, and dependence on the other, the ambition, the intellect, the wrath of the inferior country, will necessarily gravitate to the more important. Absenteeism ruined Ireland. In the last century almost every Irishman of distinction preferred England to his natural home. Irish peers, Irish gentry, Irish lawyers, artists, poets, even Irish politicians of the highest type, like Edmund Burke, were tempted away by the grander rewards which London life had to offer them ; and no people can hope to thrive when deserted by their best men. The same thing is already happening, and will happen more and more, with Australia and the Cape ; men go there to make money and return when it is made, bringing their spoils with them. If these countries were independent, like America, a national pride would keep their eminent citizens in their own land ; but so long as they are attached on the present lines to Great Britain, it seems to me certain that colonists of great intellectual powers, or who have made fortunes and wish for cultivated society, will be under an irresistible temptation to transfer themselves from the circumference of the empire to its centre. Is it likely that a painter will linger at Sydney, when he may be winning glory at the Royal Academy ? Will a brilliant young lawyer be content to shine in the courts at Ottawa or Melbourne, when he thinks he sees his way to the woolsack ? In England great wealth commands, not luxuries only, but social station, a seat in Parliament, and the adulation of mankind. Will a colonial millionaire stay in a land of liberty and equality, where riches will bring him none of these pleasant things, and where his antecedents are perhaps remembered, and forego the attractions of Grosvenor Square and an English park ? If the colonies are really the germs of nations that are to be, this of absenteeism is the most vital of all questions to them. The life-blood is ebbing away from them if they lose all their superior people.

Lastly, and perhaps this is the most important matter of

all, in a colony, however free be its government, no real training for independence is possible. Colonies have no foreign policy. They cannot quarrel with their neighbors, and can have no war. They are like boys at school who are not allowed to fight, and in these ominous times no country can keep its liberties long which is unable or unprepared to defend itself. And again, internally, the colonists are held within the four corners of the constitution. Under the British flag there can be no such thing as a revolution; the majority of numbers must always rule. Both of these disabilities may seem to some people unmixed advantages. Happy the countries which are in no danger of foreign complications of their own creating. Happy the countries which are safe from the ambition of adventurers, and are compelled to walk along the peaceful path traced out for them at the polling-booths. Not for them the bloody factions of the small Grecian states; not for them the fierce and barren revolutions of the Spanish-American settlements. What sadder tragedy was ever heard of than the late destruction of Paraguay? An entire infatuated people setting their hearts on a sinister and sanguinary tyrant, and dying to a man in his cause! Surely the British colonies may congratulate themselves on being free from such terrible possibilities. Surely the moment should be indefinitely postponed when they may have at last to be exposed to them.

And yet the child learns to walk by falling down. All that we learn that is worth learning, we learn by our own efforts and by our own mistakes. We value nothing which is freely given to us. Hardihood and perseverance, the stubborn virtue which prefers death to failure, the qualities which have made illustrious the consecrated names of history—these are the only foundation on which national life can be built up, and they are learnt only in the severe school of experience. A people who are to hold an important place in the world must be hardened in the fire, and the fire cannot approach where the British flag is flying. We all hate war, but the self-respect which belongs to independence will be found only where there is a consciousness of power to defend it. I know no sight more pitiable than of a political rabble clamoring for the rights of freemen who would run from a dozen policemen. An individual who has never

had to struggle, never grows to be a man. A nation which is forced forward in a political conservatory may shoot rapidly into imposing luxuriance of flowers and fruit, but it will not stand the frost or the storm. The oak does not grow under glass, nor nations which have the oak's fibre.

So, again, we all hate violent revolutions. The will of the majority peacefully expressed answers all purposes in quiet times. Separate interests neutralize each other, and, on the whole, what the majority decides is probably the best under the circumstances. But it is far otherwise at those critical periods which decide the character of nations ; when interests push in one direction, and truth and honor in another. Then, "voting" is at fault. Then, those are right who prefer justice at any cost, to a sound skin and a full pocket ; and such persons are very rarely indeed in a majority. Few, very few, of the great beneficent changes which have taken effect in this world had a majority for them before they were accomplished. If the Greeks had been polled at the Persian invasion, a majority would have decidedly voted that it was useless to oppose Xerxes. Xerxes, with his myriads of men, would infallibly eat them up. A majority in the Low Countries in the sixteenth century would have submitted to Philip II. In England, and even in Scotland, a count of heads would have gone for the maintenance of the mass and the pope's authority, at least as late as the Armada time. A majority in England would have restored Charles I. at the Treaty of Newport. All the fruit of the civil war would have been lost, and there would have been no Commonwealth and no English freedom. The serfs in Russia might have waited for emancipation for centuries, had they waited to be liberated by vote. The emperor decided that they should be free ; and free they are, and will remain. Before the civil war in the United States, a majority would have voted against the abolition of slavery. It was only in the five New England States that there was any unanimity of hatred for it. Mr. Lincoln was elected President merely through a division in the opposing party ; and Mr. Lincoln was not in favor of the abolition of slavery, but only against the extension of it. My distinguished friend, the late Mr. Motley, told me that if a pro-slavery President had been elected in Mr.

Lincoln's place, the New England States, and not the South, would then have seceded; the New England Republicans would have resisted the tyranny of the majority as fiercely as the South resisted, and with a nobler cause.

The position is simply this: a hundred men hold an opinion strongly enough to vote for it. Twenty men hold the opposite opinion, and will not only vote, but fight for it. I know not which of the two parties ought to prevail, but I know which will prevail where the trial is allowed; and for my part, I think the faith which makes the bravest man is the most likely to be right. At any rate, there have been times in the history of all considerable nations, where minorities have successfully resisted majorities at the peril of their lives, and it has always been at moments when the future fate of the country is to be decided for good or evil.

In the British self-governed colonies no such remedy is possible; it may be thought that the conditions which call for it are not likely to occur. I do not say that they are; but the thing which has been may be again. I can conceive a wealthy colonial community, where the chief object of life has been to make money; where a colonial ministry, with all the patronage in its hands, and an abundant revenue to dispose of, could so influence the constituencies, and could so paralyze Parliamentary opposition, as to become practically despotic. I have heard colonists express their fears that such a thing might be; and I have heard them say that a local administration of such a kind, secured by corruption against defeat in the local legislature and secured against revolution by British authority, would be a greater curse to a colony than the most careless secretary of state who ever misgoverned it from his office in Downing Street.

Such, then, are the difficulties in the way of maintaining a union between Great Britain and her magnificent dependencies. If we keep them under the crown, we mismanage them; if we give them self-government, they tend to drift away from us; and the intermediate state is so inconvenient, and produces so many serious evils, that for the sake of the colonies themselves we ought not to desire it to be continued. We may go on as we are for some time longer, but the existing arrangement is

only temporary. In some form or other they must be drawn closer to us, or the connection will come to an end. And I think that, if we persevere much further with the "poor relation" principle, the second alternative is the more likely of the two. The question is what we desire and what they desire, and how earnest that desire is. If we have merely a vague wish and do not care to exert ourselves, events will take their natural course. If we are serious, if we are really convinced on both sides that the union of the empire is worth struggling for, then this nation would not be what it is, and where it is, if we had not encountered more arduous problems and grappled with them successfully. No great thing was ever accomplished without effort. The union of the British Empire is not a matter which can be completed by legislative arrangements. No such arrangement is at present possible. Forethought, deliberation, a steady purpose that a way shall be found, and patience to wait till the right way is found—this will do it, and this only. Political experimenting will end in certain failure. Of course there are obstacles; of course there must be sacrifices; something must be risked if much is to be gained. The small Italian states lost something when they parted with their independence to form an Italian kingdom. Hanover and Würtemberg, Saxony and Bavaria, the great Prussia itself, gave up powers and privileges which they would gladly have retained, to make possible the German Empire. Yet there is not an Italian and there is not a German who does not feel himself five times the man that he was since those great confederacies have become realized facts. The American Union was not made without a sacrifice of State's rights, and it has not been preserved without a further limitation of them. At the Secession of 1861 the question was put to the American people, Shall this great republic stand united, an honor to mankind, a beacon tower of hope to those who look and long for the peaceful progress of mankind; or shall it be broken into fragments, where the sad drama of the Old World will be played over again with new nations and new national rivalries and wars and revolutions? America so divided would still have produced its great and interesting men and remarkable and hardy communities; there would have been the struggle for existence, in which the fittest would have survived, and the

story would have provided fresh materials for political philosophers and historians. But alas ! the history of the past, so far as I know it, is but a groundwork woven out of the dull, patient suffering of the mass of mankind for generation after generation, on which are embroidered a few illustrious names, a few glorious actions, but which for the most part contains but a series of pictures representing the same subject in a thousand forms—the knave preying on the fool, and the strong on the weak. America chose the better part ; one might have despaired of progress altogether had she chosen otherwise. She determined to remain one, and she is one, though it cost her half a million of her bravest citizens and a thousand millions of money.

Even so common a union as a domestic marriage brings with it sacrifices. A young man and a young woman feel drawn to one another. They feel that their happiness in life depends on their casting in their lot together, and becoming one instead of two ; yet they will make a bad business of it unless they understand that they must each surrender a good deal—surrender especially their own wills. They cannot any longer go their separate ways and follow their separate pursuits and pleasures. They must bear with each other, and if they fall out, they must fall in, as the way of such adventures is. But in marriage they begin to be serviceable members of society ; useful to others as well as to themselves. They are entering a school where the purest features of human character are developed and invigorated. They gain the world and they gain their own souls besides.

Well, then, is it the interest of the two parties in this British colonial marriage that I am speaking of, to come together ? I have spoken of the objections ; let me now speak of the advantages. First, is it the interest of Great Britain ? These are not the days of small states. Every day we see small states combining into large. The great powers grow greater ; the lesser powers confederate for protection. All but ourselves have room within their own boundaries to increase their numbers. These small islands of ours are already as full as it is convenient that they should be. Ireland thirty years ago held nine millions of people. But the potato crisis came, and more than a third of them have been driven to find a home elsewhere.

We cannot by taking thought ever so earnestly add an acre to our area. The expanding powers of our race are not diminished. But we require room in which to grow, and we have territory in the colonies as large again as Europe if we choose to use it. When I hear men talking of annexing Egypt, annexing Asia Minor, annexing this or that, I think of the schoolboys who were invited to a breakfast in a garden, where the table was ready spread with the choicest fruits which it produced, and they would touch none of them: they preferred to climb the trees to gather sour apples for themselves. Great Britain is strong now; but if her flag floats over no land beyond her own shores, she must stand still while her rivals increase. Absolutely she may not decline, but relatively she must. The Americans count that by the end of the century they will be a nation of eighty millions. Why are we to lag behind the Americans? You who have families to provide for, what will you do with your sons? When I see the swarms of children running about our streets, I ask myself whether these precious bits of English life are to be lost to the English commonwealth. I travel through the boundless plains of South Africa, where a perfect soil, with a perfect climate, is crying out to be cultivated. What enchantment prevents the soil and the cultivators from being brought together, where the food will multiply faster than the mouths can multiply to eat it, and the owners of such mouths can become fresh millions of British citizens? . . . I will illustrate to you what that soil can do. Natal is for the most part a desert, bare as a Scotch moor. Eight years ago a gentleman in Maritzburg desired to show the colonists what a mine of wealth they were neglecting. On a slope three miles from the town he enclosed forty-five acres of wilderness, on which nothing was then growing but coarse grass. He broke up the ground, he sowed a quantity of various seeds, and that was nearly all that he did. Six years after, he took me to see the place. Round the edge of the enclosure was a thick belt of trees—pines, gum-trees, and acacias—already forty or fifty feet high, forming a perfect shelter. Passing through, we came into seven acres of coffee plants in full bearing. Beyond the coffee plantation were groves of orange-trees, lemons, citrons, pomegranates, apples, pears, peaches, apricots, figs—all loaded with

fruit. In the open spaces between them were strawberry-beds, beds of pineapples, melon-beds, beds of vegetables of all kinds, in profuse luxuriance. Ornament had not been forgotten. Rhododendrons, azaleas, roses, magnolias, camellias, seemed struggling with each other which could most perfectly develop its choicest beauties. It was a very garden of Alcinous. It was the work of but half a dozen years, and the cost of producing it had been next to nothing. On the resources of such a soil, and on the number of English people who might thrive there as they never throve at home, it is needless to comment.

Turn to the other side—to the effect in England on English trade. The whole world, we are told, is the English market. But is it a sure market? It is held subject to perpetual challenge, and foreign competition comes up fast behind us. The Americans are rapidly supplying themselves—nay, they are supplying us here in our own stronghold. American calicoes have been seen in Manchester itself. The Americans are not easily beaten on what they set their minds to do. But if we look to the colonies we find that trade follows the flag. The colonies, in proportion to their population, buy more than twice as much of us as strangers buy, because the colonial merchants are Englishmen who have emigrated thither, and are in close connection with the great firms at home. In another fifty years there will probably be four times as many people in the colonies as there are to-day; the whole vast number of them producing corn and wine and wool and silk and gold and diamonds, and crying out for all that we can supply them with from our workshops and factories. Let them remain under our flag, and be it interest or be it sentiment which prompts them, to us they will come to buy and sell. England has no customers so constant as her own people. I cannot listen patiently when I am told that it matters nothing to us whether they leave us or stay with us. To me it seems that on whether they remain with us or not, the whole alternative depends whether we are to continue the greatest people in the world, or to decline into a second Holland.

So much for our own interest. Now for the interest of the colonies. I have said that they will lose in becoming more closely attached to us. They will lose the inviting prospect of

future independence; they will lose the pride of developing a separate national character—they will be Englishmen, and not Australians or Canadians. But they will have the same liberties which we have; neither more nor less. Once let it be determined that they are integral parts of the empire, and they will have no more to fear from the caprices of the Colonial Office. They will not be petty states, small in purpose, counting for nothing in the councils of the world—a prey, it may be, of factions, and with a problematic destiny. They will be incorporated in a great historic commonwealth, the freest that exists, with a splendid past behind it, and with powers stretching round the globe. They will lose less than Scotland lost; they will gain all that Scotland gained; and even the loss to Scotland at the union was more in imagination than reality. Scotch patriotism believed that it had sold its birthright; does Scotch patriotism complain now? Is Scotland sacrificed to England? Has the national spirit of Scotland grown tame? Scotland is all that she was, and more than all that she was; free as ever, in the essential meaning of freedom, and strong with twice her old strength, for she has the strength of England added to her own.

The union with Scotland was brought about because our hearts were set upon it. If our hearts had been set as warmly on our colonies we should not have lost America a hundred years ago—we should not now be talking of the disintegration of our present dominion. An American was once speaking to me of the possible annexation of Canada to the United States. I asked if Canada would like it. "Like it?" he said; "would I like Baring Brothers to take me into partnership?" And is not Canada, I thought, already in partnership with Great Britain? and is not one firm as good as the other? Unhappily, no. Canada is not in partnership with Great Britain; Australia is not in partnership; South Africa is not in partnership. We have never invited them into partnership. They are still "poor relations," whom our ruling classes tolerate at a distance, but have no desire to recognize as really belonging to them. No colonists are admitted to our ancient orders of honor. We have indeed created of late years a special order for them—the "St. Michael and St. George;" but the very specialty marks them

off from us as a distinct and inferior race of beings. A colonist of course might not aspire to the Sublime Garter; but not one of them has even the "Bath;" not one of them has even a seat in the Privy Council. You never heard of a Victorian earl or a Canadian marquis. The agents of our self-governed colonies are at least as important personages as a Chinese or a Brazilian ambassador. A colonial premier is a man of consequence in his own country; but agents and premiers are nothing in the London world. The Foreign Office lights its lustres for a Shah of Persia, a Khedive of Egypt, or a Sultan of Zanzibar. No such honors are offered to Sir John Macdonald or Sir Julius Vogel. They are not named in court circulars; they pass unnoticed in the levees; they are not reported among the distinguished guests at ministerial dinner-parties. Is it answered that we regard them as belonging to ourselves, and that we treat them as if they were at home? I reply that you do neither the one thing nor the other. You do not admit them to your honors as Englishmen; you do not pay them respect as if they were strangers.

The Americans have no "poor relations." A new settlement is formed into a territory. When it has become of sufficient consequence, it enters the Union as a State. Had we begun thus, there would have been no difficulty. The crown colony when it attained its majority would have been enfranchised and represented in Parliament. It is too late now. Neither the colonists nor we are prepared at present for any such proposal. Distance is not the difficulty. Members of the Cape Legislature come to England habitually in the recess upon their own business, and return to Cape Town for the session. But the self-governed colonies have a larger control over their own affairs than would be compatible with a political union with the mother country; and they are not likely to part with it till they know better what they are to expect from us. Nor could we on our side have colonial members voting taxes in our Parliament while we have no voice in theirs. It has been suggested that colonial members might sit and speak and have no vote—or they might vote only on questions of imperial policy. Distinctions of this kind are fantastic. Public policy carries taxation behind it. If colonial members come at all, they must

come with the full privileges of representatives. To limit those privileges would be to place on them a public stamp of inferiority, and would aggravate every existing soreness.

Another notion finds favor in some circles, that the constitution might be altered. An Imperial Council might be formed out of representatives from all parts of the empire, and to this council might be entrusted all questions of peace and war, of external commerce, or of the management of the army and navy; the present Parliament being left with functions like those of an American State legislature. Of course out of such a council the ministers would be chosen. The majority there and not elsewhere would determine who were to be in office and who in opposition. I do not envy the members who should propose such a change to the House of Commons. To expect that the British Parliament, with its traditions of six centuries, with a historical grandeur unapproached by any legislative body that ever existed, except perhaps the Roman Senate, would perform the happy dispatch, and reduce itself into the condition of a parish vestry or a county board, demands a power of belief to which I am myself unequal. The House of Commons is now sovereign in this country. Sovereign bodies may be upset by revolution; but they never abdicate, that I know of, as long as they have health and strength to hold on.

It is waste of time to discuss the architecture of such castles in Spain. No political union with the mother country is to be looked for now. Perhaps it can never be. It depends, in my opinion, on whether the mother country can change its front and come to regard the colonies as the foremost of all its interests. Let the colonists see that we are in earnest; that we wish to share with them in all that we have and are; that we will pour our spare population and capital into them, as if their territories were so much new soil added to our own islands; that their able men shall have free access to all avenues of honor and power among us: then it may be that the iron will heat up to the welding point. Till that time comes, I shall make no suggestions as to how the union is to be. I do not believe that there is any "*how*" just now which it would not be worse than useless to try. Much may be done meanwhile. Confidence may be recovered, and good feeling cultivated; we may eman-

cipate our policy from European traditions ; we may do many things, which I will point out presently in detail. But I must draw first an important distinction, which is often overlooked.

When we speak of colonies, we must remember that we have colonies of two kinds. There are those which are self-governed, as the Australian colonies, New Zealand, the Canadian Dominion, and the Cape Colony. Besides, there are a large group where the executive is still with the crown, as the West India Islands, Ceylon, Natal, the Transvaal, the Mauritius, and several more.

The old intention of the Colonial Office was gradually to emancipate them all, to keep them in leading-strings only till they could go alone, and to give them all constitutions as soon as they should be competent to manage their own affairs. Two distinct tendencies have since revealed themselves. In colonies where there is a preponderating European population, constitutional liberty has taken firm hold and works successfully. The result has been different in colonies where the colonial population preponderates. Constitutions tried under such circumstances have been found unworkable : we have had troubles in Jamaica, troubles in Barbadoes, troubles in Natal ; and in more than one instance the crown has been forced to resume its authority. The reason is obvious. If we give the blacks the franchise on the same terms with the whites, where they have the numerical majority they are the white man's masters ; and this position is not found to be tolerable. If we refuse them the franchise, we pass them over to the tender mercies of an oligarchy of planters ; and a constitutional government so conducted may be a tyranny of the most abominable kind.

No one colonial policy is applicable to communities so entirely different from one another ; and with regard to the West Indian and African colonies there is a further circumstance which complicates the question yet more gravely. The Red Indians, the Aborigines of Australia and New Zealand, disappear before the white settler. Their history has been a sad and even a shameful one ; but these races are essentially wild. They cannot accommodate themselves to civilized ways, and as we may not preserve them to hunt as we do foxes, they die as the wild animals die. Gentle treatment makes no difference. The savage pines in his cage like the eagle. The imprisoned

eagle will not mate and rear his eaglets in captivity ; he waits, gloomy and solitary, for his own deliverance in death. So it is with the savage tribes ; they recede before the white man into the wilderness, and perish as if stricken with blight. Utterly unlike them is the African negro. The negro takes to domestication as kindly as the duck to water. He is called idle : we should all be idle if we were not obliged to work ; we have idle classes at home who are rather proud of that privilege. The negro no more objects to work than the European man ; that is to say, he will work when he must. He is faithful when well treated ; he is an excellent servant. When I was travelling in South Africa I had a black man and a white man with me, and the black was worth a dozen of the white. For all I know, the black race may be as good as the others when it has gone through the same training. Hitherto the negro has had no chance ; he has been a slave from the beginning of history ; as he is now in Cuba, so you see him painted on the walls of the Egyptian tombs ; he is ignorant, childish, given to drink ; he is free now, but he cannot stand alone in competition with his white superiors ; we have yet to find out how to deal with him. He does not pine, like the Sioux or the Delaware, for the wild freedom of the forest, and die if it is taken away from him. He is happy enough when he has enough to eat, and he multiplies his little black olive-branches at a rate which might make Malthus turn in his grave. What is to become of him ? He can be trusted with a vote in America, because he forms but a small fraction of the community ; but in Jamaica, where he is ten to one compared to the whites, how is it to be ? Or in Natal, where he is twenty to one ? I have the warmest respect both for his heart and for his understanding ; but I cannot wish to see him trusted with the government, nor can I wish to see him handed over to those who, if they can, will coin his sinews into gold.

Colonies like these are in the condition of India ; we cannot govern India with a constitution, and we cannot govern Jamaica with a constitution. The negroes are a legacy left to us by the sins of our fathers, and if we simply wash our hands of them, and tell them that they are free now and must be their own keepers, we may pretend, on platforms and in leading articles,

that we are the most righteous people upon earth ; that we have struck the fetters from the wrist of the slave, and all the rest of it, but the latter end of the poor creatures may be worse than the beginning. Our fathers at least cared for them as well as they cared for their horses. I will tell one story from my own experience, to show how it fares with them in the days of liberty. During my South African travels my black driver was taken ill ; he required a strong dose of calomel, and I gave it him. We came in the evening to a hotel, and I asked the mistress to let the man have a bed, as he was unwell. I asked it as a favor, because I knew that the colored servants were left generally to sleep in sheds and outhouses. I met a flat refusal. They kept no beds for black fellows, the woman said—no black fellows were allowed to sleep under the same roof with the whites. The weather was cold and wild. I said that the man might die if he was all night in the air, with the medicine which he had taken. "Let him die, then," was the answer. "He shall have no bed here." Finding that I could not move the mistress, I repaired to the kitchen, and found the cook there, a *Burmese*, to whom I told my situation, and asked him if he could help me. "Well, sir," he said, "it is a hard case ; I am a married man, but if my missus does not object, he may turn in with us." I confess I thought that my friend the *Burmese* was a better Christian and a better citizen than his masters. Colonies where such a spirit is abroad are not fit for constitutional government. They are not growing into independent nations ; they have not the making in them of independent nations. They must remain under authority till they have learnt the duties of humanity.

.This subject should bring me to speak more particularly of South Africa, the part of our colonial empire of which I personally know more than any other. There is much to be said about it. But South African politics just now are full of intricacies and complications. To enter fully upon the questions at issue would require more space than the limits of this article will afford, and any partial opinion which I might express would be misleading and mischievous. The general situation is plain enough. The Europeans in South Africa have around them and in the midst of them a vast multitude of negroes, growing fast by natural increase, and reinforced continually from the interior of the

African continent, tribe after tribe pouring in to take shelter under the British flag from the oppression of their own great chiefs. The Europeans, on the other hand, are pressing northwards, with no fixed frontier. Ivory and gold and diamonds, and boundless pasture-fields, and mighty rivers, ready-made highways of future commerce, beckon forward the English and Dutch settlers; and where they go the government must follow them. Already the Zambezi is talked of as the probable boundary. But the Zambezi once reached will be overleapt by British enterprise. Beyond the Zambezi lies the Congo, a river as vast as the Nile, which has just been explored by Cameron and Stanley. Other discoverers are already prospecting on the great lakes where the Nile itself rises; and more than one thoughtful person believes that by the end of the century we shall have charge of the African continent at least as far as the equator. How is this enormous country to be governed? The Cape Colony from Table Mountain to the Orange River has its own parliament. The native pressure falls least heavily on the Cape Colony, as it is sheltered from the interior by the frontier states, and there it has been possible to give the natives the franchise. Yet even within this colony at this moment a desperate native war is raging. The colonists cannot defend themselves, and British regiments are now fighting for them; while the British governor has been obliged to dismiss his colonial ministry, and in addition to the native war there is a political crisis. Such a beginning promises ill for the indefinite extension of an African empire. The difficulty of granting self-government to such a country increases with each new annexation, when the number of the natives increases and the number of the whites diminishes. Were the African settlements under such an administration as we have in India, we could control blacks and whites alike, and we could prohibit the encroachments which bring about these conflicts of races. As things are, we have no authority in the colony itself, where the power lies and the wealth. Beyond the colonial border we have an indefinite responsibility, and no power at all but what we furnish from home. Under these conditions I am not dazzled with the prospect of our promised dominion. Eager as I am that the colonies which we have should be attached more

firmly to us, I believe that we may have too much of them in their present loose coherence. To the British Government, South Africa is now only valuable for the harbor and naval station at Table Mountain. It may be a question whether we might not with advantage give the South Africans the alternative of returning under the authority of the crown; with the understanding that if they refuse, we shall retire ourselves within the lines of our own necessities, and release the rest of the country from its allegiance.

Leaving South Africa, I come now to the general question, What can be done towards drawing closer to us our self-governed colonies?

First, we can show that we regard the colonists as Englishmen and not as strangers, and that we wish to give them a voice, so far as their and our constitutions allow, in the administration of public affairs. We cannot now admit their representatives to the House of Commons. But there is a second house to which the objection does not apply. Why should we not have colonial peers? The colonies produce very eminent men—men of large fortune, distinguished politicians, the equals socially and intellectually of many of those whom we select at home for political canonization. Why should we not have the help of these persons in the House of Lords? Questions often rise in Parliament affecting colonial interests, and the jurisdictions of the Imperial and Colonial Parliaments come occasionally into collision. It would be very useful if we had Australians and Canadians present among us who could speak in the name of their own people, and warn us when we were touching on their interests. In matters, moreover, of imperial policy the colonies would not be so completely unrepresented as they are at present. There might be a reluctance (I think it would be a proper reluctance) in these young communities to introduce among themselves the hereditary dignities of the Old World. But there might be "life peers." I wish we had them of our own. A life seat in the Upper House would be a proper reward for a leading colonial lawyer or statesman; it would be appreciated by himself, and still more by his wife and daughters.

Again, there is the Privy Council. The Privy Council has many functions in which the colonists might have a share; and

it might have many more. The mere title of Right Honorable is something as a public recognition that a man has deserved well of his country. People like these feathers in their caps, and so do their friends for them.

Again, there are the various departments of the civil service. What could be more desirable than that we should have colonists as the immediate servants of the queen? It may be said that they can offer themselves now for the competitive examinations on the same terms as Englishmen or Scots or Irish. But the examinations follow the line of our home education. The education in the colonies is not identical with ours, and cannot be; and young men of equal or superior ability educated at colonial colleges would have no chance in a competition with opponents specially trained in England. They know this, and therefore do not come forward. Why should not a certain number of vacancies be allotted to each of the great colonies? Let examinations be held in Melbourne and Sydney and Ottawa and Cape Town. Plenty of ambitious youths will then be found to enter for the race. They would come from the most influential families, and each one of them that gained a position would be a tie between his relations and the mother country. Imagine a merchant in Sydney with a son in the Foreign Office; his neighbor across the street with another in the Board of Trade; a third with a favorite boy in the Indian Civil Service, hearing of him rising in favor, becoming collector, commissioner, lieutenant-governor, perhaps, in Scinde or the Punjaub. The colonists would have at once an immediate interest in the active life of the empire. In fifty years, when Australia has thirty million inhabitants, how would our grasp on India be tightened if the Australians felt that it belonged as much to them as to us!

The English professions cannot create special facilities for colonial competition. We have Irish lawyers and doctors, Scotch lawyers and doctors, even American lawyers, in distinguished practice among us; we would gladly see Australians and Canadians added to the list. Lord Lyndhurst was colonial born. They must make their own places, however, and if they succeed they will be warmly welcome. But there are the universities, which ought to be the centres of education for the elect of the British race from all parts of the world. Let

Oxford and Cambridge invite the colonies to unite with them in founding scholarships and fellowships bearing the colonial names. And let the colonial schools be allowed to nominate their best students to such scholarships, to take rank on the foundations, where they may qualify themselves for higher advancement. The distinctions which such students may acquire will reflect credit on the land they come from. They will form home friendships. We shall learn what the colonists are, and they will learn what we are ; and insensible links will form, more strong a thousandfold than the most ingenious political contrivances.

So, again, with the army and navy. There are young men in every country unsuited for the tamer walks of life, and made by nature to be soldiers and sailors. Might not a few commissions be granted to the colonies with advantage ? a few nominations to our naval training-ships ? Nay, we have Highland regiments, we have Irish regiments. Why not have Australian regiments and Canadian regiments ? Why not have Australian and Canadian frigates and line-of-battle ships, forming part of the general service, yet manned and officered by their own people ? Might not this be the true solution of the vexed questions of naval stations and colonial defences and divided commands, such as are now harassing South Africa ? The colonies will not have it, I am told. But did we ever invite them ? The Canadian Dominion has seventy thousand seamen and a militia of nearly half a million. I once asked an eminent statesman whether we might not look on so handsome a force as adding something to the strength of the empire. "The empire !" he said. "Why should Canadians fight for the empire ? Let them be strong for themselves." The Canadians, it seems, look differently on their relations with us. During these last few weeks Canadian battalions have volunteered for service with us should a war break out. Let us devoutly hope that a war will not break out, and that we shall not need their help. But they have shown that, so far as they are concerned, the interests of the empire are their interests, and they claim a place at our side in defence of it.

Lastly, what the colonies most need from us is a supply of British immigrants. Tens of thousands of our people annually

leave our shores for other lands. The British Government refuses to interest itself in their destination, and professes the most entire indifference whether they remain subjects of the crown or prefer to change their allegiance. The Americans know their value. Of all foreigners who land on their shores the English are the most welcome, and the Americans spare no pains to secure English. They attract not only four fifths of the numbers who go away from us, but they attract the pick and flower of them. The remainder which are left to the colonies are the second-best only: younger sons of good families who have gone wrong; ex-officers of the army and navy who have parted with their commissions; lawyers, doctors, and clergymen, who for one reason or another have been unsuccessful at home; agricultural laborers, poorly educated or not at all; and the vagabond class who collect at gold-fields and diamond-fields. We do not send out convicts any more; but the impression still remains in practice that the British colonies are places of exile and quasi-penal settlements. We could earn the gratitude of the colonists forever if we could place this matter on a better footing. To succeed well in a new country, a lad should go early and learn the ways of it before he becomes his own master. I go to one of our new national schools; I see long rows of bright little boys and girls gathered up out of the streets, and given a chance of growing into serviceable men and women. I ask myself, as I look at them, what is to be the future of these little creatures, whose intelligent faces promise so much. How many of them *may* be orphans? How many of them *must* be children of parents who ill know how to feed and clothe them! The school does much, but it does not teach any bread-winning trade. Tens of thousands of children will be annually turned adrift in this country, after three or four years of training, with no outlook but a dreary one. Why might not arrangements be made with well-conditioned colonial settlers, to take some of these boys and girls as apprentices, and bring them up under their own eye to colonial business? If it be understood that they may have the services of such children till they are twenty-one years old, they will themselves cheerfully pay the cost of bringing them out, and will feed, clothe, and care for them. At twenty-one they would receive

a certain sum in money for wages. They would have acquired the knowledge necessary for success, and they could start on their own account, with the certainty of a prosperous life before them. I have talked to colonists high and low on this subject, and I have heard but one opinion from them—that there is no boon which we could bestow on them for which they would be more heartily grateful.

I have thus mentioned a few things which might be done to attach the colonies to us without touching the existing constitutions, and I might mention several more; but I pass to the most important change of all, without which all else will avail nothing.

✓ Washington left as a legacy to his countrymen a warning never to entangle themselves in European complications. The Americans have remembered the lesson and have acted upon it. They do not fret themselves into agitation over the “balance of power.” “Furious Frank and fiery Hun” may fight till Doomsday, and America will not lift her hand to promote the quarrel or to end it; and thus America goes on upon her way, developing quietly her own enormous resources, not needing to load her back with the huge military establishments which burden the industries of every nation in the Old World. Her modest budget scarcely reaches to a third of the sum which the Chancellor of the Exchequer annually demands of England; and instead of piling up her national debt, she pays it off by a million a month. Inevitably and properly the English colonies will desire to imitate America’s example. To them, as to their great model, the politics of Europe are a game, in which they have only a spectator’s interest. And though they may be moved, as Canada has been, into momentary sympathy with the mother country at an exciting crisis, they will tend always into an attitude of neutrality. Therefore it is quite certain that
✓ if it be England’s intention to adhere to her old pretensions, if England persists that she will be the arbiter of Europe (although on the European continent she owns not an acre, save Gibraltar Rock, and never can acquire an acre), the colonists will wisely decline a nearer union with us. Even now the present light connecting thread lays them open to serious danger. Those who meddle in quarrels in which they have

but an artificial interest are likely in the end to make enemies of all who are vitally concerned. It is possible—I do not say it is probable—that if England adheres to these courses she may provoke again, as she has done before, a European combination against her as a general nuisance. She may find her supremacy even on her own ocean disputed by the united fleets of injured and resentful powers; ugly visitors may look in upon her undefended colonial harbors; ugly demands may be presented at sea towns like Melbourne, with threats of shell and rocket if they are refused. To these casualties the colonies are liable already. In a political union with us they would have to share the cost of the ambitious elevation which it pleases us to claim—a cost incalculably great, and incurred for objects which prudent men will not think to be worth the outlay. If the colonists are as wise as I believe them to be, they will resolutely refuse to take on themselves any such dangerous obligations. Glory we may gain in these contests; but glory as barren as it will be hardly won. No territory in Europe can we annex or occupy. No millions of indemnity can we extort at the cannon's mouth from the inland continental capitals. We may carry our flag with our old pride in the smoke and roar of naval battles. We may sink our enemies' ironclads, we may ruin their commerce, and we may spend in doing it our hundreds of millions which we shall leave posterity to pay. If the English people are so enamored of their European position that on these conditions they mean to cling to it, they are masters of their own destiny. But let them understand that in choosing this course they will part company with the rest of their kindred. The empire of the New World, the empire of peace and prosperity, they abandon forever. Now in this our own generation we stand at the parting of the ways. Choose whom you will serve—whether the old spirit which you call honor, and which another age may call madness and dishonor; or the spirit which in the fire and cloud led these millions of our brothers out of the Egypt of vain ambition, into the promised land of industry and self-respect—

Choose, and your choice shall be
Brief, and yet endless :

briefly made, and endless in its consequences.

To me, English statesmen seem like the man who had a hundred sheep, and left his ninety-nine to stray and forsake him if they pleased, and wandered off after the worst and most scabbed of his flock—after some phantom of prestige, some vapory image, like that which mocked Ixion. What are Europe and its dissensions to us, that we should heap tax on tax, add ship to ship and battalion to battalion, because a few million souls are to pass from one sovereign to another—because Germany is growing stronger than France, or Russia is gaining ground against the Turks?

- ✓ The balance of power! Why is the balance of power more to us than to America? If other nations are strong, let us make ourselves strong. But the pretence itself is but an excuse. No other country dreams of meddling with England.
- ✓ Our danger, when it comes, will be, as it has always been, from our own meddling first with others. Let the Great Powers go at it, exhaust their treasuries, take the laborers from the field and the horse from the plough, arm the one with rifle, and yoke the other to the cannon. Let them convert Europe into an arena, where the bears and base dogs shall tear each other for age after age, and where each generation shall follow in the bloody footprints of its predecessor. But let it be understood that we mean, for our part, to be henceforth spectators of these performances, and that we will act in them no more. The Channel marks us off from the Continental stage. The enterprise of our own people has built another for us—a stage where we need fear no rivals, and can play in contrast our own drama of peace. If we need allies, let us turn our faces, not eastward to Europe, but westward beyond the Atlantic.

I have said much of the Americans. They are the people of the future. In the Americans we may read the character and tendencies of the ages that are to be. They are sprung, like us, from the loins of our own fathers. They claim an equal share with us in the traditions of English history; and their great men trace their descent with as much pride from historical English families. Theirs, as well as ours, are the Plantagenet and Tudor princes. Theirs are Drake and Raleigh, Burghley and Cromwell. Theirs are Chaucer and Shakespeare and Bunyan. In our modern poets and men of science, in

Scott and Byron, in Burns and Tennyson, in Macaulay and Carlyle, in Tyndall, in Huxley, in Darwin, in John Mill, they will allow us no exclusive right of possession. Let any Englishman, whom the Americans have learnt to respect, go over among them and see if he is received as a stranger. Their voluntary and instinctive sympathies prove that between the American and the English people there are bonds uniting them closer than those which unite any nations on the globe, and only the action of what are called the governing classes among us prevents the political relations from becoming as intimate as the spiritual. An American alliance is worth all French, Austrian, German, Italian, Greek, Turk—all European alliances together. We two nations standing back to back, with our separate governments, but one in heart and one in policy, they with their enormous continent, we with a no less vast colonial union, may then spread into an innumerable company of English, Scotch, and Irish born freemen; and, secure in our own deserved prosperity, we may leave Europe to work out its own destiny. Can imagination picture a fairer prospect for us? There would be no risk of war then, for who would have a motive to quarrel with us? Who would dare to quarrel with us? There would be no danger of colonial disintegration, for what colony would dream of leaving so splendid an association? Little need should we then have to boast of the army corps that we can move, or of the number of campaigns that we can bear, or to start in alarm when fools talk of England's prestige being in danger. From the sure and serene heights of power and confidence we could smile at the envy which sneered at England's decadence.

Ninety years ago, when all generous hearts were beating with hope at the opening of the French Revolution, Jean Paul said:


"On the sunset gate of this century stands written, 'Here is the way to virtue and wisdom,' as at the western gate of Cherson stands the proud inscription, 'Here is the way to Byzantium.' Infinite Providence, thou wilt cause the day to dawn!" Three generations have gone by, and, for Europe, that day has not dawned. It is still "the twelfth hour of the night." The "birds of prey are still on the wing," and dock

and arsenal ring loud as ever with preparations for mutual slaughter. How is it with England? It may please our princes and aristocracies to challenge their parts in this dark and lurid prospect. Kings and emperors and dukes and field marshals are all that they know or care for in the human family. The rest of us fly after the vain glitter of these people as moths fly about a candle. We all feel honored in paying taxes, and killing and being killed, at these illustrious persons' bidding. I feel honor in nothing of the kind.

Let the "rest of us" look to ourselves. America saw its way long ago, and cast their lots with their own kindred. There lies the way to our Byzantium—not eastward, through the Sea of Marmora, where queen and cabinet are trying to drive us, but far off through the sunset gate which leads into the New World.

In a change of policy, in a disregard forever of a past which is out of date, in the hearty embracing of a new future, when all English-speaking races will have one interest, and English and Americans, Australians, Canadians, South Africans, shall rank side by side for the common good of mankind—there, and nowhere else, lies the true solution of the colonial problem. Give us that, and we need look no further. The British Empire will be held together by a magnetism which no local or selfish ambition can then decompose. All difficulties will vanish then. No province of such an empire will be denuded of its wealth, denuded of its genius, denuded of its self-dependence, where the life-blood of the heart will flow freely to the furthest extremities. I saw in Natal a colossal fig-tree. It had a central stem, but I knew not where the centre was, for the branches bent to the ground and struck root there; and at each point a fresh trunk shot up erect, and threw out new branches in turn, which again arched and planted themselves, till the single tree had become a forest, and overhead was spread a vast dome of leaves and fruit, which was supported on innumerable columns, like the roof of some vast cathedral. I saw an image, as I looked at it, of the future of England and her colonies, if the English people can read the signs of the times.

JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE.



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